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PREFACE

The text of this edition is that prepared by me for the *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis* with a few corrections and modifications. Such as it is, it is the only text based on the three archetypal MSS., the *Clarkianus* (B), the *Marcianus* (T), and the *Vindobonensis* (W). The readings of T are taken from a photograph in my possession, those of W from the collation of Professor Král of Prague.

In the Introduction and Notes I have chiefly endeavoured to elucidate the argument, and to show the importance of the *Phaedo* as an historical document. Grammatical points have only been dealt with when they seemed to have a direct bearing on these problems. The interpretation of an ancient document must always be based on grammar, but an edition of the *Phaedo* is not the place for a full discussion of general grammatical problems like the constructions of οὐ μὴ and μὴ οὐ.

I have given references throughout to the second edition of my *Early Greek Philosophy* (E. Gr. Ph. 2), where I have discussed more fully the historical background of the dialogue. I hope to have an early
opportunity of discussing certain textual problems in a more scientific way than is possible in an edition like the present.

The reader will see that I am under great obligations to the editions of Wyttenbach and Heindorf. Of more recent editions I owe most to that of the late Sir William Geddes.

J. B.
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INTRODUCTION

I

If only we may take the *Phaedo* for what it professes to be, it surely stands quite by itself in European literature. It does not, indeed, claim to be a word for word report of all Socrates said to the inner circle of his followers on the day he drank the poison in prison. By letting us know incidentally (59b 10) that he was not present, Plato seems to decline responsibility for the literal exactitude of every detail. But, for all that, it does on the face of it bear to be such an account of that memorable day as its author could conceive a favourite disciple giving not long afterwards to a group of deeply interested listeners. That means a great deal. Though he was not present when the Master died, it is certain that Plato continued in close association with others who were,¹ and they must often have talked about Socrates together. Further, the narrative is put into the mouth of Phaedo of Elis, who was certainly still living when the dialogue called by his name was written. So, no doubt, were the chief interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, and

¹ The statement in Diog. Laert. ii. 106, iii. 6 that, just after the death of Socrates, Plato retired with other Socratics to Megara, the home of Euclides (cp. 59 c 2 n.), rests on the authority of Hermodorus, who was a disciple of Plato and wrote a book about him. Even apart from this, it is certain that the Socratics kept together and remained in touch with Plato. Some of them, like Theaetetus and the younger Socrates, were subsequently members of the Academy.
probably others of the company.\(^1\) In these circumstances, it is not easy to believe that Plato intended his readers to regard the *Phaedo* simply as an 'imaginary conversation'. Of course, as has been indicated, he need not have meant every detail to be taken as historically exact. If we choose to suppose that he introduced into the *Phaedo* sayings and doings of Socrates which really belonged to other occasions, there is nothing to be said against that; for such concentration of characteristic traits in a single scene is quite legitimate in dramatic composition. A certain idealization might also be allowed for; but we should expect the idealizing process to have taken place in the minds of Plato and the rest before the dialogue was written, and to have been in the main unconscious. We may say, then, that the *Phaedo* professes to be nothing less than a faithful picture of Socrates as Plato conceived him when he wrote it. It professes to be even more. We are certainly led to believe that it gives us a truthful record of the subjects on which Socrates dis- coursed on the last day of his life, and of his manner of treating them. No reader who made his first acquaintance with Socrates here could possibly suppose anything else. This, then, is what the *Phaedo* professes to be; and if only it is this, it is the likeness of a great philosopher in the supreme crisis of his life, drawn by a philo-

\(^1\) It is impossible to discuss the date of the *Phaedo* here; for this would involve an inquiry into that of the *Republic*. I may say, however, that I regard it as proved that the *Phaedo* is earlier than the *Republic*, and as probable that it was written within ten years of the death of Socrates. But, in any case, Phaedo, who lived to found the school of Elis, is a mere lad in 399 B.C. (cp. 89 b 3), while Simmias and Cebes are *neaviovoi* (89 a 3). No one would assign the *Phaedo* to a date at which it is reasonable to suppose they were dead.
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The sopher who was greater still, and was also one of the most consummate dramatic artists the world has known. It would not be easy to find the match of such a work.

II

But are we entitled to take the Phaedo for what it professes to be? The general opinion apparently is that we are not. It is admitted, indeed, that the narrative portion of the dialogue is historical, but most interpreters doubt whether Socrates talked about immortality at all, and many deny that he held the belief set forth in our dialogue. Hardly any one ventures to suppose that the reasons given for holding this belief could have been given by Socrates; it is assumed that they are based on doctrines formulated by Plato himself at least ten years after Socrates had passed away. I cannot accept this account of the matter. I cannot, indeed, feel sure that all the incidents of the narrative are strictly historical. These are, in my opinion, the very things for which a dramatic artist might fairly draw on his imagination. I have only an impression that they are, broadly speaking, true to life, and that they all serve to bring before us a picture of Socrates as he really was. But the religious and philosophical teaching of the Phaedo is on a very different footing. Whatever Plato may or may not have done in other dialogues—and I say nothing here about that—I cannot bring myself to believe that he falsified

1 I refer mainly to current opinion in this country. Some references to views of another character will be found below (p. xiv, n. 2).

2 It is obvious that we must apply a somewhat different standard to a dialogue like the Phaedo, which is supposed to take place when Plato was twenty-eight years old, and to one like the Parmenides, which deals with a time at least twenty years before he was born. If it can be
the story of his master's last hours on earth by using him as a mere mouthpiece for novel doctrines of his own. That would have been an offence against good taste and an outrage on all natural piety; for if Plato did this thing, he must have done it deliberately. There can be no question here of unconscious development; he must have known quite well whether Socrates held these doctrines or not. I confess that I should regard the *Phaedo* as little better than a heartless mystification if half the things commonly believed about it were true.

**III**

The interpretation which finds nothing in the *Phaedo* but the speculations of Plato himself is based on the belief that 'the historical Socrates', of whom we may get some idea from Xenophon, is quite a different person from 'the Platonic Socrates'. What the latter is made to say is treated as evidence for the philosophy of Plato, but not for that of Socrates himself. This does not mean merely that Plato's Socrates is idealized. That might be allowed, if it were admitted that Xenophon too idealized Socrates after his own fashion. If it were only meant that each of these men drew Socrates as he saw him; and that Socrates was, in fact, a different man for each of them, the truth of such a view would be self-evident. We should only have to ask which of the two had the better opportunity of seeing Socrates as he really was, and which was the more capable of understanding and portraying him. But very much more than this is meant.

shown, as I believe it can, that the latter dialogue is accurate in its historical setting (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192) and involves no philosophical anachronism, the *Phaedo* will *a fortiori* be a trustworthy document.
It is meant that Plato has used Socrates as a mask to conceal his own features, and that the Platonic 'Socrates' is, in fact, Plato.

The general acceptance of this view in recent times is apparently due to the authority of Hegel. Speaking of Socrates, he lays down that 'we must hold chiefly to Xenophon in regard to the content of his knowledge, and the degree in which his thought was developed', and this dictum became a sort of dogma with the Hegelian and semi-Hegelian writers to whom we owe so much of the best nineteenth-century work in the history of Greek philosophy. It can only be made plausible, however, by isolating the Memorabilia from Xenophon's other writings in a way which seems wholly illegitimate. We must certainly take the Oeconomicus and the Symposium into account as well; and, in estimating Xenophon's claim to be regarded as a historian, we must never forget that he was the author of the Cyropaedia.

The Apology of Socrates which has come down to us under Xenophon's name raises another question. It is pretty clearly based on Plato's Apology, and it contains a rather clumsy plagiarism from the Phaedo. This has led many scholars to deny the authenticity of the work; but the more Xenophon's methods are studied the less cogent do such arguments appear, and there is now a growing disposition to regard the Apology as Xenophon's after all. If so, we have to face the possibility that he derived much of his knowledge of Socrates from the writings of Plato.

As for the Memorabilia itself, there is no doubt that it is a strangely constructed work, and the 'higher critics'

1 Gesch. der Phil. ii. 69. 
2 Cp. 89 b 2 n.
have condemned whole chapters as interpolations. It is not necessary to discuss their theories here; I only mention them at all in order to show that the book presents a real problem, and that the time has gone by for speaking of its historical character as something beyond cavil. If, however, we wish to avoid the conclusions of the critics, we can only do so by putting something better in their place. The question we must ask is whether it is possible to give an account of Xenophon’s Socratic writings which will explain them as they stand. I believe that it is; but I also believe that it is ‘the historical Socrates’ who will then appear as the fictitious character.

IV

By his own account of the matter, Xenophon was quite young—hardly more than five and twenty—when he saw

1 It has quite recently been argued that two of the most important conversations (i. 4 and iv. 3) are derived from Plato’s Timaeus, and were inserted in their present place by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (K. Lincke, Xenophon und die Stoa, Neue Jahrbücher, xvii (1906), pp. 673 sqq.).

2 This view is gradually making its way. Raeder, while speaking of the distinction between the Platonic and the historical Socrates as ‘a recognized truth’, is equally emphatic in stating that the Platonic Socrates must be distinguished from Plato himself (Platons philosophische Entwicklung, p. 53). Ivo Bruns (Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 1896) insists upon the fact that both Plato and Xenophon give faithful portraits of Socrates as they knew him, only it was a different Socrates that they knew. C. Ritter (Platon, i, p. 71) says that Plato’s Socrates, ‘even though poetically transfigured, is yet certainly the true one, truer not only than the Socrates of comedy, but also than that of Xenophon’. My colleague Professor Taylor’s Varia Socratica (St. Andrews University Publications, No. IX. Oxford, Parker) came into my hands too late for me to refer to it in detail. Though I cannot accept all his conclusions, I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with him.
Socrates for the last time. ¹ When he made his acquaintance we do not know; but of course Socrates was a familiar figure to most Athenian lads. We can see pretty clearly, however, that Xenophon cannot have associated regularly with Socrates after he reached the age of military service. It is very significant that, as he tells us himself (An. iii. 1. 4), it was the Boeotian Proxenus who wrote to him suggesting that he should attach himself to the expedition of Cyrus. That certainly looks as if he had already served a pretty serious military apprenticeship, and in these years most of the fighting was at a distance from Athens. The fact that a Boeotian professional soldier knew him to be a likely man for an adventure of this kind seems to imply that he had already given proof of such inclinations; and, if so, his intercourse with the teacher who had not left Athens for years must have been intermittent at best.

That Xenophon did know Socrates personally, I see, however, no reason to doubt.² What he tells us on the subject in the *Anabasis* rings true, and is in complete harmony with what we know otherwise. He says (An. iii. 1. 5) that, when he had read the letter of Proxenus,

¹ The youth of Xenophon at the time of the expedition of Cyrus was first pointed out clearly by Cobet (Novae Lectiones, pp. 539 and 543). In the *Anabasis* (iii. 1. 14 and 23) he tells us himself that he hesitated to take command of the Ten Thousand because of his youth. Now two of the generals who had been killed were thirty-five and Proxenus was thirty, so Xenophon must have been appreciably younger. Cp. also iii. 2. 37, iii. 3 sq., and iv. 2 where he insists upon his youth. As Croiset says (Litt. grecque, vol. iv, p. 340, n. 1), 'Si l'on se laissait aller à l'impression générale que donne l'Anabase, on attribuerait à Xénophon en 399 plutôt vingt-cinq ans que trente.' The fact that Apollodorus gave his *floruit* as the archonship of Xenaenetus (401/0 B.C.) does not weigh against this; for that is merely the date of the expedition.

² It has been doubted by E. Richter, whose work I have not seen.
he consulted Socrates the Athenian on the matter. Socrates had misgivings. He was afraid—and the event proved him right—that, if Xenophon attached himself to Cyrus, it would damage his prospects at Athens, so he advised him to consult the Delphic oracle. But Xenophon had already made up his mind, and only asked the Pythia to what gods he should pray and sacrifice to ensure a prosperous issue to the journey he had in view and a safe return. The oracle, of course, gave him the answer he sought, but Socrates blamed him for not asking first whether he should undertake the journey at all. As it was, he bade him do as the god commanded. This story throws great light on what Xenophon afterwards wrote in the *Memorabilia*. We read there (i. i. 4) that Socrates used to warn his friends to do this and not to do that; on the strength of premonitions from his 'divine sign', and that for those who did as he told them it turned out well, while those who did not repented of it later on. We are also told that Socrates used to advise his friends to consult oracles on difficult questions, but in matters within the reach of human intelligence to use their own judgement.

It is not, surely, without significance that Xenophon should tell us this at the very beginning of the *Memorabilia*, just as the story given above from the *Anabasis* occurs at the precise point in the narrative where he introduces his own personality. It seems as if it had been the centre round which his personal memories of Socrates naturally grouped themselves. In those days, as we know from other sources, Socrates struck many young men chiefly as one possessed of a sort of 'second sight'. In the *Theages* (wrongly included in the Platonic canon, but still an early work) we read (128 d 8 sqq.) how
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Charmides consulted Socrates before beginning to train for the foot-race at Nemea. He neglected the advice given him, 'and it is worth while to ask him what he got by that training!' So, too, Timarchus declared, when he was being led to execution, that he owed his plight to disregard of a warning given by Socrates. And there were others. A certain Sannio consulted Socrates, just like Xenophon, before starting for the wars, and Socrates is represented as saying that he expects him either to lose his life or come within an ace of doing so.

It was not his second sight alone, however, that attracted these young men to Socrates. If they had regarded him as a mere clairvoyant, their feelings to him would not have been what they plainly were. No doubt it was Alcibiades who did most to make Socrates the fashion; but we can see from the Symposium that Plato had good grounds for believing that his enthusiasm was based on a conviction that Socrates was a man of no common strength of character. In particular, all these young men knew him to be a brave soldier and a good citizen. His services at Potidaea, where he saved the life of Alcibiades, and at Amphipolis, and above all his personal courage in the field of Delium, were matter of common report. In the dialogue called by his name (181a 7 sqq.), Plato makes Laches express the high esteem in which Socrates was held in military circles, and all that would appeal strongly to the group of young men I am trying to characterize. The close of the war with Sparta had left them without any very definite occupation, and they were very ready to try their luck as soldiers of fortune. They were not all Athenians—the Thessalian Meno was one of them—and in any case they had no local
patriotism to speak of. They were willing to fight for any one who would employ them, and they were naturally attracted by a man who had not only given proof of bravery in the field, but had also a mysterious gift of foreseeing the chances of military adventures.

Nor would these young men think any the worse of Socrates because he was an object of suspicion to the leaders of the Athenian democracy. They were mostly hostile, if not actually disloyal, to the democracy themselves. They would certainly be impressed by the action of Socrates at the trial of the generals after Arginusae. Xenophon was very likely present on that occasion, and he mentions the matter with some emphasis in the *Hellenica* (i. 7. 15).

That Xenophon belonged to this group we may readily admit, without supposing him to have been a member of the more intimate Socratic circle. As we have seen, he can have had little time for that, and this makes his testimony to the existence of such an inner circle all the more valuable. In dealing with the charge that Critias and Alcibiades had been associates of Socrates, he points out that they were so only for a time and to serve their own ends. Besides these, and others like them, there were many who associated with Socrates in order to become good men, and not to further any political ambitions of their own. The names he gives—Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebe, Phaedondas 1—are all familiar to the readers of Plato.

1 *Mem.* i. 2. 48. The mention of the Theban Phaedondas, of whom nothing is known (cp. 59 c 2 n.), might suggest the suspicion that Xenophon merely took his list from the *Phaedo*, were it not that Plato calls him *Phaedondes*, just as he calls Archytas *Archytes*. It almost seems as if Xenophon knew him personally by his Boeotian name.
With one doubtful exception, they are those of men whom he represents as supporting Socrates at the trial or in the prison or both.

Now, if Xenophon is here speaking from his own personal knowledge, he confirms the statements of Plato in the most remarkable way; for he bears witness to the existence of a circle of true disciples which included the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes. If, on the other hand, he has merely taken his list of names from Plato’s *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, he must mean at the very least that Plato’s account of the matter is quite in keeping with the memories of his youth. The reference to Simmias and Cebes in the conversation with Theodote (*Mem.* iii. 11. 17) shows further that he knew they had been attracted to Athens from Thebes by their desire to associate with Socrates, or at least that he accepted this as a true account of the matter.

There is nothing so far to suggest that Xenophon had any special information about Socrates, or that he was in any real sense his follower. His behaviour in the matter of the Delphic oracle is highly characteristic, and he tells the story himself. It represents him as a self-willed lad who thought he might guard against the consequences of his actions by getting a favourable response, no matter

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1 Most editors follow Groen van Prinsterer in changing the MS. Ἐρμοκράτης to Ἐρμογένης, which would bring Xenophon and Plato into complete agreement. It is to be observed, however, that, in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, Plato represents Hermocrates as present, and that he meant to make him the leading speaker in the third dialogue of the trilogy. I do not think it likely that Plato should have invented an impossible meeting, and Hermocrates may have come to Athens and made the acquaintance of Socrates during his exile. If he did, the fact would certainly interest Xenophon.
how, from the Pythia. That is quite human, and we need not be too severe upon him for it; but it hardly inspires confidence in him as a witness to the beliefs of Socrates about things unseen and eternal.

V

Turning a deaf ear to the warnings of Socrates, young Xenophon left Athens to join the expedition of Cyrus, and he never saw Socrates again. He had, therefore, no first-hand knowledge of his trial and death, while Plato was certainly present at the trial. Further, though it is just possible that Xenophon revisited Athens for a short time in the interval between his return from Asia and his fresh departure with Agesilaus, he spent practically all the rest of his life in exile. He was, therefore, far less favourably situated than Plato for increasing his knowledge of Socrates by conversation with others who had known him. Phaedo, indeed, was not far off at Elis, but he never mentions Phaedo at all. He might very easily have made inquiries among the Pythagoreans of Phlius; but, in spite of the exceptional sympathy he shows for Phlius in the Hellenica, he never says a word about Echecrates or any of them. We have seen that he does mention Simmias and Cebes twice (in both cases for a special purpose), but it is very significant that no conversations with them are reported in the Memorabilia. It seems to follow that Xenophon did not belong to the same circle as these men did, and we can very well believe his sympathy with them to have been imperfect. He does appear to have known Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus (Phaed. 59 b 7 n.), but that is apparently all.

Where, then, did he get the conversations recorded in
the Memorabilia? To a considerable extent they are discussions at which he cannot have been present, and which he had no opportunity of hearing about from oral tradition, as Plato may easily have done in similar cases. It does not seem probable that they are pure inventions, though he has given them an unmistakable colouring which is quite his own. In some cases they seem to be adaptations from Plato. It is difficult to believe that what he makes Socrates say about Anaxagoras, and the hazy account he gives of the method of hypothesis, have any other source than the Phaedo.\(^1\) It is highly probable that some of the conversations come from Antisthenes, though I think it a mistake to regard Antisthenes as his main source. We must bear in mind that there were many ‘Socratic discourses’, of which we get a very fair idea from what Wilamowitz calls ‘the Socratic Apocrypha’. If we take up the Memorabilia when we are fresh from the Theages or the Clitopho (to the latter of which there seems to be an allusion in the Memorabilia\(^2\)), we shall find the book much easier to understand in many respects. If I mistake not, we shall have the feeling that Xenophon got the substance of many of his conversations from sources of this kind, and fitted these as well as he could into his own recollections of the

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\(^1\) For Anaxagoras cp. Mem. iv. 7. 6 with Phaed. 97b 8, and for ἰπόθεσις cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 and Phaed. 92d 6 \(m\). That both passages are misunderstood proves nothing against this view.

\(^2\) Clitopho 408 d 2 πῶς ποτε νῦν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπῆν ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἄρετῆν; ὃς ὡντος μόνου τούτου, ἐπεξελθεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐνι τῷ πράγματι καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως; . . . 410b 4 νομίσας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέψειν εἰς ἄρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιαν 'ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν . . . μακρότερον δὲ οὔδεν. Cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4. 4 Εἰ δὲ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἐνιοι γράφουσι τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαίρομενοι, προτρέψαθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπως ἐπ’ ἄρετῆν κράτιστον γεγο-νέας, προαγαγεῖν δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν οὕχ ἰκανόν κτλ.
brave old man with the gift of second sight, whose advice he had sought in early life without any particular intention of taking it.

VI

It is not even necessary for our purpose to discuss the vexed question of Xenophon's veracity, though it is right to mention that, when he claims to have been an eyewitness, his statements are not to be trusted. At the beginning of his Symposium he says he was present at the banquet which he describes, though he must have been a child at the time. He also claims in the Oeconomicus to have heard the conversation with Critobulus, in the course of which (4. 18 sqq.) Socrates discusses the battle of Cunaxa, though it is certain that Xenophon saw Socrates for the last time before that battle was fought. These things show clearly that we are not to take his claims to be a first-hand witness seriously, but the misstatements are so glaring that they can hardly have been intended to deceive. Xenophon was eager to defend the memory of Socrates; for that was part of the case against the Athenian democracy. He had to eke out his own rather meagre recollections from such sources as appealed to him most, those which made much of the 'divine sign' and the hardiness of Socrates, and occasionally he has to invent, as is obviously the case in the passage of the Oeconomicus referred to. When Plato

1 The banquet is supposed to take place in 421/0 B.C. In Athenaeus 216d we are told that Xenophon was perhaps not born at that date, or was at any rate a mere child. It follows that Herodicus (a follower of Crates of Mallos), whom Athenaeus is here drawing upon, supposed Xenophon to have been only twenty years old at the time of the Anabasis. This is probably an exaggeration of his youth at that date.
reports conversations at which he cannot have been present, he is apt to insist upon the fact that he is speaking at second- or third-hand with what seems to us unnecessary elaboration,¹ but Xenophon's manner is different. He says 'I was there', or 'I heard', but that is only to make the narrative vivid. We are not supposed to believe it.

VII

In view of all this, it is now pretty generally admitted that Xenophon's Socrates must be distinguished from the historical Socrates quite as carefully as Plato's. That seems to leave us with two fictitious characters on our hands instead of one, though of course it is allowed that in both cases the fiction is founded upon fact. But how are we to distinguish the one from the other? We require, it would seem, a third witness, and such a witness has been found in Aristotle. It is pointed out that he was a philosopher, and therefore better able to appreciate the philosophical importance of Socrates than Xenophon was. On the other hand, he was far enough removed from Socrates to take a calm and impartial view of him, a thing which was impossible for Plato. Where, therefore, Aristotle confirms Plato or Xenophon, we may be sure we have at last got that elusive figure, 'the historical Socrates.'²

This method rests wholly, of course, on the assumption that Aristotle had access to independent sources of infor-

¹ Cp. especially the openings of the Parmenides and the Symposium.
² This is the distinctive feature of Joel's method in his work entitled Der echte und der Xenophonische Sokrates. Though I cannot accept his conclusions, I must not be understood to disparage Joel's learning and industry.
motion about Socrates. There can be no question of first-hand evidence; for Socrates had been dead fifteen years when Aristotle was born, and a whole generation had passed away before he came to Athens for the first time. He might certainly have learnt something from conversation with Plato and the older members of the Academy, and he might have read Socratic dialogues no longer extant. It is impossible to suggest any other source from which he could have derived his information, and these do not come to much. It is to be supposed that Plato and his friends would represent Socrates much as he appears in the dialogues, while the lost Socratic writings would not take him far beyond Xenophon.

In practice, too, this criterion proves of little value. Aristotle himself does not tell us a great deal, and the Aristotelian Socrates has to be reconstructed with the help of the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. This seriously vitiates the results of the method; for the considerations urged in support of Aristotle's trustworthiness cannot be held to cover these later works. As to the remainder, Zeller is clearly right in his contention that Aristotle never says anything about Socrates which he might not have derived from works which are still extant.¹ There is no sign that he had even read the *Memorabilia*, and in fact the presumption is that, when Aristotle says 'Socrates', he regularly means the Socrates of Plato's dialogues. No doubt, like all of us, he sometimes refers to the Platonic Socrates as Plato, but that is natural enough on any supposition; the really significant fact is that he so often calls him Socrates. Indeed, he was so much in the habit of regarding the dialogues

¹ *Phil. der Griechen* iv. 94, n. 4.
of Plato as ‘discourses of Socrates’ that he actually includes the *Laws* under this title.\(^1\) It is surely quite impossible to suppose that he really meant to identify the Athenian Stranger with Socrates. If he was capable of making a blunder like that, it would not be worth while to consider his evidence on the subject at all. It is far simpler to assume that, for Aristotle, Socrates was just the Platonic Socrates, and that, in speaking of the *Laws* as ‘discourses of Socrates’, he has made a slip which would be intelligible enough on that supposition, but wholly inexplicable on any other. If that is so, and if ‘discourses of Socrates’ meant to Aristotle ‘dialogues of Plato’, we can make no use of what he says to check the statements of Xenophon, and still less to support the view that the Platonic Socrates is unhistorical. Aristotle is always ready to criticize Plato, and if he had been in a position to contrast the real Socrates with Plato’s, we may be sure he would have done so somewhere in unmistakable language.

It cannot be said either that Aristotle’s statements as to what ‘Socrates’ really meant are of much help to us. He is by no means a good interpreter of philosophical views with which he is not in sympathy. He is, for instance, demonstrably unfair to the Eleatics, and the Platonic Socrates is almost equally beyond his range.

\(^1\) *Pol. B. 6. 1265 a ii τῶν μὲν ὀφεῖν περιττῶν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομφὸν καὶ τὸ καυνοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν κτλ. Aristotle has just been speaking of the *Republic*, the paradoxes of which he also ascribes to Socrates, and he goes on to the *Laws* with these words (1265 a 1) τῶν δὲ Νόμων τῶν μὲν πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν διότι, ἄλλα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν (sc. ὁ Σωκράτης). The editors say that the Athenian Stranger is identified with Socrates, and seem to be unconscious of the absurdity of such an identification,
It looks after all as if our only chance of learning anything about Socrates was from Plato, but we must of course subject his evidence to the same tests as we have applied to Xenophon and Aristotle. In the first place we must ask what opportunities he had of knowing the true Socrates. He is singularly reticent on this point in his dialogues. We learn from them that he was present at the trial of Socrates but not at his death, and that is all. He has completely effaced his own personality from his writings. We may note, however, that he likes to dwell on the fact that his kinsmen, Critias and Charmides, and his brothers, Glaucon and Adimantus, were intimate with Socrates.

Plato was twenty-eight years old when Socrates was put to death, and we cannot doubt that he had known him from his boyhood. The idea that Plato first made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was grown up may be dismissed. It is inconsistent with all we know about Athenian society, and especially that section of it to which Plato's family belonged. It was common for parents and guardians to encourage boys to associate with Socrates, and to beg Socrates to talk with them. Plato was the nephew of Charmides, and we know that

1 This rests on the authority of Hermodorus (ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 6). Cp. p. ix, n. 1.

2 The current story that Plato made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was twenty does not rest on the authority of Hermodorus at all, though it is quoted in Diogenes Laertius just before the statement referred to in n. 1. Others said that Plato associated with Socrates for ten years. Both figures, I take it, are arrived at by a calculation based on the solitary datum furnished by Hermodorus. Some counted from the beginning and others from the end of Plato's two years as an ἐφηβος. If that is so, there was no genuine tradition.
Charmides was warmly attached to Socrates when Plato was in his 'teens. Even later, as we know from Xenophon, Socrates prevented Glaucon from speaking in public before he was twenty, 'being well-disposed to him because of Charmides and Plato.' In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that Plato did not meet Socrates over and over again in the gymnasium and elsewhere. Xenophon may have known Socrates in this way too, but the presumption is far stronger in the case of Plato. Moreover, the son of Ariston would certainly be a far cleverer boy than the son of Gryllus, while his artistic susceptibility and his keen eye for the characteristic would be early developed. The sketches he has left us of the Master's way with boys in the gymnasium are too vivid to be wholly imaginary.

When he grew up, Plato does not seem to have left Athens. No doubt he saw some service; but he tells us himself that his ambitions were political, and by his time the political and military careers were quite distinct. If he had qualified himself, like Xenophon, to be a professional soldier, we should have known something about it.

1 We learn from the dialogue called by his name that Charmides came under the influence of Socrates as a boy, three or four years before the birth of Plato. We learn from Xenophon that he kept up the close relationship to him which began then. It was Socrates who did him the doubtful service of urging him to enter public life in spite of his shyness (Mem. iii. 7), and in the Symposium (1, 3) Xenophon represents him as associating with Socrates along with Critobulus, Hermogenes, and Antisthenes. He is made to say that he could associate more freely with Socrates when reduced to poverty by the war. For the conversation with Glaucon, cp. Mem. iii. 6, 1. These data cover the whole period of Plato's boyhood and early manhood.

2 Ep. vii. 324 b 8 sqq.
Plato, then, had exceptional opportunities of knowing Socrates, but this does not prove that he belonged to the inner Socratic circle. The evidence does not carry us beyond the probability that he belonged to the group of young men—'the sons of the richer citizens, who have most time to spare'—who gathered round Socrates for the pleasure of hearing him expose the ignorance of pretenders to knowledge. That is a different group from the one to which Xenophon belonged, but it is equally well marked, and it is not the inner circle. We can infer no more from the passage in the Apology where Socrates offers to call Adimantus to prove that Plato had got no harm from associating with him. The fact that Phaedo thinks it necessary to explain Plato's absence from the scene in the prison may mean a little more, but that refers to a later date.

If we regard the Seventh Epistle as Plato's—and I do not see who else could have written it—the matter appears in a clearer light. Plato does not say a word in it about having been a disciple of Socrates, though he speaks of him as an older friend for whose character he had a profound admiration. His ambitions, as we have seen, were political, not scientific. He was in his twenty-fourth year when the Thirty were established, and his kinsmen urged him to take office under them; but the behaviour of Socrates in the affair of Leon of Salamis

1 We cannot draw any inference from Xenophon's omission of his name from the list. To mention the kinsman of Critias and Charmides would have spoiled the point he is trying to make.
2 Apol. 23 c 2.
3 Apol. 34 a 1.
4 Ep. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Ἀρκάτην, ὅν ἐγὼ σχέδου ὀν ἀλοχνωνή τι ἐπαύν δικαιότατον εἶναι τῶν τότε.
5 Ep. vii. 324 e 2 ἐπὶ τινα τῶν πολιτῶν μεθ' ἐτέρων ἐπεμπον, βλα ἄξωντα ὁς
opened his eyes to the real character of the oligarchy. When the Thirty fell, he was at first impressed by the moderation of the restored democracy, and once more thought of entering public life, but the condemnation of Socrates proved to him that there was no hope in that direction either. In fact, though his first awakening went back to the year of the Thirty, his final conversion dated only from the death of Socrates. He probably rose a new man from the sick-bed on which he was then lying. It would not be the only case of a man called to be an apostle after the death of his Master.

Such seems to me the most probable account of the relations between Socrates and Plato; but, even if he was not a disciple in the strict sense, his opportunities for learning to know Socrates as he really was were vastly greater than those of Xenophon. Above all, he was at Athens during the last two years of his life, while Xenophon was in Asia. So far as the Phaedo is concerned, the statement of our earliest authority, Hermodorus, that, after the death of Socrates, Plato threw in his lot with the Socratics and retired with them to Megara, the home of Euclides and Terpsion, is of the first importance. We may be sure that he made it his business to hear every detail of the Master’s last words and actions from all who had been present, and he makes Phaedo express the delight they all took in speaking of him, while Echecrates ἀποδεικνυμένον, ἵνα δὴ μετέχοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς, εἶτε βούλοιτο εἶτε μὴ ὥσπερ ὦκε ἐπείθετο, πᾶν δὲ παρεκκλίθησθαι παθεῖν πρὶν ἀνοσίαν αὐτοῖς ἔργαν γενέσθαι κοινῶν. The story is told in Apol. 32 c 4 sqq., where the name of Leon is given.

1 Ep. vii. 325 a 5 sqq. Plato says that he was prevented from entering public life by the impossibility of effecting anything without a party and the proved impossibility of acting with either party.

voices the desire of all admirers of Socrates for exact information about him. That Plato was really in a position to give a full and true account of the day described in the *Phaedo* is not, therefore, open to doubt.

**IX**

Still, it will be said, the ancient idea of historical truth was so different from ours, that we cannot look for what is called an ‘objective narrative’ from such a writer as Plato. It is usual to refer to the speeches of Thucydides in support of this contention, and they are really rather to the point. It seems to me, however, that they prove something different from the position they are supposed to illustrate. Thucydides tells us that he has put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as he thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time endeavouring, as nearly as he could, to give the general purport of what was actually said.\(^1\) Even that would carry us a considerable way in the case of the Platonic Socrates in the *Phaedo*. It would surely mean at the very least that Socrates discussed immortality with two Pythagoreans on his dying day, and that implies a good many other things.

But it is really the contrast between the speeches of Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato that is most instructive. Broadly speaking, all the orators in Thucydides speak in the same style. Even Pericles and Cleon can hardly be said to be characterized. In Plato

\(^1\) Thuc. i. 22. Observe that he only professes to give \(\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\omega\nu\tau\alpha\), what was called for by the occasion, not \(\tau\alpha\ \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\), what was appropriate to the character of the speakers.
we find just the opposite. Even the Eleatic Stranger and the speakers in the *Laws* have a character of their own, and only seem shadowy by contrast with the rich personalities of the earlier dialogues. This realism is just one of the traits which distinguishes the literature of the fourth century from that of the fifth. Aristotle had observed the existence of the new literary genre and calls attention to the fact that it had not received a name. It had two distinctive marks, it used prose for its instrument and it was an imitation. It included the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and also 'the Socratic discourses'. This classification of the Platonic dialogue with the mime is one of Aristotle's happiest thoughts. If the anecdotes which are told of Plato's delight in Sophron are historical, we can see what suggested it; but in any case, it is true. Plato's dialogues really are mimes, but with this difference, that the characters are all real and well-known people. They are just the opposite of the speeches in Thucydides.

The critics have, no doubt, discovered a certain number of apparent anachronisms in the dialogues. It is said that, in the *Symposium* (193 a 2), Plato makes Aristophanes refer to the διοικισμός of Mantinea which took place in 385 B.C., and that, in the *Meno* (90 a 4), he makes Socrates refer to the enrichment of Ismenias by Persian gold as recent, whereas it happened after the death of Socrates. The latter instance, however, is extremely doubtful; for Ismenias was an important figure at Thebes considerably before the death of

1 Poet. 1447 b 2 sqq.
2 The story that Socrates was a student and imitator of Sophron rests on the authority of Duris of Samos (FHG. ii, p. 480).
Socrates, and the former is probably a misunderstanding. Aristophanes does not mention Mantinea, and what he says about the διοικησμός of the Arcadians by Sparta may very well refer to the dissolution of the Arcadian Confederacy, which was quite recent when the banquet described in the Symposium is supposed to take place. For my part, I am quite ready to accept the dictum of Wilamowitz that there are no anachronisms in Plato; but, even if there were one or two of the kind just mentioned, they would be of little account. They would have to be regarded as slips which no one would have noticed unless he had been looking for them, and which do not detract in the least from the historical character of the dialogues in which they occur.

On the other hand, we must note certain positive features which show that Plato was not only a realist in his character-drawing, but had also a strong sense of historical perspective and a genuine feeling for historical values. In particular, he has avoided completely a very subtle form of anachronism. He has a wonderful way of keeping up the illusion that his dialogues belong to the pre-revolutionary period. The Revolutions of 404 and

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1 Cp. E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. v. §§ 854, 855. The chronology of the Hellenica is certainly at fault in regard to these transactions, and Persian gold may well have found its way to Thebes before the supposed date of the conversation described in the Meno.

2 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die Xenophontische Apologie, Hermes xxxvi (1897), p. 102, n. 1. He points out that Plato does not make Aristophanes mention Mantinea at all, and that the allusion does not correspond to what we know of the Spartan treatment of Mantinea in 385 B.C. The Arcadian League struck coins with the superscription Ἀρκαδικόν, and these coins cease after the battle of 418 B.C. As the Symposium is supposed to take place in 416 B.C., Aristophanes is alluding in a natural way to an event then recent.
403 B.C. made a complete break in the politics and literature of Athens. A new world had arisen, and the carry-over, so to speak, was far less than at the French Revolution. There is hardly a single statesman or writer of the fifth century whose activity was prolonged into the fourth. Aristophanes is the exception that proves the rule; for the Aristophanes of the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Plutus* is a different man from the Aristophanes of the *Lysistrata* and the *Birds*. It is important to realize this gap between the centuries and to keep it constantly in view if we wish to understand Plato's art.

The majority of the dialogues are supposed to take place before the Revolutions, and Plato never loses sight of this for a moment, though many of his personages came to play a leading part in the troubled times which he had cause to remember so vividly. Critias and Charmides were kinsmen of his own, and he must have been affected by the tragedy of the life of Alcibiades. Yet there is not the slightest hint of all this in the *Charmides* or the *Symposium*. Critias is still a cultured politician and poet; Charmides is still a modest and beautiful lad; Alcibiades is still at the height of his wild career. Coming events are not even suffered to cast their shadows before, as an inferior artist would have made them do. Like the great dramatist he was, Plato has transported himself back to the age of Pericles and the age of Alcibiades, and portrayed them as they seemed to the men who lived in them, not as they must have appeared to his contemporaries and to himself, when the glamour of the great time had passed away.

Nowhere, perhaps, is Plato's self-restraint in this respect better seen than in the picture he has drawn
of Aristophanes. It is almost the only one of his literary portraits which we can fully appreciate. We can form a fairly clear idea of Aristophanes from his comedies, and there can be no doubt that Plato's Aristophanes corresponds admirably to it. The Platonic Aristophanes is thoroughly Aristophanic, and this raises at least a presumption that the Platonic Socrates is Socratic. But, above all, what strikes us is the relation of good fellowship in which Socrates and Aristophanes stand to one another. The Clouds had been produced some years before, but they are still the best of friends. At that time, there was really no reason why Socrates should resent the brilliant caricature of Aristophanes, and Alcibiades does not hesitate to quote it in his encomium (Symp. 221b 3). No one in these days would take a comedy too seriously. At a later date, things were rather different. Even if what Socrates is made to say about Aristophanes in the Apology is not to be taken quite literally, the Socratic circle must have felt some resentment against him after the condemnation. Yet Plato keeps all that out of sight; such thoughts belong to the fourth century and not to the fifth.

It seems to me that the reason why Plato's power of transporting himself back to an earlier time has met with such scant recognition is just the success with which he has done it. As we read him, we can hardly realize that he is calling up a time which was passing away when he himself was a boy. The picture is so actual that we feel it must be contemporary. That is why so many writers on Plato speak as if the first half of the fourth century ran concurrently with the second half of the fifth.¹ They

¹ It is no wonder that lesser writers should be deceived, seeing that
think of Plato as the adversary of the 'Sophists', though, when he wrote, there were no longer any sophists in the sense intended. They were merely memories in his day; for they had no successors. Even Thrasymachus belongs to the generation which flourished when Plato was a child.¹ So, too, the problems discussed in the dialogues

Eduard Meyer, who has done more than any one to make the historical background of Plato's life intelligible, falls under the illusion. He says (Gesch. des Alterthums, vol. iv, p. 429) that the Symposium 'proves nothing as to the relations of Socrates with Aristophanes, but only as to those of Plato... Two such diametrically opposed natures as Socrates and Aristophanes could have no relations with one another, but it is quite natural that Plato and Aristophanes should have found and understood each other'. He finds a confirmation of this in the Ecclesiazusae, which he regards as a parody of Plato's Republic, but which he says is quite free from the bitterness and malice of the Clouds, so that Plato and Aristophanes may have been on excellent terms. Now Meyer also holds (loc. cit.) that Aristophanes was in earnest when he attacked Socrates, and that Plato was quite right in ascribing the chief responsibility for his master's death to him. We must apparently believe then that, some half-dozen years after the death of Socrates (the Ecclesiazusae was probably produced in 392 B.C.), and within a few years of the time he wrote the Phaedo, Plato 'found and understood' the man whom he rightly regarded as mainly responsible for the death of Socrates, and then thought it appropriate to write a dialogue in which he represents Socrates and Aristophanes as boon companions. If that can be true, anything may. The fact is that the Aristophanes whom Plato might very well have 'found and understood' is just the Aristophanes of the Symposium, not the revenant who wrote the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus. But Plato was only a baby when the Clouds was produced, and a mere boy at the time the Symposium took place. What we may really infer is that the references to Aristophanes in the Apology are little more than Socratic persiflage like the similar allusion in the Phaedo itself (70 c 1), and that Plato knew very well that Aristophanes was not in earnest, and that no one supposed he was. Constantin Ritter has, in my opinion, put this matter in a truer light (Platon, i, p. 50, n. 1).

¹ Thrasymachus is about the last representative of the 'Sophists' (though Plato never gives him that name), and he was early enough to be satirized in the Δαραλάς, the first comedy which Aristophanes wrote. That was in 427 B.C., before Plato had learned to speak. It is improbable
are those which were of interest at the time they are supposed to take place. That of the Strong Man, for instance, which is the subject of the Gorgias, belongs to the end of the fifth century. It is also the theme of the Herakles of Euripides.

It naturally follows from this that, when Plato does wish to discuss questions which had come up in his own time, he is quite conscious of the impropriety of making Socrates the leading speaker. If we adopt the chronology of the dialogues now generally received, the Theaetetus is, with one striking exception, the latest in which Socrates leads the discussion. In the Parmenides, he is quite a youth, and the immature character of his views is shown by Parmenides and Zeno. In form, the Sophist and the Statesman are a sequel to the Theaetetus; but Socrates, though present, takes hardly any part in the argument, which is conducted by an anonymous stranger from Elea. The Timaeus and the Critias profess in the same way to continue the Republic, but here too Socrates is no more than an 'honorary president', as a recent writer puts it. We can see that the same was meant to be the case in the Hermocrates, a dialogue which Plato designed but never wrote. In the Laws, Socrates disappears altogether, and his place is taken by an 'Athenian Stranger' who seems really to be Plato himself. The only exception to this rule is the Philebus, and that exception is easily accounted for, as the dialogue deals with subjects which Plato makes Socrates discuss elsewhere. In fact the Philebus is the crucial case. It must

that he was still living when Plato began to write, and the theories which he is made to uphold in the Republic are not such as any one is likely to have maintained in the fourth century.
be later than some, at least, of the dialogues just mentioned, and the fact that Plato once more makes Socrates take the lead shows that it was solely in the interests of historical verisimilitude that he refrained from doing so in other dialogues.

Of course, if we are to regard Plato as our best authority, we shall have to revise our estimate of Socrates as a philosopher. The need for such a revision has long been felt, though it has never been taken thoroughly in hand. Even before Hegel laid down that Xenophon was our only authority for the philosophy of Socrates, Schleiermacher had suggested a much more fruitful method of studying the question.\footnote{\textit{Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen} (\textit{Works}, Section III, vol. ii, pp. 287 sqq.).} He started from the consideration that, as Xenophon himself was no philosopher, and as the \textit{Memorabilia} does not profess to be anything more than a defence of Socrates against certain definite accusations, we are entitled to assume that Socrates\textit{ may} have been more than Xenophon is able to tell us, and that there\textit{ may} have been other sides to his teaching than Xenophon thinks it convenient to disclose in view of his immediate purpose. He goes on to show that Socrates\textit{ must} have been more than Xenophon tells us, if he was to exercise the attraction he did upon the ablest and most speculative men of his time. The question, then, is: 'What\textit{ may} Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without, however, contradicting the traits of character and principles of life which Xenophon definitely sets up as Socratic; and what\textit{ must} he have
been to give Plato the occasion and the right to represent him as he does in his dialogues? ’ This is surely the proper light in which to regard the question, and it was formally acknowledged to be so by Zeller, though the consequences of so regarding it have not been fully recognized. I would only add one more question to Schleiermacher’s, and it is quite in harmony with his method. We must ask, I think, very specially ‘What must Socrates have been to win the enthusiastic devotion of the Pythagoreans of Thebes and Phlius and of the Eleatics of Megara? ’ That question is forced upon us by any serious study of the Phaedo, and the answer to it reveals Socrates to us in a very different light from Xenophon’s Memorabilia.

XI

For one thing, this consideration suggests that Socrates cannot have stood aloof from the scientific movement of his time. Xenophon does not really say that he did. He tells us, indeed, that Socrates dissuaded his friends from spending their lives in the study of higher mathematics and astronomy, but he adds in both cases that Socrates was not unversed in these subjects himself. It would be quite like Socrates to tell a young man to leave these things alone till he had learnt to know himself, and that would account for all Xenophon says.¹ Nor does

¹ Mem. iv. 7. 3 καίτων οὐκ ἀπείρος γε αὐτῶν ἢν (sc. τῶν δυσσυνετῶν διαγραμμάτων, as Xenophon quaintly calls them), ib. 5 καίτων οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκουσ ἢν (sc. the planetary orbits, their distances from the earth, the times of their revolutions and their causes, i.e. the whole higher astronomy of the Pythagoreans). Certainly Socrates held that there was something more important than this knowledge, and what Xenophon tells us as to his advice not to waste one’s life in such studies would be amply accounted for by the recollection of some such saying as that re-
Aristotle say anything inconsistent with the account given by Socrates of his intellectual development in the Phaedo (96a 6 sqq.). He only says that he applied his new method of universal definitions to ethical subjects alone; and, as the Phaedo represents the discovery of the new method as subsequent to the scientific studies of Socrates, there is no contradiction at all. On the other hand, the narrative in the Phaedo is confirmed in a striking way by our earliest witness, Aristophanes. As was pointed out long ago by F. A. Wolf, Socrates was only about forty-five years old, and Plato and Xenophon were babies, when the Clouds came out (423 B.C.), and it is quite possible that Socrates was still known chiefly as a student of natural science at that time. The really decisive argument, however, is this, that, if we take the Phaedo and the Clouds seriously, making due allowance for comic exaggeration in the latter, we get an account of the scientific position of Socrates which fits exactly into what we know of the intellectual atmosphere of the middle of the fifth century B.C., and which would be inconceivable at any other date.

In the first place, the cosmological theories burlesqued in the Clouds are mainly those of Diogenes of Apollonia, who had revived the theory of Anaximenes that Air was corded in the Phaedrus (229 e 5) οὖ δύναμιν πως κατὰ τὸ Δελφικῶν γράμμα γνώμαι ἐμαυτῶν γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἐτὶ ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀλλήλον σκοπεῖν. Cp. Mem. i. 12. καὶ πρωτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει ποτε ποτὲ νομίζοντες ικανῶς ἢ γὰρ τὰ δύναμιν εἰδέναι ἐρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φθονίζειν κτλ.

1 Cp. Met. 987 b 1; 1078 b 17. Part. An. 642 a 28. These statements only mean that Socrates did not apply his special method to cosmological subjects. Aristotle nowhere denies that Socrates started from the science of his time.

2 See his edition of the Clouds (1811), pp. ix sqq.
the primary substance. Indeed, the whole comedy is based on this. According to Diogenes, Air condenses into Mist, and becomes visible in the form of Clouds. That is why the Clouds are the divinities of the Socratic school. Further, Diogenes held that Air was 'what we think with', and that is why Socrates swings aloft in the air. The damp of the earth would clog his thought.

Another influence with which we must reckon is that of the Anaxagorean Archelaus. The statement that Socrates was his disciple is far too well attested to be ignored. Ion of Chios apparently said that he visited Samos with Archelaus, and in any case the statement was known to Aristothenus and (what is more important) to Theophrastus. It is, therefore, no Alexandrian figment. Archelaus is not mentioned in the Phaedo by

2 See E. Gr. Ph. pp. 409 sqq.
3 Cp. Phaedo 96 b 4 n. and Clouds 225 sqq. where Socrates explains that he could not rightly have discovered 'the things aloft', εἶ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα | λεπτὴν καταμείζας ἐς τὸν ὄμοιον ἄρα. If he had tried to do so on the ground, he would have failed οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἢ γῆ βλα | ἐλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἱμάδα τῆς φροντίδος. Cp. Theophrastus, de Sens. 44 (of Diogenes) φρονεῖν δ', ὡσπερ ἐλέξθη, τῷ ἄρι καθαρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ καλύειν γὰρ τὴν ἱμάδα τὸν νεόν.
4 Diog. Laert. ii. 22 Ἰων δὲ ὁ Χῖος καὶ νέον οὖν (sc. Σωκράτη) εἰς Σάμου σὺν Ἄρχελαῷ ἀποδημήσας. Ion may, however, have meant another Socrates, as Wilamowitz suggests (Philol. Unters. i. 24), viz. Socrates of Anagyrus, who was a colleague of Pericles and Sophocles in the Samian War. For the evidence of Aristothenus, see Diels, Vors. p. 323. 34 sqq. For Theophrastus, cp. Diels, Dox. p. 479. 17 Καὶ Ἄρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃ καὶ Σωκράτη συγγεγονέαν φασίν, Ἀναζαγόρου γενομένῳ μαθητῇ. See also Chiapelli in Arch. f. Gesch. der Phil. iv, pp. 369 sqq.
name, but Socrates says he had heard the book of Anaxagoras read aloud by ‘some one’ and had been deeply impressed by it (97 b 8 sqq.).

The narrative in the Phaedo goes on to tell us how Socrates grew dissatisfied with the doctrines of Anaxagoras. That also is characteristic of the time. Gorgias certainly, and Protagoras probably, had given up science in the same way. And we can see pretty clearly that the dialectic of the Eleatic Zeno was what shook the faith of all three.¹ In the Parmenides, Plato has told us this of Socrates in so many words, while the problem of the unit, which had been raised by Zeno, holds a prominent place in the enumeration of his doubts and difficulties in the Phaedo (96 e 7 sqq.).

But there is another influence at work and from a different quarter. In the Phaedo there are several references to the doctrines of Empedocles. Socrates was in doubt whether ‘what we think with’ was Air or Blood (96 b 4). The latter was the doctrine of Empedocles, and Aristotle tells us it was adopted by Critias.² What is more important still is that Socrates was troubled in his youth by the question whether the earth was flat or round (97 d 8), and that implies Pythagorean influence. The philosophers of Ionia all held that the earth was flat, and it was only from some Italian source that Socrates could have learned the other theory.³

¹ Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 417. Gorgias had been an Empedoclean (ib. p. 234, n. 4), and Plato at least suggests that Protagoras had been a Heraclitean (ib. p. 188). The experience of Socrates was only one effect among others of the ‘bankruptcy of science’ in the middle of the fifth century (ib. 406).

² Arist. de An. A. 2. 405 b 6. As Empedocles joined the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C., his views may easily have become known at Athens.

³ Cp. 97 d 8 n.
This influence of Western cosmological ideas upon Socrates is confirmed in a curious way by Aristophanes. It is quite natural that Socrates should be classed with those who busy themselves with 'things aloft' (τὰ μετέωρα), but we regularly find that 'the things beneath the earth' (τὰ υπὸ γῆς) are associated with these in his case.  

Now it was Empedocles who first paid much attention to the subterranean. The volcanic phenomena of Sicily and the Orphic interest in the House of Hades both led him to dwell upon the question of the earth's interior, and this double interest is beautifully brought out in the closing myth of the Phaedo. Aristophanes knows this point too, and his words ἐρεβοδιφώσειν υπὸ τὸν Τάρταρον might have been written in ridicule of the very theories which Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates at the end of our dialogue.

Further details as to the science of the Phaedo will be found in the notes; here I only wish to point out that the curious fusion of Ionian and Western theories which characterizes it is inexplicable unless we regard it as belonging to Athens in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At no other date, and in no other place, could such a fusion well have taken place.

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1 Cp. Apol 18 b 7 τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντισθεὶ καὶ τὰ υπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξη-τηκῶς, Clouds 188 ἄητοῦν εἰτοι τὰ κατὰ γῆς.
3 Clouds 192. The interest of the myth in the Phaedo is mainly eschatological, but it also gives us a complete theory of τὰ υπὸ γῆς, explaining incidentally tides, volcanoes, earthquakes, and the like. The subterranean rivers are specially Empedoclean.
4 The Ionians remained unaffected by the more scientific cosmology of the West. Democritus still believed that the earth was a disk hollow in the centre. As explained in the note to Phaedo 109 b 3, the theory of Socrates represents an attempt to combine this view with the theory of a spherical earth. At any date earlier or later than that of Socrates,
According to the *Phaedo*, when Socrates gave up natural science in despair, he found satisfaction in what is generally known as the Theory of Ideas. I have tried to explain this theory simply in the Notes, so far as such an explanation is necessary for a right understanding of the *Phaedo*; we have only to do here with the fact that it is represented in our dialogue as already familiar to Socrates and all his associates, whereas it is generally held to be a specifically Platonic doctrine, and one which was not even formulated by Plato in any dialogue earlier than the *Phaedo* itself. This is evidently a problem of the first magnitude and cannot be treated fully here. I can only restate the conclusion to which I have come elsewhere, namely, that the doctrine in question was not originated by Plato, or even by Socrates, but is essentially Pythagorean, as Aristotle tells us it was.\(^1\) A few further considerations, which tend to confirm this view are, however, strictly pertinent to the present inquiry.

We have seen that there was a point beyond which Plato did not think it right to go in making Socrates the leader of his dialogues. Now, if the 'Ideal Theory' had originated with himself, and if, as is commonly believed, it was the central thing in his philosophy, we should certainly expect the point at which Socrates begins to take a subordinate place to be that at which the theory is introduced. What we do find is exactly the opposite.

\(^1\) E. Gr. Ph.\(^2\) pp. 354 sqq.
INTRODUCTION

The dialogues where Socrates falls into the background are just those in which the 'Ideal Theory' is criticized, or in which nothing at all is said about it; where it is assumed and affirmed, Plato has no hesitation in making Socrates its mouthpiece. Indeed, with one remarkable and significant exception, no speaker but Socrates is ever made to expound the doctrine at all, and the exception is the Pythagorean Timaeus.¹

It has been said that to question Plato's authorship of the 'Ideal Theory' is 'to deprive him of his birthright'. It is at any rate a birthright he has never claimed; indeed, he has done everything in his power to bar any such claim on his part. He has made Socrates discuss the theory with Parmenides and Zeno almost a generation before his own birth, and he has indicated that it was not unknown to the Eleatics. Nor is it only Socrates who is represented as familiar with the theory. In the Phaedo, the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, know all about it and are enthusiastic believers in it. Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it, or even for an explanation. It is simply taken for granted. When Phaedo repeats all this to the Pythagoreans at Phlius, the same thing happens. Echecrates, who shows himself anxious for exact information on other points, asks no questions about this one. As I have argued elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 355), it is surely incredible that any philosopher should introduce a novel

¹ Tim. 51c 4 έναι τι φαμεν είδος ἐκάστου νοητόν. Here we have the 'we', which is such a marked feature of the discussions of the Phaedo, and this time it is used by a Pythagorean. The Timaeus was written years after the Phaedo, but it still preserves the old way of speaking.
theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a number of distinguished living contemporaries, and that in reporting a conversation at which he distinctly states he was not present.

Plato's own contribution to philosophy is a great enough thing, quite apart from the theory of 'forms' expounded in the *Phaedo*. This is not the place to discuss it, but it seems worth while to consider how it has come about that in modern times the 'Ideal Theory' of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* has often been regarded as practically the whole of it. In the first place, about the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the dialogues from which we can learn anything of Plato's riper thought, the dialogues in which Socrates no longer takes the leading part, were declared to be spurious. In the second place, the importance of Plato's oral teaching in the Academy, which did not find full expression in his dialogues, was seriously underrated. This was due to a natural reaction against the theory of an 'esoteric doctrine', which had been much abused; but it cannot really be disputed that many of Plato's fundamental doctrines were only expounded orally. Aristotle over and over again attributes to him precise statements which may be implicit in the later dialogues, but are certainly not to be found there in so many words. The task of reconstructing Plato's mature philosophy from the unsympathetic criticisms of Aristotle is a delicate but not, I believe, an impossible one.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the later dialogues were reinstated one by one in the positions from which they had been thrust, and a serious attempt was made to understand Aristotle's criticism of Plato.
It was assumed that there was a 'later theory of Ideas' which in many respects contradicted that set forth in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, and this had one very salutary effect, that of directing attention once more to those dialogues which had always been held in antiquity to contain the genuine philosophy of Plato. At the same time, I am convinced that the theory of an earlier and later theory of Ideas is only a half-way house. Aristotle knows nothing of such a distinction, and he would have delighted to insist upon it if he had. The time has come, I believe, for a return to the older and better view. I prefer, accordingly, not to speak of 'Plato's earlier theory of Ideas', because I do not believe the theory was Plato's at all; and I prefer not to speak of 'Plato's later theory of Ideas', because I am not clear that Platonism proper is adequately described as a 'theory of Ideas', however true it may be that it is based on the Pythagorean doctrine to which alone that name is really appropriate.  

1 This view is specially associated with the name of Professor Henry Jackson. Though I cannot accept all his results, I must not be taken to undervalue his great services to Platonic study. The genuineness of Plato's later dialogues was first clearly established by my predecessor, Professor Lewis Campbell.

2 Aristotle is commonly said to have denied that Socrates held 'the theory of Ideas', but there is really no such statement in all his writings. What he does say is that Socrates did not make universals 'separate' (*χωριστά*) from particulars, and that is quite true of the Platonic Socrates. In the *Parmenides* he is represented as puzzled about the precise relation of the forms to particular things, and in the *Phaedo* (100 d 5) he is not sure whether *παρουσία* or *κοινωνία* is the right term. So, too, particulars 'partake in' or 'imitate' the forms; but always and everywhere the particular thing is what it is because the *εἶδος* is immanent in it. We know from Plato's *Sophist* that there were 'friends of the *εἴδη*' who did 'separate' the intelligible from the sensible, and it is with these that Aristotle contrasts Socrates. The true Peripatetic interpretation is preserved
It remains to be added that I have only discussed in the notes that aspect of the theory of Ideas with which we are concerned in reading the Phaedo. So far as that dialogue goes, it is a purely logical and scientific doctrine. The possibility of science extends just as far as the theory of Ideas will carry us and no further. Where it can no longer be applied, the region of myth begins. I am well aware that the doctrine has another aspect, to which attention has been specially called by Professor Stewart. In certain dialogues the Ideas are regarded as objects of ecstatic contemplation, and appear, to some extent, in a mythical setting. With that we have nothing to do at present. I may say, however, to avoid misunderstanding, that, while I quite agree with the demand for a 'psychological' explanation of this way of presenting the doctrine, I can by no means admit that the explanation is to be looked for in the ψυχή of Plato son of Ariston. The idea of ecstatic vision is most prominent in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, that is to say, in just those dialogues where Plato's dramatic art is at its best, and where, therefore, if my general principles of interpretation are sound, Socrates is most truly Socrates. The soul of the man who stood transfixed in silent, brooding thought for twenty-four hours in the camp at Potidaea is surely the soul to which we must look for a psychological explanation of the beatific vision described in the Phaedrus. On what else can his thoughts

by Aristocles the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fr. τ) Ὑχ Ἱμίστα δε καὶ Σωκράτης, αὖτι δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐγένετο πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρί, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ἔφη Πλάτων. ἐφυσσάσατος γὰρ ὄν καὶ δεινὸς ἀπορήσαε περὶ παντὸς ὄντος, ἐπεισήμενε τὰς τε ἡμικάς καὶ πολιτικῶς σκέψεις, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἴδεων, πρῶτος ἐπιχειρήσας ἀρίζεσθαι πάντα δὲ ἐγείρων λόγον καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐγείρων, ἔφθη τελευτήσας.
have been concentrated during that day and night? Surely not on the things he discusses in the *Memorabilia*?

**XIII**

The best book on Greek beliefs about the soul has no chapter on Socrates. Even Plato, the writer says, had not clearly conceived the thought of immortality so long as he continued to regard the world from the standpoint of a slightly developed Socraticism.\(^1\) This view is based on two considerations. It is said, in the first place, that in the *Apology* Plato makes Socrates treat the question of immortality as an open one, and that the *Apology* is more historical than the *Phaedo*. In the second place, it is pointed out that Xenophon does not make Socrates say anything about immortality in the *Memorabilia*. The inference is that the belief was foreign to 'the historical Socrates'.

When, however, we look a little closer at these facts, their significance is seen to be rather different. Plato's *Apology* professes to give us the speeches delivered by Socrates at his trial; and, though it would be absurd to treat it as a word for word report, it is doubtless historical in its main outlines.\(^2\) Even if it is not, it is clear that Plato has taken pains to make it such a speech as might actually have been delivered in an Athenian court, and it is quite certain from the practice of the orators that, in addressing the judges, it was impossible to assume immortality as distinct from mere survival. The old belief in powerful and dangerous ghosts had disappeared, and nothing very definite had

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2. As Gomperz puts it, the *Apology* is 'stilisierte Wahrheit'.

taken its place. No doubt the average Athenian would allow that the souls of the departed had some sort of existence—the religious observances connected with the dead imply that—but he had lost all faith in the primitive belief that they continued to interest themselves in the affairs of this world. ‘If by any means,’ says Demosthenes, ‘the departed should be made aware of what is now taking place,’ and that is the standing formula. Nor is there any evidence that people thought of the next life as a better life, or of the house of Hades as a better world. It was believed, indeed, that those who had been initiated at Eleusis enjoyed a better lot than others. They alone could properly be said to live after death; but even that was a shadowy sort of life, and as far removed as possible from the immortality preached by the Orphic sectaries and the Pythagoreans. According to them, the soul was divine and immortal in its own right, and it was only after separation from the body that it could become truly itself. The soul of the Orphic votary dwelt with God and the saints and attained to complete purity and wisdom, while the initiated of Eleusis were at best a class of privileged shades.

Had there been any real belief in a better life, it must have found expression in the Funeral Speeches, and especially in that part of them which was regularly devoted to the consolation of the survivors; but we

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1 Cp. Dem. Lept. 87 εἰ τινες τούτων τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπῳ τινὶ τοῦ νυνι γεγομένου πράγματος αἰσθησιν. At the end of his speech against Eratosthenes (100) Lysias goes so far as to say ὅμαι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς (τοὺς τεθνεῶτας) ἡμῶν τε ἀκροᾶθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐσοθαι τὴν ψήφον φέροντας, which is the strongest statement in the orators. Cp. also Isocr. 19. 42 εἰ τίς ἔστιν αἰσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶται περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε γεγομένων, Plato, Menex. 248 b 7 εἰ τίς ἔστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιαν αἰσθησις τῶν ξώντων.

2 Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 203 (495), n. 3.
INTRODUCTION

find nothing of the sort even in the *Menexenus*, which is put into the mouth of Socrates. The writer, whether Plato or another, has felt bound to conform to the usual practice in this respect. Nor is there any trace in Aeschylus or Sophocles of a belief in a blessed immortality. It is Euripides who says ‘Who knows if life be death and death be life?’, and is laughed at by Aristophanes for doing so. We see from this how foreign such a thought was to the Athenian mind. Euripides, like Socrates, had been influenced by strange doctrines, and he, like Socrates, was considered ‘impious’.

In the *Apology*, then, Socrates only speaks as he was bound to speak. He wishes to show that death is no evil to a good man, even if the ordinary view of it is correct. At the worst, it is a dreamless sleep, and a night of dreamless sleep is better than most waking days. But that is only one possibility. There are certain ‘sayings’¹ according to which death is really a migration of the soul to another world; and, if these are true, we may hope after death to join the company of Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer. It is surely clear that Socrates himself is more in sympathy with this belief than the other, though he may not say so in as many words, and though he speaks with a certain reserve on the subject. Even in the *Phaedo* he makes certain reservations. He is sure that the soul is immortal, and that the purified soul only leaves the

¹ This, and not ‘popular opinion’, I take to be the meaning of τὰ λεγόμενα in *Apol.* 40 c 7, d 6. Cp. notes on *Phaedo* 63 c 6 and 70 c 5. The term belongs originally to the language of the mysteries, in which τὰ λεγόμενα are opposed to τὰ δρώμενα, and is used elsewhere in Plato of the mystic doctrine or ἱερὸς λόγος.
body to be with the wise and good God; he is not sure that it will enjoy the company of the saints and heroes of old.\(^1\) Both in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere he steadily declines to commit himself to the details of the Orphic doctrine. It is a ‘probable tale’, and we may hope that it, or something like it, is true. In this respect the *Phaedo* does not go a step further than the *Apology*, and the language of the *Apology* really implies the belief explicitly stated in the *Phaedo*. Whatever concessions he may make for the sake of argument, Socrates lets it be clearly seen that his beliefs about the soul are not those of the man in the street.

The same considerations help to explain the silence of Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*. He is seeking to prove that the belief of Socrates about the gods was just the same as that of other pious people,\(^2\) and it would never have done to suggest that he held peculiar views about the soul. The doctrine of the soul’s immortality was, and remained, a heresy. Even Plato’s brother Glaucon is represented in the *Republic* as startled when Socrates propounds it as something he seriously believes and thinks he can prove.\(^3\) And yet Xenophon knew the doctrine perfectly well. Even in the *Memorabilia*, he lets slip the statement that the soul ‘partakes in the divine’, a phrase which really implies the whole theory.\(^4\)

\(^1\) *Phaed.* 63 c r.

\(^2\) *Mem.* i. i. 3 ὃ δ’ ὄφδεν καυνότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων κτλ.

\(^3\) *Rep.* 608 d 3 οὐκ ἦσθαι, ἢν δ’ εἶν, ὅτι ἰδάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ-δέποτε ἀπόλλυται; —Καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέφας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· Μᾶ Δί’, οὐκ ἐγάγει· σὺ δὲ τῶν ἐμεῖς λέγειν;

\(^4\) *Mem.* iv. 3. 14 ἄλλα μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχὴ, ἃ, εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν φανερῶς, ὀρᾶται δὲ ὄφδ’ αὐτῆ. The invisibility and divine nature of the soul are just the
Further, this view, which could not safely be developed in the Memorabilia, is worked out at considerable length in the Cyropaedia, where the dying Cyrus is made to formulate it in language almost identical with that of the Phaedo. Of this fact there can only be two explanations. Either Xenophon is borrowing from the Phaedo, or Plato and Xenophon are drawing from a common source. Further, this source must be Socratic; for the kinship of the dying speech of Cyrus with the argument about the invisibility of the soul ascribed to Socrates in the Memorabilia is patent. It is possible that Xenophon derived it from Hermogenes, from whom he professes to have heard what he knew of the trial and death of Socrates; but, on the whole, it is more likely

points made in Phaedo 79 b 1 and 80 a 8, while basileuei refers to the argument of Phaedo 79 e 8. Cp. Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 2 (205). 'If the soul is immortal, it is in its essential property identical with God. Among the Greeks, whoever says immortal says God; these are interchangeable notions. Now in the religion of the Greek people the true fundamental proposition is that, in the divine order of the world, humanity and divinity are locally and essentially distinct and must remain so. A deep gulf separates the worlds of man and God.' Even so innocent-looking a phrase as τοῦ θείου μετέχει ignores this gulf, and therefore implies the mystic doctrine. There are some other passages about the ψυχή which seem to be reminiscences of the Phaedo. Cp. i. 2. 4 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίσει (cp. Phaed. 65 a 10), i. 4. 13 τὴν ψυχῆν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε (ὁ θεός), i. 2. 53 τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθόντας, ἐν ἧμι μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις. These go far beyond the popular use of the word ψυχή.

1 Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 17 sqq. Cp. especially 19 οὕτω εἶγονε, ὃ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πάντοτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀν ἐν θυγατρὶ σώματι ἂν, ἐφ᾽ ὃν ὀφεὶ δὲ τοῦτον ἀπάλλαξι, τέθηκεν . . . οὐδὲ γε ὡς ὅπως ἀφρων ἐσται ἡ ψυχή, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφρωνος σώματος δίχα γένηται, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἄφρωνος καὶ καθαρὸς ὑπὲρ ἀκρατῆς, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτὸν εἴκοσ εἶναι.

2 Cp. Cyr. vii. 7. 17 οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τῇ γὰρ ἐκῆν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσώρατε with the passage about the invisibility of the soul quoted p. li., n. 4.

3 Xen. Apol. 2.
that he simply took it from the *Phaedo*, adding some touches of his own. If so, he at least knew nothing inconsistent with the ascription of such arguments to Socrates.

But we can go much further than this. We have positive evidence, dating from a time when Plato and Xenophon were children, that Socrates was commonly believed to hold strange doctrine about the soul. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 94), Strepsiades says, pointing to the house of Socrates—

\[\psiυχ\dot{\omega}ν\ \sigmaοφ\dot{\omega}ν\ \tauο\dot{\nu}τ’\ \ddot{\epsilon}στι\ \φροντιστή\ddot{ρ}ιον,\]

and, however natural such a way of speaking may appear to us, it was not natural for an ordinary Greek in the fifth century B.C. It is sufficiently established that the use of the word \[\psiυχ\dot{\eta}\] to express a living man’s true personality is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from mysticism. Properly speaking, the \[\psiυχ\dot{\eta}\] of a man is a thing which only becomes important at the moment of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that may be lost; it is, in fact, ‘the ghost’ which a man ‘gives up’.¹ Yet we find Aristophanes trying to raise a laugh by representing Socrates and his disciples as ‘souls’ or ‘ghosts’ even in their lifetime.²

¹ The φιλόψυχος is the man who clings to life. To risk one’s life is \[θείν, \tauρέχειν, \κα\dot{\iota}νυνεύειν \pi\epsilon\iota\ \psiυχ\dot{\eta}ς.\] Cp. Rohde, *Psyche*, i, p. 47 (43), n. 1; ii, p. 141 (432), n. 1. From Homer downwards, the \[\psiυχ\dot{\eta}\] is so regarded; wherever it means more than this, we may trace the influence of mysticism or philosophy.

² Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* ‘innuit non vivos vegetosque illic habitare homines sed mera ε\ddot{ι}δολα καμόντων, νεκών quaedam \ddot{\a}me\ddot{\iota}να κάρρα quibus ϕρίνες ο\ddot{u}κ \εμπεδοι ε\ddot{io}ν, Socrati ψυχαγωγ̄ (Av. 1555 qui locus omnino est conferendus) obtemperantia. Cf. infra vs. 504, ubi unus ex eorum numero dicitur \ddot{\h}μυθής.’ This is the popular view of the μελέτη θανάτου (81a 1). See note on \ddot{\tau}ανατώσει, *Phaed.* 64 b 5.
The same point is made in the chorus of the *Birds* where Socrates is represented as calling up the souls of the dead.\(^1\) This, at any rate, cannot be aimed at 'the Sophists', and the caricature would be wholly pointless unless the real Socrates taught even at that date something like the doctrine of immortality and the 'practice of death' (*μελέτη θανάτου*) which, as we know from the *Phaedo* itself, seemed so ridiculous to the mass of men.\(^2\)

The truth is that, apart from the prejudice which insists on seeing Socrates as a 'rationalist', there is nothing to cause surprise in the fact that he was influenced by mystic doctrines. We have only to remember the character of the man and the times he lived in. The fusion of science and mysticism, to the great advantage of both, had been the characteristic feature of the generations immediately preceding his own, and his youth was passed at a time when it was much in evidence. He had even spoken with Parmenides at Athens,\(^3\) and he was only about twenty years younger than Empedocles, who joined the Athenian colony of Thurii when Socrates was about five and twenty.\(^4\) A little later, the Pythagoreans were expelled from the cities of Magna Graecia, and took refuge at Thebes, Phlius, and

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1 Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* 'Sic ridetur philosophus de animi immortalitate disputare solitus dum vitae lenocinia aspernatur'. The context makes it clear that \(φυκαγορεῖ\) is to be taken in the strict sense of ghost-raising. Chaerephon 'the bat' is represented as playing the part of the 'spirit'.

2 *Phaed.* 64 b 1 sqq.

3 E. Gr. *Ph.*\(^2\) p. 192, and, for the connexion of Parmenides with Pythagoreanism, *ib.* pp. 194 and 221.

4 E. Gr. *Ph.*\(^2\) pp. 229 and 237. It is nowhere stated that Empedocles visited Athens, but it would be strange if he did not, seeing that he went to Thurii.
elsewhere. All this could not but impress a young man who had a strong vein of mysticism in his own nature, as is shown by what we know of his ecstatic trances and the ‘divine sign’. We are told expressly that he had the latter from boyhood. It would be much more difficult to account for all this, if we were to suppose Plato rather than Socrates to have been the mystic. By his time Orphicism had degenerated into a mere superstition, and the barefooted Pythagorists who still maintained the original practices of their order would be quite unsympathetic to him. The Pythagoreans whom he knew had dropped all that, and busied themselves only with science and politics. It is a fine historical touch in the Phaedo that the young Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebe, are not very familiar with the mystic doctrine, and require to have it explained to them by Socrates.

XIV

But Socrates was no Orphic for all that. He had another characteristic which kept him from turning mystic out and out. That was the Attic εἰπώτεια, that shrewd, non-committal spirit, natural to a people of farmers and tradesmen, which Aristophanes has depicted for us in his typical Athenian figures, and which Demosthenes denounced. Enthusiasm tempered by

1 E. Gr. Ph. p. 99.
2 Apol. 31 d 2 ἵμοι δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐστίν ἐν παιδιῶν ἄρχαμενον. The twenty-four hours trance at Potidaea happened when Socrates was about thirty-seven, five years before Plato was born.
3 E. Gr. Ph. p. 103, n. 2.
4 E. Gr. Ph. p. 319 sq.
5 The proper meaning of εἰπώ is ‘sly’, ‘cunning’, malin, and εἰπώτεια is not regarded as exactly a good quality. In the Platonic dialogues, it is
Irony (using both words in their Greek sense) may serve as a formula for the Socratic ἡθος.¹ Xenophon gives us too little enthusiasm and Aristophanes too little irony; it is only in the Platonic Socrates that both elements are harmoniously combined in a character with a marked individuality of his own. The Platonic Socrates is no mere type, but a living man. That, above all, is our justification for believing that he is in truth 'the historical Socrates'.

Only the opponents of Socrates who ascribe it to him. The Scots words 'canny' and 'pawky' express something similar. Demosthenes speaks of it as a bad trait in the Athenian character (Phil. i. 7, 37). At its worst, it leads people to shirk their responsibilities; at its best, it is a salutary νάφε καὶ μέμναι λαμπρείν. For the way in which Socrates refuses to commit himself to the positive details of the mystic theology cp. 63 εἰ ἰ. It is clearly a personal trait.

¹ Or, as Gomperz puts it, 'a hot heart under a cool head.'
NOTE UPON THE TEXT

The dialogues of Plato were arranged in nine tetralogies by the grammarian Thrasyllus in the reign of Tiberius. The first tetralogy comprised the *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito,* and *Phaedo,* i.e. those dialogues which deal specially with the trial and death of Socrates.

At some subsequent date the dialogues were edited in two volumes, the first of which contained tetralogies I–VII, the second, tetralogies VIII–IX, with some spurious works. As one or other of the two volumes was apt to be lost, the MS. authority for tetralogies I–VII is quite different from that for tetralogies VIII–IX and the spurious dialogues.

The leading representatives of the first volume are the Bodleian MS., E. D. Clarke 39 (B), the Venice MS. App. class. 4, 1 (T), and the Vienna MS. 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 (W).

B. The Bodleian MS., commonly called the *Clarkianus* after E. D. Clarke, who discovered it in the island of Patmos, was written for Arethas in the year 895 A.D. It was held by Cobet and others that it was our sole independent authority, and all recent texts of the *Phaedo* are based more or less consistently on this hypothesis.

T. The Venice MS. or *Marcianus* (tenth century A.D.? ) is the original of the great majority of existing Plato MSS., and in particular of the MS. from which the Aldine text was derived. The text of Stephanus also goes back to the same source. These MSS. were arbitrarily classed by Cobet and at one time by Schanz as *deteriores,* and the chief work of Platonic critics
down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was to bring the text more and more into accordance with B, and to eliminate readings which came from other MSS.

The credit of inaugurating a better method belongs to Schanz himself. In 1877 he showed that T was of co-ordinate authority with B, and that we must take account of both. In some ways T represents the tradition even more faithfully than B. For instance, it contains the old scholia, while B has a new set composed in the ninth century A.D., probably by Arethas himself.

Unfortunately, Schanz had edited the Phaedo before he made this discovery, and he has not republished it since. The readings of T were first published by the present editor in 1899.

W. The importance of this MS. had been seen by Bast, and an imperfect collation of it was used to some extent by Stallbaum, but its omission from Bekker's *apparatus criticus* led to its being generally ignored till Professor Král of Prague once more called attention to it. Its claims to be regarded as a co-ordinate authority with B and T were warmly contested by Schanz, but on insufficient grounds. The publication of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus from a Berlin papyrus showed conclusively that W represented a very ancient tradition of the text. The MS. was brought to Vienna from Florence, and it seems to have come there from Sicily. The Latin version of the Phaedo made by Euericus Aristippus, Archdeacon of Catana, in the twelfth century, A.D., was made either from it or from a very similar MS. It is to be noted further that the corrections made by the second hand in the Clarkianus (B²), which is probably that of Arethas himself, are taken from a MS. closely resembling W, so that it must represent a tradition older than B.

A special feature of W is the number of ancient variants which it records in the margin. If all the other MSS. were lost, we could still construct a good text from W alone, and that is more than can be said either of B or of T.
In this edition, when W alone is quoted, it is to be understood that B and T have the reading adopted in the text; when B and T alone are quoted, it is to be understood that W agrees with B. Thus, on the first page, it may be inferred that B and T have τὸ φόρμακον ἐπιευ and ἀγγεῖλαι, while W has ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι, οἰός τ' ἡν and τί οὖν ἡν.

An interesting addition to our knowledge of the text was made by the publication by Professor Flinders Petrie of some papyrus fragments which must have been written within a century of Plato's death (Ars. i.e. papyrus Arsinoitica). On the whole, their text is inferior to that of our MSS., though these are more than a thousand years later. The papyrus represents the cheap texts current in early times, while our costly MSS. are copied from careful editions.

The quotations in ancient writers, especially Eusebius and Stobaeus, sometimes preserve old readings, and often confirm TW as against B. They are, however, taken from MSS. of various degrees of authority and must be used with great caution.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

EX. Αὐτὸς, ὃ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἦ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιευ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἱκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτὸς, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες.

EX. Τὶ οὖν ὅ ἐστιν ἄττα ἔπειν ὃ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανά-

τοι; καὶ πῶς ἔτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἄν ἔγω ἀκούσαμι. καὶ

γὰρ οὔτε [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλειασίων οὔδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωρίαξει

τὰ νῦν Ἀθηναῖες, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκτα χρόνον συχνὸν

ἐκείθεν ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγειλαί οἷος τ' ἢν περὶ

τοῦτων, πλὴν γε ὅ ἢ τοί φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάναι. τῶν δὲ

ἄλλων οὔδεν ἔχετε φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὖν δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπούθεσθε ὃν τρόπον

ἔγενετο;

EX. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν

γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὑστερον φαίνεται

ἀποθανόν. τί οὖν ἢν τοῦτο, ὃ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη. ἐτυχεν

γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλούον

ὅ εἰς Δήλου Ἀθηναίοι πέμπουσιν.

α 2 ἐπιευ τὸ φάρμακον W a 6 ἐγὼ B: om. T a 7 τῶν πολι-

τῶν secl. v. Bamberg: φλιασίων secl. Schaefer b 1 ἀπαγγείλαι W

ἀν B: ἡ T a 5 οὖν B: om. T a 8 πέμπουσιν B T: πέμπουσιν

κατ' ἐτοσ B W
EX. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτι ἐστι τὸ πλοίον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὃ
Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς “δις ἐπτὰ” ἐκείνους ὥξετο

b ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι
ηὕξαυτό ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεὶν, ἐκάστου ἐτους θεωρίαν
ἀπάξεω εἰς Δῆλον· ἢν δὴ ἂει καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ’
ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτονσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς

5 θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτῶς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν
tesy πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτεινώναι, πρῶν ἐν εἰς
Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ’
ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, οταν τύχοσιν ἀνεμοὶ ἀπο-
c λαβώντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχῇ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ
ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου·
tοῦτο δ’ ἐτυχεῖν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγο-
nός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν

5 τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θάνατον, ὡς Φαίδων; τί
ἂν τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τῶν οἱ παραγενόμενοι
τῶν ἐπιτηδεύων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἡ οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι,
ἀλλ’ ἐρήμος ἐπελεύστα φίλων;

d ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρησάν των, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προσυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῶς
ἀπαγγελοῦν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυχάνει οὐσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι υἱῶν διηγή-
5 σασθαι καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμηχθαί Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτῶν λέγοντα
καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἐμοίγε οἱ πάντων ὁδιστοὺν.

EX. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὡς Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντες γε
τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἐχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἄν δύνῃ ἀκριβε-
στατα διεξέλθεις πάντα.

e ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἐπάθος παραγενόμενος.

οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτω παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδεύος ἔλεος

aii ποτε θησεύς W b7 τε B: om. T e6 τί ἢν BT: τίνα

何必 B"W d4 γε B: τε T d8 ἐτέρους BT: ἐταῖρους W
d9 διεξέλθειν B: διελθεῖν T
ΑΙΔΩΝ 58ε

εἰσήγει: εὑράμων γάρ μοι ἀνήρ ἐφαίνετο, ὡς Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ
tοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῖς καὶ γενναῖως ἐτελεῦτα,
ὡστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασαι μηδὲ εἰς "Αἴδου λύντα ἄνευ
θείας μολόρας λέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὗ πράξειν
εἴπερ τις πάσοτε καὶ ἄλλοι. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδέν πάντως μοι
ἐλευθὼν εἰσήγει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δοξείην εἴναι παρόντι πένθει,
oὔτε αὐ ἡδονή ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν οὕτων ὄσπερ εἰλάθεμεν
—καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τουοτοὶ τινες ἦσαν—ἀλλ' ἀδεκviol
ἀτοπόν τι μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἄδηθς κράσις ἀπὸ τῆς
ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομένης
ὅτι αὐτικὰ ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες
σχεδὸν τι σύντοι διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελώτηνες, εἰςτε δὲ
dιακρύνετε, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος—
oὐσθα γὰρ που τῶν ἄνδρα καὶ τῶν τρόπων αὐτῶν.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκείνως τε τοιῶν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ
αὐτὸς ἐγὼν ἔτεταράγμην καὶ ὁ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐμμοῦν δὲ, ὁ Φαίδων, τῶν παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὔτος τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων
παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἐρμυγέ-
νης καὶ Ἐπιγένθης καὶ Ἀλσύνης καὶ Ἀὐστιθένης. ἢν δὲ καὶ
Κτήσιππος δό Παιανινς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινες τῶν
ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οὐμαί ἤσθενεί.

EX. Ξένοι δὲ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναὶ, Συμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ c
Φαιδώνθης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψών.

EX. Τί δέ; Ἀριστιππος καὶ Κλέομβροτος παρεγένοτο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὖ δήτα: ἐν Αλγύῃ γὰρ ἐλέγουντε ἦσαν.

ε 3 ἄνήρ Β: ὁ ἄνήρ Τ: ε 4 τῶν λόγων Β' Τ' W: τοῦ λόγου Β t
β 5 ὡςτε μοι ΒΤ: ὡστ' ἐμοῦγε W: παρίστασαι ἐκείνων W: et transp.
signis fecit T: a 6 ἀπὸ B: om. T: a 8 τοῦτο Τ: ότὲ B: τῷ Τ
b 7 κριτόβουλος Τ: ὁ κριτόβουλος Β: αὐτοῦ ΒΤ: αὐτοῦ κρῖτων Β' W
b 11 δὲ om. pr. T: c 1 τε ΒΤ: om. W: c 2 φαιδώνθης Β' Τ: 
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ B W

PLATON VOL. 1. 6
5 ΕX. Ἄλλος δὲ τις παρὴν;
ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οίμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
ΕX. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φης ἢσαν οἱ λόγοι;
ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγώ σοι εξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἐδὲ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθημεν φοιτῶν καὶ ἐγώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συνλεγόμενοι ἐδείχθης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εὖ ὡς καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο; πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἔως ἀνοιχθεὶ τὸ δεσμωτηρίου, διατρίβοντες μετὰ ἀλλήλων, ἀνεφηγεῖτο γὰρ οὐ πρός ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶ, εἰσήμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωινὲρον συνελήγημεν· τῇ γὰρ πρωτεραίᾳ [ἡμέρᾳ] ε ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθομεν εκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῦτον ἐκ Δῆλου ἀφεγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἢκεν ὡς πρωινὲρον εἰς τὸ εἰώθος. καὶ ἡκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξῆλθον ὦ θυρώρος, δόσπερ εἰώθη εὐπακούειν, εἴπεν περὶ 5 μένειν καὶ μὴ πρωινέρον παριέναι ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς κηλεύῃ· "Ἀνοίξε εἰτὲ γὰρ," ἔφη, "οἱ ἐνδέκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇ δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ." οὐ πολὺς δ' οὖν χρώνων ἐπισχῶν ἢκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσίναι. εἰσίν τίτιν ὡς κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθιππην—γιγανσώσκεις γὰρ—ἐξουσάν τε τὸ παιδῖν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὃς οὖν εἴδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθιππή, ἀνηρφήμησε τε καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ὄταν εἴπεν, οὐδὲ εἰώθασιν αἱ 60 γυναῖκες, ὅτι "οἱ Σώκρατες, ὅστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσιν νῦν οἱ ἐπιτίθεοι καὶ ὦν τούτους." καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, "Ὡς Κρίτων," ἔφη, "ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτῆς οὐκαδε." Καὶ ἔκειν ὡς ἀπήγον τως τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν δε καὶ κοπτομένην· δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθίζομεν εἰς τὴν

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5 Ἀνέφηγε τὸ ΒΤ: ἀνέφηγυ τὸ W ἐσθέμεν B: ἦμεν T
5 Ἀνέφηγε τὸ ΒΤ: ἀνέφηγυ τὸ W ἐσθέμεν B: ἦμεν T
6 Ἐσθέμεν B: ἦμεν T
7 Ἐσθέμεν T: ταῦτην T W δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθίζομεν εἰς τὴν
κλάνην συνέκαμψε τε το σκέλος καὶ ἔξετρυψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἁμα, 'Ως ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἐοικὲ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὁ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢδυ, ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρὸν, τὸ ἁμα μὲν 5 αὐτῷ μὴ 'θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἄνθρώπῳ, εἰώ δὲ τις διώκη τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τις ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμέρας δὴ ὀντε, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνευόσθεν αὐτὰ Λύσωπος, οὗθον Ἀδηστομος, καὶ ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆγεν εἰς ταῦτα αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὃ ἐν ὁ τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὥστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὥσπερ ὁ ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι 5 ἐοικεν ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δέσμοι ἢν εἰ τῷ σκέλε τὸ ἀλγεενόν, ἤκειν δὴ φανέστη ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἱδού.

'Ο οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, Νή τὸν Δία, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ’ ἐποίησαν ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὃν πεποίηκας ἐνείωσες τοὺς τὸν Ἀισώπον λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν 'Απόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς με ἣδη ἣροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Ἐνεργός πρόγον, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοοθέεις, ἐπειδὴ δὲδο ἤλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν τῶποτε ποιῆσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχεων ἐμὲ Ἐνεργό ἀποκρίνουσαι ὅταν 5 με αὕθας ἐρωτῶ—εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται—εἰπὲ τί χρή λέγειν.

Λέγει τοῖς, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὡ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὅτι οὖν ἐκεῖνοι βουλόμενοι οὔδε τοῖς ποιήσασι αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνοι εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα—ἠδὴ γὰρ ὅς οὐ βάδιον εἶπ—ἀλλ’ ἐνυπνοῦν τινῶν ἀποσπαραμένους τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενοι εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταῦτην τὴν μούσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

'ίνα γὰρ δὴ ἃττα τοιαδέν πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν-
5 ὑπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὦσει φανώ-
μενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, "ὩΣ Σώκρατες," ἐφη, "μουσικὴν
πολεῖ καὶ ἐργάζομαι." καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ
ἐπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι παρακελεύσθαι τε
6καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥστερ οἱ τούς θέουσι διαικελεύομενοι, καὶ
ἐμοὶ οὖτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἐπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν,
μουσικὴν ποιεῖς, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσὶς μεγάλης μουσι-
κῆς, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο πράττουτο. νῦν ὦ ἐπειδὴ ἦ τε δίκη
5 ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκάλυε μὲ ἀποθυγέκειν, ἔδοξε
χρῆναι, εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις μοι προστάτων τοῦ ἐνύπνιον ταῦτην
τὴν δημῶθη μουσικὴν ποιεῖς, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἅλλα
ποιεῖς. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπειλᾶν πρὶν ἄφοσιώ-
bςασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα [καὶ] πιθώμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ,
οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεοῦ ἐποίησα οὐ ἢν ἡ παροῦσα
θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεοῦ, ἐνυψέσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι,
εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μῦθους ἄλλα οὐ λόγους,
5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐς προχείρους
ἐίχον μῦθους καὶ ἤπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τοῦτον ἐποίησα
οὐς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον. ταῦτα οὖν, δὲ Κέβης, Εὐνυφό θράξε,
καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καὶ, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκεις ὡς τάξιστα.
c ἀπεμι δὲ, ὡς έοικε, τίμερον· κελεύσοι γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἶον παρακελεῦτη, ἐφή, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, Εὐνυφῷ. πολλὰ γὰρ ἢδη ἐντεύκτηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ
σχεδον οὖν ἦς ὡς ἐγὼ ἠσθήμαι οὐδ᾽ ὀπωστιών σοι ἕκω
5 εἶναι πείσται.

Τῇ δέ; ἢ δ᾽ ὡς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐνυφός;
*Εμοιγέ δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
*Εθελήσει τοίων καὶ Εὐνυφό καὶ πᾶς ὅτω ἄξιος τοῦτον
τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἐσεβεῖ, βιάσται αὐτὸν;

a 8 εἶναι BΤ: εἴναι εὐθύμιον B² W πρὶν BΤ: πρότερον πρὶν ἄν
B² W b 1 καὶ B TW : om. W et punct. not. t πιθώμενον
B TW sed ei ex T b 5 δὴ B : om. T b 6 καὶ ἥπιστάμην
μῦθους B² TW τούτων T : τούτους B b 8 ὡς τάξιστα B : om.
T e 4 soi B : ἂν soi T e 9 μέντοι B T Olymp. : μέντοι γε
B² W
οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἂμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

'Ἡρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιαζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν ὃ ἂν τῷ ἀποθησκοῦντι τῶν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαί; Τι δε, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σὺ τε καὶ Συμμίς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφων συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω. ὃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοῶς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγεω. καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείστε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἑκεί, πολὺν τώλα ἄνθρωπον δεῖν: τι γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἅλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἥλιον δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

Κατὰ τι δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀποκτενών, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ ὑπνῆ ἐν ἱρὸν, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ’ ἕμιν διητάτο, ἢδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τιμῶν, ὡς οὐ δεότι τοῦτο ποιεῖν. σαφῆς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πόστε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρῆ, ἐφῇ τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄκοισαι. ἱσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σου φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἑστῶ, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἕστω ὅτε καὶ οῖς βέλτιοι (ὅτι) τεθνᾶναι ἢ ζήν, οὐς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνᾶναι, θαυμαστόν ἱσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἅλλα ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐρεγητήν.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἤρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεῦς, ἐφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἵπών.

οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἂμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τα σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

Ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω. ὃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοῶς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγεω. καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείστε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἑκεί, πολὺν τώλα ἄνθρωπον δεῖν: τι γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἅλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἥλιον δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

Κατὰ τι δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀποκτενών, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ ὑπνῆ ἐν ἱρὸν, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ’ ἕμιν διητάτο, ἢδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τιμῶν, ὡς οὐ δεότι τοῦτο ποιεῖν. σαφῆς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πόστε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρῆ, ἐφῇ τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄκοισαι. ἱσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σου φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἑστῶ, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἕστω ὅτε καὶ οῖς βέλτιοι (ὅτι) τεθνᾶναι ἢ ζήν, οὐς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνᾶναι, θαυμαστόν ἱσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τοῦτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὑ ποιεῖν, ἅλλα ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐρεγητήν.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἤρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεῦς, ἐφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἵπών.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

62 b

Καὶ γὰρ ἀν ὀδέξειν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὔτω γ’ εἶναι ἀλογον’ οὗ μὲντοι ἀλλ’ ὅσο γ’ ἔχει τωά λόγον. ὦ μέν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτους λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὥσ ἐν τῷ φρουρᾶ ἔσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐκ ταύτης

5 λύειν οὖν ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τε τίς μοι φανεται καὶ οὗ βάδιος διδεῖν οὗ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γε μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι Ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους καὶ Ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἦ σοι οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;

10 Ἐμοιγε, φησιν ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, καὶ οὐ ἀν τῶν σαυτῶν κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτενῶν, μὴ σημηναυτός σου ὅτι θούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἀν αὐτῷ καὶ, εἰ τινα ἔχου τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῦν ἂν;

5 Πάνω γ’, ἔφη.

Ἰσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἀποκτενῶν δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινά θεός ἐπιτέμψη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν υἱόν Ἡμῶν παροῦσαν.

’Αλλ’ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φανεται. ὃ μὲν—

d ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔσοκεν τοῦτο, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀτόπωρ, εἴπερ ὁ υπόθη ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελε- λούμενον Ἡμῶν καὶ Ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης θῆς θεραπείας

5 ἀπίστωτα, εὖ ἔπιστατάσσων αὐτῶν οἴπερ ἀριστοὶ εἰσών τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστᾶται, θεοὶ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γὰρ που αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἶται ἀμείων ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ’ ἀνώτατος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ’ ἄν οἰληθεία ταῦτα, φευκτέων
e εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὗ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ

b 2 γ’ B T: om. W b 4 post ἔσμεν add. πάντες B² b 10 φη- σιν B : ἔφη TW c 1 κτημάτων B : om. T c 7 πρὶν (ὥν) Heindorf thes B : ὃ thes B² T W Olymp. c 8 παροῦσαν Ἡμῶν W d 2 ἔχει B² T W : ἔχειν B d 6 ποι B Olymp. : ποι T d 7 ἐπιμελήσεσθαι B Olymp. : ἐπιμελεῖσθαι T
ἀλογίστως ἀν φεύγοι τὸν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοὶ ποὺ ἂν ἂεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ βελτίων. καίτοι οὕτως, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τοῦναύτιον εἶναι εἰκὸς ὑπνόη ἐλέγετο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ 5 φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυμήσκοιτας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἀφρονας χαίρειν.

'Ακούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθηναί τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, Ὅελ τοι, ἐφη, [ὁ] Κέβης λόγους τυνάς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἔβελει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἃν τις εἶπη.

Καὶ οἱ Συμμίας, Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, νῦν γε μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης τι γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι 5 ἄνδρεσ σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγουσι καὶ ράδιος ἀπαλλάττοντο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεὶ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνει τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ράδιος φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπωσι καὶ ἄρχονται ἄγαθοι, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀμολογεῖς, θεοῦς.

Δίκαια, ἐφη, λέγετε: ὅμια γὰρ ἡμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρὴ μὲ b πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας.

Φέρε δὴ, ἡ ὁ δὲ, πειραθὼ πιθανότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἔγω γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Συμμία 5 τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ψύχῃ ἡζεῖν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωπον τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἔνθαδε, ἡδίκουν ἄν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ νῦν δὲ εὖ ἵστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοῦς—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν c πάνυ δισχυρισάμην—ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἄγαθος ἢξειν, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων δισχυρισάμην ἄν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὀμολογοῦν ἀγανακτῶ ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἰναὶ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ, 5

όσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολύ ἀμεων τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς.

Τι οὖν, ἔφη οὗ Συμμίας, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν τῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοθής;

κωνὸν γὰρ δὴ ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἁγαθὸν τὸῦτο, καὶ ἀμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης.

'Αλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψάμεθα τι ἐστιν ὁ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.

Τι δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τοῦ φάρμακον ὧτι χρή σοι

φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦτον προσφέρειν
e τοῦ φαρμάκου· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζοσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τοῦ τοιοῦτον ποιόντας.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, 'Εα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευαζότω ὡς καὶ δὶς δῶσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ,

καὶ τρίς.

Ἀλλὰ σχεδοῦ τίνέ τι ἢ, ἔφη δὲ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.

'Εα αὐτοῦ, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ τοῖς δικαιοσυναίς βούλομαι ἢ ὁ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὦς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνήρ τῷ

διετὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρήσας τοὺς βίους θαρρεῖν μέλλων

ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθέλπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγειτον οὐσίσθαι ἁγαθὰ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἄν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὔτως ἔχωι, ὁ Συμμίας τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγώ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

Κυνωνίουσι γὰρ οὐσὶν τυχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι

φιλοσοφίαν λεληθέναι τούς ἄλλους ὡς τοῦ ἄλλο αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύομεν ἢ ἀποθηρήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἀτοποῦ δῆπον ἄν εἰπή προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ
βίω μηδέν ἄλλο ἦ τοῦτο, ἢκοντος δὲ ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὁ πάλαι προνθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήθεινον.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Νή τὸν Δία, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνὶ γελασεῖοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἴμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαντας δοκεῖν εἰ τόνῳ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας—καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε ὑπὸ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἶσον 5 τοῦτο πάσχειν.

Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ’ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὁ Σωκράτης, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λεληθεὶν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἦ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἦ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἶον θανάτου οἱ ὁς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπομεν γὰρ, ἐφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοι: ἤγομεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἰμαι;

Πάνυ γε, ἐφη ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Σωκράτης.

Ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἦ τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπό τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῆν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς 5 ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν ἂν καθ’ ἂντό τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέσθαι αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτῆς εἶναι; ἅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἦ ὁ θάνατος ἦ τοῦτο;

Οὐκ, ἄλλα τοῦτο, ἐφη.

Σκέψασθαι δὴ, ὕγαθε, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῆ ἄπερ ἐμοί: ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἴμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὑν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεσθαι σοι φιλοσόφοι ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τάς ἥδους καλομένας τάς τοιάσθε, οἶον σιτῶν [τε] καὶ ποτῶν;

"Ἡκιστα, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης.

Τὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

Οὐδαμῶς.
Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντόμους ἤγείσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἴον ἰματίων διαφερόντων 10 κτῆσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμῶν δοκεῖ σοι ἡ ἀτιμάζεως,
καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλή ἀνάγκη μετέχεις αὐτῶν;
'Ατιμάζεως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὃ γε ἡς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
σοφος.
Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφη, ὑ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πραγ-
ματελα οὗ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἄλλα καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;
'Εμοιγε.
'Αρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δήλος ἐστιν ὁ 65 φιλόσοφος ἀπολούων ὃτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;
Φαίνεται.
Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὃ Συμβία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις 5 ὃ μηδὲν ἥδι τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχεις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ξῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τέως τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φρον-
τίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσὶν.
Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσι; πό-
10 τερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἡ οὖ, εἶν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει
κοινωνίας συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτο δέχων ἀρα ἔχει 6 τὸν ἀλήθειαν τινα ὡς τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἡ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσι, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβές οὐδὲν ὡς ὅρῳμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὖτα τῶν περὶ τὸ
5 σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ
αἱ γε ἄλλαι πᾶσαι γάρ που τοιοῦτον φαυλότερα ἐσιν. ἡ 76 σοι οὖ δοκοῦσιν;
Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
Πότε οὖν, ἡ δ' ὃς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὅταν

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**64 d ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ**

The text is a fragment from Plato's *Socratic Republic*. The page contains a discussion on the nature of medicine and its relationship to the soul. The highlighted text is from Plato's dialogue, focusing on the philosophical distinction between the soul and the body, and the role of medicine in their relationship. The page is a translation and discussion of a section from Plato's text, emphasizing the importance of understanding the soul's nature and its distinction from physical ailments.
μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρήσα τι σκοπεῖν, ὅλην ὃτι
tότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἰπερ ποι ἄλλοθι κατά-
δηλον αὐτῇ γλύνεται τι τῶν ὄντων;

Ναί.

Λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι τότε κάλλιστα, δηλον αὐτὴν τούτων 5
μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοή μήτε ὅψις μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδὲ
τοις ἴδουν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γλύηνται ἐώςα
χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κονωπόνα
αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὑρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.

'Εστι τάυτα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἦ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μᾶλλον
ἀτυμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτῇ καθ' 10
d αὐτὴν γλύνεσθαι;

Φαίνεται.

Τί δὲ δή τὰ τοιάδε, ὃ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι ὅκαινον
αὐτὸ ἦ σοῦδὲν;

Φαμέν μέντοι νὴ Δία.
Καὶ αὖ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν;
Πῶς δ' οὖ;

'Ἡδη οὖν πάσατε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἴδες;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὃς.

'Αλλ' ἄλλη του αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφῆς
αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ύψιεια,
ἰσχύοι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνί λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ
τυγχάνει ἐκαστον ὃν άρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν το ε
ἀληθεστατον θεωρεῖται, ἦ δὲ ἔχει δ' άν μᾶλλον ἡμῶν
καὶ ἀκριβεστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἐκαστον διανοηθήναι
περὶ οὖ σκοπεῖ, οὕτοι ἀν ἔγγυταν ὅιο τοῦ γνώναι ἐκαστον;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

65 b

65 τότε Β' TW: τοῦτο τε Β 
6 μηδὲν τοῦτων αὐτῆν W
6 d 7 αὖ Heindorf e Ficino: om. B
6 e1 τάληθεστατον αὐτῶν τΟlymp.
'Αρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἄν τοῦτο ποιήσειν καθαρώτατα ὡστε ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανολῇ οὐ ἐφ' ἐκαστον, μήτε τῷ ὅψιν παραπτώμενος εὗ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην αἰσθητῶν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετα τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεὶ τῇ διανολῇ χρόμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτῷ εἰλικρινεὶ ἐκαστὸν ἐπιχειροὶ θηρεύει τῶν ὅντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὅτων καὶ ὃς ἔποιο εἰπεῖν σύμ- παυσε τοῦ σώματος, ὃς ταραττοῦντος καὶ ὅντ' ἐώτως τῷ ψυχήν κτήσασθαι ἀλλήθειαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωθῆ; ἃρ' οὖν οὔτὸς ἔστιν, ὥΣμιλα, εἴπερ τίς [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὅντος;

Ὑπερφυώς, ἐφ' ἐς Σμιλα, ὧς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὥ

ΩΣκρατεῖς.

b Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐκ πάντων τοῦτων παριστάσθαι ὅξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφους, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγεις, ὅτι "Κινδυνεύει τοι ἀσπερ ἄτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς [μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει],

5 ὅτι, ἐὼς ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἐχώμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ὥ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησόμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν φαμέν δἐ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἄλληθες. μυριάς μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ, ἂν τωσοὶ προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσι τῆς ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὅντος θήραν· ἔρωτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλανρίας ἐμπύλησιον ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λειγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦ ὅτι ὑπ'

5 αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονίσας ἡμῖν ἐγγίζεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδέν ἄλλο παρέχει ἦ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμία. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρη- μάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα στ' αὐτοῦ στρεψαί τῆς μακροθυμίας την ἀναμένων.
\(\Phi A I D W N\)

66d

ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύσετε τῇ τοῦτον δ' θεραπείας. καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἀσχολίαν ἀγομενοὶ φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ ἐσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐὰν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπέζιμα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτοῦ πανταχὸς παραπτίπτων θορυβου παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τάλιθες. ἀλλὰ τῇ ὅπτι ἡμῶν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἰσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῶν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτησωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζωσι δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶνον τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινώσκαμεν, δυὸν θάτερον, ἦ συνάρμοι ἔστω κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἣ τελευτήσασιν τότε γὰρ αὐτῇ καὶ αὐτῇ ἣ ψυχῇ ἔσται χωρίς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὐ. καὶ ἐν δὲ ἄν ζωμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν οτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλώμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὅτι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπημπλάμεθα τῆς τοῦτον φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἃν δὲ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὗτῳ μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὅσ τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γυνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τούτῳ δ' ἔστω ἴσως τὸ ἁληθές· μή καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μή οὐ θεμιτοῦ ἦ·’ τουαύτα οἴμαι, ὡ Σμμίλα, ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἦ οὗ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;

Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὡ Σώκρατες.

Οὔκοιν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὡ ἔταιρε, πολλῆ ἐπὶς ἀφικομενῳ οὐ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεί ἰκανῶς,
εἴπερ ποι ἄλλοθι, κτῆσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἑνεκα ἡ πολλὴ
10 πραγματεία ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἡ γε
c ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος
γέγυνται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὅς ἤγεται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τήν
dιάνοιαν ὀσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
5 Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν παντα-
χόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἄθροίζεσθαι,
καὶ οἶκειν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ
d ἐπείτα μόνην καθ’ αὐτὴν, ἐκλυνομένην ὀσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ
tοῦ σώματος;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε θάνατος ὄνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς
5 ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;
Παντάπασι γε, ἡ δ’ ὄς.
Λύειν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται αἱ μάλιστα
καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ
tοῦτο ἐστι τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς
10 ἀπὸ σώματος· ἡ οὖν;

Φαλεῖται.
Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοιοῦν ἄν εἰ ἄνδρα
e παρασκευάζοντ’ ἐκατόν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὡς τοῦ
tεθνάναι οὕτως ἥν, κατειθ’ ἥκιντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;
Γελοιοῦν· τῶς δ’ οὖ;
Τῷ ὅτι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες
5 ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετᾶσθαι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοὶς
ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν, ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γάρ δια-

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1 μοι B: ἐμοὶ B'TW
c 2 παρασκευάζοντα ΜΤ: παρασκευά-
σασθαι W
d 1 prius ἐκ T Iambl. Protr.: om. B W: alterum ἐκ
d 4 θάνατος τοῦτο
ge W
d 5 ψυχῆς B'TW Iambl. Ἐτστ.: om. B
d 9 ψυχῆς
B'TW Iambl.: τῆς ψυχῆς B
e 3 γελοιοῦν scripsi: οὗ γελοίον
BTW Socratis tribuentes: in Ars. spatium septem litterarum
βέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτον δὲ γινομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖν, οὗ πολλῆ ἀν ἄλογία εἰ, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖστε οὐεν, οἱ ἄφκομενοι ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὐ διὰ βλου ἡρων τυχεῖν—ἡρων δὲ φρονήσεως—ἡ τε διεβέβλητο, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νέων ἀπαθανατῶν πολλοί δὴ ἐκόντες ἡθέλησαν εἰς "Αἴδου μετελθεῖν, ὅπω ταύτης ἁγόμενοι τῆς 5 ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεὶ δὴ ἐπεθύμοι καὶ συνέστησαν φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἑρων, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεῦξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἄξιως λόγου ἡ εὖ "Αἴδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἁποθυμήσωκαν καὶ b οὐχ ἄσμενοι εἰσὶν αὐτόσε; οὔεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἡ, ὃ ἐταύρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεῦξεσθαι φρονήσει ἄλλη ἡ ἐκεί. e ἐλ τοῦτο ὄντως ἐχεί, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλῆ ἀν 5 ἄλογία εἰ, εἰ φοβοῦντο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;

Πολλῆ μεῖντι νὴ Δία, ἡ δ’ ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν ἰκανὸν σοι τεκμηρίων, ἑφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, δὐν ἄν ἢς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, οτι οὐκ ἃρ ἦν φιλόσοφος ἄλλα τις φιλοσάματος; ἢ αὐτὸς δὲ ποῦ c οὕτως τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἔτερα τοῦτων ἡ ἀμφότερα.

Πάντως, ἑφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὅς λέγεις.

"Αρ’ οὖν, ἑφη, ὃ Συμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὁνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία 5 τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσῆκει;

Πάντως ὁποῦ, ἑφη.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅνωμάζοντο σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτομησθαι ἄλλ᾽ ὁλιγόφρως ἔχεω καὶ κοσμίως, ἃρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοὺς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὁλιγωροδοῦν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;

'Ανάγκη, ἐφη.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ᾽ ὅσ, ἐννοησαί τίνι γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοποσ.

Πῶς δὴ, ὃ Σῶκρατες;

5 Οὐσθα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅσ, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἠγοῦντο πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;

Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μεικώνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν;

10 Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

Τῷ δεδιέναι ἁρὰ καὶ δεῖ ἀνδρείοι εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογον γε δεῖ τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρείοι εἶναι.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Τὶ δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτο ποτὲ πεπόθθαιον ἀκολούθη τινὶ σωφρονεὶς εἰσο; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοὶς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὁμοίον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐθύνη σωφροσύνην φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσι γε ἀκολουθήναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀρχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατούμενοι υπ᾽ ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν.
τοῦτο δ' ὀμοίων ἔστω ὃ νυνὶ έλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολούθων αὐτοῦς σεσωφρονίσθαι.

"Εοικε γάρ.

"Ω μακάριε Συμμία, μη γάρ οὖν αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθή πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἄλλαγῃ, ἥδονας πρὸς ἥδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μείζων πρὸς ἐλάττων ὡσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθὸν, ἀντὶ οὖ δεὶ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, [καὶ τούτον μὲν πάντα] καὶ μετὰ τούτον [ὡςομένα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα] τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴν, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγυγομένων καὶ ἀπογιγομένων καὶ ἥδουνων καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἀλλών πάντων τῶν τοιούτων χωρίζομενα 5 δὲ φρονήσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τηοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδόδης τε καὶ οὖν ὑγίεις οὖν ἄληθες ἔχεις, τὸ δ' ἄληθες τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρονήσις μὴ καθαρμὸς τις ἢ. καὶ κινδυνέονσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῶν οὖν κατατησάντες οὐ φαινόν τινὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνώτεσθαι ὅτι δς ἢν ἀμύντος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς 5 "Αἰδον ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κέλεσται, δ' ἐκεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει, εἰσιν γὰρ δὴ, ἢ ποτὲ οἱ περὶ τᾶς τελετᾶς, "ναρθηκοφόρου μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦρον" οὕτω δ' εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν 10 ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὥν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυσνατὸν οὖν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ

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ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

70b

Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης, ἥδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμι ἦττων ἄδειοι ἐξεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν.

Οὗκον γ' ἂν οἴμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἂν ἀκούσαμεν, οὐδ' εἰ κοιμώδουπος. εἰ, ὡς ἀδολεσχώ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους πουομε. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδὲ πη, εἰτ' ἁρα ἐν "Αἰδοῦ εἰσιν ἂι ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθείδει ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρῳ ἀφικνοῦται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' όὗτος ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἀλλο τι ἢ εἰεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γάρ ἂν ποὺ πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μή δ' οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὅπερ φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμάθει ἀλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἀλλοῦ ἂν τοῦ δεοι λόγου.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

Μη τούπων κατ' ἁνθρώπων, ἡ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τούτο, εἰ βούλει βρῶν μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῶνων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ἱδωμεν ἃρ' οὕτωσι γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἀλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν εἰναι τα ἐναντία, ὁσοὶ τυχάναι ἐν τοιούτον τι, οἴνον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον ποὺ καὶ δικαιον αἰδίκω, καὶ ἀλλα ὁμιρία οὕτωσ ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἁρα ἀναγκαίων ὁσοὶ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῶ ἐναντίου. οἴνον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνεται, ἀνάγκη που εξ ἐλάττονος οὕτως πρότερον ἔπειται μείζον γίγνεσθαι;

Ναί.

10 Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἐλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντως πρῶτερον
71 ὑστερον ἐλαττον γενόσσεται;

"Εστώ ὁπω, ἐφη.

Καὶ μὴν εἰς ἵσχυρότερον γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βρα-
δυτέρου τὸ θάττου;

5 Τί δὲ; ἃν τι χείρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐὰν ἀμείνουσα, καὶ ἃν
δικαιότερον, ἐὰν ἄδικωτέρου;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

'Iκανῶς οὖν, ἐφη, ἔχομεν τούτῳ, οὕτω πάντα ὄντως γίγνεται,
10 ἐὰν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;

Πάνω γε.

Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιώνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ
ἀμφοτέρων πάντως τῶν ἐναντίων οὕτως ὄντως ὃς γενέσεις,

b ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρου, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου
πάλιν ἑπὶ τὸ ἑτέρου μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττωνος
μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν αὐξά-
νεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;

5 Ναί, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχονται
καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὖτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς
ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἄλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὖτως ἔχει
ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐὰν ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε ἔναι

10 ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἣ δ' ὅς.

c Τί οὖν; ἐφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον, ὁπερ τῷ
ἐγρηγορέατι τὸ καθεύδειν;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Τί;

Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἔξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, ἐπερ ἐναπτί ἔστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν μεταξὺ δύο ἄνων ὄντων;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τὴν μὲν τοῦτων ἔτεραν συζύγιαν ὡν νυνὶ ἐλέγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις. σοῦ δὲ μοι τὴν ἔτεραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδεω, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέων, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέων γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέων καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν καταδραθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανόνιοι σοι, ἐφη, ἦ οὐ;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Λέγει δὴ μοι καὶ σοῦ, ἐφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. 5 οὔκ ἐναρτίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;

'Ἐγώγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἔξ ἀλλήλων;

Ναλ.

'Εξ οὖν τοῦ ζώντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;

Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἐφη.

Τί δὲ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος;

'Αναγκαίων, ἐφη, ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.

'Εκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὁ Κέβης, τὰ ζώντα τε καὶ οἱ ζώντες γίγνονται;

Φαίνεται, ἐφη. Εἰςίν ἄρα, ἐφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν "Αἰθοῦ.

'Εοικεν.

Ο网首页 καὶ τῶν γενεσέων τῶν περὶ ταῦτα ἦ γ' ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὕσα τυχάναι; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθησίσκειν σαφῆς δήπον, 5 ἦ οὖ;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν

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σ.7 αὐτῶν B Stob.: αὐτῶν T σ.11 ἐγρηγορέων ... σ.12 καθεύδειν B² T W Stob.: om. B d I αὐτῶν Stob. d.5 μοι καὶ σοῦ B: καὶ σοῦ μοι B² T W Stob. e 2 εἰσίν ἄρα T W Stob.: ἄρα εἰσίν B
ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλῇ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη
10 ἀποδούναι τῷ ἀποβιβήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;
Πάντως ποι, ἔφη.
Τίνα ταύτην;
Τὸ ἀναβιβάσκεσθαι.
Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾿ ὅσ, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιβάσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν
72 τεθνεώτων ἄν eἰ ἡ γένεσις εἰς τούς ἰώντας αὐτή, τὸ ἀνα-
βιβάσκεσθαι;
Πάνυ γε.
"Ομολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ἰώντας ἐκ τῶν
5 τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἤππο τῇ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν
ἰώντων, τούτων δὲ ὅπως ἰκανὸν ποι ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι
ὅτι ἀναγκαίον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι ποι, ὧν ἔδω
πάλιν γλύνεσθαι.
Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων
10 ἀναγκαίον οὕτως ἑξεν.
"Ἰδὲ τοῖνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἄδικως ὀμο-
λογήκαμεν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄει ἀνταποδιδοὶ τὰ
b ἔτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὥστερεὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα, ἀλλ’
eυθεῖᾳ τις εἰ ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ κατα-
tυκρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον μηδὲ καμπη-
pοιότο, οὐσθ’ ὅτι πάντα τελευτώτα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἄν σχοῖν
5 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἄν πάθοι καὶ πάυσατο γιγνόμενα;
Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.
Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ’ ὅσ, ἐννοήσαι ὁ λέγω· ἀλλ’ οἶον εἰ
τὸ καταδαρθάνει μὲν εἰ, τὸ δ’ ἀνεγείρεσθαὶ μὴ ἀνταποδιδοὶ
gιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθευδότος, οὐσθ’ ὅτι τελευτῶτα πάντ᾿
c〈ἀν〉 λῇρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειν καὶ οὐδαμὸν ἀν
φαύνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τάλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκείνω πεπονθέναι,
καθευδεῖν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ

a 4 ἐφα ἡμῖν B T Stob. : ἡμῖν ἐφα W a 6 ἐδόκει B Stob. : om. T
a 11 οὗτως B : om. TW b 4 ποιότο B : ποιοῖ T b 7 ἐννοήσαι
B'TW : ἐννοήσασιν B b 9 πάντ’ ἄν Bekker: πάντα B TW
c 3 διακρίνοιτο T: διακρίνατο B W
μή, ταχύ ἄν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γηγονὸς εἰ, "Ομοί πάντα χρήματα." ὥστως δέ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποβήσικοι 5 μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβει, ἑπειδή δὲ ἀποδάνοι, μένου ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχῆματι τὰ τεθειότα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκειο, ἀρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτώντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ 7 ζῶντα γίγνοντα, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα ὑπήκοοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὕχι πάντα καταναλωθήναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς πανταπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

'Εστώ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὃς ἑμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔξαπατόμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τῷ ὅπτι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθειότων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι [καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἁγαθαῖς ἁμεινῶν εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς ε ἀκάκου].

Καὶ μήν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνων γε τῶν λόγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἐστιν, ὅν σὺ εἰωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις 5 τυγχάνει οὐδα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τοῖς χρόνωι μεμαθηκέναι ἂ νῦν ἀναμμηνισκόμεθα. τούτο δὲ ἄδυνατον, εἰ μὴ ἢν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ δὲ τῷ ἄν- 73 θρωπίῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι: ὅστε καὶ ταύτη ἄθανατον ἡ ψυχὴ τι ἐοικεν εἶναι.

'Αλλὰ, ὃ Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας ὑπολαβῶν, ποίαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησιον με' οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι 5 μέμνημαι.

'Ενι μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὃτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, ἐὰν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτὸι λέγουσιν πάντα ἢ ἐχει—καίτως εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ
όρθος λόγος, οὐκ ἂν ὁ οἶος τ’ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσαι—ἐπειτα

η ἄλλο τί τῶν τοιούτων, εὔταθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἐφι, πείθῃ, ὡ Συμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τιθεὶ πὴ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδέξῃ. ἀπεισεῖς γὰρ

ὅτι πῶς ἡ καλομεμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστιν;

'Απιστῶ μὲν [σοι] ἔγγογε, ἢ ὡς ὁ Συμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐφι, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὐ δό λόγος, ἀναμνησθήναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ἢν Κέβης ἐπεχειρησε λέγεω ἡδή μεμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδέν μεντάν ἤττου ἁκούομι νῦν τῇ σὺ ἐπ-

εχείρισας λέγεω.

Τῇδ’ ἔγγογε, ἢ ὡς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὕτως, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτόν τοῦτο πρότερον ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.

Πάνυ γ’, ἐφι.

Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστῆμη παρα-

γίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἰσαι; λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. εάν τίς τι ἔτερον ἢ ἱδῶν ἢ ἁκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβῶν μη μόνον ἐκείνῳ γνῷ, ἄλλα καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοησῇ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἄλλη ἄλλη, ἃρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαῖος λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνησθῇ, οὐ τῇν ἐννοιαν

ἐλάβειν;

Πῶς λέγεις;

Οἶον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη ποὺ ἐπιστήμη ἄνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν οἰσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἱδῶσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλα τι οἰς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἰσὶ δραχμαί, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τῇν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἑλαβόν τὸ

a 10 ποιήσαι Hirschig: ποιήσεων B: ποιήσεων TW b 4 soi TW: soi ἐν B (sed ἂν punct. not.) b 6 soi B: om. TW b 7 παθεῖν Heindorf: μαθεῖν B TW b 9 μέντ’ ἂν B² W: μὲν ἂν B TW πῇ σῦ B T: σῦ πῇ B² W c 1 τῇδ’ B: τί δὲ T c 6 τῶν B: τοῦτον T ἐτερον T: πρότερον B Olymp. ἢ (post ἐτερον) B Olymp. T e 9 λέγομεν TW: ἐλέγομεν B d 6 ἄλλο τι B: τι ἄλλο T
εἰδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἦστιν ἀνάμνησις· ἄστερ γε καὶ Συμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαύτ' ἄν εἴη. 10

Μυρία μέντοι νη Δία, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἦστι; μάλιστα ε μέντοι δέ τις τοῦτο πάθη περί ἐκείνα δ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἑπισκοπεῖν ἦδη ἐπελέλυστο; 15

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Τί δε; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἦστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἱδόντα καὶ 5 λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπον ἀναμνησθήναι, καὶ Συμμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Συμμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Συμμίου ἀναμνησθήναι; 10 Ἡ ἐστι μέντοι, ἐφη.

'Αρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τήν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἄρ' ὅμοιως, εἰναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

Συμβαίνει· 74

'Ἀλλ' δέ τις γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὅμοιων ἀναμμηνήσκεται τίς τι, ἄρ' 5 οὐκ ἀναγκαίων τὸδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἶτε τι ἐλλεῖπει τοῦτο κατὰ τήν ὅμοιοτήτα εἴετε μὴ ἑκείνου οὖ ἀνεμνήσθη; 10

'Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. 15 φαμέν ποῦ τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ ξύλων λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθου λίθῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιουτῶν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτερῶν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον φώμεν τι εἶναι ἦ μηδέν;

Φῶμεν μέντοι νη Δί', ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. 20 Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ' ἦστιν;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τήν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὖν ἐξ δὲ ὅν νυν ἔλεγομεν, ἦ ξύλα ἦ λίθους ἦ ἄλλα ἀττα ἱδόντες 25

ισα, ἐκ τούτων ἔκεινο ἐνενόησαμεν, ἔτερον δὲ τούτων; ἡ
οὐχ ἔτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆς. ἂρ' οὐ λίθοι
μέν ἵσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὅντα τῷ μέν ἵσα φαίνεται,
tῷ δ' οὐ;

10 Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

c Τοῦτ' ἄυτε τὰ ἱσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἡ ἡ ἰσότης
ἀνισότης;
Οὐδεπότ' γε, ὃ Σώκρατες.
Οὐ ταύτων ἀρα ἔστιν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ταὐτά τε τὰ ἱσα καὶ αὐτὸ
5 τὸ ἱσον.
Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὃ Σώκρατες.
'Αλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἵσων, ἔτερων ὅντων
ἐκείνου τοῦ ἱσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννοηκάς τε
καὶ εἰληφας;

10 Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Οὐκοῦν ἡ ὑμοῖον ὅντος τούτως ἡ ἄνομολον;
Πάνω γε.
Διαφέρει δὲ γε, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἔως ἂν ἄλλο ἵδων ἀπὸ
d ταύτης τῆς ὑψεως ἄλλο ἐννοῆσης, εἰτε ὑμοίοιν εἰτε ἄνομοιον,
ἀναγκαίον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμυνησιν γεγονέναι.
Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Τοῦτ' ἄυτε; ἡ δ' ὅς: ἡ πάσχομεν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς
5 ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς υψώθ' ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἱσοῖς; ἢρα φαίνεται
ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἶναι ὅσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀ ἔστιν, ἡ ἐνδεί τι
ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἱσον, ἡ οὐδέν;
Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεί.
Οὐκοῦν ὑμολογούμεν, ὅταν τὸς τι ἵδων ἐννοῆση ὅτι βού-
10 λεται μὲν τοῦτο ὅ νῦν ἑώρω εἶναι οἶον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅντων,
e ἐνδεί δὲ καὶ οὗ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἵσον] οἴον ἔκεινο, ἄλλ'
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εὐδεὶ δὲ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τού ἱσοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέραι;

Ναὶ.

Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἁρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῶν αὐτῆς εἰλη-

φέραι.

Ἐοικεν.

Οὐκούν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενό-


μενοί οὐ μόνον τὸ ἱσοῦ καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἄλλα

καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσοῦ μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων

οῖς ἐπισυφραγιζόμεθα τὸ "αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστὶ" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτη-

σεσιῶν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡς

τε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῶν τούτων πάντων τᾶς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ

5 γενέσθαι εἰληφέραι.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπικελήσμεθα,

εἴδότας ἄει γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄει διὰ βλού εἰδέναι τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τούτων ἔστω, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεων καὶ μὴ

ἀπολωλεκέναι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λῆθην λέγομεν, ὡς Συμμία, ἐπι-

στήματι ἀποβολήν;

cε 

Πάντως ὅπου, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Εἰ δὲ γε οἴμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπω-

λέσαμεν, ὅστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς ποτε καὶ πρὶν

5 εἴχομεν, ἃρ' οὖν δὴ καλοῦμεν μανθάνεις οἰκεῖαν ἄν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνεις εἰ; τούτω δὲ ποι ἀναμμῆνοσκειςθαί λέγοντες ὅρθῶς ἄν λέγομεν;

Πάνυ γε.
Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἡ ἱδόντα 76
η ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα ἐτερόν τι ἀπὸ
τοῦτον ἐνυόησαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ὁ τοῦτο ἐπιστᾶσαζεν ἀνόμοιον
ὅν ἢ ς ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῦν θάτερα; ἦτοι ἐπι-
στάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βλου πάντες, 5
ἡ ὑστερον, οὐς φανεν μανθάνειν, οὔδεν ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀναμμη-
σκονται οὕτω, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἄν εἰη.
Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὖτως ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Πότερον οὖν αἰρῇ, ὁ Σιμμᾶ; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγο-
νέανι, ἡ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι ὑστερον ὁν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην b
εἰληφότες ἦμεν;
Οὐκ ἔχον, ὁ Σώκρατες, εν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.
Τί δὲ; τόδε ἔχειν ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πὴ σοι δοκεὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ;
ἀλὴρ ἐπιστάμενους περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἃν δοῦναι λόγον 5
ἡ οὐ;
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Ἰὴ καὶ δοκοῦσι σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τοῦ-
των ὡν νυνὶ ἐλέγομεν;
Βουλούμην μεντὰν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον 10
φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὐρὼν τηρικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς
ἀξίως οἷος τε τοῦτο ποιήσαι.
Οὐκ ἀρα δοκοῦσι σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμᾶ, c
πάντες αὐτὰ;
Οὐδαμῶς.
'Αναμμηνήσκονται ἀρα ἢ ποτε ἐμάθοι;
'Ανάγκη. 5
Πότε λαβοῦσαι αὐ ψυχαί ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ
γὰρ δὴ ἄφ’ οὖ γε ἀνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.
Οὐ δῆται.
Πρότερον ἀρα.
Ναὶ. 10

a 1 αἰσθάνομενόν W a 4 θάτερον B T W: τὰ έτερα B b 4 τόδε
W: om. B T c 4 ἢ ποτε B: ποτε & T e 6 αὐτῶν B: om. T
Ησαυ ἀρα, ὁ Σωκράτης, αὐτοὶ γυναικεῖοι καὶ πρότεροι, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπον εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.

Εἴ μὴ ἄρα ἄμα γυνώμενοι λαμβάνωμεν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας. οὕτως γὰρ λείπεται ἐτὶ τὸ χρόνος.

d. Εἶνεν, ὃ ἐταίρε ἀπόλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν πολὺ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ;—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντες γε αὐτὰς γυνώμεθα, ὃς ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν—ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλυμεν ἐν ὁπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἡ ἔχεις ἄλλου τις εἰπεῖς χρόνου;

5. Οὐδαμῶς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἐλαθοῦν ἐμαυτὸν οὓδεν εἰπών.

 Ars oūn oútwos ἔχει, ἐφη, ἡμῖν, ὁ Σωκράτης; εἰ μὲν ἔστω δ θρυλοῦμεν ἄει, καλὸν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἔπι ταύτην τά έκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχονταν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἔκεινη ἀπεικόσμεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὁσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταύτα, ἄλλως ἃν ὁ λόγος οὕτως εἰρημένοι εἰς; ἀρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτα τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

Ὑπερφυὼς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμολογεῖ εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἂν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὔδεν οὕτως μοι ἐναργεῖς ὅν ὅς τούτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτ' εἶναι όσο οὖν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ἀνυπνῆθη ἐλεγες καί ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἰκανῶς ἀποδέξειται.

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης; δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.

Ἰκανῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃς ἔγωγε οἵμαι· καίτοι καρτερῶν.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
τάτος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν πρὸς τὸ ἀπίστευν τοὺς λόγους. ἀλλ’
οίμαι οὐκ ἐνδεδώς τούτο πεπείσθαι αὐτοῦ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι
ήμας ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή’ εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνομεν
ἐτὶ ἐσταί, οὔδε αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεί-
χθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐτὶ ἐνέστηκεν οὐ νυν Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν
πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀμα ἀποθνῄσκοντο τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δια-
σκεδάνυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἰναί τοῦτο τέλος ἢ. τί
5 γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνιστάσθαι ἀλλοθέν
ποθεν καὶ εἰ καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σώμα ἀφικέσθαι,
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τοῦτο, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν
tελευτάν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;

Εὖ λέγεις, ἐφη, ὡς Συμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ
ἀπεπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δεί, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠμᾶς
ἥν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, δεὶ δὲ προσαποδείξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνομεν οὖν ἦττον ἐσταί ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἶ μέλλει
tέλος ἡ ἀποδείξεις ἔξων.

Ἀποδεδεικται μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ
Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ἑθέλετε συνθεῖναι τούτον τε τὸν
λόγον εἰς ταῦτον καὶ διὸ πρὸ τοῦτον ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ
gίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζων ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεότοι. εἰ γὰρ ἐστώ νῳ,
ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ῥοῦθη τε
cαὶ γεγομένη μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθέν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ
τεθναναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνη εἰναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεὶ αὕτης αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀπο-
δεδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν. ὡμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς
5 σὺ τε καὶ Συμμίας ἥδεος ἃν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι
tὸν λόγον ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παῖδων, μὴ ὡς
ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαινουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος δια-

a 9 ἐστιν . . . ἀπιστεῖν in marg. T τοῖς in ras. T b 2 δοκεῖ
om. pr. W ὡς Σώκρατες ἐφη T b 4 άμα B3TW: om. B δια-
σκεδασθήται Matthiae b 6 ἀμάθεν Bekker: ἀλλοθέν B TW
c 3 δεὶ B: δεὶ T (el s. v.) W c 5 ἔξειν T: ἔχειν B
c 9 μὲν B: om. TW d 2 καὶ B: te kal ek T d 3 αὕτην T b:
αὕτη B (ut vid.) W d 4 γε B: δὲ T sed punct. not. αὕτην
αὕτης W d 5 λέγεστε Par. 1811: λέγεται B TW
ε φυσι καὶ διασκεδάζουσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νημείᾳ ἄλλῳ ἐν μεγάλῳ τοις πνεύματι ἀποθησκοῖν.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, Ὑς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπέλθειν μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἄλλῃ ᾽Ιῶς ἐνὶ τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς δότοις τα τοιοῦτα φοβεῖται. τούτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπέλθειν μὴ δεδεῖν τοῦ θάνατον ὀσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

'Αλλὰ χρῆ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειψιν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἔως ἄν ἐξετάσῃ.
προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαφθινοίς ταύτη ἀπερ συνετέθη·
εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει δὲν ἄσυνθετον, τούτω μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ
πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, οὕτως έχειν, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἂεί κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταύτα
μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἄσωνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ
μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα;

Έμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

'Ιωμεν δὴ, ἐφη, ἐπὶ ταύτα ἔφ' ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν 10
λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρω-
τώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἂεί ἔχει κατὰ
tαυτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ
ἐκαστὸν ὦ ἐστίν, τὸ ὁν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἤμισυν
ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἂς αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὦ ἐστίν, μονοεἰδὲς ὄν αὐτὸ
5 καὶ αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ
οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοιῶς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;

'Ωσαύτως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὦ
Σώκρατες.

Τι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἶνον ἀνθρώπων ἦ ἵππων ἦ 10
ἰματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὄντων ὅπως τοιούτων, ἢ ἵσον [ἡ καλῶν] ἢ ε
πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμοιόμοιως; ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πάν
τούναντιον ἐκείνους οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλῆλοις οὐδέποτε
ὡς ἐποίειν οὐδαμώς κατὰ ταύτα;

Οὕτως αὖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ταύτα· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. 5

Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄναιοι κὰ τοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις
αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθηθοῖ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντων οὐκ ἔστω
ὁτι ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοι τὸ τῆς διανοίας λογισµῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστω
ἀνὴρ ἡ τοιαύτα καὶ οὖχ ὅρατα;

c 4 ταύτα B (sed punct. not.): τὰ αὐτὰ T  c 7 τὰ] & Heindorf
a 8 δὲ BT: δὲ εἶναι B² W d 2 κατὰ ταύτα B² T: κατὰ τὰ
a 2 B W κατατὰ B d 10 καλῶν secl. Classen  e 1 ἢ ante
εἰσιν om. T  e 3 δὲ BT: καὶ εἴτε B² W
b: om. B  e 4 ταύτα B: ταύτα ἔστιν B² T W e 5 a e B
pr. T Ars.: οἷς, ἀνὴρ B  ὅρατα B; ὅραται T (sed ex emend.) W

PLATO, VOL. I.
5 Παυτάπασιν ἐφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Θώμεν οὔν βούλει, ἐφη, ὰυὸ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὄρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές;

Θώμεν, ἐφη.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀιδές ἂεί κατὰ ταύτα ἔχουν, τὸ δὲ ὄρατον ἡμιδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφη, θώμεν.

b Φέρε ὅ, ἢ δ', ὅς, ἀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή;

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη.

Ποτέρφω οὔν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ 5 συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα;

Παντὶ, ἐφη, τούτῳ γε δήλουν, ὅτι τῷ ὄρατῷ.

Τῇ δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὄρατον ἡ ἀιδές;

Oὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐφη.

'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὄρατα καὶ τὰ μὴ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων

10 φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἡ ἄλλη τῳδε οἰεῖ:

Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Τῇ οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὄρατον ἡ ἀόρατον εἶναι;

Oὐχ ὄρατον.

'Αιδές ἀρα;

15 Ναὶ.

'Ομοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σώματος ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῇ ὄρατῷ.

c Πάσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Oὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρήται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τῷ διὰ τοῦ ὄρατον ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἅλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ

5 ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—

τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σῶματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλασάται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιά ὀσπερ μεθύονσα, ᾦτε τουούτων ἐφαπτομένην;

Πάνω γε,

"Οταν δέ γε αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκείστε οἴχεται εἰς d τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὃν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὄσαυτως ἔχου, καὶ ὃς συγγενής οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περιπερι τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἑκείνα δει κατὰ ταύτα ὄσαυτως ἔχει, 5 ᾦτε τουούτων ἐφαπτομένην' καὶ τοῦτο αὐτής τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;

Παντάπασι, ἐφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

Ποτέρω οὖν αὐν σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὀμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέατερον;

Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ 3 ὅς, συγχωρήσας, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὃτι ὅλω καὶ παντὶ ὀμοιότερον ἐστὶ ψυχῇ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄσαυτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μῇ.

5 Τῇ δὲ τὸ σῶμα;

Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

"Ορα δὴ καὶ τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὃσι ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύεω καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, 80 τῇ δὲ ἄρχεω καὶ δεσπόζεω καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὐτὸ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὀμοιον τῷ θεῶ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυτῷ; ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ μὲν θείῳ οὖν ἄρχεω τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύεις πεφυκέναι, τῷ δὲ θυτοῦ ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

"Εμοιγε.

Ποτέρω οὖν ἡ ψυχῆ ἐοικεν;

Δήλα δὴ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχῇ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυτῷ.
10 Σκόπει δή, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, εἶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
b τάδε ἦμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ
καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὀσταῖνος κατὰ ταῦτα
ἔχοντε ἐαυτῷ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ
θυητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτω καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε
5 κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντε ἐαυτῷ ὁμοίωτα τον αὕτη εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν
ti παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, ἦ ὦνξ οὕτως ἔχει;
Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Ti οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἂρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν
tαχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὕτη τὸ παράπαν ἀδια-
10 λύτῳ εἶναι ἦ ἐγγύς τι τούτου;
c Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἐφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ δ' ἀνθρωπός, τὸ μὲν
ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κέμενον, ὃ δὴ οὐκρόν
καλοῦμεν, ὃ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπέπευμ καὶ δια-
5 πνεύσθαι, οὐκ εὔθυς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεικῶς
συχρόν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, εἰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ
σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνιν μᾶλα· συμ-
πεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὁπερ οἱ ἐν Ἀλγυπτῷ
ταριχευθέντες, ὄλγον ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον,
d ἔνα δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἄν σαπὴ, ὅστα τε καὶ νεόρα
καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὄμως ὦς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν ἀθανάτῳ ἐστιν:
ἡ οὖ;

Ναι.

5 Ἡ δὲ ψυχῇ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον
οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀιδῆ, εἰς "Αἰδοῦ ὅς
ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεὸν, οἱ, ἄν θεὸς

b2 κατὰ B Eus. Stob.: καὶ κατὰ T b4 ἀνοήτω καὶ πολυειδεῖς
marg. t: ἦ ῥα marg. b c2 ἐπειδαίν B: ὅτι ἐπειδάν B T W Eus. Stob.
oc 3 αὐτοῦ τὸ B Eus.: αὐτοῦ T Stob. c4 καὶ διαπέπευμ T W b
d5 ἔτερον τὸν Αρσ. d6 τὸν γενναῖον Αρσ. d7 τὸν ἀγαθὸν
θεὸν (καὶ φρόνιμον) Αρσ. (ut vid.) ol δὴ Αρσ. (ut vid.)
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θέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὑψιχῇ ἱτέουν, αὐτῇ δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτῃ καὶ οὕτω πεφυκώς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σωμία, ἄλλα πολλῷ μάλλον ὃν᾽ ἔχει· ἕαν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδέν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἀτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ έκούσα εἶναι, ἄλλα φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθρομομένῃ αὐτῇ εἰς έαυτήν, ἀτε μελετῶσα αὐτῷ τούτῳ—5 τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα μαθίως· ἢ οὗ τούτοι, ἢν εὖ μελέτη 81 θανάτου;

Παντάπασί γε.

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἐξουσία εἰς τὸ ὁμοιὸν αὐτῇ τὸ ἄδες ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θείῳ τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ 5 ἀφικομένῳ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐθαίρει, πλάνης καὶ ἄνοιας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὡσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμομένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λυπού εἰρήνην μετὰ θείων διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

Οὕτω νη Δία, ἔφη ὃ Κέβης.

'Εὰν δὲ γε οἶμαι μεμισμενή καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος b ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι αἰς συνοίσι καὶ τούτῳ θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἑρώτων καὶ γοητευμένη ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιών καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὡστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθῆς ἄλλη ἢ τὸ σωματειδές, οὐ τίς ἄν ἄψαν καὶ ἰδοι καὶ πίοι 5 καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὁμοιὰ σκοτώθηκας καὶ ἀδείς, νοητῶν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἴρετῶν,
πλατώνος

tοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω
c δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷς ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἄντι αὐτὴν εἰλικρινὴ ἀπαλ-
λάξεσθαι;
Οὖν' ὅπωστιοὺς, ἔφη·
'Αλλὰ [καὶ] διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς,
5 δ' αὐτῆς η ὁμίλλα τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ
συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τῆν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφωνον;
Πάνω γε.
'Εμβριθὲς δὲ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ
βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ὀρατόν· δὴ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα η τοιαύτη
10 ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐξεκται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον
φόβῳ τοῦ ἁίδους τε καὶ "Αἰδοῦ, ὁσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ
κυνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυνωδομένην, περὶ τὰ δὴ καὶ
ἀφθη ἀττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδή φαντάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἱ
τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἶδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλά
τοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρθώται.

5 Εἰκὸς γε, οὐ Σῶκρατες.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τάς τῶν ἁγαθῶν
αὐτῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα
ἀναγκαζόνται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσα τῆς προτέρας τρο-
φῆς κακῆς οὐσίας· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανώνται, ἐως ἂν τῇ
tοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἑπιθυμία πάλιν
ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δὲ, ὁσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαύτα
ἦθη ὧποι ἀπτ' ἄν καὶ μεμελετηκώς τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποιά δὴ ταύτα λέγεις, οὐ Σῶκρατες;

5 Οἶνον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαγρίας τε καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφίας
μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ δυναλβηθηῶνεις εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη
82 καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύνεσθαι. ἡ οὐκ οἰει;
Πάνω μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

c 4 καὶ B : om. B² T Ars. Stob. διειλημμένη pr. B c 5 τε
om. W c 8 δὲ γε τοῦτο (ὡς φίλε) ? Ars. οἴεσθαι γε W c 9 δὴ
καὶ B T Stob. : δὴ W d 2 ... χῶν φαν ... Ars. et mox ν ταφ ... 
οθείνει d 5 εἰκόνας Ars. ο Σῶκρατες] ἔφη Ars. d 7 αἰτῶς
Ars. : ταύτας B T W Stob. d 8 τροφῆς B Stob. : τροφῆς T
ε 2 τοιαύτα B T Stob. : τά τοιαύτα W Eus. ε 6 διειλαβηθηῶνε
T (sed η punct. not.) b : dieulabουμένους B Stob.
Τούς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγάς προ-
tετμημέκτας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτιὼν
γένη· ἣ ποι ἄν ἄλλος φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας λέναι;

'Αμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα.

Οὔκοιν, η' δ' ὅς, δὴ δὴ καὶ τάλλα ἢ ἄν ἐκαστα ίοι
κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;

Δήλον δὴ, ἐφη· πῶς δ' οὖ;

Οὔκοιν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰς καὶ εἰς τοὺς
βέλτιστον τόπον ὅντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν
ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδεύκοτες, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ
δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἐθνός τε και μελέτης γεγονυνάν ἀνευ φιλο-
σοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πῇ δὴ οὖν εὐδαιμονέστατοι;

"Ὅτι τούτοις εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιούτων πάλιν ἀφικνείσθαι 5
πολιτικῶν καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ
μυρμήκων, καὶ εἰς ταύτων γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος,
καὶ γίγνεσθαι εἰς αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκός.

Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς 10
καθαρφ διπλώτη εὐθυμίας νηπίοις ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. c
ἀλλὰ τούτων ἐνεκα, ὡ ἑταίρε Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ
tὸν θρόνον φιλοσοφοι ἀπέχουται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σώμα ἐπιθυμιῶν
ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροὺς καὶ οὐ παραδιδόσως αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοὺς,
οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πεπίλαν φοβούμενοι, ὀσπέρ οἱ 5
πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν
μοκχηρίας δεδομένα, ὀσπέρ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι,
ἔπειτα ἀπέχουνται αὐτῶν.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν πρέποι, ἐφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὗ μέντοι μᾶ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, τοιγάρτου τούτου μὲν d
άπασιν, ὁ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἳ τι μέλει τῆς ἐαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαῖρεν εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὃς οὐκ εἰδῶς ὅτη ἔρχονται,

5 αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δειν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταῦτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἣ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

Πῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες;

Ὁ γάρ ἐρω, ἐφή. γιγνώσκοις γάρ, ἢ δ’ ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς

e ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀνάγκαιομένην δὲ ὀσπέρ διὰ εἰργοῦ διὰ τούτον σκοπεῦσαι τὰ οὕτα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δ’ αὐτής, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθῇ κυλών-

5 δουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργοῦ τὴν δευτέρητα κατίδοσα ὅτι δ’ ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ

83 εἴῃ τοῦ δεδεσθα,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκοις οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύεις ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστῇ δὴ διὰ τῶν ὄμμάτων σκέψις,

5 ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὅτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πειθοῦσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀδροίζεσθαι παρακελευμένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλῃ

b ἡ αὐτὴν αὐτῆ, ὅτι ἄν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ὅτων ὅτι δ’ ἄν δι’ ἄλλων σκοπῆ ἐν ἄλλως δὲν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές. εἰναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ ὀρατῶν, δὲ αὐτὴ ὅρα νοήτων τε καὶ αἰδέως.

5 ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ ὀλοµένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὁς

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d2 ὁ B: ἐφή δ’ B’TW d3 σώματι B: σώματα B’ TW
d4 πορεύονται Αρσ. δ’ καὶ τῷ καθαρμῷ Αρσ. δὴ Αρσ.: ομ. BT
d7 ἐκείνη om. Αρσ. d8 τῶς] pòs λέγεις ἐφη Αρσ.
d9 ἐφή om. Αρσ. e1 ἢ ΒΤ: om. W e2 δεδεμένην W
W a1 τοῦ Heindorf: τῷ B’T W Αrs. a5 ὅτων
B T Iambl.: ἀκόων W καὶ] ἢ Αρσ. a6 ἀπαχωρεῖν W a7 αὐ-
tοῖς om. Αρσ. a8 ἄλλα’ et mox αὐτήν om. Αρσ. b1 οὔτ᾽ θέλ
ὅταν Αρσ. et mox αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τί (ut vid.) b2 δν om. Αρσ.
b4 τε om. Αρσ. b... ὅρα] δ... προσέχει Αρσ. b5 οὖν] δ’ b
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άληθώς φιλοσόφου ψυχή οὔτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἱδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένῃ ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἴσηθι ἡ φοβηθῇ [ἡ λυπηθῇ] ἡ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δόν ἄν τις οἰηθεὶς, οἷον ἡ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντων μέγιστὸν τε κακὸν καὶ ἐσχατὸν ἐστί, τούτῳ πάσχει καὶ οὔ λογίζεται αὐτῷ.

Τί τούτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐφ’ ὦ Κέβης.

"Ὅτι ψυχή παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἀμα τε ἴσηθι καὶ 5 σφόδρα ἡ λυπηθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἥγεισθαι περὶ ὧν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχει, τούτῳ ἐναργεῖστατον τε ἐναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὖν οὔτως ἐχοῦν ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὑπάρχουσα ὑπό οὖν;

Πάνω γε,

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκται ψυχή ὑπὸ δ σώματος;

Πῶς δῆ;"
Τούτων τούτων ἑνεκα, οἷον ἄγαμος μικροτέρος ἐσι καὶ ἀνδρείοι, οὐχ ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἑνεκα φασίν: ἣ σὺ οἴεις;

84. Οὐ δέλτα ἐγώγε. 
Οὐ γάρ: ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιν' ἀν ψυχὴ ἄνδρος φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οὐθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδίδοναι ταῖς ἥδωναις καὶ ἀνύπαι ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνήπτυκτον ἐργών πράττειν Πνευμόνης τω ἐναυτίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζόμενης, ἄλλα γαλήνην τούτων παρασκεύαζονσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐσία, τὸ ἄληθες καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον 

b θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἰεται οὕτω δεών ἔσω ἃν ἡ, καὶ ἔπειδαν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγένες καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁφικομένη ἀπηλλάξαυ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τουαυτῆς τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινόν μὴ φοβηθή. 

5 [ταύτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα,] ὡς Σωμμάτε τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσιθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδέν ἐτι οὔδαμον ἦ.

c Συγή οὖν ἐγένετο ταύτα εἰσόντος τοῦ Ἀρηστάτου ἐπὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρμένῳ λόγῳ ἤν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃς ἓδειν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἢμων οἱ πλείωτοι: Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σωμμίας συμκρόν πρὸς ἀλλήλων διελεγέςθην. καὶ ο

5 Σωκράτης ἴδων αὐτῷ ἢρετο, Τῆ: ἐφῆ, ὑμῖν τα λέχθεντα μῶν μὴ δοκεὶ ἐνεδῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἐτί ἐχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξεῖνα. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθου, οὐδέν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ
τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήστε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ
dιελθεῖν, εἶ ποι ὑμῶν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἢν] λειτήναι, καὶ
d αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μάλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμὸν
eυπορήσεις.
Καὶ δὲ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθη σοι
ero. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τῶν ἐτερον προωθεῖ 5
καὶ κελευεῖ ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσας, ὁκνεῖν δὲ
ὀχλον παρέχειν, μη σοι ἂνδες ἢ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.
Καὶ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησιν· Βαβσαί,
ὦ Σιμμία· ἢ ποι χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πεἰ-
σαμί ὡς ὦ συμφοράν ἤγονύμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε
ge μηδ' ὑμᾶς ὀνυμαί πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ ὅνυκολο-
tερον τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίω· καὶ, ὦς ἔσκε,
tῶν κόκων δοκοὶ φαυλότερος ὑμῶν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἱ
ἐπειδὴν αἰσθώνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν
τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἄδονσθαι,
γεγονότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἁπνέαν οὐπέρ εἰς
θεράπωντες. οἱ δ' ἀνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου
καὶ τῶν κόκων καταψιεῦονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς ἄρσηνούτας
tῶν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξῆδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὔδὲν
ὁρεύον ἄδει ὧταν πεινῇ ὃ ῥίγῳ ἡ τωα ἀλλήν λύπην λυπήται,
οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἁγδῶν καὶ χελίδῶν καὶ ὁ ἐποψ, ὃ δὴ φαι
διὰ λύπην ἄρσηνούτα ἄδειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται
λυποῦμενα ἄδεισθε οὔτε οἱ κόκων, ἀλλ' ἂτε οἴμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλ
λωνος οὗτες, μαντικὸι τε εἰς καὶ προειμάθες τά ἐν ἁρίδον
ἀγαθὰ ἄδουντι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως
ἤ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦγομαι
ὁμοδούλος τε εἶναι τῶν κόκων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, 5
καὶ οὐ χείρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἐχεῖν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου,
οὔδε δυσθυμοτέρων αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἑνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτάν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἐώς ἂν Ἀθηναῖων ἐδώσω ἄνδρες ἐνδέκα.

10 Καλῶς, ἐφή, λέγεις, ὁ Συμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τε σοι ἔρω ὅ c ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐ ὅδε, ἦν οὐκ ἀποδέχεσαι τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἵσως ὡσπερ καὶ σοι τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχαλεῖπον τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ

5 οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μή προσφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείτη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἄνδρος· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράζεσθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ ἢ εὐρείων ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβάντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτό-

d τατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὡςομενὸν ὡσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κυνωνεύοντα διαπλείσθαι τοῦ βίου, εἰ μή τις δύναις ἄσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκυδωνοτέρον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὄχιματος, [ἡ] λόγον θείου τιμῶ, διαπορευθήμας. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐγώγεν οὐκ ἐπαισχύν-

5 θήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαυ-

tον αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὡτι νῦν οὐκ εἴπον ἃ μοι

dοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρήμενα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ικανῶς

10 εἰρήσθαι.

e Καὶ ὁ Σώκρατης, Ἰσως γάρ, ἐφή, ὡς ἐταίρε, ἀληθῆ σοι

φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγει ὅτι δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς.

Ταύτη ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἢ

5 μὲν ἀρμονία ἀδρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλον τι καὶ

86 θείον ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὕτη δ' ἢ λύρα καὶ


Heindorf d 6 ἢ ἂς B T: ἢ ἂς ἂς B W e 3 ἢ δὴ W: ἂς B T e 4 λόγον τοῦτον W e 5 ἀδρατον T: ἀδρατον τι B
αἱ χορδαὶ σῶματα τε καὶ σωματοειδή καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεωδή ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυτοῦ συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἰ τις διοσχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σὺ, ὥς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι 5 τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολλωλέαι—οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἐτι εἶναι διερρωγισθῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυτοειδεῖς οὕσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολλωλέαι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυή τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θυτοῦ ἀπολομένην—ἄλλα φαίη ἀνάγκη ἐτι πον εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπὴσεσθαι πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἴμαι ἐγὼ γε καὶ αὐτὸν 5 σε τούτο ἐντεθυμήσθαι, ὅτι τουτοῦ τοι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τουτοῦ του ἀρνόμεν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν, καταστάσεν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τοῦτων τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρῶς κρατῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα—εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχή οὕσα ἁρμονία τις, δήλου ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἡ ἐπισκαφή ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολλωλέαι, καίπερ οὖσαν 5 θεωτάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν χρόνου παραμένειν, ὡς ἂν ἡ κατακαυχή ἡ κατασαπή—ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τούτον τῶν 10 λόγων τὰ φήσομεν, ἐὰν τις ἄξιος κρὰσων οὖσαν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλομένῳ θανάτῳ πρῶτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰσῆλθε, 5

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a 2 σῶματα B: σῶμα T σύνθετα B: σύνθετα τε T a 4 καὶ B: ἢ T a 7 ἐν secl. Bekker b 1 ὁμοφυή καὶ ἐμφυή W b 3 ἀνάγκη Baiter b 4 καὶ B: τε καὶ B'T W c 1 μετρίως καὶ καλὸς W c 3 ἡμῶν B: om. T c 4 ἐπισκαφή T W: ὑποσκαφή B et ὅποι s. v. W in marg. t c 5 ἀνάγκη B T W: ἀνάγκην t ὑπάρχειν B T W c 7 ἐν T: αἴ ἐν B d 1 κατακαυχή ἡ κατασαπή pr. W d 5 διαβλέψαμενος in marg. B
καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Συμμίας. εἰ
οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορότερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ
οὐ φαύλως ἐοικεν ἀποτμένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεὶ μέντοι μοι
χρημαὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἐτί πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι
e τὶ αὖ ὁδὲ ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγευμένου βου-
λευσόμεθα τι ἐροῦμεν, ἐπειτα [δὲ] ἀκούσαντας η ὑγνωρεῖν
αὐτοῖς ἐὰν τι δοκοῦσι προσάδεω, ἐὰν δὲ μῆ, οὕτως ἡδὴ
ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' οὔ, ὧν Κέβης, λέγε,
5 τὶ ἢν τὸ σὲ αὖ θράττον [ἀπιστίαν παρέξει].

Λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ' ὦ δ ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτὶ ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν,
87 ταυτὸν ἐγκλῆμα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἥν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
πρὶν εἰς τὸν ἐποίον ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθημαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ
χαριέντος καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἑπαξόθεν ἐστὶν εἴπειν, πάνυ ἰκανῶς
ἀποδεδέχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποβανόντων ἡμῶν ἐτὶ ποι ἔστως,
5 οὖν μοι δοκεὶ τῇδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἵσχυρότερον καὶ πολυ-
χρωνιώτερον ψυχῇ σώματος, οὐ υγνῳρῷ τῇ Συμμίλοι ἀντι-
λήψει· δοκεὶ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τοῖς πᾶν πολὺ διαφέρεω. τί
οὖν, ἄν φαίνῃ ὁ λόγος, ἐτὶ ἀπιστεῖς, ἑπειδὴ ὧρα ἀποβανόντως
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε ἀσθενέστερον ἐτὶ ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυ-
b χρωνιώτερον οὐ δοκεὶ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐτὶ φύεσθαι ἐν
τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τὸν ἑπίσκεψαι, εἰ τῇ λέγῳ
ἐλκόνος γὰρ τῶν, ὡς ἐοικεν, κἂν ὡσπερ Συμμίλος δέομαι.
ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεὶ ὁμολογὸς λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὡσπερ ἄν τις ἐπὶ
5 ἀνθρώπου ύφάντου πρεσβυτοῦ ἀποβανόντος λέγοι τοῖς τοῦ
τόν λόγου, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλων ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἐστὶ ποι
σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θομάτιον ὁ ἡμείχετο αὐτὸς
ὑφηνάμενος ὃτι ἐστὶ σῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλλων, καὶ ἐδὶ τις
c ἀπιστοὶς αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτήθη πότερον πολυχρωνιώτερον ἐστὶ

δ ὁ Συμμίλος λέγει W ὁ B: om. T ἐ2 δὲ B: om. TW
e 4 ἀλλὰ γε B TW e 5 τὸ B TW: θ al. ἀπιστίαν παρέξει scel.
Hermann e 7 ἐμπροσθεν W a. 2 ἀνατίθημαι W Olymp.: ἀντι-
τίθεμαι B T a 4 ἐστὶν B TW: ἐσται B W a 8 ἑπειδὴ B: ἑπειδὴ
γε B TW b 7 σῶς Forster: ίσως B TW: e i ἀπιστοὴ
Heindorf: ἀπιστῶν B TW
τό γένος ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἰματίου ἐν χρεία τε ὄντος καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκριμαμένου δὴ [των] ὁτι πολὺ τό τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω φίλο ἀποδεδείξαι ὅτι παντὸς ἁρὰ μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἀνθρωπος σῶς ἔστω, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρουνώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. 5 τὸ δὲ οἶμαι, ὃ Σωμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἀ λέγω. πάσας [γὰρ] ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὑρίσκεις λέγει ο τοῦτο λέγων. ὃ γὰρ υφάντης οὕτως πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαύτα ἰμάτια καὶ υφηνήμενοι ἑκένων μὲν ὑστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολ- λῶν οὕτων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταῖον οἶμαι πρότεροις, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτον ἔνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ιματίου φαυλότερον οὔπερ ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δεξαίτ ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μετρὶ ἂν μοι φαινοίτο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ 5 πολυχρόνοιν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγο- χρουνώτερον ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ πολλὰ ἐτή βιω — εἰ γὰρ μέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοντο ἐτί ζωτὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ ἡ ψυχή ἂει τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίρον — ἀναγκάιον ε ὑμνήματι ἐν, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὸν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέρων ἀπόλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἤδη τῆς φύσεω τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνυόν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπεῖν δύονοιτο. 5 ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύοντας θαρρεῖν ὡς ἐπειδὴ ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι που ημῶν ἡ ψυχή ἔστω. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἐτὶ τῷ λέγοντι ἢ δ σεν λέγεις συγχωρήσειν, οὐσι αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἰναι ημῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν εἰλὼν ἔτι εἴναι καὶ ἔστεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενή- 5 σεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι οὕτως — οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει

c 3 ἀποκριμομένου T δὴ om. W tivos seclusi c 7 γὰρ B: om. TW e 9 οὗτος BT et s s. v. W: οὗτος B=W 7 d 3 ταύτης B TW: om. B d 5 αὐτῶν B TW: τῶν αὐτῶν B μὲν ψυχῆ B: ψυχῆ μὲν T W d 8 καὶ B TW: καὶ el B: βιω T: βιω T B: a 1 ἡ ψυχή ημῶν T W a 4 τὰς ψυχὰς B: τὴν ψυχήν T W
 Ionhrhnh. evnai, ooste pollhakis gynomwnevnhn psikhv anhtexew —dous de tahta ekhein. mhkeitiv synychwroi, mh ou povew aytin. ev taist pollhais gevesesin kai telenutwson gey en

twn twn thavata twv pantapason apollusthai, touton de tout.

b thavaton kai tahtin twn, diatwson tou savoratos h tpsikhe ferei olerbrom. mhevna faite eidevna—adovaton gar einai otrfou althesahei hmwn—ei de touto outw exhei, oudeine proisheke thavaton barroou'ti mh ouk anohtos tharpein, de an

5 mh exh apodeixezi oti exht psikhe pantapason adovaton te kai anwlethron. ei de mh, anagkhn einai aei tout melonata apodanevthei dediein uper ths aytov psikhis mh en tpsikhein twv savoratos diaxeixe pantapason apohlytai.

c Panton oewn akousantaes eipontwn aytovn ahdwv diehevthe-

men, ows ousteron elygeomven pros allhnous, oti upo tou ejmpodsev logos sfodora pepeisemounous hmws palin edokon anataraxai kai eis apistlian katafalei ou mou ton pros

5 proeiromewn logos, alla kai eis ta ousteron melonata rethsesthai, mh oudeivos ajev einem kratai h kai ta prag-
ymata auta apistata h.

EX. Nh tous theous, o Faidonw, synynwmin ge exw umyn.

kai gar auton me vnu akoustanta sou touvotou ti lege

d pros ejmaton epitxetai: "Tini ouv eht piostelosomen logos;

ows gar sfodora pidanouv oun, ou d Soekrathts elxegi logos,

vnv eis apistlian kapatpwtkev." thvmainwos gar mou d

logos ovtos antilamabantei kai vnu kai deel, to armoniv

5 twa hmwn einai thn psikhin, kai ousper upemwshen me rthesi oti kai autf mou tahta proudedokto. kai patin deomai paliw ousper ex archis allon tivdos logos ous me peixei wos
tou apothanontos ou synapodhisei h psikhe. lege ouv pros

a7 thn psikh

W a8 mhkeloi ekheino T bi h TW:
ei B b3 alasbedvai T: alatadenvhai B b4 prosodkeiv Stephanus b6 anagkhn BW t: anagkhn T c3 palin T: palai B e5 ousteron W sed a supra on c6 etiemen TW: etiemen B e7 auta B3 TW: om. B f] eti Heindorf d1 piostelosomen B: piostelosomen T
Διὸς πή ὁ Σωκράτης μετήλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὃσπερ ὡμᾶς φής, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἦ ὦ, ἀλλὰ πρῶις ἐβοήθη τῷ λόγῳ; [ἡ] καὶ ἰκανὸς ἐβοήθησεν ἦ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἦμῶν ἴσελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβεστάτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὡ 'Εχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πάτοτε μάλλον ἡγάσθην ἦ τότε παραγενόμενον. 5 τὸ μὲν ὦν ἐχεῖν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκείνοι ἱσως ὀδηγέν ἄρτοπον ἀλλὰ ἐγώνε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἦδεως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμέμνως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέχατο, ἐπειτα ἦμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἱσθέτο ὃ 'πεπούθημεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἐπειτα ὡς εὖ ἦμᾶς λάσατο καὶ ὀσπέρ πεφευγότας 5 καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προϋτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖ τῶν λόγων.

ΕΧ. Πῶς θῇ;

ΦΑΙΔ. 'Εγὼ ἐρῶ. ἐτυχὼν γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαίχηλου τινός, ὦ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ 89 υψηλότερου ἡ ἐγώ. καταψήφισα σὺν μοῦ τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ συμπίεσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰλθέει γάρ, ὅποτε τόχοι, παίξεων μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὐριον ὅ, ἐφή, ἱσως, ὥ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀπόκερη. 5 'Εοικεν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ω Σώκρατες.

Οὐκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πελθη. Ἀλλὰ τὶ; ἤν δ' ἐγώ.

Τῇμερον, ἐφή, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἦμῶν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἐγώ' ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἶναι καὶ με διαφεύγοι δ' 10 λόγος, ἑνορκοῦν ἄν τοιςαμάν ὀσπέρ 'Ἀργείων, μὴ πρότερον κομήσῃς, πρὶν ἄν νικῆσαι ἀναμαχόμενος τῶν Συμμιᾶ τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.


PLATO, VOL. 1.
'Αλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὗτ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶος τε εἶναι.

'Αλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἐφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐως ἐτὶ φῶς ἑστὶν.

Παρακαλῶ τούν, ἐφην, οὗ ός Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ός Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆς.

Οὐδὲν διώσει, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μη πάθωμεν.

Τὸ ποίον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὦς, μισόλογοι, ὡσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι. ὡς οὖκ ἑστὶν, ἐφη, ὅτι ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἦ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισάνθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισαν-

5 θρωπία ἐνοῦται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τών πιστεύσαι ἀνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγίσασθαι παντάπασι γε ἅληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγίη καὶ πιστῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπειτα ὀλίγου ὑστερον εὑρεῖν τούτων πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀπιστών, καὶ αὐθίν προστατοῦντος τοῦ τούτων μάλιστα οὖς ἄν ἡγίσαιτο.

οἰκιεύσατος τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσ-

κρούσι συμεὶ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγίες εἶναι το παράπαν. ἦ οὖκ ἠθέλησαι σὺ πῷ πού τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

Πάνιν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ὁυκὼν, ἦ δ' ὦς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ ταύθρωπεω ὁ τοιοῦτος χρήσαται ἐπεικειμεν τοῖς ἄνθρω-

ποῖς; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὡσπερ ἐχει ὑστος ἂν ἡγίσατο, τοὺς μὲν ἁρπαστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγώ.

"Ὡσπερ, ἦ δ' ὦς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων"
οἰεὶ τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξεύρειν ἀνθρωπον ἡ κύνα ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιον; ἡ αὖ ταχύν ἡ βραδὺν ἡ ἀσχρόν ἡ καλὸν ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλανα; ἡ οὐχὶ ἴσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἑσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλγία, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀφθονα καὶ πολλά; 

Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 

Οὐκοῦν οἰεὶ, ἐφη, εἰ ποιηρίας ἄγων προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλγίους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανήναι; 

Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 

Εἰκὸς γὰρ, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὄμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ ὑπνὴ προάγοντο ἐγώ ἐφεσπομένη, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἦ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύῃ λόγῳ τωσ ἀληθεί ἐστε ἁνει τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τῆς κατασκεύαστα ὀλγίου ὅστε δόξῃ ψευδής εἶναι, εἵνεκε μὲν ὅν, εἵνεκε δ' οὐκ ὅν, καὶ αὐθινές ἐπεροι καὶ ἐπεροὶ—καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀνυλογοίς λόγους διατρίψαντες ὀδοθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἶνοται σοφότατοι γεγονέναι καὶ καταγενθέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὐτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὔδενος οὔδεν ὄγει οὐδε βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἅλλα πάντα ὅτα οὔτα ἄτεχνως ὄσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπω ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνων οὔδενα ἐν 5 οὐδείς μένει.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὴς λέγεις. 

Οὐκοῦν, ὥ Φαίδων, ἐφη, οἰκτρὸν ἀν ἐι τὸ πάθος, εἰ τὸ αὐτοὺς ὅτι τῶν ἀληθείς καὶ βέβαιον λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοήσαι, ἐπείτη διὰ τὸ παραγίνεσθαι τοιούτως τωσ ἐν λόγους, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μῆ, μή ἔατον τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τῇν ἐαυτοῦ ἄτεχνην, ἅλλα τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἄλγεων ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' 

5 ἐαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσατο καὶ ἡ ἡ τῶν λοιπῶν βίων μισῶν τε καὶ λοιπόν τους λόγους διατελοὶ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.

Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦκτρον ὕπτα. Πρῶτον μὲν τούς, ἑφη, τούτῳ εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ

κατείχομεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ύγίες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὃτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω ύγίως ἐχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ύγίως ἐχειν, σοὶ μὲν σὺν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα βίων παντὸς ἑνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ

αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύον ἐγώγη ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον οὐ φιλοσόφως ἐχειν ἀλλ’ ὄσπερ οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅτι μὲν ἐχει περὶ ὧν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἦ ὁ φροντι-

5 ζουσι, ὅπως δὲ ἡ αὐτοὶ ἐθεύτο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τούτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ εὐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰπὶ πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτοὶ ἐμοὶ ὃτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως

ἀ ἐχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φιλε ἐταίρε—θέσασι ὃς πλεονεκτικῶς—εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὡντα ἡ λέγω, καλῶς ἡ ἐχει τὸ πεισθήναι εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσατι, ἀλλ’ ὃν τοῦτον γε τὸν χρόνου αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς

5 παροῦσιν ἀνήστι ἐσομαι ὁδυρόμενος, ᾧ δὲ ἀνοίᾳ μοι αὐτῇ οὐ συνδιατελεῖ—κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν—ἀλλ’ ὁλόγον ὥσπερ ἀπο-

λείτα. παρεσκευασμένοι δη, ἑφη, ὃ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὐτωσὶ ἐρχομαι ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων’ ὑμεῖς μεντοῦ, ἂν ἔμοι πει-

c θησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ύμῶν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομο-

λογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβοῦμενοι

d6 τοῖς λόγοις B²TW: om. B

a8-9 δόξει T: δόξη B a8 προθυμήσομαι T: προθυμήσομαι B b1 ὁς BΤ: ὄσπερ W b4 γε B²TW: δὲ B b5 ἀνοίᾳ B²TW: διάνοια B b7 ὅδ H: μὲν ὅδ Th c2 λέγειν ἀληθές T c3 εὐλαβοῦμενοι B²TW: om. B
οπως μη ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἀμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξα-
πατήσας, ὦστερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπῶν οἰχήσομαι. 5
'Αλλ' ἵτεον, ἐφη. πρώτων μὲ υπομνήσατε ἐλέγετε, ἕαν
μη φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγγυμαι,
ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θεότερον καὶ
κάλλιον δι τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύνητα ἐν ἄρμονίας εἶδει
οὖσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξε τούτο μὲν ἐμοι συγχωρεῖν,
pολυχρονιῶτερον γε εἶναι ψυχῆν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε
ἀδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατα-
τράφασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταίον σῶμα καταληπόσα ὑν 5
ἀτὴ ἀπολλύνηται, καὶ ἦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλε-
θρος, ἐπεὶ σώμα γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται.
ἀρα ἀλλ' ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεὶ ἦμᾶς
ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
Συνωμολογεῖτην ὑπ' ἡ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀμφω. 92
Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ
ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ;
Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ.
Τί οὖν, ἢ ὁ ὁς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν φ' 5
ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὗτως
ἐχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἐχειν ἀλλοθὶ πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τὸ σῶματι ἐνδεθῆναι;
'Ἐγώ μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τὸτε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην
ὑπ' αὐτὸν καὶ νῦν ἐμμενὼ ὡς οὐδεὶ λόγῳ.
Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὗτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ
ἀν θαυμάζωμι εἰ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτὲ τι δόξειν. 5
Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἀλλά ἀνάγκη σοι, ἐφη, ἡ ἐκεί Θηβαίε,
ἀλλα δόξαι, ἐκατέρ μεινὴ ἢδε ἡ οὔησις, τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι
σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

c 7 γαρ B: om. T ὡς ἐγγυμαι om. W: ἐγγυμαι s.v. W d 1 κάλ-
λιστον W d 5 νῦν ἀντε τὸ τελευταῖον transp. T d 8 δὲ ἐ
δὴ T e 4 ἐφάτην T b Stob.: φάτην B W e 5 λέγετε T Stob.:
λέγεται B W e 7 ἐλλοθὶ T : ἐλλο τι b Stob.: ἐλλοθι τοῦ W
a 3 ἐμμενὼ W a 5 ἐλλο T b: ἐλλα B W Stob. ἄτρε τι scripsi:
pοτὲ ἐτὶ T Stob.: ποτὲ B W a 7 ἐλλα] ἐλλο Stob. δόξαι T
Stob. (sed δοξαί ev pr. T): δοξάσαί B W
σώμα ἐντεταμένων συγκείσθαι οὐ γάρ ποιν ἀποδέξῃ γε
ប  σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρῶτερον ἢν ἄρμονία συγκείμενη, πρὶν
ἐκείνα εἶναι ἕξ ὥν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἡ ἀποδέξῃ;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Ἀλαθάνη οὖν, ἡ δ' ὦ, ὅτι ταυτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν,
5 ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων εἶδός
te καὶ σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκείμενην ἐκ τῶν
οὐδέτων ὑπότων; οὐ γάρ ὅτι ἄρμονία γε σοι τοιοῦτον ἔστων
oriously, ἀλλὰ πρῶτερον καὶ η λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ
c οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἄναρμοστοι ὑπεσ γίγνονται, τελευταίοι δὲ
πάντων συνίσταται η ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὕτως
οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσσεται;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίλας.
5 Καὶ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὦ, πρέπει γε ἐπερ τῷ ἀλλῷ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ
εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας.
Πρέπει γάρ, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίλας.

Οὕτως τοῖςν, ἐφη, σοι οὐ συνῳδός· ἀλλ' ὅρα πότερον
αἱρῇ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμυνσιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν
10 ἄρμονίαν;

Πολὺ μάλλον, ἐφη, ἐκείνοιν, ὁ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γὰρ

d μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδέξεως μετὰ ἐκότος τυχός καὶ εὐπρε-
πειας, οἶδεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς
diὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὸς ἀποδέξεις ποιομένους λόγοις σύνοιδα
οὕσων ἀλαξίωσιν, καὶ άν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φιλάττηται, εὕ μάλα
5 ἐξαπατῶσιν, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν.
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμύνσεως καὶ μαθῆσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως
ἄξιας ἀποδέξασθαι εἰρήται. ἐρρήθη γάρ ποιν οὕτως ἦμων
εἶναι ἡ ψυχή· καὶ πρὶν εἰς σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴς
ἔστω ἡ οὐσία ἐχουσα τὴν ἑπώνυμαι τὴν τοῦ "δ έστιν"

b 1 σαυτοῦ B² TW Stob.: αὐτοῦ B b 4 ὦ ΒΤ Stob.: ὦ τι ωὐ W
b 6 ττ B² TW: γε B: om. Stob. b 8 ὧ B² TW Stob.: ὦ B
ɔ3 ξυνάσσεται B² TW: ξυνάσσεται B: ξυνανάσσεται Stob. ɔ8 σολ.

οὐ B² TW Stob.: οὐ Β ɔ9 ψυχή B² TW Stob.: ψυχή B
c 11 ἐφη ἐκείνοι B (ἐκείνοις B²); ἐκείνοιν ἐφη B² TW Stob.
d 7 ὑποδε-
ξάσθαι W sed à supra ό d 8 αὐτῆς] αὐτὴ Mudge
φαίδων

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εγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτοῦ πείθω, ικανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀπο- δέξημαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταύτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἀρμονία.

Τι δὲ, ἢ δ' ὅς, δ' Συμμία, τίδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἄρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκει ἄλλως πως ἔχεω ἢ ὡς ἀν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη ἢ ἄν συγκέντρα;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχεω ἄλλῳ παρ' ἢ ἄν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῆ ἢ πάσχη; 

Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσήκει ἄρμονίαν τούτων ἢ ἣν ἄν συντεθῇ, ἄλλῃ ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἄρμονία κυηθῇναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.

Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἐφη.

Τι δὲ; οὐχ οὐτως ἄρμονία πέφυκεν εἰναι ἐκάστη ἄρμονία ὡς ἄν ἄρμοσθῇ;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη.

"Η οὖν ἢ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἰπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἄν ἄρμονία εἰη καὶ πλεῖων, εἰ δ' ἢττον τε καὶ ἢτ' ἐλαττον, ἦττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;

Πάνυ γε.

"Η οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἢτ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰναι, ψυχήν;

Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη.

Φέρε δὴ, ἐφη, πρὸς Διὸς· λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχεω καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἰναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιαν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἰναι κακή· καὶ ταύτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;

"Αληθῶς μέντοι.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἰναι τι τις φήσει
taύτα οὖνta εἰναι εν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τήν
5 κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐτῷ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;
kai τὴν μὲν ἡμώσθαι, τὴν γαθῆναι, καὶ ἔχειν εν αὐτῇ
ἀρμονία ύπατη ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτὴν τε
einai kai ouk éxeh en auti allhn;

Οὐκ ἔχω ἐγωγ', ἔφη δ' Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δήλον δ' ὦτι
tοιαυτ' ἄττ' ἀν λέγου ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος.

Καλλα προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον
ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆν ψυχής εἰναι· τούτῳ δ' ἐστι τὸ ὁμο-
lόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ'
ἐλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας εἰναι. ἡ γάρ;

5 Πάνω γε.
Την δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἀρμονίαν οὐσαν μήτε
μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡμώσθαι· ἔστων οὕτως;

'Εστων.

Ἡ δὲ μητε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡμοσμένη ἔστων οὕτι πλέον
10 ἡ ἐλαττον ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἡ τὸ ἴσον;
Τὸ ἴσον.

Οὐκοίν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἄλλη
e ἄλλης αὐτὸ τούτῳ, ψυχῆ, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον
ημοσται;
Οὕτω.

Τοῦτο δὲ γε πεπονθώια οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ
5 ἀρμονίας μετέχοι αὖ;
Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

Τοῦτο δ' αὐτε πεπονθώια ἅρ' ἀν τι πλέον κακίας ἥ ἀρετῆς
μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἥ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἥ δὲ
ἀρετῆ ἀρμονία εἰ;
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

Οὐδὲν πλέον.
Μάλλον δὲ γέ που, ὡς Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχῇ μεθὲξει, εἰπὲρ ἄρμονια ἑστὶν ἄρμονία γὰρ οὕτω παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὀνόσα, ἄρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἀν μετάσχοι.

Οὐ μέντοι.
Οὐδὲ γε οὕτω ψυχῆν, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχῆν, κακίας.
Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;
'Εκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῶν ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται, εἰπὲρ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαὶ, εἴναι.

'Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες.
'Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅσ', οὔτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσχεν ἀν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἤν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν εἴναι;

Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη.
Τῇ δὲ; ἢ δ' ὅσ': τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὅτι ἀλλο λέγεις ἄρχεις ἡ ψυχὴν ἀλλώς τε καὶ φρόνιμον;

Οὐκ ἐγώγε.
Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιομενὴν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόντι, οὔτω καθήμερος ἐνόντως καὶ δύσους ἐπὶ τοιναύτιον ἐλκεω, τὸ μὴ πίνεω, καὶ πείνης ἑνοῦσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθλεω, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποιν ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιομενὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα: ἢ οὖ;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μὴποτ' ἀν αὐτὴν, ἄρμονίαις γε οὐσαν, ἐναντία ἢδεις οἷς ἐπιτείνωτο

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5 καὶ χαλάτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιωνὶ πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἑπεσθαί ἐκεῖνοι καὶ οὐποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν;

'Ωμολογήσαμεν, ἐφη· πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τί οὖρ; νῦν οὖ πάν τουναντίον ἡμῶν φαίνεται ἐργαζόμενη, ἡ ἡγεμονεύουσα τε ἐκεῖνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί. τις αὐτὴν δ动, καὶ ἐναντιομενή ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλέπωτερον κολά-ζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικήν καὶ τὴν λατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ 5 νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅργαις καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἀλλή οὖσα ἅλλω πράγματι διαλεγόμενη; οἷον που καὶ 'Ομηρος ἐν 'Οδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν 'Οδυσσέα·

στήθος δὲ πλῆξας κραδίην ἠνίπατε μύθων·

tέτλαθι ὅ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἐτλης.

ἀρ' οἷς αὐτῶ παίδα ποίησας διανοούμενον ὅς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὖσης καὶ οἷς ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθη-μάτων, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἷς ἄγει τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ 5 οὖσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειότερον τιῦδο πράγματος ἥ καθ' ἄρμονίαν;

Νὴ Δία, ὧ Σῶκρατες, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Οὐκ ἀρα, ὦ ἅριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχήν ἀρμονίαν τινά φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς ἐοίκεν, 'Ομήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογούμεν οὔτε αὐτοί ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

'Εχει οὕτως, ἐφη.

Εἰεν δή, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τά μὲν 'Αρμονίας ἡμῖν τής 5 Οἰηβαϊκῆς ὑλεὰ πώς, ὡς ἐοίκε, μετρῶς γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἐφη, ὡς Κέβης, πῶς ιλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;

Σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσεις· τούτων γονήν

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c5 ψάλλοιτο pr. T (ut vid.) Stob.: πάλλοιτο B TW e6 τυγχάνοι T: τυγχάνει B Stob. e9 νῦν B T Stob.: om. W d1 ἐναντιομενή B2 TW Stob.: ἐναντιομενήν B d3 τε B T Stob.: δὲ W e3 παθημάτων B2 TW Stob.: παθῶν B e5 πράγματος B: om. T Stob. e7 ἐμοίγε B Stob.: ἐμοὶ T a3 ἔχει TW Stob.: ἔχει B T a7 τουτού B: τούτον T
τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἦπορεί, πάνυ ἑθαύ-
μαζον εἰ τι ἔξεις τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ: πάνυ ὁν b μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρῶτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι 
tου σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμι καὶ τοῦ τοῦ 
Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

'Ωγαθέ, ἐφη ο Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν 5 
βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἐσέσθαι. 
ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρίκος 
ἐγγὺς ἱόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ 
κεφαλαιόν ὃν ζητεῖς· αξίοις ἐπιδεικνύει ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὐσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλ-
λων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενοι ἀποθανόν ἐκεὶ 
εὐ πράξεων διαφεροῦτος ἢ εἰ ἐν ἀλλῷ βίῳ βιοὺς ἔτελεύτα, 
μὴ ἀνώτερον τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρῆσει. τὸ δὲ ἀπο-
φαίνειν ὅτι ἵσχυρον τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή καὶ θεοεἰδές καὶ ἢν ἐτι 5 
πρότερον, πρὸν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν 
φής πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυ-
χρόνιον τέ ἐστιν ψυχή καὶ ἢν ποὺ πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον 
χρόνον καὶ ὢσει τε καὶ ἐπραττεῖν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ 
oυδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτό τὸ εἰς ἀν-
θρώπον σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἄρχη ἢν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὅσπερ νόσοι 
καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένῃ τε ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῇ καὶ τελευτῶσα 
geν ἐν τῷ καλομέμενῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ 
φής οὐδέν εἶπε τὸ ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἶπε πολλάκις, πρὸς 5 
ge τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβείσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβείσθαι, 
eὶ μὴ ἀνώτερος εἰς, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς 
ἀθάνατον ἐστιν. τοιαύτ' ἄττα ἐστίν, οὐκαί, ὥ Ἐβης, ἃ ε

a 9 δτε] ἃ τί cf. Forster b 1 χρῆσασθαι B: χρήσθαι T: oúν T: 
μὲν οὖν B b 5 ἡμῶν W: ἡμῶν BT b 6 ἐσέσθαι BT: λέγεσθαι 
B²W t c 3 εἰ B: om. T e 5 ἢν BT: ὅτι ἢν B²W e 7 φῆς 
ἀν in marg. b πολυχρονιστέρον W c 8 ὅσον χρόνον B: om. T 
d 4 διαφέρει al. Heindorf d 6 προσήκειν Baiter e 1 τοιαύτ' 
ἄττα B: τοιαύτα T
λέγεις: καὶ ἑξεπτύχθης πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ὡς μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει, προσθήσῃ ἡ ἄφελης.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλὰ οὔδεν ἔγγυε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφη,

5 οὔτε ἄφελεῖν οὔτε προσθείαιν δέομαι ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα δὲ λέγω.

Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνων ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαίλλον πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ζητεῖς ὡς γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν δια- πραγματεύσασθαί. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δείμω περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐάν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη: ἐπείτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαύνηται ὃν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθω περὶ ὃν ὅτι λέγεις χρήσι.

5 Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε.

'Ακοῦσ τούτων ὡς ἔρούντος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ὃν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἑπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢν ἢν καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἰστορίαν ὑπερήφανοι γὰρ μοι ἐδόκει εἰναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτιὰς ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἐκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἄπολυται καὶ διὰ τί ἐστι, καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε:" Ἀρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τιά λάβη, ὡς τινες ἐλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζώα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἰμὰ ἐστὶν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄρη ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ

5 τούτων μὲν οὔδεν, ὃ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὃ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τὸν ἀκούειν καὶ δράν καὶ ὀσφαίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο ὁμοιἡ καὶ δόξα, ἢ δὲ νομήκη καὶ δόξης λα- βούσης τὸ ἢρμείων, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορᾶς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν

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τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὗτος ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς c ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφύης εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμή-
ριον δὲ σοι ἐρώ ἰκανόν ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἡπιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκοιν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη, ὡστε 5 ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἐδείκνυε, ἐπεὶ ἀλλῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὰ ἀνθρώπως αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ ὦμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἔσθειν καὶ πίνειν: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν στίλων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσ- γένωται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστά, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστους προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὄλγον ὦμουν ὄντα υποτερον πολὺν γεγονόν, καὶ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἀνθρωπον μέγαν, οὗτως 5 τότε ὦμην ὑ γι δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;

'Εµοιχε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐγί. ὦμην γὰρ ἰκανόν μοι δοκεῖν, ὃποτε τις φαίνοντο ἀνθρωποι παραστάσεις μέγας σμικρά μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἔπποσ ἔπποσ καὶ ἔτει γε τοῦτων ε ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδοκεῖ τῶν ὁκτὼ πλέων εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτῶν προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηxu τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἥματε αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.

Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πόρρω ποι, ἔφη, νὴ Δία εἰμὶ εἶναι τοῦ οἶεσθαι περὶ τοῦτων του τήν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅσ γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπείδαι ἐνὶ τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἂ τὸ ἐν ὃς προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἃ τὸ προστεθὲν, ἃ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ὃς προσ-

eτέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο: 97 θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὄτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἄλληλων ἢν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἢν καὶ οὐκ ἥστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ᾿
ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλους, αὕτη ἀρα αὐτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο
5 γενέσθαι, ή σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίου ἀλλήλων τεθήναι. οὖδὲ
γε ὃς ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὃς αὕτη
αὖ αὐτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γάρ
b γίγνεται ἢ τότε αὐτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι
συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἐτέρων ἔτερῳ,
νῦν δ' οὐτί ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέρων ἀφ' ἔτερου. οὖδὲ
γε δ' οὐτί ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πεῖθω ἐμαυτόν,
5 οὖδ' ἄλλο οὔδεν εὐλόγῳ δι' οὐτί γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ
ἔστι, κατὰ τούτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων
tρόπων αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσέμει.
'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινὸς, ὃς ἔφη, Ἦναξ-
c αγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοιτο, καὶ λέγοντος ὃς ἀρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ
διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αὐτίως, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αὐτίᾳ ἡσθήν τε
καὶ ἔδοξε μοι τρόπον τωδ' ἐν ἔχεω τὸ τῶν νοῶν εἶναι πάντων
αὐτίων, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτ' οὕτως ἔχει, τῶν γε νοῶν
5 κοσμούντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέναι ταύτη δηθῇ
ἀν βέλτιστα ἐχῇ; εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αὐτίαν εὐρείᾳ
περὶ ἐκάστου δηθῇ γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἔστι, τοῦτο δὲν
περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρείᾳ, δηθῇ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἡ εἶναι ἡ
d ἄλλο ὅτιον πάσχειν ἡ ποιεῖν· εκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτον
οὔδεν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ-
νοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἂλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τούτων καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι·
5 τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταύτα δὴ
λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἡγήκεινα ὄμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αὐτίας
περὶ τῶν δύτων κατὰ νοῶν ἐμαυτῷ, τῶν Ἦναξαγόρων, καὶ
μοι φράσεων πρώτων μὲν πόσερον ἡ γῇ πλατείᾳ ἔστιν ἡ
e στρογγυλή, ἐπειδῆ δὲ φράσειν, ἐπεκδημήγησθαι τὴν αὐτίαν

a.4 αὐτοῖς αὐτία T τοῦ δύο W: δύο B: δυοῖν T a 6 διχάσῃ W
a 7 αδ om. T b 1 ἢ W: ἢ B T μὲν om. W b 2 τὸ πλησίον
et mox τὸ ἐτέρων W b 3 ὑφ' W b 5 εἶνεν δάχφ ρως B: εἴν
ἄλγυφ T ἡ γίγνεται W c 2 δῇ B Eus.: δῇ T ὁ Eus.: om. T c 7 δηθ' ἡ Eus. c 8 αὐτῷ B² T W Eus.: αὐ-
tῶν B d 2 προσήκειν B² T W Eus.: προσήκεις B W ἐκεῖνον B: om.
T W Eus. d 3 τῶν B² T W Eus.: om. B d 8 ἔστιν om. W e 1 ἐπεκδημήγησθαι W (et mox e 4, b 3)
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καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμεῶνοι καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἀμεῶνον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἶ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεθαι ὡς ἀμεῶνοι ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὃς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἥλιου οὗτο παρεσκευάζημην ὡςαύτως πενεσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτὲ ταῦτ' ἀμεῶνον ἐστίν ἐκαστὸν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀ πάσχειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ αὐτὸν φύμην, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήθησαν, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοὶς αἰτίας ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστίν ὡςπερ ἔχειν ἐκάστω ὃν. αὐτῶν ἁποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῆς πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον φύμη καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πάσων ἐπεκδιηγήσεθαι ἄγαθον καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἄλλα πάνυ σπουδὴ λαβών τὰς βίβλους ὃς τάχιστα οἴος τ' ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ὦς ὅς τάχιστα εἰδεῖν τὸ ἐβελτίστων καὶ τὸ χείρον.

Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστής ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φύσμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδή προϊόν καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὥρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὖν ἡμῶν χρόμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἄρας δὲ καὶ αἰϑέρας καὶ ὡδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξευν ὁμοίωτατον πεπονθέναι ὡςπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅτα πράττει νῦν πράττει, κἀπείτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων δι' ἐκάστω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε καθήμαι, ὅτι σύγκειοι μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὡστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡστὰ ἐστὶ στερεὰ καὶ διαφυγὰς ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλων, τὰ δὲ νεύρα οἷα ἐπιτεύνευσαν καὶ ἀνίσευσαν, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὡστὰ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτὰ· αἰσθημένων οὖν τῶν ὡστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλώτα καὶ συντείνοντα·

α.1 ἀποφαίνοι Τb: ἀποφαίνοιτο Β παρεσκευάζαιν Ευσ. ὑποθέμενος Ετ γρ. Τ: ὑποθέμενος Ε. Α.Β αἰτίας αὐτῶν Β'<Σ> βέλτιστον Ευσ. Α.Τ b.7 ὦ ἑταῖρε ἐλπίδος ΤΕυσ. 03 λέγοι pr. W
τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι ποὺ ποιεῖ οὖν τ’ εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ
5 μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κα-
θημα' καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας
αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία
e τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενοι, ἀμελῆσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν,
ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίωι ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψη-
φᾶσθαι, διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτὸ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε
καθήθον, καὶ δικαίοτέρων παραμένουσιν ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην
5 ἢν ἄν κελεύσωσιν· ἔπει νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι ἂν
99 ταύτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὅστα ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βουτών ἢν,
ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαίοτερον ὃμην
καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεῦγεν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν
ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥμων' ἄν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἰτία μὲν
5 τὰ τοιαύτα καλεῖν λιῶν ἀτόπουν· εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ
τοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχειν καὶ ὅστα καὶ νέυρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω
οὐκ ἂν οὖς τ’ ἢ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντα μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγων· ὡς
μέντοι διὰ ταύτα ποιῶ ὑ ποιῶ, καὶ ταύτα νῦ πράττων, ἀλλ’ οὐ
b τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ βαθμία εἰς
τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οὖν τ’ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν
t ἢ ἕστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὐ τὸ αἴτιον
οὐκ ἂν ποτ’ εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφάντες οἱ
5 πολλοὶ ὀσπέρ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὁνύματι προσχρόμενοι,
ὡς αἴτιον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύσειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὃ μὲν τις δώτη
περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένει δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῇν,
ὁ δὲ ὀσπέρ καρδόπω φπαλεία βάθρων τοῦ ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδε
5 τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὅσον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι δύναμιν οὖν
νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτῃ ὡς τίτινοιν οὔτε ταύτα ἄοινται δαι-
μονιὰν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἄλλα ἤγονται τοῦτον "Ἀτλαντα ἄν
ποτε ἔσχυρότερον καὶ ἄδανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπαντᾷ

d 4 ποι om. W e 5 κελεύσωσιν T a i καὶ
TW Eus.: τε καὶ B a 6 ἄλλα ὅσα W a 7 ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι om. T
a 8 ποιῶ & B² T W Eus.: ποιῶν & B πράττων Heindorf: πράττω
B T W Eus. b i ἐν TW Eus.: om. B (post ῥαθύμια recc.)
b 3 ἢ στή τι T ἐκεῖνο BT Simpl. Stob.: ἐκεῖνο B² W t b 5 σκότω
W ὁνύματι T Simpl. Stob.: ὁνύματι B W B 8 ἀέρα BT
Simpl. Eus, Stob.: ἀέρα κἀτ’ W e i βέλτιστα αὐτᾶ T Simpl. Eus.
Stob.: αὐτὰ βέλτιστα B² W: βέλτιστον αὐτᾶ B e 3 ἂν ποτε
Ἀτλαντα TW Eus. Stob.
συνέχοντα ἐξευρείως, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον 5
συνεδρία καὶ συνέχεια οὐδὲν οὖνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς
tοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητής ὅτου οὐκ ἄν
γενόμην ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρέi
οὐτὶ παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οὔς τε γενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον
πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησον ἣ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει d
σοι, ἐφε, ἐπιδειξεὶς ποιήσωμαι, δὲ Κέβης;
Τ' ὑπερφυῖς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὡς βούλομαι.
'Ἐδοξεὶ τοῖς μοι, ἢ δ' ὦς, μετὰ ταύτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη
tὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῦ εὐλαβηθήναι μὴ πάθοιμ ʰθπερ οἱ τὸν 5
ἡλιον ἐκκλησίωτα θεωροῦντα καὶ σκοποῦμενοι πάσχοσουν'
dιαφθείρονται γάρ που ἐνιοῦ τὰ ὄμματά, ἐὰν μή ἐν ὑδατὶ ἢ
tυι τοιούτῳ σκοπῆται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τι καὶ e
ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἐδέισα μὴ παντόπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλο-
θείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη
tῶν αὐτοθέωσων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεθαι αὐτῶν. ἐδοξεὶ δ' ὦς
χρήνα εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν 5
tῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀληθείαν. ἵσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον
tινα οὐκ ἐοικεν' οὐ γάρ πάνω συγχρώμο τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] λόγοις 100
σκοποῦμενοι τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόνι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τῶν ἐν
[τοῖς] ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν δ' ἐπὶ ταύτη γε ἄρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος
ἐκάστοτε λόγον ἄν κράνῳ ἐρρωμενέστατον εἰναι, δ' μὲν
ἀν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ οὖνα, καὶ 5
περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων [ὄντων], ἢ δ' ἄν
μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δὲ σοι σαφέστερον εἶπεῖν
ἀ λέγων' οἴμαι γάρ σε ὑπὲρ οὐ μανθάνεω.
Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἐφη δ' Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.
'Αλλ', ἢ δ' ὦς, δὲδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καῖνῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἀεὶ δὲι b

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τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληφθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαιμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὁ πεπραγμάτευμα, καὶ εἰμὶ πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα
5 τὰ πολυθρόλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τάλλα πάντα· ἀ εἰ μοι δώσω τέ καὶ συνχωρεῖσι εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξει καὶ ἀνευρήσεις ὡς ἀδάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή.

c 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.

Σκότει δὴ, ἐφή, τὰ ἐξής ἐκείνος εἶν τοις συνδοκῇ ὦστερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γὰρ μοι, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτό
5 τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιάδε αἰτία συνχωρείς;

Συνχωρῶ, ἐφή.

Ὅν τοίνυν, ἢ δ' οὖς, ἐτί μανθάνω οὐδὲ ὑναμαί τὰς ἄλλας
10 αἰτίας τὰς σοφᾶς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ' εὰν τὸς μοι λέγῃ
d δι' ὦτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὄτιον, ἢ χρώμα εὐανθέος ἔχον· ἢ σχῆμα
ἡ ἄλλο ὄτιον τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαῖρεν ἢδω,
—ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι—τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἰσως εὐήθως ἔχον παρ' ἐμαντῷ, ὦτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι
5 ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παροῦσι εἴτε
κομνωνία εἴτε ὅτι δὴ καὶ ὅπως ζ' προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ
tοῦτο διασχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὦτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ
[γίγνεται] καλὰ. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλεστάτων εἶναι καὶ ἐμαντῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τοῦτον ἐχόμενος
e ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅπως ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ
[γίγνεται] καλὰ· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ;

b 2 τὲ B² TW : καὶ B b 3 γὰρ B : om. T b 8 σοι B : se T
tv B T : τὴν τε W b 9 ἢ om. pr. T e 4, 5 πλὴν . . . καλὸν
B² TW : om. B d 1 (bis) B : ἢ ὅτι B³ TW d 4 εὐθεὸς W
d 6 προσγενομένη] προσγενορυσμένη Wytenbach d 7 πάντα TW b : om. B d 8 γίγνεται Tb : om. BW d 9 ἀποκρίνεσθαι T
e 3 γίγνεται T et (post καλὰ) W : om. B
Δοκεῖ.
Καὶ μεγέθει ἁρὰ τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζων μείζων, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων;

Ναὶ.
Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρ’ ἀν ἀποδέχου εἰ τίς των φαίη ἐτέρου ἐτέρου ἡ κεφαλὴ μείζων εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττων τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττων, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἄν ὦτι ὦτι μὲν οὕδεν ἄλλο λέγεις ἡ ὦτι τὸ μείζων πάν ἐτέρου ἐτέρου οὔθεν ἄλλῳ μείζων ἐστὶν ἡ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζων, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων οὔθεν ἄλλῳ ἐλάττων ἡ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ἐλάττων, διὰ τὴν σμικρότηταν, φοβοῦμενοι οὐμαί μή τίς σοι ἐμαυτός λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζων τῷ φής εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττων, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζων μείζων εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρῷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζων μείζων εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ των μέγαν των εἶναι: ἡ οὐκ ἃν φοβοῦν τάῦτα;

Καὶ δ’ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
Οὐκών, ἡ δ’ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὅκτων δυοῖν πλεῖον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῦν ἃν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ διὰ τὸ ὄπειρα τοῦ πηχουλοῦ ἡμίσει μείζων εἶναι ἄλλ’ οὐ μεγέθει; δ’ αὐτὸς γὰρ πον φόβος.

Πάνυ γ’, ἔφη.
Τί δὲ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντω τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἡ διασχισθέντωσ τὴν σχῖσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἃν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἃν βοῆς ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα ἄλλος πως ἐκαστὸν γιγνόμενον ἡ μετάσχειν τῆς ἱδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστοτε οὐ ἃν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην των αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλ’ ἡ τῆς τῆς δυνάμεως μετάσχεσιν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἃν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσσεσθαι, τὰς ὑπὸ σχῆσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαῦτας κομψεῖς ἐφής ἃν χαίρειν, παρεῖς

* Σημαντικές αλλαγές: Οι μεταξύ των 6, 8, 10 είναι αλλαγές μετάφρασης.
αποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαντοῖς σοφωτέροις· οὐ δὲ δεδώς ἂν, τὸ
ΔΑ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκίαν καὶ τὴν ἄπειραν, ἡχόμενος
ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναυ ἂν,
εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρεις ἡ̉ς ἂν καὶ
οὐκ ἀποκρίναυ ἐως ἂν τὰ ἀπ’ ἑκείνης ὄρμηθέντα σκέψαυ
ΕἸ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἡ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπείδη δὲ ἑκείνης
αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὕσαυτως ἂν διδόλη, ἀλλην ἂ ὑπὸ
ὁπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἦτις τῶν ἀνωθὲν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο,
ΕΩς ἔπι τι ίκανον ἐλθόις, ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροι αὕστερ οἱ
ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ
ἑκείνης ὄρμημέων, εἴπερ βούλιῳ τι τῶν ὄντων ἑυρεῖων;
ἑκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἵσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τοῦτον λόγον οὔδὲ
ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ· ίκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκάντες ὅμως
δύνασθαι αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ’, εἴπερ εἰ τῶν ἑφίλοσόφων,
ΟΙΣ ὅμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.
'Αληθέστατα, ἑφί, λέγεις; ὁ τε Σύμμιας ἃμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.
ΕΧ. Νὴ Δία, ὁ Φαῖδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γὰρ
μοι δοκεῖ ὃς ἑναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρῶν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν
ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
παροῦσι χείλεμεν.
ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἀποδούσι, νῦν δὲ ἄκοινοιν. ἀλλὰ
τῶν δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεύκηντα;
ΦΑΙΔ. Ὅς μὲν ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρίζῃ,
καὶ ὀμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τοῦτων
tάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τῆν ἐπωνύμιαν ἤσχεων,
τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρότα, ἔλθη δὴ, ἦ δ’ ὃς· ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις,
ἀρ’ όν, ὅταν Σύμμιαν Σωκράτους φῆς μειζὸν εἶναι, Φαῖδωνος
ὁ δὲ ἐλάττων, λέγεις τὸτ’ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σύμμια ἀμφότερα, καὶ
μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;

Δ1 σαυτοῦ Β’ΤΩ: ἦαυτοῦ Β B‘ΤΩ: ἦαυτοῦ Β
Δ2 ἀποκρίνοις πτ. ΤΩ: ἦεφοιτο Μαδβίγ
Δ3 εφοιτο Madvig
Δ6 αὐ Β: τ’Τ
Ε3 ὀμολογεῖτο πτ. Τ
Ε4 οὖδὲ εἰς Β: οὖδές ΤΩΒ
Ε5 ὅμως
Β’ΤΩ: δύμως Β
Ε7 τὸ τ’Β: τότε Τ: ταῦΤ
"Εγώγε.

'Αλλά γάρ, ἢ ὁ δὲ, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Συμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοὺς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὔτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ ποι πεφυκέναι Συμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Συμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυχανὲν ἔχων όὔτ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὃτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὃτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων μέγεθος;

'Αληθῆ.

Οὐδὲ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὃτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὃτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Συμμίαν σμικρότητα;

*Εστι ταῦτα.

Οὕτως ἀρα ὁ Συμμίας ἐπωνυμιάν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὃν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχουν. Καὶ ἄμα μειδιάσασα, Ἐοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρείπῃ, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ ποι ὃς λέγω. Συνεφή.

Λέγω δὴ τοῦτ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δὸξαί σοι ὑπερ ἐμοί. 5 ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐκ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἠμὶν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυνῶ τὸ ἐτερον, ἡ φεύγει καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖ ὅταν αὐτῷ προσή ὁ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἡ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἐτερον ἡ ὑπερ ἡμ. ὁ στερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὃν ὁ στερ εἰμι, οὕτως ὃς ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκείνῳ δὲ οὕτω τετάλμηκεν μέγα ὃν 5 σμικρὸν εἶναι ὃς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἠμὶν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτ' ἀλλο οὐδέν τῶν

c6 τῷ ΒΤ: τούτῳ ἡ W d1 ὑπέχων ΤΤW: ὑπερέχων Βτ τῷ ἐξ ὑπὲρ ἡ T et mox om. τοῦ d5 δῇ Τῆς: δῇ ἢ W d6 οὖν τοῦτο(ε) ΒΤ: οὖντε τῆς Τῆς ὑπερεχεῖ B: προσή B: προσή W e4 ὁ στερ W e5 ἐκεῖνο ΒΒΤΤW: ἐκεῖνος Β οὐ BΒΤΤW: om. B e6 ὁ στερ W W e7 γενέσθαι W οὐδὲ ΒΤ: οὕτε ΒΒτ
€ναντίων, ἔτι οὖν ὅπερ ἦν, ἀμα τούναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

Καὶ τίς εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅτις δ' ἦν, οὐ 5 σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῶν λόγοις αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυν λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τούτῳ ἐλάττωσο τὸ μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττων, καὶ ἀτεχνὼς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβάλλων τῷ κεφαλῆι καὶ ἀκούσας, b Ἀνδρικός, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκα, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτω τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἔχοντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομαζόμενες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν οὐν ἐνότον ἐξει τῇ ἐπωνυμίᾳ τὰ ὀνομαζόμεναι· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φαμεν ἐθελήσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἀμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἄρα μή πον, ὁ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σε τι τούτων ἑταραξεν οὖν ὅδε εἶπεν;

5 Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλὰ με ταράττει.

Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἀπλῶς τούτῳ, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

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ε 8 ἐτι δι' Τ W: αὐτίων B et γρ. W a 5 ἡμῖν W: ὑμῖν B T a II παραβάλλων W b 5 ποτε om. T c 2 πρὸς B: els B≠T W c 3 ἔφη ὁ Κέβης T W c 5 οὖδ' αὖ W t: δ' αὖ B T et γρ. W καίτοι obv B2: καὶ τοιοῦτο τι B T W c 8 ἔσεσθαι ante ἐαυτῷ T
"Ετι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἐφη, εἰ ἄρα συνυμολογήσεις. ἂν
θερμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρὸν;

'Εγῳγε.

'Αρ' ὄπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;
Μᾶ Δὴ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

'Αλλ' ἐτερὸν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἐτερὸν τι χιόνος τὸ
ψυχρὸν;

Ναὶ.

'Αλλὰ τὸδε γ' οἷμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὗτον 5
δεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν,
ἐτι ἔσσεθαί ὄπερ ἥν, χιόνα καὶ θερμὸν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος
tοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσεων αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολείσθαι.

Πάνυ γε.

Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς
ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι τοτὲ τολμῆσεις δεξα-
μένου τὴν ψυχρότητα ἢτι εἰναι ὄπερ ἥν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρὸν.

'Αληθῇ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

'Εστῶν άρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ένια τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ
μόνον αὐτό τὸ εἶδος δεξιούσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν
ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλο τὸ ἐστὶ μὲν οὐκ ἑκεῖνο, ἐχεὶ
dὲ τὴν ἑκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ, ὅτανπερ ἥ. ἢτι δὲ ἐν τῶδε 5
ισως ἢσται σαφέστερον δ' λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττῶν ἀεὶ ποὺ
δεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ὄνοματος τυγχάνειν ὄπερ υὼν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ;

Πάνυ γε.

| 'Αρά μόνον τῶν ὄντων—τούτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἠ καὶ ἀλλο
τι δ' ἐστὶ μὲν οὐχ ὄπερ τὸ περιττῶν ὄμως δὲ δεὶ αὐτὸ 104
μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω
πεφυκέναι ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω
δὲ αὐτὸ εἰναι οὖν καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ.

σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς 5

| c 13 χιόνα B: χιών T | d 5 χιόνα γ' W: χιών B T | d 6 πρώ-
σθεν T: ἐμπροσθεν B | d 8 αὔτῳ TW: αὐτῷ B | d 9-11 πάνυ...

ἀπολείσθαι om. T | d 11 τολμήσει B T W: τολμήσει B

| d 5 τῷ T: τοῦ T |
δύομαι αἰὲ προσαγορευτέα εἴναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὃντος οὖχ ὁπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὁμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμίνυ τοῦ ἄριθμοι ἄπας, ὡστε

οὐκ ὁπερ τὸ περιττὸν δεῖ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός· καὶ αὐ τὰ δύο καὶ [τὰ] τέτταρα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἔτερος αὐ ὀ στίχος τοῦ ἄριθμοι οὐκ ὁπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὁμως ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιος ἐστών αἰὲ· συγχωρεῖς ἡ οὐ;

5 Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη.

"Ο τούνω, ἐφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἀθρεί. ἐστών δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκείνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὁντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰὲ τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνη τὴν ἱδέαν ἦ

tοι απολλύμενα ἡ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἦ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείπομεν πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοι πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεύωμεν ἐτὶ τρία οὔτα ἀρτία γενέσθαι;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

5 Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὅσ, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστιν οὔτας τριάδι.
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Οὐκ ᾧρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὖ ὑπομένει ἐπιώντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὖ ὑπομένει ἐπιώντα.

10 Ἀληθεύστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις.

Βούλει οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅσ, ἐὰν οἶοι τ' ὅμεν, ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταύτα ἐστών;
Πάνω γε.

d ὁ Ἀρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἰν ἂν, ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχει μὴ μόνον ἄναγκαζεί τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν αὐτῷ ἵσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τινός;

α 7, οὕτως Heindorf οὕτως T: οὕτω πως Bt
b 2 a τὰ om. T
b 4 aei om. T
b 8 aei εἴχει T: b 10 aντίοις reccc. : aντί BTW
c 2 πρὶν T W: πρὶν ἦ B
c 5 oúde B2 T W: oúde B et ἥ s. v. W
c 8 τὰ om. T: οὔτι δ' ὅσ] ἐφη W
d 1 d B2 W: om. T
D 3 anagkazei B B' TW: anagkazei B aντί B T: aντίοις W ἵσχειν T W: ἵσχειν B
d 3 aυτῷ aei τινός B: aei τινος aντὶ W: δεὶ aντὶ τινος T
"Ωσπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν. οὖσθα γὰρ δὴπον ὅτι ἂν ἦ τῶν 5 τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὖ μόνον τρισίν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

Πάνω γε.

'Επὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὅ, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἂν τούτῳ ἀπεργαζηταί οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι.

Οὐ γάρ.

Εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἦ περιττή;

Ναὶ.

'Εναντία δὲ ταύτη ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου;

Ναὶ.

'Επὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει.

Οὐ δῆτα.

'Αμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.

'Αμοιρα.

'Ανάρτησις ἄρα ἢ τριάς.

Ναἰ.

'Ὁ τούτων ἐλεγον δρίσασθαι, ποιὰ ὦκ ἐναντία τω ὄντα ὁμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον—οῖον νῦν ἢ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γάρ ἐναντίον ἄει αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἄλλα ὅρα δὲ ἑι οὕτως ὀρίζη, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἅ ἁλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὅ ἃν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἔφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἦ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλω δὲ ἄναμμυνήσκουν οὐ 5 γάρ χειρὸν πολλάκις ἀκούεις. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω ἐναντίον, ὁμως δὲ τὴν
τοῖς περιττοῖς οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὸ ἢμισυν, τὴν τοῦ ὕλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα, εἴπερ ἔπη τε καὶ συνδοκεί σοι οὕτως.

Πάνε σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεί, ἑφι, καὶ ἐποιμαί.

5 Πάλω δὴ μοι, ἑφι, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ὃ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μμούμενον ἐμὲ. λέγω δὴ παρ’ ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀλλυν ὅρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔρωι με ὃ ἄν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμῶν ἐσταί, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὃτι ὃ ἄν θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὃτι ὃ ἄν πῦρ· οὗτε ἄν ἔρη ὃ ἄν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσῆσαι, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὃτι ὃ ἄν νῦσος, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἄν πυετός· οὐδ’ ὃ ἄν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἐσταί, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὃ ἄν περιττότης, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἄν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ’ ὥρα εἰ ἡδὴ ἰκανῶς οἴσθ’ ὃτι βουλομαί.

'Ἀλλὰ πάνε ἰκανῶς, ἑφι.

'Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὅς, ὃ ἄν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἐσταί;

'Ομι ἄν ὑψηλῇ, ἑφι.

6 Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ; ἢ δ’ ὅς.

Ψυχῇ ἄρα ὃτι ἄν αὐτῇ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ

φέρουτα ζῷην;

5 Ὅκει μέντοι, ἑφη.

Πότερον ὃ ἐστὶ τί ζῷην ἑναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;

'Εστιν, ἑφη.

Τί;
Θάνατος.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ὦ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὖ μὴ 10 ποτε δέχηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὀμολόγηται;
Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.
Τῇ οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ὕδεαν τὶ νυνὶ ὀνομάζομεν;
'Ανάρτιον, ἐφη.
Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μῆ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἀν μονοικὸν μὴ δέχηται;
'Αμοῦσου, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦ.
Εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;
'Αθάνατον, ἐφη.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχῇ οὖ δέχεται θάνατον;
Οὐ.
'Αθάνατον ἁρα ψυχή.
'Αθάνατον.
Εἶεν, ἐφη· τοῦτο μὲν ὡς ἀποδεδείχθαι φώμεν; ἡ πῶς δοκεῖ;
Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
Τῇ οὖν, ἡ δ' ὦς, ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τὸ ἄναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν 10 ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἀλλο τι τὰ τρία ἡ ἀνώλεθρα ἄν ἦν;
106
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
'Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀθερμὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρον εἶναι, ὡς τις ἐπὶ χώνα θερμῶν ἐπάγου, ὑπεξῆ ἄν ἡ χών οὕσα σῶς καὶ ἀτικτός; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὕδ' αὐ ὑπο-5 μένονσα εἴδεξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.
'Αληθῇ, ἐφη, λέγεις.
'Ως δ' αὐτῶς οἶμαι καὶ εἰ τὸ ἅψυκτον ἀνωλέθρον ἦν, ὡςτε ἔπι τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπῆει, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶς ἂν ἀπελθὸν ὄχετο.

10

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

105d


d 10 ψυχῆ B Stob.: ἡ ψυχὴ TW
d 13 νῦν ὁ B: TW Stob.: νυνὶ δὲ B: TW Stob.: νυνὶ δὲ B
d 14 ὀνομάζομεν B et in marg. T: ὀμολογήσαμεν
e 4 ψυχὴ TW Stob.: ἡ ψυχή B
e 6 ψυχῆ T Stob.: ἡ ψυχῆ B W
e 10 ἀναρτίῳ B t Stob.: ἀρτίῳ T
a 1 ἢ B et post τί t Stob.: om. T
a 3 ἀθερμον t: θερμῶν B TW
Stob.: θερμῶν B TW Stob.: θερμῶν B TW Stob.: θερμῶν B
Stob.: θερμῶν B TW: ψυχρὸν Stob.: ψυχρὸν Wytenbach
'Ανάγκη, ἐφη.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅδε, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν;
ei μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ,
ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἢ, ἀπόλλυσθαι θάνατον μὲν γὰρ
ὅτι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέσεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκὼς,
5 ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφαινεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γ' αὖ τὸ
περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδὲ γ' ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερ-
μότης. "Ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει," φαίη ἂν τις, "ἀρτιον μὲν τὸ
περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπικότος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὥσπερ ὡμολογη-
c ται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;"
τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχομεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ
ἀπόλλυται, τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ
tούτῳ ὡμολόγητο ἢμῖν, ῥᾴδιος ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελ-
5 θόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἶχεται ἀπώντα-
καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχό-
μεθα. ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

/ Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἢμῖν ὡμολογεῖται
10 καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχῇ ἂν εἰπ̄ πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατον εἶναι
d καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δειοὶ λόγου.

'Αλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἐφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι
ἀλλο φθορὰν μή δέχοιτο, εἰ τὸ γε ἀθάνατον ἄλιθον ὃν
φθορὰν δέσεται.

v 'Ο δὲ γε θεὸς οἴμαι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὕτη τὸ τῆς
ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ἀθανάτον ἔστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν
ὁμολογηθεὶς μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Παρὰ πάντων μὲντοι νῦν Δί', ἐφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ
ἐτι μᾶλλον, ὃς ἑγὼμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.

e 'Οπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθανάτον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἔστιν, ἄλλο

b1 εἰπεῖν B: om. T Stob. b6 πῦρ B: τὸ πῦρ T Stob.
c1 ἀπολομένου B T: ἀπολλυμένου W Stob. c2 διαμαχέσασθαι
TW: διαμάχεσθαι B Stob. c4 ὡμολόγητο B: ὡμολογεῖτο T Stob.
c8 πάνω μὲν οὖν B t: om. T c9 θανάτου pr. T Stob. ἢμῖν
om. W c10 τῷ B² T W Stob.: τῷ B d3 εἰ τὸ γε B T W:
ei τὸ τε Stob.: ei γε τὸ B ἄλιθον ὃν B Stob.: καὶ ἄλιθον T
d4 δέσεται B Stob. et e, ai s. v. W: δέσειται T W d8 τέ γε B
Stob.: τε T W sed γ s. v. W
τι ψυχὴ ἡ, εἰ ἄθανατος τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἄν εἰη;
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
'Επιώντος ἁρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θυτῶν, 5
ὡς εὑρίκει, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δὲ ἄθανατον σῶν καὶ
ἀδιάφθορον οὐχεῖται ἀπίων, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.
Φαίνεται.
Παινώς μᾶλλον ἁρα, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἄθανατον καὶ
ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ οὔτι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν "Αἰδον. 107
/Οὐκοιν ἔγγοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο
τι λέγειν οὐδὲ πὴ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι
Συμμίας οὖδὲ ἦ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὐ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῇ-
σαν· ὡς οὐκ οὐδα εἰς ὑπτώ τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο 5
ἡ τῶν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι
εἴπειν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.
/ 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅ σ' ὁ Συμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἐτι ὅπη
ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ
ἂν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίην ἀνθέειναι ἀτιμάζων, b
ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίκαν ἐτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν
ἐλεημένων.
Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὁ Συμμία, ὁ Σώκρατης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά
τε εὖ λέγειν καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ 5
πισται ύμῖν εἰσίν, ὡμοι ἑπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν
αὐτὰς ἰκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ,
καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μαλίστ' ἀνθρώπω ἐπακολουθήσαι· κἂν
τούτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.
'Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 10
'Αλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὁ ἀνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὡτι, c
ἐπερ ἢ ψυχὴ ἄθανατος, ἐπιμελελαὶ δὴ δείκατι οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ

ε2 ψυχὴ ΒΤ Stob.: ἡ ψυχὴ ΒΤ: post τι Stob.: om. T
a3 οὐδὲ πη ΒΤ: οὐδὲτι W a4 ὡδὲ B2 T W: om. B a5 τις
ΒΤ: τὶς ἀν W ἀναβάλλοιτο W (in marg. ἀνακρούοιτο) a6 ή τι
b5 γε B2 T W: om. B b6 ἑπισκεπτέα Seager b7 διέ-
λητε B2 W: διέληται B: ἔληται T (e s. v. t) ἀκολουθήσεται B3 W:
ἀκολουθήσεται ΒΤ (e s. v. t) b8 καὶ B W t: καὶ T e1 τόδε
γ' ΒΤ: τόδε W: το γ' Stob. e2 ἄθανατος BΤ Iambl. Stob.: ἄθανατος ἐστιν B2 W
χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ὡς καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κύνδυνος νῦν ὡς καὶ δόξειν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι,
5 εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἔρμαιν ὁ ἄν τοὺς κακοὺς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σάματος ἀμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἰδανάτος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν
d εἰ τις ἄλλη ἀποφυγῇ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλήν τοῦ ὡς βελτίωτην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ δὴ καὶ μεγίστα λέγεται ὡφελέ η πλάτειν τὸν
5 τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσθα πορείας. /λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐκαστὸν ὀδαίμων, ὁσπέρ ζωντα εἰλήξει, οὕτως ἁγεν ἐπιχειρεὶ εἰς δὴ των τόπων, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς "Αἰδοὺ
e πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ὡς δὴ προστίκτακται τοὺς εὐθένδε ἐκείσθα πορεύεσθαν τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεὶ δὲν δὴ τυχεὶς καὶ μείναντας ὅν χρή χρόνου ἄλλος ἐδύρο πάλιν ἡγεμόνων κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνων καὶ μακραίς περιόδους. ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος
108 μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῆν οἰμῶν φήσιν εἰς "Αἰδοὺ κέρεω, ἡ δ' οὕτε ἄπλη οὕτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἐδεῖν οὐ γὰρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρται οὐδαμόσει μίας ὀδού ὀυσης. νῦν δὲ εἰοκε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριβός τοιο ρεύσαντες ἐξειν' 5 ἀπὸ τῶν θυσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν εὐθαδε τεκμαρόμενοι λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἐπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἁγαλεὶ τα παρόντα. ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ζημπροσθεν ἔστον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πώλων

χρόνου ἑπτομεμένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ δὲ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἶχεταί ἀγομένη. ἀφικομενήν δὲ ὀθίπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τὶ πεποιηκυίαν τουστίτου, ἢ φῶνων ἀδίκων ἡμιμενή ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα τουείται 5 εἰργασμένην, δὲ τούτων ἄδελφα τε καὶ ἁδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυχχάνει ὑντα, ταύτην μὲν ἀπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὐτε συνεμποροσ οὔτε ἡγεμῶν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτή δὲ πλανάται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἐως ἃν ὅτι τινες c χρόνοι γένονται, δὲν ἐλθόντων ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φερεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴ πρέπουσαι οὐκησον. ἢ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρῶς τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόροι καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ἄκησεν τοῦ αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰςων 5 δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαναματο τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτῇ οὔτε οἶα οὐτε ὄση δουξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἔγω ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὁ Συμμαῖος, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἕφη, λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες; d περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκῆκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σε πείθει· ἱδέως οὐν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὡς Συμμία, οὐχ ἢ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασαι αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστίν· ὥς μέντοι ἀλήθη, 5 χαλεπώτεροι μοι φαίνεται ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἔγω ὑπὸ σος οὐδὲν ἂν οἶδα τε εἶπη, ἀμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἥπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ἐμός, ὡς Συμμία, τῷ μήκει τῷ λόγῳ οὖν ἑξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἵδεαν τῆς γῆς οὖν πέπεισμαι εἰναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει ἐ ε λέγειν.

Ἀλλ’, ἕφη ὁ Συμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.
Πέπεσμαι τοίνυν, ἥδε ὅσ, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστων 5 ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερής ὅπα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μή πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ίκανὴν εἶχαν αὐτήν ἵσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτής τῆς ἰσορροπίαν ἰσορροποῦν γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοίον τῶν ἐν μέσῳ 5 τεθέν όν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον υφὸν ἤττον ὄνδαμοσε κλιθήναι, ὁμοίως δέ ἔχον ἀκλινές μενεί. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἥδε ὅσ, τούτο πέπεσμαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Ἐν τοίνυν, ἐφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν 5 τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τυφοὶ μορφῇ, ὡσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἡ βατράχους περὶ τῆν θάλατταν οἰκούντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλους τούς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τὸποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τῆν γῆν πολλὰ κοῦλα καὶ πανταπατα καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς δὲ συνερρήξειν τὸ τε ὑδωρ καὶ τῆν ὅμιλχην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς γῆς καθαρῶν ἐν καθαρῷ κείσαθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ὑπέρ ἑστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, διὸ δὴ αἰθέρα ὁμομάζειν 5 τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ συρρεῖν αἰεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῦλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκούντας ἐν τοῖς κοῖλοις αὐτῆς λεκηθέναι καὶ οἶκεται ἅνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἐν 5 μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἰοῦτο τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλαττῆς οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὑστος ὄρον τῶν ἔλαιον καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ άστρα τῆς θάλατταν ἱγοῦτο οὐρανόν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτα τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπόποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἁκρὰ τῆς θαλαττῆς αφιγμένοις μηδὲ ἑωρακός εἰς, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας 5 ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, διὰφ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλον

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ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

άκηκως εἶ θαύματος. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ὑποθέταν οἰκούντας γὰρ ἐν τοιῷ κολώ τῆς γῆς οἷς ὁμολογεῖται ἐπάνω αὐτής οἰκείων, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανοῦ καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανὸς ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χαρωύντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταύτ᾽ ὑποθέταν ἡ πηνιὰς γενόμενος ἀνάπτυκτο, κατιδεύς {ἀνέ} ἀνακύ-ψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἱχθύες ἀνακύ-πτουσες ὀρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεύν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανή εἶ θαυμάσχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γυναῖναι ἂν ὦτι ἐκείνων ἐστὶν ὁ ἄληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἄληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἡ ὂς ἄληθῶς γῆ. ἡ δὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἄπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἔστιν καὶ καταβεβρω- μένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιοι λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς ἐποιεῖ οἰ ὀδύν ἐστὶ, σημαγγεῖστε δὲ καὶ ἀμμοῦ καὶ πηλὸς ἄμηχανος καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσίν, ὅποι ἂν καὶ [ἡ] γῆ ἢ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν κάλλη κρώσθησαν οὐδ᾽ ὀπωστιών ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἐτὶ πλέον φανεῖ δια- φέρειν εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλὸν, ἄξιον ἀκούοντα, ὥσπερ τὰ πυγχανέα τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. ἅλλα μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμῖλας, ὥς Σάκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτον τοῦ μῦθον ἤδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμεν.

Λέγεται τολίνων, ἔφη, ὡς ταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη 5 ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἱδεῖν, εἰ τις ἁνωθεν θεύτω, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάκυλαι σφαιρᾶς, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλήμμενη, ὅν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφήσι
καταχρώνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πάσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ
πολὺ ἐτί ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν
μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι [καὶ] θανμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ
χρυσοεἰδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὀση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χίουν λευκοτέραν,
5 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὤσαυτός, καὶ ἐτὶ
πλεούνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὁσα ἥμειοι ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ
αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοιλά αὐτής, ὦδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα

ὁντα, χρώματος τι εἴδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν
ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλία, ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτής εἴδος συνεχές
ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἄνα
λόγον τὰ φυώμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ άνθη καὶ τοὺς
5 καρποὺς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαυτῶς καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἐξειν ἀνά
τον αὐτῶν λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ
χρῶματα καλλίω· διν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ
ἀγαπώμενα μορία, σάρδια τε καὶ ἱάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους
e καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὔδεν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ
ἐτὶ τοῦτων καλλίω. τὸ δ’ αὐτῶν τοῦτον εἶναι ὅτι ἐκείνων οἱ
λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεθνησμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι
ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἀλμήν ὑπὸ τῶν δεύο
5 σωφρονικῶτων, δ’ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε
καὶ φυτοῖς ἀλόχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν
κεκοσμημένην τοῦτοις το ἄπασι καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ
III τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι,
オンτα πολλὰ πλῆθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε
αὐτὴν ίδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεῶν. ζῶν δ’ ἐπ’
αὐτὴ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν
5 μεσογαίᾳ οἰκούντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὡσπερ ἥμεις

ο 3 καὶ B Stob. : om. T Eus. ο 5 ἐγκειμένην W ἐτὶ B'T W:
ἐπὶ B ῥ 7 ἐκπλεα B T W Eus. Stob. : ἐκπλεα al. d 1 παρ-
d 6 * * * * * * * * τῆν τε λειότητα T (τελείοτητα B
Stob.) e 1 δτί οὐ B T : δτίων Eus. (et mox οὐκ εἶναι) : δτὶ μὴ B2' W:
δ μὴ Stob. : 3 εἰσὶ καθαροὶ B : καθαροὶ elain T W Eus. Stob.
e 5 & s. v. T : om. Stob. λίθου τοῖς in marg. B' 3 δτασι
B Eus. Stob. : πασίν T τε καὶ T Eus. Stob. : καὶ B a 2 παν-
a 4 αὐτὴ B : αὐτὴν T W : αὐτής Stob.
περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν υἱοῖς ὅς περιπρέπω τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὕσας. καὶ ἕνι λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῶν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρέαν, τούτῳ ἐκεὶ τῶν ἀέρα, δ' ὅτι ἡμῶν ἀήρ, ἐκεῖνος τῶν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὀρας αὐτοῖς κράσιν ἔχει τουαύτην ὡστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζην πολὺ πλεῖον τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῆ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἠμῶν ἀφεστανὰς τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἦπερ ἄηρ τε ὕδατος ἀφεστηκεν καὶ αἴθηρ ἀέρος 5 πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεὼν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῇ ὄντι οἰκητᾶς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τουαύτας συνουσίας γλυκεθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοὺς· καὶ τὸν γε ἡλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα ὅρασθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὡστα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὐτώ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτῆς 5 κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν φ' ἡμεῖς οἰκοδεμέν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὡντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἐλαττοὺς ἐχεῖν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῶν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οἷς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε 6 εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἄλλην συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στειρότερα καὶ εὐφύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ μὲν ἔξ ἄλληλων εἰς ἄλληλους ὕστερ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἄειάνων 5 ποσαμῶν ἁμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν υδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποσαμούς, πολλούς δὲ ύγροὶ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβωθωδεστέρου, ὕστερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύακος πηλοῦ ρέοντες e ποσαμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ρύαξ· δὲν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους


11*
πληροῦσθαι, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεὶν ἃνω καὶ κάτω ὡσπερ αἰώραν
5 τω ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὴ ἡ ἀιώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τω. ἐν τι τῶν χαρμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε

112 μέγιστον τυγχάνει δὴ καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένου δὴ ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τούτῳ ὡσπερ Ὀμηρὸς ἔπαι, λέγων αὐτὸ
tῆλε μάλterraform. ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέβεθρον.

ὅ καὶ ἅλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἅλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. ἦς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέονσι τε
5 πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦτο πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν γίγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τοιούτοι δὴ οἷς ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέσων. ἦ δὲ

b αἱτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐσφέρει πάντα τὰ ρέυματα, ὅτι πυθμένα ὅπερ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὕγρον τούτο.
10 αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἃνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄρη καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτων ποιεῖ· συνεπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ
5 ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐσπερὶ ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὡσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεύσων ἂεὶ ἐκπνεύει τε καὶ ἀναπνεύει
15 ρέου τὸ πνεῦμα, οὔτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναφρούμενον τῷ ὕγρῳ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοῦς τως ἄνευς καὶ ἁμηχάνοις παρέχεται καὶ
c εἰσίων καὶ ἐξίων. ὅταν τε οὐν ὑποχωρῆσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τῶν ὅτι κάτω καλοῦμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ ρέματα
20 ἃ[διὰ] τῆς γῆς εἰσφέρει τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὐτὸ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ,
5 τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστὰ ἀφικνοῦμεν,
25 εἰς οὖς ἐκάστους ὁδοποίηται, βαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν ὅνομεν
κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελάβοντα καὶ
30 πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τῶν

e 3 ὡς Stob.: ὅν B T a 5 τε B T Stob.: om. W b 4 αὐτὸ Heindorf: αὐτὸν B T Stob.: c 1 οὖν B T Stob.: οὖν ὄρμησαν B² W c 3 διὰ B T: om. Stob. c 4 ἀπολέιπῃ W c 6 καὶ
dia om. W c 7 ἐκάστοις T Stob.: ἐκάστους B ἄδοσονὶ ται Stob.: ἄδοσοιείται B T: εἰδοποιεῖται W (sed δ s. v.) d 2 ἐλάττω W

βραχυτέρους B Stob.: βραδυτέρους T
Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω [ἡ]. ἦ ἐπιντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγων πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρει τῆς ἐκροής, καὶ ἐνια μὲν καταυτικρῶν [ἡ] [εἰσρεῖ] ἐξέπεσεν, ἐνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὡσπερ οἱ ὁφεῖς, εἰς τὸ δυσατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυσατὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθέναι, πέρα οὗ οὖν ἀναντε γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς ἰδέμας οἰκάρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὅθέν ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἰδέματα ἐστὶν. τυγχάνει οὗ ἀρα ὁμι λοί τοὺς τοὺς πολλοὺς τέσσαρ' ἀπτα ἰδέματα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω βέων περὶ κύκλῳ ὃ καλούμενος Ὁκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταυτικρῶν καὶ ἐναντίως βέων Ἀχέρων, διὸ δὲ ἐρήμων τοῦ τόπου βεὶ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν βέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχεροσυιάδα, οὐ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαῖ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινας εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαται, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκκαμπτονται εἰς τάς τῶν ἵππων γενέσεις. τριτὸς δὲ ποταμὸς τοῦτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπήπτει εἰς τόπου μέγαν περὶ πολλῆς καμόμενος, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦς ἐπεκέφαλον ἐνευθεῖν δὲ χωρὶς κύκλῳ θολεροῦ καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιχθένες δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοστε τὰ ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἐσχάτα τῆς Ἀχεροσυιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι. περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγένθοντα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ῥάκες ἀπο-
στάσματα ἀγαφυσώσων ὅπη ἀν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτον δὲ αὐτοκτονήσει τέταρτος ἐκπλήττει εἰς τούτον πρῶτον δεινῶν τε καὶ ἄγριων, ως λέγεται, χρώμα δ' ἐξουσία ὄλου ὦλου ὃς κυνός, δυνῆ ἐπονομάζουσι Στῦγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἤν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στῦγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπέσων ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινῶς ὄνωμεν λαβῶν ἐν τῷ ὦδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελλυτόμενοι χωρεῖ ἐναντίον τῷ Πυρροφεγέθουτι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχέρουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἡς ἐναντίας· καὶ ὅπις τὸ τούτου ὤδωρ ὄδειν μεγίστως ἀλάλα καὶ ὁποῖος κύκλῳ περιελλυτόμενος ἐστὶν τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίον τῷ Πυρροφεγέθουτι· ὅπως δὲ τὸ τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ὡς σοὶ ποιήται λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

Τούτων δὲ συνειδάν ἀφίκωνται τοι τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὃ δαίμονες ἐκαστὸς κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσύως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μῆ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἃν δοξώσει μέσως βεβιωκόμενοι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέρουντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ ὅτι αὐτοῦ ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφίκονται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκούσι τε καὶ καθαραμένου τοῦ τε ἀδικημάτων ἑξῆκε δίκαι ἀπολύμοντι, εἰ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε ἐνεργεσίων τιμᾶς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐκαστὸς· οἱ δ' ἃν δοξώσει ἀναμόρφωσεν ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἡ ἰεροσυλία πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἡ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένου ἢ ἄλλα ὀσα τοιάντα τυχάναι ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ὑπηκολεῖ εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, οὕτων ὀυποτέ ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' ἃν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δοξώσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτηματα, οὕτως πρὸς πατέρα ἡ μητέρα ὑπ' ὄργης βλαίον τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλοντι αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσων, ἡ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιαύτῳ τῶν ἄλλως τρόπῳ γένονται, τούτοις δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον

b 6 ὅπη B T Stob.: ὅποι Eus. b 7 αὐτός B
ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐναυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, 5 τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυρηφλέγ- ἔθουτα. ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένονται κατὰ τὴν λίμνη τῆς Ἀχερονισάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς ὑβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἰκετεύουσι καὶ δεόνται ἐσάνος σφάς ἐκβήναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, b καὶ ἕαν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαινοῦσι τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, φέρουνται αὕτις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχουσι τοὺς πρότερον πάυνται πρὶν ἀν πείσωσιν οὔς ἡδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ 5 ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ ἰ ἀν δοξοὶ διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὅσιος βιώμα, οὕτωι εἰσὶν οἱ τῶν δὲ μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἔλευθερομένου τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττό- μενοι ὁσπέρ δεσμωτηρίων, ἀνώ δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν ὀίκησιν c ἀφικνοῦμεν καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζομεν. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἵκανος καθηράμενοι ἄνευ το ζωμᾶτων ἔως τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐτὶ τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦμεν, ὅσον ὡς ῥάξιον ὑδαλησα οὕτε ὁ χρόνος 5 ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἑνεκα δρῆ ἄν διεληλυ- θαμεν, ὃ Συμμία, τῶν ποιεῖν ὡστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν tῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. 

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχωρίσασθαι οὐτως ἐχειν ὡς ἐγὼ d διεληλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοου ἐχουντι ἀνδρι· ὅτι μέντοι η ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτ' ἀτα περὶ τας ψυχας ἡμων καὶ τας οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φανεται οὕσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκει καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνευσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως 5 ἐχει—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κέννυνος—καὶ χρη τα τοιαύτα ὁσπέρ ἐπάδεων ἐαυτφ, διῳ δὴ ἐγγευ καὶ πάλαι μηκόν τον μύθον.

πλάτωνος

...οὔκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἄνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὐτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἀἴδου πορείαν [ὡς πορευσόμενοι ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ]. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ άλλοι, εἰς αὖθις ἐν τινί χρόνῳ ἐκαστοί πορεύσεθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίνει ἂν ἄνηρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τι μοι ἄρα τραπέζθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρὸν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶν παρέχειν νεκρὸν λοίμων.


t. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἰσέν, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ὃ ἠμοὶ ἐπιστεύεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῦμες;


5 Ἀπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὁ Κρίτων, οὔδὲν καυστέρου· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν οἷμεσ καὶ ἠμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἄττ' ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὀμολογήσητε· εὰν δὲ ὑμῶν [μὲν] αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε καὶ μὴ 'θέλητε ὀφτερ κατ' ἱγνὴ κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὔδέ εὰν πολλὰ ὀμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὔδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ἑάντοις μὲν τοῖς προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν, θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον;

Ὀπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω υμᾶς. Γελᾶσας δὲ ἄμα ἱστυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν· Ὡ σε πείδω, ὣς ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς...
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

115 c

ἐγὼ εἰμὶ οὕτος Σωκράτης, ὃς νῦν διαλεγόμενος καὶ δια-
τάττων ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ οὐταὶ με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι
ὅν ὁφείται ὄλγον ύστερον νεκρῶν, καὶ ἐρωτᾶ δὴ πῶς με
θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς,
ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλὰ
οἰχήσωμαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα
μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἀμα μὲν
ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυησάσθη σὺν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα,
ἐφή, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγχύη ἣ ἢν οὕτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς
ἥγγατο. οὕτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν ύμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν
μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυησάσθη ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ ὀἰχή-
σεσθαι ἀπούντα, ίνα Κρίτων ῥόον φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μον τὸ
σώμα ἡ καόμενον ἡ κατορμυτόμενον ἀγανακτή ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ
ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἡ προτίθεται
Σωκράτη ἡ ἐκφέρει ἡ κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὃ
ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο
5 πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακὸν τί ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ
θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦμον σώμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν
οὗτως ὅπως ἃν σου φίλου ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἥγη νόμιμον εἶναι.
116

Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκείνως μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήμα τι ὧς λουσό-
μενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἴπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευεν περιμένειν.
περιεμένουμεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν
eἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντοι, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς
5 διεξιώντες δος ἡμῖν γεγονύια εἴη, ἀτεχνὸς ἡγούμενοι ὡσπερ
πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοί τὸν ἐπειτὰ βίον. ἐπειδὴ
δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἡμέχθη παρ' αὐτῶν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ
ἐνεὶς σμικρὸι ἤσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες
ἀφίκουτο ἐκείναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεγθέοι τε καὶ
ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδία

0 7 οὗτος B: οὗτος δ Τ W
d 2 θάπτῃ B: θάπτει τ W: θάψει
secit W (ψ. v.)
d 8 ἡγησάτο B T et <γ. W: ἡγησάτο B² W

d 9 οὖν post ἐγγυὴσασθε add. t

e 1 ρόον T: ράδιον B e 3 δεινὰ

πάσχοντος B t: δεινά ἅττα σχόντος τ

e 7 θάπτειν καὶ om. pr. T

h 3 ἐκεῖναι οὖν οὖν τ W: οὖν οὖν ἐκεῖναι B (ἐκεῖναι secit B')
5 απέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ᾿ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡμέρα ἐγγύς ἦλθον δυσμῶν· χρόνου γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδοὺν. ἔλθὼν δ’ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένοι καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέξθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὅ τῶν ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς

καὶ παρ’ αὐτόν, ὦ Ἅγια Σῶκρατες, ἥφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι γε σοῦ ὁπερ ἂλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταραίνεται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἂλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ προότατον καὶ ἀριστοῦ ἄνδρα οὗτα τῶν πόσποτε δεύρῳ ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐν οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαῖνες, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνοι. νῦν οὖν, οἰσθά γὰρ ὁ ἴλθων

d ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς βάστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. Καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆι. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν, Καὶ σὺ, ἥφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς,

5 ὄς ἀστείος, ἥφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήξει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἄνδρών λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναιώς με ἀποδακρύσει. ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω πίσι τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται εἰ δὲ μὴ, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

e Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, ἈΛΛ᾽ οἶμαι, ἥφη, ἐγὼ γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἔτι ἦλθον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσί καὶ οὕτω δεδεκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἴδα καὶ ἂλλος πάνυ ὡς ἐπὶ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγέλθη αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντας τε καὶ πίνοντας εἴ μάλα, καὶ συγγενο-

μένους γ’ ἐνίοτον δὲν ἄν τοχῳσιν ἐπιθυμοῦστε. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγουν ἐτί γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἥφη, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐς σὺ λέγεις—οἴνοι καί γὰρ κερδαίνει ταῦτα ποιήσαντες—καὶ ἐγώγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω σοῦ ὑδεῖν γὰρ


ομαὶ κερδανεῖν ὀλίγου ὑστερον πιὼν ἀλλο γε ἡ γέλωτα 117
ὁφλῆσεων παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, γλυχόμενος τοῦ ζήν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐ-
δενὸς ἐτὶ ἐνότος. ἀλλ᾽ ἢδι, ἐφὶ, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἀλλὸς ποιεῖ.
Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίου ἐστῶτι.
καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνου διαμόρφωσε ἤκεν ἄγων 5
τοῦ μέλλοντα ὁδῶς τὸν φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμ-
μένον. Ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶει, ἐφῆ, ὡ
βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρή ποιεῖν;
Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφῆ, ἡ πιόντα περιενέα, ἔως ἂν σοι βάρος
ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἐπειτὰ κατακεῖσθαι καὶ οὖτως αὐτὸ
ποιήσει. Καὶ ἄμα ὀρέξει τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.
Καὶ ὁς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἔλεως, ὁ Ἐχέρατες, οὐδὲν
τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσ-
ώτου, ἀλλ᾽ ὁστερ εἰῶθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν 5
ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφή, περὶ τούτῳ τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ
ἀποσπείρασί των; ἔξεστιν ὡς;
Τοσοῦτον, ἐφῆ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἴομεθά
μετρίων εἰναι πιεῖν.
Μανθάνω, ἡ ὁ δὲ: ἀλλ᾽ εὐχεσθαί γέ ποι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξεστὶ
τε καὶ χρῆ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖστε εὔτυχῆ γενέ-
σθαι: ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαι τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἄμ᾽
eἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως
ἐξέπειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἴοι τε 5
ήσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὅς δὲ εἰδομεν πιῦντα τε καὶ
πεπωκότα, οὗκετι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ γε βία καὶ αὐτῶν ἀστακτῇ ἔξωρε
τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτῶν—οὐ
gὰρ δὴ ἐκειὼν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τόχην, οἶου ἀνδρός
ἐταῖρον ἐστερημένος εἶν. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἐτὶ πρότεροι ἐμοὶ,
ἐπειδὴ οὖχ οἴος τ᾽ ἐν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη.
Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεῖν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο
dακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸτε ἀναβρυχήσαμεν κλάων καὶ
a 1 κερδανεῖν B²: κερδανεῖν B T
πιὼν B² t: πιὼν B T: ἀπίων W
a 3 πείθου T W: πιθοῦ B a 6 δώσειν B² T W: διδόναι B a 8 t
B T: εἰπε τῇ T W b 4 post διαφθείρας: add. οὔτε τοῦ σώματος W
c 3 ἄμα λέγων W c 7 γε βία καὶ αὐτῶν B: αὐτῶν βία καὶ T: τε καὶ
αὐτῶν βία W ἀστακτ(ε) B T: ἀσταλακτ W: γρ. καὶ ἀβαστακτί
καὶ βία W d 1 πρότερον pr. W ἐμοὶ B: μον T
5 ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα οὖν αὐτῷ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλὴν

γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.

'Εκείνος δὲ, Ὅλε, ἐφη, ποιεῖτε, ὄμω θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι

οὐχ ἦκιστα τοῖτον ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἣν μὴ

tοιαύτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὔφημῳ χρή
tελευτῶν. ἀλλ' ἦσυχαί τε ἄγετε καὶ καρπέρειτε.

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἁσχόνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ
dακρύων. ὅ δὲ περιελθόν, ἑπείδη οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τά

5 σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑππιος—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος—

καὶ ἄμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὃς τὸ πάρμακον,

dιαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκέπη τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη,

καπεῖτα σφόδρα πίεσα αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἦρετο εἰ ἀσθάνοιτο,

ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ αὐθίς τᾶς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανών

οὕτως ἦμιν ἐπεδέκινυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτο τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ

αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἑπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται

αὐτῷ, τότε οἰκῆσται.

5 Ἡδὴ οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν. τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα,

καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ—ἐίπεν—δ' ἡ τελευ-

tαιῶν ἐφθέγξατο—'Ω Κρῖτων, ἔφη, τῷ 'Ασκληπιῷ ὁφείλομεν

ἀλεκτρύνα: ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσῃτε.

'Αλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρῖτων: ἀλλ' ὥρα εἰ τί ἀλλο

λέγεις.

Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὅλγον

χρόνον διαλιπῶν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐξεκάλυψεν

αὐτόν, καὶ διὰ τὰ ὦμματα ἐστησεν· ἱδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρῖτων συνέλαβε

τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

15 Ὡδὲ ἡ τελευτή, ὧ 'Εσέκρατε, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἦμιν ἐγένετο,

ἀνδρός, ὥς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἂν, τῶν τότε δὲν ἐπειράθημεν ἁρίστου

καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιώτατον.
NOTES

Introductory dialogue in dramatic form, 57a 1—59 c 7.

The scene is the Pythagorean συνέδριον at Phlius. The only Pythagorean who speaks is Echecrates, but the presence of the others is implied (cp. especially 58 d 7 and 102 a 8). The time is not long after the death of Socrates; for the Pythagoreans have not yet heard any details. As Geddes first pointed out, it would be natural for Phaedo to visit the Pythagoreans of Phlius on his way home from Athens to Elis. It is not far off the road.

For the Pythagoreans of Phlius, cp. Diog. Laert. viii. 46 τελευταίοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγόρειων, οὗς καὶ Ἀριστόδεινος εἶδε, Ζευόφιλός τε ὁ Χαλκίδεως ἀπὸ Ἐράκης καὶ Φάντων ὁ Φιλάσιος καὶ Ἐχεκράτης καὶ Διοκλῆς καὶ Πολύμναστος, Φιλάσιοι καὶ αὐτοί. ἦσαν δ' ἄκροαται Φιλολάου καὶ Εὐρύτου τῶν Ταραντίνων (cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 320).

Phlius lay in the upper valley of the Asopus (893 ft. above sea-level), where Argolis, Arcadia, and the territory of Sicyon meet. It was surrounded by mountains 4,000 to 5,000 feet high, 'under whose immemorial shadow' (δασκίοις Φλειούμνοις ἐν ἄγνισει θρεπτικοί, Pind. Nem. vi. 45) 'the high discourse is supposed to be held' (Geddes). The territory of Phlius, which was only a few miles square, consisted of a triangular valley with its apex to the north. The town was on the eastern side of the valley and built in the form of an amphitheatre. A few ruins are still left. The people were Dorians and faithful allies of Sparta.

Tradition connected Pythagoras himself with the place (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 94, n. 1), and he is said to have assumed the name of φιλόσοφος for the first time there or in the neighbouring Sicyon (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 321, n. 2).

Phaedo of Elis is said (Diog. Laert. ii. 105) to have been a prisoner of war brought as a slave to Athens, where he attracted the notice of Socrates, who secured his liberation. At the time of
this dialogue he is quite a youth and still wears his hair long (89b 5). At a later date he founded the school of Elis. We
know nothing of his teaching; but, as the school of Eretria was an
offshoot from that of Elis, and as both are commonly mentioned
along with that of Megara, it is probable that he busied himself
chiefly with the difficulties which beset early Logic. For us, as
Wilamowitz says, he chiefly represents the conquest of the most
unlikely parts of the Peloponnesse by Athenian culture, which is
the distinguishing feature of the fourth century B.C.

57 a 1 Αὐτὸς κτλ. We seem to be breaking in on a conversation
already begun; for ἢκουςας has no expressed object. Perhaps
Phaedo has already spoken of something Socrates said or did on
the day of his death.

παρεγίνου: the verbs παρεῖναι and παραγίνεσθαι are specially
used of being at hand to support any one in times of trouble or
rejoicing. So in Lat. adesse alicui. We should say, ‘Were you
with Socrates?’ Cp. also παρακαλεῖν, advocare.

a 2 τὸ φάρμακον, sc. τὸ κώνειον. It is nowhere expressly stated in the
Phaedo that it was hemlock; but that was the drug commonly em-
ployed, and the symptoms described at the end of the dialogue
(117 e sqq.) correspond to those elsewhere ascribed to it. It has
been doubted whether hemlock-juice would really produce these
symptoms, but see Appendix I.

a 5 Τι ... ἐστιν ἄττα: this is the regular construction (cp. 58 c 6),
though in 102 a 9 we have τίνα ... ἦν ... τὰ ... λέχθετα.

δ άνὴρ is an emphatic αὐτός or ἐκεῖνος. Cp. 85 c 8; 61 c 3, and
note on 58 e 3 ἀνήρ.

a 7 [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλειασίων: Riddell (Dig. § 36) defends this by
making Φλειασίων depend on οὐδείς τῶν πολιτῶν, ‘for neither of the
Phliasians does any citizen,’ which seems unnatural. Most editors
bracket Φλειασίων, but I think v. Bamberg is right in suspecting
rather τῶν πολιτῶν. In Stephanus of Byzantium and elsewhere we
regularly find notices like ὄλος’ οἱ πολίται, Οἰαίων καὶ τὸ ἐθνικὸν ὁμοίως,
and we can understand how, in the absence of capital letters, such
an explanation might seem desirable. Further, the form Φλειασίων
is exceptional (cp. however Ἀναγνωράσιον), and Cicero tells us (ad Att.
vi. 2) that he himself wrote Phliuntii by mistake. A similar case
is possibly *Meno 70 b 2* οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταῖρον [πολίται] Λαμπσαῦι. The absence of the article with the ἐθνικῶν is normal, and the form Φλειάσιοι (Φλιάςαυ ΜSS.) is guaranteed by inscriptions and coins.

a 7. οὖδεὶς πάνυ τι, 'no one to speak of.' The phrase does not necessarily mean 'no one at all', though it tends to acquire that sense. Cp. οὔ πάνυ (Riddell, Dig. § 139) and the English 'not very'. It is unnecessary to discuss, as most editors do, why communications between Athens and Phlius were interrupted. There is no statement that they were, and it must often have happened that no Phliasian had business in Athens and no Athenian at Phlius. There was, however, at least one such (58 a 3).

εἰπωριάζει ... Ἀθηναζε: there seems to be no other instance of εἰπωριάζειν in this sense. It usually means 'to be native', and is used of local dialects, customs, &c. Here apparently it is equivalent to ἐπιθημείν and takes the construction of that verb. Cp. *Parn*. 126 b 3 ἐπεδήμησα δεδο ἐκ Κλαξομενών.

b 1. σαφῆς τι: in such expressions σαφῆς means 'sure', 'trustworthy' (not 'clear'). So σαφῆς φιλος, σαφῆς μάντις.

b 3. εἰχεν, sc. ὁ ἀγγείας. He has not been mentioned, but he has been implied.

58 a 1. τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης: the normal construction would be τὰ περὶ τὴν δίκην (cp. 58 c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸν θάνατον), but the prepositional phrase is influenced by ἐπίθεσθη. Heindorf compares Xen. *Cyr*. v. 3. 26 ἐπὶ πῦθον τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρούριον, *Anab*. ii. 5. 37 ὅπως μάθητα τὰ περὶ Προξένου.


a 6. Τύχη has always the implication of *coincidence*, which is here made explicit by the cognate verb ἔτυχεν. In most of its uses, the meaning of τυχάνειν is best brought out in English by using the adverb 'just'.

ἔτυχεν ... ἐστεμμένη, 'had just been crowned.' The Ionic στέφειν is only used in a ritual sense in Attic prose. So, with mock solemnity, in *Rep*. 398 a 7 ἐρίῳ στέψαντες. The common word is στεφανοῦν.

a 8. πέμπουσιν. In the Bodleian (Clarke) MS. (B) Bishop Arethas, for whom the MS. was written, has added κατ' ἑτος in his own hand (B²). These words are also found in the Vienna MS. (W). The correc-
tions of B* were taken throughout from a MS. very closely resembling W. The additional words may well be an ancient variant.

a 10 τὸ πλοῖον: i.e. the θεωρία. For the Delian θεωρία, cp. Aristotle, Αθ. πολ. 56 καθίστησε δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δῆλον χορηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχιθέω- ρον τῷ τριαυντορίῳ τῷ τοῦ ηθέους ἄγοντι. The seven youths and seven maids were technically called the ηθεοὶ (masc. and comm. of παρθένοι). The story is told in Bacchylides xvi (xvii), a dithyramb entitled Ἡθεοὶ. Cp. also Plut. Θεσ. 23 τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ὃ μετὰ τῶν ἡθεων ἐπέλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τὴν τριαυντορίον, ἄχρι τοῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνου διεφύλαττον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι. Of course none of the original timbers were left, and Plutarch tells us the philosophers took it as their stock example in discussing the question of identity. Was it the same ship or not?

a 11 τοὺς "δις ἔπτα" ἔκεινον: this was also a traditional name. Cp. Bacchyl. xvi. (xvii.) I Κυκέτρωαρα μὲν ναύς μενέκτυπνον | Θησέα δις ἔπτα τ’ ἄγλαους ἄγονσα | κούρους ἱδίων | Κρητικῶν τάμεν πέλαγος. In the Λαώς (706 b 7) Plato says it would have been better for the Athenians to lose πλεονάκες ἔπτα ... πάιδας than to become ναυτικοὶ.

b 2 θεωρίαν, 'pilgrimage', 'mission'. A θεωρός is simply a 'spectator' (θεαφόρος, Dor. θεάρος), but the word was specialized in the meaning of an envoy sent by the State to the Great Games, to Delphi or to Delos. The θεωρίαι were λητουργίαι (cp. Dict. Ant., s. v. θεωρία).

b 3 ἀπάξειν: the ἀπο- has the same force as in ἀποδιδόναι and ἀποφέρειν, that of rendering what is due. Cp. the technical ἀπάγειν τὸν φόρον, φόρου ἀπαγωγή, and Ditt. Syll. p. 43 τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ἀπήγγαλον.

b 5 καθαρεύειν, sc. φόνον, 'to be clean from bloodshed.' Cp. Plut. Φιλοχίον 37 καθαρεύεισαι δημοσίου φόνον τὴν πόλιν ἐσταίρυσαν. So Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2 διὰ τὸ Δῆλον μὲν ἐκείνων τοῦ μυρὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα γὰρ δημοσία ἀποθυγάσκειν ἐως ἣν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δῆλου ἐπανέλθῃ.

b 7 δεύτερο, 'to Athens.' It is true that Phaedo is speaking at Phlius, but he is quoting the Athenian νόμος.

b 8 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, 'takes a long time.' This meaning of ἐν, which is not clearly explained in most grammars, is well brought out by an anecdote Plutarch tells of Zeuxis (Περὶ πολυφιλίας 94 f): ὁ Ζεύξις αἰτιωμένων αὐτῶν τινων ὅτι ζωγραφεῖ βραδέως, Ὄμολογω, εἴπεν, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς πολὺν.
b 8 δὲν τὰ ἔρχοντα τοὺς τῶν σαπρῶν, 'at times when the winds detain them' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The regular term for 'cut off', 'intercept', is ἀπολαμβάνειν, especially of ships 'detained' by contrary winds. Cp. Hdt. ii. 115 ἰόν ἤνεμων ἢδη ἀπολαμβάνειν, Thuc. vi. 22 ἢν ποὺ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβανόμεθα, Dem. Chers. 35 νόσω καὶ χειμῶν καὶ πολέμου ἀποληφθέντος, Plato, Menex. 243 c 2 ἀπελθημένων ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τῶν νεῶν.

c 1 αὐτοῖς: the Greek thinks of the crew rather than the ship. In Thucydides and elsewhere a plural pronoun often stands for πόλις, ναῦς, and the like.

c 3 ἥτυχεν... , γεγονός, 'had just been done.' Cp. a 6 n.

c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον: cp. a 1 n.

τί ἦν: cp. 57 a 5 n. W has ῥία here also, and B² corrects accordingly.

c 7 οἱ παραγενόμενοι: cp. 57 a 1 n. So παρεῖναι just below.

c 8 οὐκ εἶδν, 'would they not allow?' 'Did they not allow?' is οὐκ ἔλασαν. The difference between a negated imperfect and a negated aorist may generally be brought out in some such way as this.

οἱ ἀρχόντες, οἱ ἐνδεκα, as we shall see.

d 1 καὶ πολλοὶ γε, 'quite a number in fact.' There is something to be said, however, for the division indicated in some MSS., ΦΑΙ. Οἰδάμως. EX. 'Αλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες; ΦΑΙ. Καὶ πολλοὶ γε. Cp. Euthyphron 2 b ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΕΥΘ. 'Αλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος; ΣΩ. Πάνω γε.

d 3 εἶ μή... τυγχάνει οὖσα, 'unless you are engaged just now.'

d 5 τὸ μεμνησθαί Σωκράτους: cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 1. 1 ἐπεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνο μεμνησθαί μή παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὀφελεῖ (a characteristic Xenophontean touch) τοὺς εἰσαθέτας τε αὐτῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἀποδεξομένως ἐκείνον.

d 8 τοιούτου ἐτέρους, 'just such others' (pred.), cp. 80 d 5, 'Well, you will find your hearers of the same mind.' The enthusiasm of the Pythagoreans for Socrates can hardly be an invention of Plato's.

ὡς... ἀκριβεστάτα, 'as minutely as you can.'

e 1 παραγενόμενος (synchronous aor. pcp.), cp. 57 a 1 n. and παρόντα just below.

e 2 οὕτε: the second οὕτε does not occur till 59 a 3 after this sentence has been resumed by διὰ δὴ ταῦτα κτλ.

με... εἰσῆλθε: we can say δέως, ἔλεος, ἐλπὶς εἰσέρχεται με, as here, or εἰσέρχεται μοι, as at 59 a 1.

e 3 ἀνήρ: cp. 57 a 5 n. The MSS. have nowhere preserved this form,
but write either ἄνηρ or ὁ ἄνηρ, though we see from examples in the oblique cases (e.g. 58 c 8 ; 61 c 3) that the article is required. The existence of the crasis is proved by the metre in Aristophanes.

e 3 καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, 'both in his bearing and his words' (Church). Here εὐθαμέω εφαίνετο takes the construction of εὐθαμονίζειν, for which see Crito 43 b 6 quoted in the next note. (The reading τῶν λόγων (TW) is better attested than τοῦ λόγου, which is a mere slip in B corrected by Arethas.)

e 4 ὃς ἀδελφὸς ἢ τελευτὰ, 'so fearlessly and nobly did he pass away.'

Such clauses are best regarded as dependent exclamations. Cp. Crito 43 b 6 πολλάκις ... σε ... ηὐθαμέως τοῦ τρόπου, ... ὃς ῥαθίως αὐτήν (sc. τὴν παραστῶσαν συμφόραν) φέρεις. Cp. below 89 a 2; 117 c 9.

e 5 ἀπετρε μοι ... παρίστασθαι, 'so that I was made to feel', 'so that I realized'. In the act. παριστάναι τί τινι is 'to impress a thing on some one's mind'. Cp. Dem. Cor. 1 τοῦτο παραστήσαι τοὺς θεούς ἵματι, 'that the gods may put it into your hearts,' Mid. 72 τὸ δεινὸν παραστήσαι τοῖς ἀκούοντιν, 'to make the audience realize the outrage.' In the mid. we can say δοξα μοι παρίσταται, 'the belief impresses itself upon me,' 'the thought comes home to me' (cp. 66 b 1), or the verb may be used impersonally as here and Alc. 143 e 8 εἴ σοι αὐτικά μᾶλα παρεσταίη, 'if it should come into your head.'

ἄνευ θείας μοίρας, lit. 'without a divine dispensation'. The meaning is that 'Providence' would watch over him on his way. The phrase θεία μοίρα is common in Plato and Xenophon as the religious equivalent of τυχή. Hdt. iii. 139 says θεῖα τυχή. Cp. Xen. Aφολ. 32 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλούς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι (Σωκράτης).

59 a 2 παρόντι πένθει, 'one who takes part in a scene of mourning.' The meaning of παρείναι was so fixed in this connexion (57 a 1 n.) that no Greek would be tempted to take it as neuter in agreement with πένθει. It is dependent on εἰσιέναι to be supplied from εἴσοχει, and governs πένθει.

a 3 οὔτε αὖ: the first οὔτε is at 58 e 2.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὄντων, 'occupied with philosophy.' Heindorf compares Xen. CyR. iii. 1. 1 ὃ μὲν δῆ κύρος ἐν τούτοις ἢν, iv. 3. 23 οἱ μὲν δῇ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἢσαν. See below 84 a 8 ἅν ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ λογισμῷ) οὖσα.

a 4 τοιοῦτοι τινες, i.e. philosophical.
a 4 ἀτεχνώς, 'just.' The phrase is equivalent to ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπόν τι ἔπαθον, for which cp. Symp. 198 c 2 ὅστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρον ἐπετόνθη, Arist. Clouds 408 νή Δ' ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀτεχνῶς ἔπαθον τούτῳ ποτὲ Διασίοισιν. In this connexion the adverb means that the description of the παθὸς is to be taken 'literally', as we say.

a 8 γελώντες . . . διακρύοντες: the participles explain οὐτῶ, and are not dependent on διεκέμεθα.


a 9 καὶ διαφερόντως, 'quite exceptionally' (καὶ as in καὶ μάλα). Cp. 61 εἰ 1; 117 c 4.

'Ἀπολλόδωρος is mentioned as a disciple in Ἀρ. 34 a 2, and Plato has chosen him as the narrator of the Sympos. In that dialogue, the friend to whom he narrates it says (173 d 4) 'Αεί δῆμους εἶ, Δ' 'Ἀπολλόδωρε' δὲ γὰρ σαυτὸν τε κακιγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀδλίους ἥγεισαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. Xenophon mentions him along with Antisthenes (Mem. iii. 11. 17) 'Ἀπολλόδωρον τε τόνδε καὶ Λυτυσθένην οὐδέποτε μοῦ ἀπολειπέσθαι), so he seems to have belonged to the Cynic section of the Socratic circle, which agrees very well with the tendency to κακιγορία and with other traits mentioned in the Symposium. In the Xenophontean Ἀρ.ology 28 we are told that he was ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ἰναχρῶς οὕτω (Σωκράτους), ἄλλως δ' εὐθής (ναϊφ, 'silly'). In most editions of the Symposium we read that he had the nickname (ἐπωνυμία) of μαλακός (173 d 8), but μαλακός has better MS. authority and suits the context better. His friend says he does not know how Apollodorus got the name of 'soft'; for he is always savage with himself and every one but Socrates. Certainly his conduct here and at 117 d 3 is μαλακία rather than μανία.

b 6 τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, 'of native Athenians.' Cp. Prot. 315 b 2 ἥσαν δὲ τίνες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ (as opposed to the ξένοι, whom Protagoras brought in his train), Rep. 327 a 4 ἦ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπῆ (as opposed to the Thracian procession).

b 7 Κριτόπουλος, son of Crito, was chiefly known for his beauty. In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates undertakes to prove himself to be more beautiful than Critobulus.

ὅ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ: W adds the name Κρίτων, and so B²; but he was
so well known that this is unnecessary. Critó was of the same age and deme (Ἄλωπεκηθὲν) as Socrates (Ἀπόλ. 33 d 9 ἥλικιότης καὶ δημότης), and Plato has drawn a touching picture of his devotion here and in the Crito. We gather that he watched over his friend and master’s worldly interests without fully understanding his philosophy.

b 7 Ἐμμογίνης, brother of Callias son of Hipponicus, who had spent more money on ‘sophists’ than any man of his time (Ἀπόλ. 20 a 4), and in whose house the scene of the Protagoras is laid. Hermogenes is one of the speakers in the Cratylus, where the poverty into which he had fallen is alluded to (Crat. 384 c 5), and he is included in Xenophon’s list of the inner Socratic circle (Mem. i. 2. 48). In Mem. ii. 10 Socrates persuades his friend Diodorus to assist him, and in iv. 8. 4 he is quoted as the authority for the trial of Socrates, which took place after Xenophon left Athens.

b 8 Ἐπιγένης: cp. Ἀπόλ. 33 e 2 Ἀντιφόν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὗτος, Ἐπιγένης πατήρ. This Antiphon must not be confused with the orator, who was τῶν δήμων Ῥαμνούσιος. There is a conversation with Epigenes in Xen. Mem. iii. 12, where Socrates says to him ὅς ἰδιωτικῶς (‘in bad training’) το σώμα ἔχεις, ἃ Ἐπίγενες, and urges him to take more exercise.

Ἄισχίνης: i.e. Aeschines Socraticus, so called to distinguish him from the orator. Cp. Ἀπόλ. 33 e 1 Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττος, Ἄισχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ. After the death of Socrates, he appears to have fallen into great poverty, but was given some place at the court of Dionysius II on the recommendation of Plato (or Aristippus). He was one of the most highly appreciated writers of Socratic dialogues. The Ἀξιοκός, the Ἐρυξιάς, and the Περὶ ἀρετῆς were at one time ascribed to him and have been edited under his name, but are certainly of later date.

Ἀντισθένης is the well-known founder of the Cynic school. The date of his birth is uncertain, but he certainly belonged to the generation before Plato. He is probably the source of a good many things in Xenophon’s account of Socrates. It has been held in recent times that many of Plato’s dialogues were directed against Antisthenes, and references to him have been discovered in a great many places. It is well, however, to be sceptical regarding these. We really know very little about Antisthenes, and it is not safe to
reconstruct him from doubtful allusions. So far as the *Phaedo* is concerned, we may be sure there are no attacks upon him in it, seeing that he is supposed to be present.

b 8 Ἰν, 'there was also.' Though it is true that compound verbs are repeated by the simple (60 b3 n.), it is not necessary to take Ἰν here as equivalent to παρην. Cp. *Prot*. 315 ε 3 τοῦτο τ' Ἰν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ 'Αδειμάντῳ ἀμφοτέρω, *Rep*. 615 d7 ἑσαύ δὲ καὶ ἰδιωταί τινες.

b 9 Κτήσιππος: in the *Euthydemus* he is called (273 a7) νεανίσκος τις Παιανεύς, μάλα καλὸς τε κἀγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστὴς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. He also appears in the *Lysis*.

Μενέκκενος: the same after whom the *Menexenetus* is called. He was son of Demopho and cousin of the Ctesippus just mentioned, as we learn from the *Lysis* (206 d3), in which dialogue he plays a leading part as the young friend of Lysis. He must not be confused with his namesake, the son of Socrates (60 a 2 n.).

b 10 Πλάτων δὲ οἷμαι ἐρθέναι. Many strange things have been written about this simple statement. Of course, it is an advantage from a dramatic point of view for Plato to keep himself out of his dialogues; and, as a matter of fact, he only mentions his own name in two other places (*Apol*. 34 a1 and 38 b6). At the same time, it is hardly credible that he should represent himself as absent on this occasion unless he had actually been so. It has been said that, had Plato really been ill, he would have had no occasion to make the reservation implied by οἷμαι. He must have known whether he was ill or not. That is so; but it does not follow that Phaedo was equally well informed, and he is the speaker, not Plato.

c 1 Σιμίας . . . καὶ Κέβης. These are the chief interlocutors in the *Phaedo*. We shall see presently that they were disciples of Philolaus at Thebes, which, like Phlius, was a city of refuge for the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 99). From the *Crito* (45 b3) we learn that they had brought a sum of money from Thebes to aid the escape of Socrates, another case of Pythagorean devotion to him. It is all the more important to observe that Xenophon confirms this by including Simmias and Cebes in his list of true Socrates (*Mem*. i. 2. 48). Cp. also *Mem*. iii. 11. 17 (immediately after the mention of Antisthenes and Apollodorus) διὰ τὶ δὲ (ὁτι) καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμίαν Ὑβηθεν παραγίνεσθαι; It is probable that Σιμίας is the
correct form of the name (from αυτός), but I have not ventured to introduce it.

C 2 Φαίδωνδρις: the MSS. vary between this form and Φαιδώνιδρης. Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 48) mentions him along with Simmias and Cebes as a true Socratic, giving the correct Boeotian form of his name, Φαίδωνδρας.

Εὐκλείδης: Euclides was the head of a philosophical school at Megara, which held a form of the Eleatic doctrine. He is also represented in the Theaetetus as devoted to the memory of Socrates.

Τερψίων. All we know of Terpsion is that he is associated with Euclides in the dramatic introduction to the Theaetetus, which serves to dedicate that dialogue to the Megarians just as the Phaedo is dedicated to the Pythagoreans.

C 3 Ἀριστιππός. Many anecdotes are told of Aristippus of Cyrene, which may be apocryphal, but agree in representing him as a versatile cosmopolitan (omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, Horace, Ep. i. 17. 23). Many allusions to his doctrine have been found in Plato’s writings; but the same caution applies here (cp. b 8 n.) as in the case of Antisthenes.

Κλεέμπροτος: Callimachus has an epigram (24) on Cleombrotus of Ambracia who threw himself into the sea after reading the Phaedo, and he has often been identified with the Cleombrotus mentioned here. Nothing, however, is known of him.

C 4 ἐν Αιγίνῃ γὰρ κτλ. In antiquity this was supposed to be an innuendo. Demetrius says (Περὶ ἔρμηνειας 288) that Socrates had been in prison for a number of days and they did not take the trouble to sail across, though they were not 200 stades from Athens. To make this more pointed, Cobet inserted οὐ before παρεγένωντο, and took the clause as a question, which only proves that the innuendo is not very apparent in the text as it stands. We must be very careful in reading such covert meanings into Plato’s words. Athenaeus (504 f) makes it a grievance that he does not mention Xenophon here, though Xenophon had left Athens two years before. If the words Πλάτων δὲ οἷμαι ἦσθένει had been used of any one else, that would have been set down to malice. As we shall see, it had only become known the day before that the ship had returned from Delos, and we learn from the Crito (43 d 3) that the news came from
Sunium where she had touched. Aristippus and Cleombrotus could hardly have heard this in time, if they were in Aegina. There is no evidence that they had been there during the whole of the thirty days, as Demetrius suggests.

Introductory Narrative.—The attitude of Socrates towards death (59 c 8—70 c 3).

(1) Preliminary Narrative (59 c 8—63 e 8).

d 8 τῇ ... προτεραία: Attic usage seems to require either τῇ προτέρα ἡμέρα or τῇ προτεραία. I have therefore followed Hermann in bracketing ἡμέρα.

e 4 ὑπακούειν, 'to answer the door.' Cp. Crito 43 a 5 θαυμάζω ὅπως ἡθέλησε σοι ὅ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

εἶπεν περὶμένειν, 'told us to wait.' T has ἐπιμένειν, which seems less suitable. It would mean 'to stay as we were' (Riddell, Dig. § 127).

e 5 ἐως ἂν: we should expect πρὸν ἂν after πρότερον, but καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίέναι is merely a 'polar' antithesis placed διὰ μέσου and does not affect the construction.

e 6 οἱ ἑνδέκα: on the Eleven and their functions, see Arist. 'Ἀθ. πολ. 52, where we are told that the people elected them inter alia ἐπιμελησομένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ.

e 7 δοῦσα ἂν ... τελευτᾶ, 'are giving instructions for his death to-day.' For this rare construction after verbs of commanding, where the dependent clause contains the substance of the order, cp. Gorg. 523 d 7 τοιτο μὲν οὐ καὶ δὴ εἴρηται ('instructions have been given') τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν πάντως, Isaeus 7. 27 διεκελεύεσθ' ὅπως ἂν, εἰ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωσι με. The present τελευτᾶ (T) is more likely to have been altered to τελευτήσῃ (B) than vice versa.

ὁ οὐ πολὺν ... χρόνον ἐπισοχῶν, lit. 'after waiting (ἐπέχω intrans.) no long time.' Cf. 95 e 7 συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισοχῶν. Similarly 117 e 7 διαλιπτῶν χρόνον, 118 11 ὅλιγον χρόνον διαλιπτῶν, 'after a short interval.'

e 8 ἐκλεευε ὦ: W has ἐκεῖλευε (and so, accordingly, B'), but this is less idiomatic. The English verbs 'send' and 'bid' refer to the starting of the action, but πέμπειν and κελεύειν operate throughout the action. 'The thought follows the motion' (Gildersleeve). The imperfect is therefore natural where we should expect the aorist.
It is for the same reason that πέμπειν can mean 'convey', 'escort', and κελεύειν, 'urge on', 'incite'.

e 8 έσιοντες: W has έσιεθόντες (and so B²), but the present pcp. goes better with κατελαμβάνομεν. There were a number of them, so the action is resolved into successive parts ('as we entered, we found ...').

60 a 1 κατελαμβάνομεν, 'we found.' When κατελαμβάνειν is used in this sense, it takes the construction of verbs of knowing.

a 2 Ξανθιππην. There is no hint in the Phaedo, or anywhere else in Plato, that Xanthispe was a shrew. Xenophon makes her son Lamprocles say of her (Mem. ii. 2. 7) οὐδεὶς ἂν δύνατο αὐτὴς ἀνασχέσθαι τῇ γαληπóτητα, and in Xen. Symph. 2. 10 Antisthenes says she was the most 'difficult' (χαλεπωτάτη) of all wives, past, present, or future. The traditional stories about her appear to be of Cynic origin.

to παιδίου. Socrates had three sons (Apol. 34 d ἐὰς μὲν μειράκιον ἵδη, δύο δὲ παιδία). The μειράκιον must be the Lamprocles mentioned by Xenophon (see last note). There was one called Sophroniscus after his paternal grandfather, so he would be the second. The child here mentioned must accordingly be Menexenus (not to be confused with Menexenus, son of Demopho, cp. 59 b 9 n.). It is worthy of note that the names Xanthispe and Lamprocles suggest aristocratic connexions, and possibly Lamprocles was called after his maternal grandfather (cp. Arist. Clouds 62 sqq.). Socrates was not always a poor man; for he had served as a hoplite, and in Apol. 23 b 9 he ascribes his poverty to his service of Apollo (ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία ἐμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν). This may explain the χαλεπώτης of Xanthispe, if such there was.

a 3 ἄνθυφησον ought to mean 'raised a cry of εὐφημείτε' (bona verba, favete linguis), and that gives a perfectly good sense. The rule was ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρη τελευτάν (117 e 1), and εὐφημείτε was therefore a natural address to people approaching a scene of death. That she should use it and then break the εὐφημία herself is only human—and feminine. Byzantine scholars took, however, another view. In the recently discovered portion of the Lexicon of the Patriarch Photius (ninth cent. A.D.) we read ἄνευφημησεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐφρήνησεν (Reitzenstein, Anf. des Phot. p. 135), and the rest follow suit. It was explained κατ’ ἄντιφρασίν, i.e. by a curious figure of
speech which consisted in saying the opposite of what you meant (\textit{lucus a non lucendo}). Very similar is Soph. \textit{Trach.} 783 ἀναφημηθεὶς oἰμωγῇ λέως (where G. Hermann took the word in its natural sense) and Eur. \textit{Or.} 1335 ἐπ' ἀξίουσι τὰρ' ἀνευφημεὶ δὸμος. In both these cases death is imminent. It may be said that the \textit{oιμωγῇ} itself is δύσφημον, but that is not necessarily so; at any rate \textit{εὐφήμως γῶος} is quoted from Aeschylus (fr. 40 Sidgwick).

4 \textit{οία δη}: these words might have been used even without \textit{εἰώθασιν}, in the sense of 'just like'. Cp. Xen. \textit{Cyr.} i. 3. 2 \textit{οία δη παῖς} ('just like a boy'), Thuc. viii. 84. 3 \textit{οία δη ναύται}.

5 \textit{οὐστατον δη}, 'so this is the last time that...'. Cp. 89 b 4 \textit{αὐριον δῆ}. With this reading (that of B: TW have \textit{ταύτην}) the words are kindly and considerate. Xanthippe had apparently passed the night with Socrates and their child (at any rate she was found there when the doors were opened), and it was only right she should go home and rest. She is sent for again just before the end to say farewell. I do not see any ground for the remarks which some editors take occasion to make here on the Athenians' treatment of their wives. Would it have been right to keep Xanthippe there all day, in her overwrought condition, and allow her to witness the actual agony? Some women would have insisted on staying, but we can find no fault with the behaviour of Socrates in the matter.

9 \textit{τίνες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος}, 'some of Crito's people.'

\textit{κοπτομένη}: the original meaning of \textit{κόπτεσθαι} was 'to beat the breasts', but it came to mean simply 'to lament' (cp. the \textit{κομμός} in tragedy). The history of the Lat. \textit{plango} (whence \textit{planctus}, 'plaint') is similar.

\textit{ἀνακαθίζομενος}: the use of this verb in the medical writers shows that the meaning is 'sitting up'. Cp. Hippocrates, \textit{Progn.} 37 \textit{ἀνακαθίζειν βοῦλεσθαι} τὸν νοσέοντα τῆς νόσου ἁκμαξουσίας πονηρῶν. We might expect \textit{ἐν} τῇ κλίνῃ, but (\textit{ἰεσθαὶ}) \textit{καβίζεσθαι} sometimes retain the construction of (\textit{ἰῶ}) \textit{καβίζω}, which are verbs of motion. The variant \textit{ἐπὶ} τῇ κλίνῃ (W and B²) may be due to the idea that the verb means \textit{residens}, 'sitting down.' Wohlrab argues that Socrates must have got up to welcome his friends, and adopts \textit{ἐπὶ} accordingly; but this would spoil the picture. We are led to understand that he put his feet on the ground for the first time at 61 c 10. The
fetters had just been struck off, and at first he would be too stiff to get up.

b 2 συνίκαμψε: this verb is specially used of bending the joints. Cp. Arist. Hist. An. 502 b 11 πίθκος πόδας συγκάμπτει, ὁσπερ χεῖρας. It is opposed to ἐκτείνω.

ἐξέτρψε, 'rubbed down,' as with a towel. Athenaeus (409 e) quotes Philoxenos for ἐκτριμμα in the sense of χειρόμακτρον.

b 3 τρίβον: the compound verb is regularly repeated by the simple. Cp. 71 e 8 ἀνταποδώσομεν ... ἀποδούναι, 84 c 7 διεξεύει ... διελθείν, 104 d 10 ἀπεργάζηται ... εἰργάζετο.

ὡς ἄτοπον ... τ: the unemphatic τε is often postponed by hyperbaton (Riddell, Dig. § 290 c).

b 4 ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρός, 'how strangely it is related to —.' Relation is expressed by πεφυκέναι πρός ... , design or adaptation by πέφυκέναι ἐπι...

b 5 τὸ ἀμα μὲν κτλ., 'to think that they will not —.' The exclamatory infinitive is often used after some expression of feeling (in the present case ὡς θαυμασίως) which it serves to justify. Cp. Eur. Alc. 832 ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι, 'Out on thee! to think thou didst not tell!'

b 6 μὴ ἀπελείν: editors speak of personification and 'the lively fancy of the Greeks' here, but even we say 'won't' in such cases.

b 7 σχεδὸν τ ... ἄει, 'in almost every case.' The omission of ἄει in B is probably accidental. The relativity of pain and pleasure is a Heraclitean doctrine, cp. fr. 104 Bywater νοῦς ὑγείᾳ ἐποίησεν ἡδον τὰς ἄγαθον, λιμὸς κόρον, κάμαρος ἀνάπαυσιν, and it is not, perhaps, fanciful to suppose that this is intended to prepare us for the Heraclitean arguments as to the relativity of life and death below (70 d 7 sqq.).

b 8 ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμιμένω, 'fastened to (Greek says 'fastened from') a single head,' a grotesque imagination like those of Empedocles and of Aristophanes in the Symposium. B has συνημμένω, but that seems to be an anticipation of c 3 συνήψεν.

c 1 Αἰσωπός: Aesop was a Phrygian slave of whom many odd tales were told (cp. Wilamowitz-Marchant, Greek Reader, ii, p. 1), and
the Athenians attributed to him the beast-fables which play so large a part in all popular literature. The prose collection which has come down to us under the title of Αἰσθώπου μῦθοι is of Byzantine date; but many of the fables were well known from popular verses and Archilochus.

c 3  αὐτῷς: this is rather neater than the variant αὐτῶν, 'He fastened their heads together for them.'

c 5  αὐτῷ μοι ἐκείνη, sc. ἐπακολούθειν. The clause ἐπείδη κτλ. is in apposition (asynedeton explicativum), and the original statement is, as usual, restated more fully after the explanation (a b a).

c 6  ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ: cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους, πραε μετυ.

c 8  ὑπολαβὼν ... ἐφέ, 'rejoined' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The meaning of ὑπολαμβάνειν is not 'to interrupt', but 'to rejoin' or 'retort'. Cp. Lat. suscipere (Aen. vi. 723 suscipit Anchises) and contrast παραλαμβάνειν (τὸν λόγον) excitere.


d 1  ἐντείνας, 'setting to music.' Cp. Prot. 326 b 1 ποιήματα ... εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες. This seems to come from the geometrical use of the term which we find in Meno 87 a 1 εἰ οἶνον τε εἰς τὸν κύκλον τὰς τὸ χωρίων ... ἐνταθῆναι, where it refers to the 'inscription' of rectangular figures in a circle (for which Euclid uses ἴγγράφειν). That in turn, like many geometrical terms (e.g. arc, chord, subtend, hypotenuse, cp. E. Gr. Ph. 9 p. 116 n. 1), comes from the use of ropes or strings in geometrical constructions. The Pythagoreans were much concerned with the inscription of polygons in circles and polyhedra in spheres (cp. 110 b 6 n.), and it was natural that the same word should be used of making words fit into a musical scheme. Cp. also Phileb. 38 e 2 ἐντείνας εἰς φωνῆς of putting thought into words.

λόγους, 'tales.' This was the usual name (cp. Ar. Birds 651 εὖ Αἰσθώπου λόγους, Herodotus ii. 134 Αἰσθώπου τοῦ λογοσοιοῦ); but, when it is important to mark their fictitious character, they are called μῦθοι and opposed to λόγοι (61 b 4). In Ionic μῦθος means the same as λόγος in Attic; the Ionic for 'fable' is αἴνος (cp. Archil. fr. 96 ἔρεω τιν' ἥμιν αἴνων, ὁ Κηρυκίδη).
NOTES

Thucydides (iii. 104) gives this name to the Homeric 'Hymn' to Apollo. Properly speaking, προοίμια are 'preludes' intended to attach the rhapsode's epic recitations to the praise of the god at whose πανήγυρις they were delivered. This instance shows that ἐντείνας is 'setting to music', not merely 'versifying'; for no προοίμιον could have been in prose. In the Phaedo, Socrates is represented throughout as the servant of Apollo (cp. esp. 85 b 4 sqq.). Apollo Hyperboreus of Delos was in a special sense the god of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 97, n. 3), and there would be no difficulty in identifying him with the Pythian Apollo who had given the famous oracle, and to whose service, as we know from the Apology, Socrates regarded himself as consecrated. They were identified in the public religion of Athens (Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, iv, p. 110). Geddes's suggestions about 'the God of Day' must be rejected. Apollo was not a sun-god at this date (Farnell, ib., p. 136 sqq.).

καὶ ἄλλοι τινές... ἀτάρ καὶ... So we find άξε μὲν... ἀτάρ καὶ νῦν (τότε)... In these uses ἄταρ καὶ... is equivalent to καὶ δὴ καὶ...

Eύνος: from Apol. 20 b 8 we learn that Evenus was a Parian who taught 'human goodness' for 5 minae. In Phaedr. 267 a 3 we are told that he invented certain rhetorical devices such as ἰποδήλωσις and παρέσαινος. Some said he even composed παράψογοι in metre μνήμης χάριν. He was also an elegiac poet.

πρόγυ, 'the other day.' We know from the Apology 20 a 3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of Socrates.

 antidexos, 'competitor', 'rival'. So in Ar. Frogs 816 Euripides is the antidexos of Aeschylus.


ἀφοσιούμενος: the verb ἀφοσιοῦμαι means facio aliquid animi religione solvendi causa. Tr. 'to satisfy my conscience'.

εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, 'on the chance that,' si forte. This use of πολλάκις is fairly common after εἰ (εἴπ) ἄρα and μή. Cp. 61 a 6.

tαύτην τήν μουσικήν, 'music in the ordinary sense.' The pronoun οὗτος is often depreciatory like ἵστε.

καὶ ἔργαζον, sc. μουσικήν. As distinguished from ποιεῖν, 'compose,'
εργάζεσθαι means ‘to make a business of’, ‘practise’, and is regularly used of arts and trades (L. S., s. v. Π. 5, 6).

e 8 παρακελεύεσθαι hortari aliquem ut aliquid faciat; ἐπικελεύειν incitare facientem (Fischer). Comparatio autem duicta est ex proverbio currentem incitare (Wyttenbach). Cf. Xen. Cyr. vi. 3. 27 τοῖς ... τὸ δέον ποιοῦσιν ἐπικελεύειν.

61 a i ὠπέρ ... καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω: the simile brings out the meaning of ἐπικελεύειν and is therefore added appositively (asynedeton explicatio), after which the original fact is more fully restated (a b a). For this regular Platonic structure, cp. 109 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 209).

διακελεύομενοι: the proper meaning of διακελεύομαι is ‘to exhort one another’. Cp. Hdt. ix. 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναίκι, but Plato often uses the word as equivalent to παρακελεύεσθαι. Here, I think, it is merely employed for variety; it could hardly refer to the partisans of different runners exhorting their favourites.

a 3 φιλοσοφίας ... οὕτης μεγίστης μουσικῆς: this is a distinctively Pythagorean doctrine. We have the authority of Aristoxenus for saying that the Pythagoreans used medicine to purge the body and music to purge the soul (E. Gr. Ph. p. 107), and Aristotle’s doctrine of the tragic κάθαρσις seems to be ultimately derived from this source. We shall see that philosophy is the true soul-purge. Strabo, who had access to Italiote and Siceliote historians now lost, says, in discussing the orgiastic dances of the Curetes (x. 468) καὶ δίὰ τοῦτο μουσικὴν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Πλάτων, καὶ ἐτι πρῶτον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Cp. also Rep. 548 b 8 τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας, Laws 689 d 6 ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνῶν (‘harmonies’) μεγίστη δικαίωτα, ἀν λέγουσι σοφία. This is quite different from the metaphor put into the mouth of Laches in Lach. 188 d 3. There the μουσικὸς ἀνήρ is he whose character is tuned in a noble key. Any educated Athenian might have said that; but here we have a definite doctrine, which is further developed in the sequel.

a 6 εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις: cp. 60 e 3 n.

b 1 πιθόμενον: this was originally the reading of T and should, I think, be preferred to πειθόμενον if καὶ is deleted and the participle made dependent on ποιήσαντα. Tr. ‘by composing poems in obedience to the dream’. We often find καὶ interpolated between two
participles, one of which is subordinated to the other. It is omitted here by W, and Schanz had bracketed it without knowing this.

b 4 μῦθους ἄλλ’ οὐ λόγους: cp. 60 d i n. Cp. Gorg. 523 α 1 ἄκονε... λόγου, δν συ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ... ἐγὼ δὲ λόγου, Prot. 324 δ 6 τούτον... πέρι... οὐκέτι μῦθον σου ἐρῶ ἄλλα λόγου, Tim. 26 ε 4 μὴ πλασθήνατα μῦθον ἄλλ’ ἀληθινόν λόγον. The distinction is almost the same as ours between ‘fiction’ and ‘fact’.

b 5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ: the construction ceases to be indirect, as ἐπειδή, not ἐννοήσας ὅτι had preceded.


tοῦς Αἰσώπου: the antecedent is incorporated in the relative clause (Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 7 οἷς πρῶτος ἐνέτυχον: the clause οἷς προχείρουσ εἶχον is restated after the explanation (a b a) (Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 8 ἐπρῶσθαι, sc. φράζε. ‘Bid him’ farewell from me.’ The regular word for delivering messages is φράζεως, and ἐπρῶσθα (perf. imper. mid. of ἰὼννυμι) means ‘farewell’ and was regularly used in ending letters, whence Lat. vale.

ἀν σωφρονῇ, ‘if he is wise,’ the regular phrase in this sense, σωφρονεῖν being used in its originally sense of sapere, ‘to be in one’s right mind.’ The more common meaning of σωφρονεῖν is an extension of the idea of ‘sanity’ to a wider sphere.

ὁς τάχιστα: the omission of these words in T spoils the sense. Cp. Theaet. 176 a 8 πειράσθαι χρή ἐνθέντε ἐκείσε (‘from this world to the other’) φεύγειν ὃι τάχιστα.

c 2 οἶον: an exclamation, not a question. Cf. 117 d 7 οἷα... ποιεῖτε.

c 3 πολλὰ... ἐντεύχηκα, ‘I have had many dealings with him.’

Cp. Lach. 197 d 3 ὃ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, Crat. 396 d 5 ἐσθεν... πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ, Parm. 126 b 9 Πυθοδόρῳ... πολλὰ ἐντεύχηκε.

c 4 σχεδόν: used as in the phrase σχεδόν (τι) οἶδα. Tr. ‘I am pretty sure that —’.

ἐκάνεινα: always with a negative, ‘if he can (could) help it.’

c 6 οὗ φιλόσοφος: as addressed to Pythagoreans, the word has a special sense (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 321), that of a man who follows a certain ‘way of life’. It is much as if we should ask: ‘Is he not a religious man?’
c 8 ἐθελῆσει, 'will be willing', 'will be ready', not 'will wish'.

Toútou toú πράγματος, sc. φιλοσοφίας, regarded as an occupation. Cp. Ἀρῶ. 20 c 5 to σῶν τί ἐστι πράγμα; The term is natural if we remember that 'philosophy' is a life.

d 7 Φιλολάω: Philolaus was one of the most distinguished of the later Pythagoreans, and had taken refuge at Thebes when the community was expelled from Magna Graecia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 99). There seems to have been a regular σωματικοῦ at Thebes as well as at Phlius. The Pythagorean Lysis was the teacher of Epaminondas.

d 8 οὐδὲν...σαφές, 'nothing certain' rather than 'nothing clear' (cp. 57 b i n.). We shall see that there were good reasons for the teaching of Philolaus about the soul being doubtful (86 b 6 n.). I do not think there is any reference to the Pythagoreans' custom of speaking δή αἰνιγμώτων, as Olympiodorus fancies.

d 10 φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν, 'I don't mind telling you.'

ε 1 καὶ μάλιστα, vel maxime. Cp. 59 a 9 n.

ἐκέισθε...τῆς ἐκεί: the adverbs ἐνθάδε and ἐκεί are regularly used of 'this life and the next', 'this world and the other'. Cp. 64 a i ; 117 c 2. So Theaet. 176 a 8 quoted in 61 b 8 n., and Aristophanes, Frogs 82 ὁ δ' εὐκόλος μὲν ἐνθάδε εὐκόλος δ' ἐκεί. There is no need to read τῆς ἐκείσθε for τῆς ἐκεί, for ἀποδήμια means a residence abroad as well as a journey abroad. Tr. 'our sojourn in the other world'.

e 2 μυθολογεῖν, 'to tell tales.' Socrates regards all definite statements with regard to the next life as μύθοι. Cp. Ἀρῶ. 39 e 4 where he introduces what he has to say about it by οὐδὲν γὰρ καλύει διαμυνθολογησαὶ πρὸς ἀλήλους. The immortality of the soul is capable of scientific proof; the details of the ἀποδήμια are not. Cp. below 110 b 1 n. and 114 d 1.

e 4 μείρε ἡλίου δυσμῶν: executions could not take place till sunset. Cp. 89 c 7 ἐως ἐτί φῶς ἑστιν, 116 e 1 ἐτί ἡλίου εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσίων καὶ οὕτω δεδυκέναι.

e 6 νυνῆ, 'just now,' i.e. 'a little ago' (ὅλγον πρόαθεν). In this sense, the grammarians accent as in the text, to distinguish the adverb from νῦν δῆ, 'now indeed', 'now at last' (cp. 107 c 4). As a rule the MSS. have νῦν δῆ in both senses.

e 7 ὦτε παρ' ἡμῶν διητάτο: it appears from these words that Philolaus had left Thebes some time before 399 B.C. We hear of him at Tarentum (Taras), which was the chief seat of scientific Pythagoreanism
in the fourth century B.C. The leading man then was Archytas (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 319).

62 a 2 ἵως μέντοι κτλ. As the construction of this sentence has been much disputed, I will first give what I take to be the right translation. This will be justified in the following notes, from which it will also appear how it differs from other interpretations. I render: 'I dare say, however, it will strike you as strange if this is the solitary case of a thing which admits of no distinctions—I mean, if it never turns out, as in other cases, that for man (that is at certain times and for certain men) it is better to die than to live—and, in such cases, I dare say it further strikes you as strange that it is not lawful for those for whom it is better to die to do this good office for themselves, but that they have to wait for some one else to do it for them.' This comes nearest to Bonitz's interpretation (Plat. Stud., ed. 3 (1886), pp. 315 sqq.), and I shall note specially the points in which it differs.

εἰ τοῦτο... ἀπλοῦν ἐπὶν: I take this clause as the expression in a positive form of what is stated negatively in the next. If we must say what τοῦτο means, it will be τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι ζήν ἢ τεθνάναι, but the pronoun is really anticipatory and only acquires a definite meaning as the sentence proceeds. Bonitz once took τοῦτο as meaning τὸ τεθνάναι, but in his latest discussion of the passage he substitutes τὸ αὐτὸν ἵναντον ἀποκτεινώναι. I do not think it necessary to look backwards for a definite reference, and I think Bonitz does not do justice to the clearly marked antithesis of μόνον τὸν ἀλλὰν ἀπάντωσιν and δόσπερ καὶ τάλλα. The ἀλλὰ must surely be the same in both clauses, and if so these must be positive and negative expressions of the same thought. I hold, with Bonitz, that the interpretation of most recent editors (τοῦτο = τὸ μὴθεμίτων εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινώναι) is untenable, if only because it gives an impossible meaning to ἀπλοῦν. Further, no one has suggested that the lawlessness of suicide is the only rule which is absolute, and the suggestion would be absurd. On the other hand, many people would say that life is always better than death. It may be added that τοῦτο is the proper anticipatory pronoun; it is constantly used praeparative, as the older grammars say.

a 3 τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων: Riddell, Dig. § 172.
ἀπλοῦν: that is ἀπλοῦν which has no διαφοραὶ (cp. Polit. 306 e 3

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πότερον ἀπλοῦν ἐστι τούτο, ἣ ... ἔχει διαφοράν). It is what admits of no distinctions such as ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς. Cp. Symp. 183 d 4 οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν ... οὗτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ οὗτε ἀλοχρὸν, ἄλλα καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλὸν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρὸν, Phaedr. 244 a 5 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι (where Socrates immediately proceeds to enumerate the different kinds of madness), Prot. 331 b 8 οὖν πάνω μοι δοκεῖ ... οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι ... ἄλλα τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. This is the origin of the Aristotelian use of ἀπλῶς. Bonitz has shown once for all that ἀπλοῦν does not mean simpliciter verum, as many editors say after Heindorf.

a 3 οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει ... βέλτιον (ὅν): these words must be taken together, whether we add ὅν, as suggested by Heindorf, or not. It is, I think, safer to add it; for the certain instances of the poetical use of τυγχάνω without a participle come from later dialogues where poetical idioms are commoner.

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, 'for man' generally. The dative is governed by βέλτιον, not by τυγχάνει, as some editors suppose.

a 4 ὧσπερ καὶ τάλλα, 'as other things do.' Olympiodorus rightly says: ἐπαμφοτεριζόντων τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ ἄκακῶν δυναμένων εἶναι (the rest of his interpretation is wrong). The phrase is an abbreviation of some such clause as this: ὧσπερ ἑνίοτε ἑνίοις βέλτιον ὅν τυγχάνει νοσείν, πένεσθαι κτλ., ἤ ψηλαίνειν, πλούτειν κτλ.

ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς: i.e. ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἔστιν οἷς, ἑνίοτε καὶ ἑνίοις. Bonitz's proposal to delete the comma at τάλλα and take ὧσπερ καὶ τάλλα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς together is at first sight attractive. It gets rid of the pleonasm of ἔστιν ὅτε after οὐδέποτε and the change from singular to plural involved in taking ἔστιν οἷς with τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. These are not, however, insuperable difficulties, and I feel that the ellipse involved in ὧσπερ καὶ τάλλα is easier if it is total than if it is partial.

a 5 τεθνάναι: in such phrases τεθνάναι may properly be translated 'to die'; for ἀποθνήσκειν lays stress on the process of dying, of which τεθνάναι is the completion. The translation 'to be dead' is clearly inadmissible in such common phrases as πολλάκις, μυρίακις τεθνάναι. Cp. also Crito 43 d 1 οὗ δεί ἀφικομένου (sc. τοῦ πλοίου) τεθνάναι με, 52 c 6 οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δεῖ τεθνάναι σε, Apol. 30 c 1 οὗδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι, 38 c 4 πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱρέομαι ὅθεν ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἥ ἐκεῖνος ζῆν, 39 c 3 οὗπω ἔρχομαι οἰ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ
a 8 ἵπτω Ζεὺς: Schol. τὸ ἵπτω ἐπιχωρίαζοντος ἔστι. In Ar. Ach. 911 the Boeotian says ἵπτω Δεὺς, 'let Zeus know' (ἵπτω = θίετω = Att. ἵπτω), 'Zeus be my witness.' The meaning is much attenuated, and the French Parbleu! comes nearest to it. Epist. vii. 345 a 3 ἵπτω Ζεὺς, φησίν ὁ Ἐθῆαιος may or may not be a reminiscence of this passage. It is more likely that the phrase struck Athenian ears as a quaint one. The expletives of a language generally strike foreigners in this way.

b 1 οὔτω γ', 'put in that way.'

b 2 ἔχει τινὰ λόγον: lit. 'it admits of something being said for it', i.e. 'is justifiable' or 'intelligible' (opp. ἄλογὸν ἔστιν, 'it is unjustifiable', 'inexplicable'), syn. εὐλογὸν ἔστιν). For the sense of ἔχειν cp. συγγνώμην ἔχειν, excusationem habet, 'it admits of excuse', 'is excusable'. The phrase is sometimes personal as in Ἀبول. 31 b 7 ἔχον ἄν τινα λόγον, 'my conduct would be intelligible,' 34 b 1 τάχ' ἄν λόγον ἔχοντι βοηθούντες, 'their conduct would be explicable.' That λόγος does not mean 'reason' in this phrase is shown by the words which immediately follow in the last of these passages: τινὰ ἄλογον ἔχοναι λόγον . . . ἀλλ' ἦ τὸν ὅρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον; 'what explanation can be given except the straight and honest one?'

b 3 ἐν ἀπορρήτωσις, 'in a mystery.' Cp. Eur. Rhes. 943 μυστηρίῳ τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φανὰς | ἐδείξεν Ὀρφεὺς. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is Orphic in origin (cp. 70 c 5 n.). There is not the slightest reason for doubting that Socrates held it, or that he derived it from this source (cp. Introd. XIII). At the same time, he always refers to the details of Orphic theology with a touch of ironical deference as here. Cp. below 69 c 4 n.

ἐν τινὶ φρουρᾷ, 'in ward.' This is Archer-Hind's translation, and
conveniently retains the ambiguity of the original, which was sometimes understood to mean (1) ‘watch’, and sometimes (2) ‘prison’. Cicero took it in the first sense. Cp. de Senectute 20, vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. In the Somnium Scipionis (3. 10) he uses the word custodia, clearly a translation of φυροῦσα: πιις omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis, nec iniussu eius a quo ille est vobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est. Antiphon the Sophist, a contemporary of Socrates, says τὸ ζῆν ἔοικε φυροῦρᾳ ἐφημέρῳ, but that may be merely a simile like the Psalmist’s ‘watch in the night’. The Stoic formula that we must live ἔως ἄν ὁ θεὸς σημῆνῃ τὸ ἀνακλήτικών (dum receptui canat) seems to be derived from an interpretation of this kind, and we must remember that φυροῦσα is the Peloponnesian word for στρατεία. The other view, however, that φυροῦσα means ‘prison’, is strongly supported by the Axiochus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., where we read (365 e 6) ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐσμὲν ψυχῆς, ἥδον ἄθαντον ἐν θνητῷ καθεργόμενον φυροῦρῳ. There is no doubt that the Orphics did speak of the body as the prison of the soul. The Christian apologist Athenagoras says (Diels, Vors. 2 p. 245. 19) καὶ Φιλόλαος δὲ ὅσπερ ἐν φυροῦρᾳ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περιελθῆθαι λέγων, with which we may compare Plato, Crat. 400 c 4 δοκοῦσα μέντοι μοι μᾶλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ ὁρφεά τούτῳ τῷ φόνῳ (σῶμα), ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὅν δὴ ἔνεκα δίδωσιν, τούτων δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σφίζηται, δεσμοστηρίου εἰκόνα. Cp. also the use of ἐνδείχθαται ‘to be imprisoned’ below 81 e 1 (ἔως ἄν) πάλιν ἐνδείχθαι εἰς σῶμα, 92 a 1 πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδείχθαι. So too Tīm. 43 a 5 ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον, 44 b 1 ὅταν (ψυχῆ) εἰς σῶμα ἐνδείχθη θνητῶν. Cp. also ἐνδείχθαι in the fragment of Euxitheus quoted in the next note. The φυροῦρα in Gorg. 525 a 7 is the ‘prison-house’ of the other world, not the body.

The genuinely Pythagorean origin of this is vouched for by a passage from an unknown Pythagorean called Euxitheus, quoted by Athenaeus from the Peripatetic Clearchus (Diels, Vors. 2 p. 245. 8), ἕξιθεος ὁ Πυθαγορικός, ὁ Νίκιον, ὁς ἀφο Κλέαρχος ὁ Περιπατητικός ἐν δευτέρῳ Βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδείχθαι (cp. preceding note) τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ δεδομένῳ βίω τόσον ψυχάς τιμωρίας χαρίν καὶ διείσονται τοῦ θεών ὅσε, εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτους, ἔως ἄν ἐκών αὐτοῦ λύσῃ πλείον καὶ μείζονεν ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμας· did πάντας

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eυλαβομένους τιναν κυρίων (i.e. δεσποτῶν, ἐπιστατῶν) ἀνάτασιν ('threat') φοβείσθαι τοῦ ἢν ἐκόντας ἐκβήναι, μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ βάνατον ἀσπασίως προσέσθαι, πεπεσμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. As Clearchus of Soli wrote about 300 B.C., this fragment is almost certainly genuine.

b 5 μέγας, 'high.' Cp. Gorg. 493c 3, where Socrates says of the most characteristic of the Orphic doctrines ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἔστω ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα ('rather queer').

b 8 κτημάτων, 'chattels.' The word is often used of flocks and herds, in which sense it is opposed to χρήματα. This doctrine of the divine herdsman appears more than once in Plato's later dialogues. Cp. esp. Laws 906a 6 σώματοι δὲ ἡμῶν θεοὶ τε ἁμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἥμεις δ' αὖ κτήμα (v.l. κτήματα) θεῶν καὶ δαίμων. In describing the Saturnia regna he says (Polit. 2716e 5) θεῶν ἐνεμεν αὐτοῦς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν,' God was their shepherd and tended them himself.' Again, in Laws 902b 8 we have θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματα φαμεν εἰναι πάντα ὄρασα θυτὰ ζῷα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἄλοι.—Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;—'Ἠδη τοῖνυν σμικρὰ ἡ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἰναι τοῖς θεοῖς' οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς (i.e. τοῖς δεσπόταις ἡμῶν) ἀμελεῖν ἄν εἰ ἐν προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτως γε οὐσὶ καὶ ἄριστοι. The similarity of phrase here points to a common Orphic-Pythagorean origin for the two passages. Cp. also Critias 109b 6 κατοικίσαντες, οἷον νομῆς ποίμνα, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἐαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐτρεφον.

c 3 τεθνάναι: cp. 62a 5 n.

c 7 πρὶν ... ἐπιτύμψη: it is easy to insert ἄν before ἀνάγκην with Heindorf, but it is more likely that this archaic and poetical construction is used to give solemnity to the sentence. Unless we are prepared to emend a large number of passages, we must admit that Plato sometimes used it to produce a particular effect. It is especially common in the solemn, formal diction of the Laws, cp. 872e 10 οὐδὲ ἐκπλυτον ἐκδεευν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μιανθῶν πρὶν φόνον φῶς ὀμοίω ὀμοίου ἡ δράσασα ψυχῆ τείση.

c 10 ῥαδίως, 'lightly', 'without complaining', as in ῥαδίως φέρεων. Cp. 63a 7.

d 2 εὐλόγως ἔχει: a frequent equivalent of εὐλογῶν ἔστι (cf. supra b 2). That which it is easy to explain or justify is εὐλογον.

θεῶν: the transition from the popular θεοῦ to the philosophic θεῶν seems quite unconscious.
toûs ðronimwtaûs: in Plato ðronimos and ðsofôs mean exactly the same thing. Aristotle distinguished ðronos from ðsofia as practical from theoretical wisdom, a distinction which he shows to be in conformity with popular usage. See my edition of the *Ethics*, p. 261 sq.

d 5 éîstataûs ... éîstataî: these are the regular terms in this connexion. *Cp.* Polit. 271e 5 theûs éînev auîtôs auîtôs éîstataûs.

d 6 ouk ðxei lògos, i.e. ðlojôv ðstî, ouk ðulògos ðxei (cp. b 2 ; d 2).

autôs: the shift from plural to singular is not uncommon. *Cp.* esp. 104 d 1 n.

e 2 ðparâméneîv, 'not to run away,' the regular opposite of àpôdidrákeiav.

e 4 ouîs, 'putting it that way,' more often ouîw γ' as above b 1.

e 5 tûínantîôn ... ñj: we say 'opposite to'. We cannot always render ñj by 'or' or 'than'; for its meaning is wider than either. *Cp.* especially the common diâférîen ñj ...

e 6 àphronas: as ðronimos = ðsofôs, so àphron = àmahîs (àsofôs is not in ordinary use).

63 a 1 ðpragmatêîa, 'diligence', 'pains-taking', the noun of ðpragmatêîovai, which is equivalent to ðprágmata ðchô, 'take pains', 'take trouble'. In late Greek polûpragmouîn is 'curiosity' in a good sense, and the meaning here is similar.

a 2 [ð] Kêbhs: it is Plato's almost uniform practice to insert the article with proper names in the narrative (cp. toû Kêbhtos just above) and to omit it in the dialogue when directly reported (cp. Kêbhs twice in the next speech, introduced by kai ð ðimîas). See Beare in Hermathena, 1895, vol. ix, pp. 197 sqq. As ð was omitted by the first hand of T, I have ventured to bracket it.

lògos pîvas ðnepénnç, 'is always on the track of some argument.' Metaphors from hunting are often used by Socrates in speaking of arguments, and the lògos is regularly the game which is hunted. *Cp.* ðmetîenâ toû lògos (88 d 9 n.) and ðmêthôdos (79 e 3 n.). This metaphor has survived in the word 'investigation'. (Cp. kar' ðxên 115 b 9 n.)

ou pânu ... êîleî, 'is not very ready to believe at once.' Note the interlaced order (a b a b); ou pânu belongs to êîleî and êîdeoîs to ðeîdeîav.

a 4 'Allá ìâî ... ðe: the emphasis is on νîv. 'Even I think that this time ('for once') there is something in what Cebes says.'
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a 6 ὅσοι ἄληθῶς belongs to σοφοί.

a 7 πρατίσω, 'lightly.' Cp. 62 c 10.

els σὲ τείνεις τὸν λόγον, 'to be aiming his words at you.' For an elaboration of the same metaphor, cp. Symp. 219 b 3 ταῦτα...

eἰπών καὶ ἄφεις ὅσπερ ἁλη, τετράςθαι αὐτῶν ὑμῖν.


b 7 παρ' ἀνθρώποις: who these were, appears from Ἀφολ. 41 a 6, where Socrates mentions Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer (in that order) as persons whom one would give anything to meet after death.

c 1 οὐκ ἄν πάνυ ... διασχυμαίμην: another touch of the Socratic irony which Plato has reproduced elsewhere. Cp. above 62 b 5 n., ΠΙΛ ΔΗΠ ΔΗΠ ΔΗΠ, and Meno 86 b 6, where, after explaining the doctrine of ἄναίμονος, Socrates says: καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἄν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυμαίμην, ὅτι δὲ κτλ.

c 2 ὅτι . . . ἡθεὶν: the sentence begins as if it were to end ἡθεὶν ἐλπίζω (ἐλπίς is Orphic for 'faith' and quite in place here) εὕτε. Instead of that, it takes a fresh start at εὕτε, and the remainder of it is accommodated to the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν πάνυ διασχυμαίμην. In T and Stobaeus the construction is regularized by writing τό for ὅτι, but this looks suspiciously like an 'emendation'.

c 4 οὐχ ὅμοιος, non perinde (Heindorf), 'not to the same extent,' as if I were without this hope.

c 5 εἶναι τι: cp. 91 b 3 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι.

c 6 πάλαι λέγεται: we must interpret this in the light of the πάλαις λόγος at 70 c 5, where the reference is certainly to Orphic doctrine. Such a belief as is here mentioned formed no part of ordinary Greek religion. According to that, only a few great sinners (Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion) were punished in the other world, while only a few favourites of heaven (Menelaus, Diomede, Achilles, and, in Athenian belief, Harmodius and Aristogiton) were carried off to the Isles of the Blessed.

c 8 αὐτὸς ἔχων, 'keeping to yourself' ('αὐτὸς ὁ. λ. est solus,' Heindorf).

d 1 κοινῶν, 'to be shared' (as in κοινὸς ἑρμῆς). Cp. Phaedr. 279 c 6 κοινὸ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων, which is a Pythagorean rule.
NOTES 63

d 2 ἡ ἀπολογία, 'the defence' (of which you spoke a little ago, 63 b). The article should be kept, though omitted in B.

d 3 πρῶτον δὲ κτλ. This interlude marks the end of the preliminary narrative.

d 4 πάλαι, 'for some time past.' The adverb does not necessarily refer to a long time.

d 5 Τί δὲ ... ἀλλο γε ἦ ... 'Why, simply that ...' The first hand of B omits δὲ, but the weight of MS. authority is in its favour. Cp. Hipp. ma. 281 c 9 Τί δ' ὅτε, ὃ Ὑπόκατος, ἀλλο γε ἦ ... 

d 8 προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ: as προσφέρειν means 'to apply,' especially in a medical sense, the usual construction is that seen in Charm. 157 c 4 προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ.

e 1 ἔνστε ἀναγκαζομαι κτλ. In Plut. Phocion 36 we have this story: Πεπωκότον δ' ἡδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον ἐπέλευσε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος οὐκ ἐφή τρίψεων ἑτέρον εἰ μὴ λάβοι δώδεκα δραχμὰς, δόσον τὴν ὀλκήν ὀνείται. χρόνου δὲ διαγενομένου καὶ διατριβῆς, ὁ Φωκίων καλέσας τινὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπὼν ὧν μὴ ἀποθάνει, ἀδήμησι δωρεάν ἐστιν, ἔκελευσε τῷ ἄνθρώπῳ δοῦναι τὸ κερμάτιον. The suggestion has accordingly been made that the δημόσιος or δήμος here was thinking less of Socrates than his own pocket.

e 3 έα ... χαίρειν αὐτόν, 'never mind him.' The phrases χαίρειν ἐὰν, and χαίρειν εἰπεῖν ('to bid farewell to ') are used of dismissing anything from one's mind. Cp. 64 c 1; 65 c 7.

e 6 σχέδον μὲν τι γενί: σχέδον τι go together and μὲν is solitarium. Cp. Lach. 192 c 5 σχέδον γάρ τι οἶδα.

(2) The ἀπολογία of Socrates. The philosopher will not fear death; for his whole life has been a rehearsal of death. 63 e 8—69 e 5.

e 8 δὴ marks these words as a reference to 63 b 2 sqq.

e 9 τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, 'to render my account' (rationem reddere) to the persons who are entitled to demand it (λόγον ἀπαίτειν) and to get it (λόγον λαμβάνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν) from me (παρ' ἐμοῦ). For the article τὸν cp. ἡ ἀπολογία above d 2.

ἀνὴρ ... διατριψας, 'a man who has spent,' quite general, and only a more emphatic form of ὃ διατριψας.

τῷ δὲντι: in his earlier dialogues Plato uses only τῷ δέντι, in his latest only δεντος. The dialogues in which both occur are Rep., Phaedr., Theaet. In Soph. there are twenty-one cases of δεντος to
one of τῷ ὄντι. The absence of ὄντως from the Phaedo is one reason among others for dating it before the Republic.

e 10 θαρρεῖν, 'not to fear', 'to have no fear of' (opp. δεδείναι and φοβεῖσθαι). We have no single word for this in English. See 88 b 4 n.

64 a 1 ἐκεῖ: cp. 61 e 1 n.

a 4 ὅσοι τυχάνουσιν . . . ἀπτομένοι, 'all who really engage in'. So commonly ἀπτεθαί γεωμετρίας, μουσικῆς, γυμναστικῆς, 'to go in for', 'to study'. For ὀρθῶς 'in the true sense of the word', cp. below 67 b 4 n.

a 5 λεληθεῖν τοὺς ἀλλους ὅτι . . . , 'it looks as if men did not know that —'. As the negative of verbs of knowing, λανθάνειν may take ὅτι as well as a participial complement.

αὐτοί, 'of themselves', 'of their own accord'.

a 6 ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, 'practise.' Cp. Cicero, Tusc. i. 30 tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem (sc. Socrates), commentatio mortis est, ib. 31 secernere autem a corpore animum ecquid aliud est quam mori discere? Seneca, Ep. xxvi egregia res est mortem condiscere . . . meditare mortem. The phrase meditatio mortis means the 'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death; for meditatio is a translation of μελέτημα, 67 d 8.

ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι, 'dying' (the process) 'and death' (its completion). Cp. 62 a 5 n.

a 9 δ . . . προνθυμοῦντο: Plato often restates the first member of a period with emphasis at the end (Palindromia of the period, Schanz, Nov. Comm., p. 10). A good instance is Apol. 27 d ὅπως ἐπερ δαίμονας ἥγουμαι . . . ἐπειδήτερ γε δαίμονας ἥγουμαι. As the first member here is προνθυμεῖσθαι . . . μηδὲν ἄλλο ἃ τοῦτο, δ must be the object of προνθυμοῦντο, and not of ἀγανακτεῖν.

b 1 οὗ πάνω . . . γελασείοντα, 'not very inclined to laugh', 'in no laughing mood'. In prose only the participle of desideratives in -σείω is used, though Sophocles says τὶ δ' ἐγρασείεις; (Philoct. 1001) and Euripides φευξείω (Herc. 628). Aristophanes has δρασεῖς in parody (Wasps 168).

b 2 ἄν . . . δοκεῖν, 'would think.'

b 3 ἐλπίζοντα goes closely with b 5 ὅτι. That the words καὶ συμφάναι . . . καὶ πάνυ are parenthetical is clear; for φημί and its compounds do not take ὅτι.
b 3 τοὺς ... παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους: i.e. the Thebans (not the Athenians, as Schleiermacher held). Olympiodorus says εἰκότως Θηβαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας, παρ’ οἷς καὶ ἦ Βοιωτία ὑπερ. That, however, is hardly adequate; for Simmias was not likely to share Athenian prejudice on this subject. More probably we have here a reflexion of the impression made by the Pythagorean refugees on the bons vivants of Thebes. The φιλόσοφοι would not appreciate Copaic eels and ducks. In any case, it is distinctly implied that the word φιλόσοφος in its technical sense was well known at Thebes before the end of the fifth century, and this confirms the view that it was originally Pythagorean (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 321 n. 2).

b 5 θανατόων, ‘are moribund’, ‘are ripe for death’. The scholium is θανάτον ἐπιθυμοῦσι, and late writers certainly use the word (or θανατίαν) in this sense. But it is not the meaning required here, and a glance at the list in Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 153, will show that verbs in -ώω (–ιώω) express morbid states of body or mind, and are only occasionally and secondarily desiderative. Thus ναυτιάν is not ‘to long to go to sea’, but ‘to have passenger-sickness’, i.e. ‘to be sea-sick’. For the real meaning of οἱ πολλοὶ cp. below ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι (65 a 6 n.). They think philosophers ‘as good as dead’, and look upon them as ‘living corpses’ (cp. Sophocles quoted l. c.). They do not trouble about their desires. ‘The picture of the pale-faced students in the φρονίστηριον of the Clouds is the best commentary on this popular impression’ (Geddes). Cp. v. 103 τοὺς ἀχριστὰς, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις, 504 ἡμεθνης γενήσωμαι (if I become like Chaerephon).

σφάς, sc. τοὺς πολλοὺς.

b 6 τούτο πᾶσχεν, sc. τεθνάναι. Tr. ‘It would serve them right’.

c 1 χαίρειν εἴπόντες ἐκεῖνος, ‘dismissing them from our thoughts.’ Tr. ‘Never mind them, but let us discuss among ourselves’. Cp. 63 e 3 n.

b 2 ἂνοιμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι: Socrates regularly begins a dialectical argument by asking whether we attach a definite meaning to the name of the thing under discussion. Cp. Gorg. 464 a 1 σώμα που καλείς τι καὶ ψυχήν, Prot. 358 d 5 καλεῖτε τι δέος καὶ φάβον; Μενο, 75 e 1 τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; 76 a 1 εἴπεδον καλεῖς τι; so below 103 c 11 θερμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

b 4 ἀλλο τι ἢ, ‘anything else than.’ Here the words have their full
sense; but, if we suppress the ἄρα μή which introduces them, we see how ἀλλὸ τι ἢ came to be used as an interrogative = nonne.

c 5 τοῦτο: pred. ‘that death is this’, which is further explained by χωρὶς μὲν κτλ. The same definition is given in Gorg. 524 b 2 ὁ θάνατος τυχάνει ὄν, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυνῶν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ’ ἄλληλων. For τὸ τεθνάναι cp. 62 a 5 n.

c 6 αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ‘alone by itself.’ The emphatic αὐτὸς often acquires a shade of meaning which we can only render by ‘alone’. So ἐν αὐτῶι ἡμῶν εἰρήσθαι, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν. Observe especially the substitution of μόνην καθ’ αὐτήν, 67 d 1.

c 8 ἄρα μή... ἢ; ‘surely it can be nothing else than this, can it?’ The interrogative form of the idiomatic ‘μή in cautious assertions’ is very rare, and occurs only four times in Plato (Goodwin, M. T., § 268).

c 10 Σκέψαι δὴ κτλ. Three arguments are given (1) the philosopher holds bodily pleasures cheap, (2) the body impedes the search for truth, (3) the things which the philosopher seeks to know cannot be perceived by the bodily senses.

ἐάν does not mean ‘whether’ like ei, but ‘on the chance that’, ‘if haply’, si forte. Goodwin, M. T., §§ 489–93.

d 3 οἶον has become purely adverbial and always stands outside the construction of the sentence. Cp. 73 d 3; 78 d 10; 83 c 1.

d 6 Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; ‘what of the pleasures of love?’ Riddell (Dig. § 21) seems to be right in regarding this as a case where τί δὲ stands for a sentence, or part of a sentence, unexpressed, but hinted at in a following interrogation (here δοκεῖ σοι κτλ., d 8). Cp. e.g. Phileb. 27 e 1 τί δὲ ὁ σῶς (βίος); ἐν τίνι γένει ... ὀρθῶς ἂν πτοε λέγοιτο; and below 78 d 10.

d 8 τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖας, cultus corporis. We see here how περὶ c. acc. comes to be used as equivalent to a genitive. So just below, d 11.

d 9 ἐντίμους ἥγεσθαι, i.e. τιμᾶν, ‘to value’, ‘esteem’, ‘appreciate’ (τιμῆ, ‘price’), opp. ἀτιμάζειν, ‘to hold cheap.’

dιαφερόντων, ‘better than other people’s.’

e 4 πραγματεία, ‘business’, ‘concern’, rather different from 63 a 1 above.

65 a 5 ὁ μηδὲν ... μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, ‘that, for the man to whom none
of these things is pleasant, and who takes no part in them.’ The rule is that, when the second relative would be in a different case from the first, it is either omitted (cp. 81 b 5; 82 d 2) or replaced by a demonstrative. Not understanding the construction BTW give μετέχειν, but the true reading is preserved by Iamblichus (fourth cent. A.D.).

a 6 ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τού τεθνάναι, ‘that he runs death hard.’ Cp. Rep. 548 d 8 ἐγγὺς τι αὐτὸν Πλαύκων τοιτού τείνειν ἐνεκὰ γε φιλονικίας, Theaet. 169 a 9 ὑδ’ ὑμὶ δοκεῖσ πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. It seems to me that this ‘objectless’ use of τείνειν is derived from racing (τείνειν δρόμον, cursum tendere), and that the meaning is ‘to run hard’, ‘to run close’. This view is confirmed by a comparison of Crat. 402 c 2 (ταύτα) πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει with ib. 409 a 7 τούτο... φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναβαγόραν πιείζειν, where πιείζειν may very well mean πρεμερε, ‘to press hard.’ The use of τείνειν in this sense, ‘to hold one’s course’ in a certain direction, ‘to be bound for,’ ‘tend’ points to the same interpretation. So also ἐγγὺς, ὅμοι τι ἐλαίνων. For the thought, cp. Soph. Ant. 1165 τὸς γὰρ ἰδνὼς | ὅταν προδώσων ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ’ ἐγὼ | ζην τούτον, ἀλλ’ ἐμφύχων ἠγούμαι νεκρὸν. This is a good commentary on 64 b 6 θανατῶσι.

a 9 Τι δὲ κτλ. The second argument. The body impedes the search for truth.


b 3 καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ: this cannot, I think, refer to Parmenides and Empedocles, as Olympiodorus suggests and most editors repeat. They would hardly be spoken of as ‘even the poets’. Epicharmus, whom he also mentions, is more possible (cp. fr. 249 νοῦς ὁρὴ καὶ νοῦς ὁκούει τῇλλα κοφά καὶ τυφλά). More likely still, the reference is, as Olympiodorus also suggests, to Hom. II. v. 127 ἀχλῶν δ’ αὖ τοι ἀπ’ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ᾧ πρὶν ἐπὶ, | ὅφρ’ εὗ γιγνόσκης ἡμὲν θέων ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα. At any rate, the ἀχλῶς of this passage is often referred to by later Platonists as an allegory of the infirmity of sense-perception, and such allegorizing interpretation was already common in the fifth cent. B.C.

b 4 περὶ τὸ σῶμα, i. e. τοῦ σώματος. Cp. 64 d 8 n.

b 5 σοφεῖς, ‘trustworthy.’ Cp. 57 b 1 n.

σχολῆ, vix. Cp. our phrase ‘It will take him all his time’.

c 2 ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, ‘in mathematical reasoning.’ The primary sense
of the word is arithmetical ‘calculation’ (ψήφοις λογιζομαι), from which it was extended to geometrical demonstration, and finally to all exact and scientific reasoning. It is no paradox, but an obvious fact, that in mathematics the sense of sight only misleads, and yet we are sure that there we reach the truth. The sense of hearing is mentioned with reference to the science of ‘harmonics’, which was just the mathematical treatment of the octave, and is more exact than tuning ‘by ear’ can ever be. To take the stock instance, ‘the ear’ does not reveal to us the impossibility of dividing a tone into two equal semitones; we only discover that by means of τὸ λογιζόμαι.

3  τῶν ὄντων: the term τὰ ὄντα is used very vaguely in Plato, and may generally be rendered ‘things’. Here, however, it is equivalent to τῶν ἀληθῶν. The verb εἰναι often means ‘to be true’, especially in Herodotus and Thucydides (cp. L. S., s. v. εἰμί A. III).


μηδὲ τις ἡδονή, ‘nor any pleasure either.’ This is preferable to the μήτε τις ἡδονή of TW.

7  αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν, ‘alone by itself.’ Cp. 64 c 6 n.

εὖσα χαῖρειν, cp. 63 e 3 n.

9  τοῦ ὄντος, i.e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Cp. above c 3 n.

11  καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ‘in this case too,’ i.e. ἐν τῇ τῆς φρονίσεως κτῆσι (65 a 9). The καὶ refers to πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοὐτοῖς (64 e 8).

4  Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοῦτο κτλ. The third argument. The things the philosopher seeks to know are not perceptible by the bodily senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

The present passage introduces us to what is generally called the ‘Theory of Ideas’. The name is unfortunate; for in English ‘idea’ means something which is ‘in the mind’, and an ‘idea’ is often opposed to a ‘reality’, whereas the ‘forms’ (μορφαι, εἶδη, ἱδεῖα) are more real than anything else.

On the other hand, the ‘forms’ are not ‘things’ in time or space.

If we will only translate literally, and avoid loose ‘philosophical’ terminology, there is nothing in the doctrine here set forth which should be unintelligible to any one who understands a few propositions of Euclid and recognizes a standard of right conduct.
Let us begin with a mathematical instance. The geometer makes
a number of statements about 'the triangle', as, for instance, that
its interior angles are equal to two right angles, and we know that
his statements are true. Of what is he speaking? Certainly not of
any triangle which we can perceive by our senses (for all these are
only approximately triangles), nor even of any we can imagine. He
is speaking of what is 'just a triangle' (ἀυτὸ τριγώνον) and nothing
more. Now, if geometry is true, that triangle must be the true
triangle. It is from this consideration that the theory seems to
have arisen.

The next step is to extend it to such things as 'right' (δίκαιον)
and 'beautiful' (καλόν). We seem to be able to make true state-
ments about these too; and, if so, it follows that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ
καλὸν must be real in the same sense as 'the triangle'. We have
never had experience of a perfectly right action or a perfectly
beautiful thing, yet we judge actions and things by their greater or
less conformity to what is 'just right' (ἀυτὸ δίκαιον) and 'just
beautiful' (ἀυτὸ καλὸν).

The 'forms', then, are what we really mean by 'triangle', 'right',
'beautiful', and it will be found helpful to think of them in the first
place as meanings. There are, of course, further difficulties, but
these can be dealt with as they arise. On the whole subject see
A. E. Taylor, Plato, Chap. II.

4 φαμέν τι εἶναι ... ἡ οὐδέν; 'Do we say there is such a thing...
or not?' It is to be noticed that, in introducing the doctrine,
Socrates says 'we', and Simmias, to whom it is apparently familiar,
accepts it enthusiastically, also using the first person plural. The
suggestion clearly is that Socrates and Simmias are using the
language of a school to which both belong. The same phenomenon
recurs whenever the doctrine is mentioned. Cp. E. Gr. Ph.²
p. 354 sq.

5 αὐτό, 'by itself.' In this technical sense αὐτό is a development
of αὐτός, 'alone.' It has become almost adverbial, as we see from
such expressions as αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτὸ δίκαιον ὑπ' (Riddell, Dig. § 47).
We come nearest the meaning by rendering it 'just'. The translation 'in itself' is highly misleading; for it suggests the modern
document that we cannot know the 'thing in itself', whereas the αὐτό
τριγώνον is just the only triangle we can know.
d 6  Ἐμπέν μέντοι νή Δία, 'I should think we do!' The particle μέντοι is used when the emphatic word of a question is repeated in an affirmative answer (cp. 81d 6; 93c 2), and may be further strengthened by νή Δία (cp. 68 b 7; 73 d 11). Olympiodorus gives us the orthodox Platonist interpretation of this remark: ὁ Σμμίας ἐτοίμως συγκατατίθεται ('assents') τῷ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγῳ ὁς συνήθης ('familiar') Πυθαγορείοις.

d 12  ὑγείας, ἱσχύος: the addition of medical εἶδη like health and strength is significant. It has quite recently become known that Philolaus played an important part in the history of medicine (E. Gr. Ph. 3 p. 322). If médecine is a true science, its objects must be real like those of geometry.

d 13  καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν κτλ. The construction is καὶ ἐὰν λόγῳ περὶ τῆς ὀψίας τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, i.e. τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων is governed by ὀψίας, which is governed by περὶ understood. Tr. 'And, to sum up, I am speaking of the reality of all the rest, i.e. of what each of them really is'.

ἐὰν λόγῳ: this phrase is not quite accurately rendered by 'in one word'; for λόγος does not mean 'a word', nor is there any Greek word for 'a word'. A λόγος is always a statement, and in the great majority of cases consists of several 'words'.

τῆς ὀψίας, 'the reality.' In this sense the term ὀψία was not familiar at Athens (where it meant 'property', 'estate'), and it is explained by ὁ τυχόν περὶ ἑκαστον ὣν, 'what a given thing really is' (cp. Meno 72 b 1 μελίττης περὶ ὀψίας ὅτι τοι ἐστίν). It was not, however, invented by Socrates, and still less by Plato. In Crat. 401 c 3 we read ὁ ἦμεις "ὀψίαν" καλοῦμεν, εἰςων οἱ "ἔσσιαν" καλοῦσιν, οἱ δ' αὖ "ὡσίαν", and we see from 401 d 3 that Socrates there means τὴν πάντων ὀψίαν, just as he does here. We could hardly be told more plainly that the term is Pythagorean. The fem. pcp. ἔσσα = ὀψα is genuine Doric, and ἔσσα is therefore a correct Doric form, while ὀψία, though only found now in pseudo-Pythagorean writings, may be justified by the Boeotian ὅσα.

e 3  αὐτὸ ἑκαστον, 'any given thing by itself,' generalizing αὐτὸ δικαίων, αὐτὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ μέγεθος, &c. If we wish to know a thing, we must think 'just that', e.g. 'just the triangle', leaving out of account its material, colour, &c., and even its particular shape (equilateral, isosceles, or scalene).
e 6 καθαρώτατα, 'most cleanly.' To the mathematical mind irrelevancy suggests dirt. Later mathematicians speak of the 'elegance' of a demonstration in a similar sense.

e 7 αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, 'with thought alone.'

μῆτε ... παραστιβέμενος, 'without taking into account.' As τιβέναι is used of 'setting down' an item in an account, it is probable that παραστιβέναι is here equivalent to ἀφπονεῖ (cp. Hor. Carm. i. 9. 15 lucro appone), though I can find no exact parallel. The middle, as often, would give the sense 'setting down to his own account'. If this is correct, we must understand τῷ λόγῳ μην from the context.

τῷ δὲ πν.: I have written τῷ for τῷ as being more idiomatic, and because B has a superfluous νῦν in the next line, which I take to be a correction of τῷ added after the wrong μῆτε.

66 a 1 ἐφίλκων, 'trailing after him.'

αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν ... αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό: thought 'alone by itself' apprehends its object 'alone by itself'. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

a 2 εἰλικρινές ... εἰλικρινίς: Cicero (Off. i. 4) translates sincerum; Tertullian (de An. 41) germanum. The etymology is uncertain, but the meaning is 'unmixed', 'unadulterated'. Valckenaeer (quoted by Stallbaum) says: proprié significat volvendo s. volubili agitatione secretum, atque adeo cribro purgatum, and 'sifted clean' would certainly suit very well.

a 3 θρεῦναι: the favourite metaphor of Socrates. Cp. above 63 a 2 n., and 66 c 2 τῷ τοῦ ὄντος θῆραν, 115 b 9 ὁσπερ κατ' ἱχνη.

τῶν ὄντων, 'things;' apparently, but at a 8 τοῦ ὄντος is 'the truth'.

b 1 ἐκ πάντων τούτων, as a conclusion from the three arguments just given.

παραστασθαὶ δόξαν, 'that a belief like this should be brought home to —.' Cp. 58 e 5 n.

b 2 γνησίως, 'genuinely,' much the same as ὁρθῶς (64 a 4; 67 e 4) and δικαίως (83 e 5).

b 3 ὁσπερ ἀτραπός [τίς], 'it looks as if a sort of by-way', 'a short cut as it were'. The weight of evidence is slightly against the addition of τίς (W omits it in the text, and adds it in the margin); but, whether it is added or not, the phrase is the subject of κυνωνεύει (cp. Meno 70 c 4 ὁσπερ αὐχμὸς τίς, 'a sort of drought'), and there is no reason for inserting ὁ βάνατος after it with Tournier. Further, the short cut is not death—the γνησίως φιλόσοφοι know there is no
thoroughfare that way—but the μελέτη θανάτου or philosophy itself. An ἄρταπός is properly a ‘track’ over hills or through woods (semita, sentier), which does not follow the turnings of the high road. The mountain-path taken by the Persians at Thermopylae is so called (Hdt. vii. 215, Thuc. iv. 36). There was a Pythagorean precept τὰς λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν, ‘not to walk on highways,’ and Olympiodorus supposes a reference to this here. Though no doubt originally a mere taboo, it may quite possibly have received some such application as this by the end of the fifth century B.C. (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 105). The Pythagorean idea of the ‘Way’ (ὁδὸς βίου) would naturally suggest the idea of the Narrow Path.

b 4 ἐκφέρειν ἵμας: as the metaphor of hunting dominates the whole passage (cp. 66 a 3 n. and c 2 τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν), the meaning is really settled by Soph. Αἱ. 7 εὖ δὲ οὗ ἐκφέρει | κυνὸς Δακίνης ὡς τὸς εὐρύνος βάσις. ‘The by-way brings us on to the trail in our hunt after truth.’ It will be seen that the metaphor of the ἄρταπός gains very much when we bring it into close connexion with the hunt.

μετὰ τοῦ λόγου εὖ τῇ σκέψει: these words have been variously interpreted. There is no difficulty about εὖ τῇ σκέψει except that the phrase is superfluous. As to μετὰ τοῦ λόγου it must mean the same thing as μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ above (66 a 1). Schleiermacher transposed the words, placing them after ἐχωμεν, where they make excellent sense; but, on the whole, it seems more likely that they are a marginal note on ἐχωμεν which has got into the wrong place.

b 5 διτι, ‘because.’

συμπεφυμένη: the word suggests the opposite of καθαρώτατα (65 e 6).

b 7 μυρίας ... ἄσχολας, ‘countless distractions.’

c 2 τοῦ ὄντος: i.e. τοῦ ἄληθος (cp. b 7).

c 3 εἰδώλων, ‘imaginations.’

c 4 τὸ λεγόμενον, ‘as the saying is.’ This must refer to the phrase οὐδὲ φρονήσατε ἐγχύνεται, ‘we don’t even get a chance of thinking for it.’ We do not know what quotation or proverb Socrates refers to.

ἀς ἄληθες τῷ ὄντι, ‘in very truth.’ The two phrases are placed εἰ παραλήλου, as the grammarians say, and their effect is cumulative. Both (and in later dialogues ὄντως) are used to emphasize the
appositeness of quotations. We also find ἀτεχνῶς in the same sense. Cp. 90 c 4.

c 7 διὰ γὰρ κτλ. The same account of the origin of war is put into
the mouth of Socrates in Rep. 373 e 6. The dialogue of the
Republic is supposed to take place during the Peloponnesian War,
and that of the Phaedo while the memory of it was still fresh, and
it was clearly recognized, especially by opponents of the war like
Aristophanes, that commercial interests had a great deal to do with
it. (Cp. the Acharnians on the Megarian decree.)

d 3 τὸ δ’ ἵσχατον, ‘and the worst of all is that —.’ Cp. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
ὅτι (followed also by γάρ).

561 b 3 τῇ παραπίπτοντι ἄνει (ἥδονή), Laws 832 b 6 τῷ παραπίπτουκότι
λόγῳ.

e 1 αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ‘things by themselves’, ‘just the things
themselves’. There is no distinction between πράγματα and ὄντα.

e 3 φρονήσεως is assimilated in case to the preceding relative (Riddell,
Dig. § 192). The phrase φρονήσεως ἐραστική is an explication of
the name φιλόσοφοι.

e 4 ὡς δ’ λόγος σημαίνει, ‘as the argument signifies.’ This is the only
rendering which will suit all the passages where this phrase occurs,
so we must not think of the λέρος λόγος here.

e 5 δυνόνθατερον: the regular way of introducing a dilemma.

67 a 4 δτι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη: cp. 64 e 1 καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλή ἀνάγκη μετέχειν
αὐτῶν, 83 a 6 ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτῶις χρῆσθαι.

a 5 μηδὲ ἀναπτυξίμεθα, ‘nor suffer the contagion of.’ Cp. Thuc. ii.
51 (in the description of the Plague) ἐτερος ἀφ’ ἐτέρου θεραπείας ἀνα-
πτυξίμεθαι (‘one catching the infection from tending another’)
διὸσπερ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον. So also 83 d 10 τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλήσα.

a 8 μετὰ τοιούτων: sc. καθαρών (Riddell, Dig. § 54). Some suppose
this to be neuter and refer it to αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα or ὄντα, but it is far
better to take it of the ‘great company’ of which Socrates speaks
above (63 b 8). The καθαροί are in Orphic language ‘the saints’.

δι’ ἰμῶν αὐτῶν: no longer ‘through a glass darkly’.

b 1 τούτο δ’ ἐστιν ἵσως τὸ ἀληθῆς, ‘and that, I take it, is the truth.’
Cp. 66 b 7 φαμέν δὲ τούτο εὖς τὸ ἀληθῆς. No real doubt is expressed
by ἵσως. Cp. ὀπίνοι.

b 2 μὴ οὖ . . . ὑ, ‘I fear it is not.’ For this characteristically
Platonic idiom (he has it thirty-five times) see Goodwin, M. T., § 265.

b 4 τούς ὑπάρχουσιν ἄγαθοις φιλομαθεῖς, equivalent to τούς γνησίως φιλοσόφους (cp. 66 b 2); for φιλομαθής is freely used as an equivalent of φιλόσοφος, and ὑπάρχος refers to the ὑπάρχος ὑπομαχόν. It means those who are φιλόσοφοι 'in the true sense of the word', those who 'have a right to the name'. So in 82 c 2 οἱ ὑπάρχοι φιλόσοφοι are the same as οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς 83 e 5. For this sense of ὑπάρχος cp. Eur. Alc. 636 ὅπερ ὑπάρχος τούτω σώματος πατήρ; Hipp. 1169 ὃς ἀρ' ὑπάρχος ἐμὸς πατήρ | ὑπάρχος, Androm. 376 οὕτως φίλοι | ὑπάρχος πεφύκασαι(i).

b 8 ἐλπίς . . . κτήσασθαι: the aor. inf. is preferred after ἐλπίς ἔστιν (cp. 68 a 1 ἐλπίς ἔστιν . . . τυχεῖν).

b 10 πραγματεία: cp. 64 e 4.

ημίν: i.e. the Socratic circle.

c 2 ἄλλῳ ἄνδρὶ, 'for any one else,' a more emphatic ἄλλῳ τινί.

c 5 Κάθαρσις: this is the central idea of Orphicism (cp. 61 a 3 n.). The Pythagoreans seem to have added the practice of κάθαρσις by science to the original κάθαρσις by abstinence and the like (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 107).

τοῦτο is the predicate, and is used πραeparatitve. Cp. 62 a 2 n.

συμβαίνει is here personal. For the other construction cp. 74 a 2.

ὅπερ πάλαι . . . λέγεται: this has not been said in the course of the present argument, and must, I think, be understood in the light of 63 c 6 ὅπερ . . . πάλαι λέγεται and the πάλαις λόγος of 70 c 5. Cp. also 69 c 5 πάλαι αἴνιττεσθαι. It seems to be the regular way of referring to the Orphic ἰερός λόγος, 'as is said by those of old in the Word' (cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 146, n. 3).

c 6 τὰ χωρίζειν κτλ. As Wohlrab justly remarked, this is to be understood in the light of the account given in Symp. 174 c and 220 c of Socrates standing still and silent for hours at a time. The religious term for this was ἐκκοσταίς, 'stepping outside' the body.

d 1 μόνην καθ' αὐτήν: syn. αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτῆν. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

ὁπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν κτλ. There is considerable uncertainty about the reading. The commonest idiom is ὅπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν τοῦ σώματος, but sometimes the preposition is repeated (cp. 82 e 3; 115 b 9). In Tim. 79 a 3 we have ὅπερ αὖλανος διὰ τοῦ σώματος.

d 8 ὑπάρχος: cp. 67 b 4 n.
e 3  Γελοιον' πῶς 6' οὖ; The MSS. have ὦ γελοιον; and give the words to Socrates, but we should then expect ἦν ὦ γελοιον; The Petrie papyrus has only room for seven letters, so I have deleted ὦ and given γελοιον to Simmias.

e 6  εἰ. . . διαβαλλανταί, 'if they are at variance with', 'estranged from' the body. The original sense of διαβάλλειν is 'to set at variance', εἰς ἔχθραν καθιστάναι.

e 8  εἰ φοβοίντο: T omits εἰ, but its repetition is natural in a binary protasis like this, especially as there is a change of mood, and εἰ has a slightly different meaning in the two clauses.

e 9  εἰ μη. . . τοιεν: this simply repeats εἰ φοβοίντο in a negative form (α β α). Cp. Ἀφόλ. 20c σοῦ γε υδέῳ πῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου . . . εἰ μη τί ἐπράττει ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί.

68 a 3  ἣ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν κτλ. A good instance of the disjunctive question, in which two statements are bound together in a single interrogation to signify that they cannot or should not both be true at once. In such questions ἄρα (α 7) is regular in the second clause. We must subordinate the first to the second ('Can it be that, whereas . . . ?') or use two sentences. In Ἀφόλ. 179 b sqq. Alcestis, Eurydice, and Patroclus are given as examples of 'human loves' whom men have gone to seek beyond the grave. Such loves are contrasted with the 'divine beloved' of which Socrates speaks in the Ἐρασία (482 a 4 φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά).

a 5  μετελθείν, 'to go in quest of.' The MS. authority is in favour of ἐλθείν, but the μετελθείν of T is too good for a mere error.

a 7  φρονήσεως . . . ἐρών: syn. φιλοσοφος. Cp. 66 e 3 n.

b 2  οἶς οθαὶ γε χρῆ, 'I should think so!'

b 4  μιθαμοῦ ἄλλοθι κτλ. It is noteworthy that the reading which the original scribe (B, not B²) has added in the margin (with the monogram for γράφεται) is that of the Petrie papyrus, which was written within a hundred years of Plato's death. This shows how old some of those variants are.

b 5  ὑπερ ὧντι ἐλεγον, sc. 67 e 9. The antecedent to the relative is the following question.

b 7  μίντοι νῇ Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.

b 8  τοῦτο is used praeparative (cp. 62 a 2 n.) and refers to the relative clause ὅν ἰν ἰδῆς κτλ. This construction is as old as Homer (II. xiv. 81 βελτερον ὡς φεύγων προφύγη κακὸν ἥ ἀλόῃ). Cp. Thuc. vi. 39
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14 τὸ καλὸς ἀρξαί τοῦτ' εἶναι δὲ ἃν τὴν πατρίδα ἀφελήσῃ, Xen. Oec. 4. 19 ἑγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἤγοιμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἄρχοντος ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ὅ ἃν ἐκόντες ἐπιστεύει.

b. 9 οὐκ ἄρ’ ἤν: the use of the imperfect of something just realized was first explained by Heindorf in his note on this passage. With this imperfect ἄρα represents our 'So!' of surprise. 'So he isn't a philosopher after all!'

c. 2 φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος: the tripartite division of the soul which plays so great a part in the Ῥεφ. is here implied; for χρήματα are the object of ἐπιθυμία and τιμῆς. We find φιλοχρήματος as a synonym of ἐπιθυμικός in Rep. 436a1; 549b2; 580e2 ἐπιθυμητικῶν γὰρ αὐτῷ κεκλήκαμεν ... καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρηματίων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαύται ἐπιθυμίαι, 581a5 τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τό μέτορο ... καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδεῖς ὀρθῶς ἃν καλοίμεν. Σο φιλότιμος is a regular synonym of θυμοειδῆς, e.g. 551a.7 ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτιμῶν ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο. This somewhat primitive psychology is doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'Three Lives' (E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 108, 109, n. 1). To Plato the soul is really one and indivisible, in spite of the use he makes of the older view. Cp. Galen, de Hipp. et Plat., p. 425 ὄς καὶ Ὅνοσειδώνιός φησιν ἐκείνου (Πυθαγόρου) πρώτου μὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸ δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δὲ ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσασθαι τελευτῶν αὐτῷ, ἃ. 478 Ποιειώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συνγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς διασφορομένου, τεκμαιρόμενος δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἐνοικιῶν τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν. Iamblichus, ap. Stob. Ecl. 1, p. 369 (Wachsmuth) Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχίτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειον τὴν ψυχὴν τριμερὴ ἀποφαίνονται, διαπρῶντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Posidonius is not likely to have been mistaken on such a point.

tά ἐπερα ... ἀμφότερα: for the plural pronouns referring to a single fact see Riddell, Dig. § 42.

c. 5 καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζόμενη: this is more clearly expressed at c 8 ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι.

c. 6 τοῖς οὖς διακειμένοις: this is made more explicit below, c 11.

c. 8 Οὐκοῦν is repeated by c 10 ἄρ’ οὐ. ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ. This is best explained by Læw 710 a 5 τὴν δημόδη γε (σωφροσύνη) ... καὶ οὐχ ἦν τις σεμνύνων ἃν λέγων, φράνησιν 40
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προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν. We are not speaking here of courage and σωφροσύνη in the high Socratic sense in which they are identical with knowledge.

c 9 ἐπτομήθεια, 'to be excited.' This verb suggests primarily the quickened heartbeat of fear or desire. Cp. Hom. Od. xxii. 298 φρένες ἐπτομήθει, Sappho 2. 6 τὸ μοι μᾶν | καρδιᾶν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτύσαεν.

c 11 ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζωσιν: Philosophy is a life. Cp. Theae. 174 b 1 ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι καὶ χαίρει τὸ ἐπτύσαεν.


d 6 τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν: it is unnecessary to add εἶναι to the partitive genitive, but there was evidently an ancient variant τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν εἶναι which is hardly consistent with μεγίστων κακῶν just below, by which phrase such things as dishonour and slavery are intended.

d 9 διὰν υπομενώσων: the addition of such phrases is almost a mannerism. There is no emphasis, and the meaning is merely ἐκάστοτε, διὰν τύχῃ, 'on occasion.' Cp. Euthyphro 7 d 4 ἐχθροὶ ἄλληλως γινόμεθα, διὰν γινόμεθα.

d 12 ἀλογόν: cp. 62 b 2 n.

e 2 οἱ κόσμοι: syn. οἱ σωφρόνες. Cp. 83 e 6. Attic tends to substitute less emphatic words for adjectives implying praise. So ἀγαθός is represented by σπουδαῖος, ἐπιτεκίς, χρηστός, μέτριος, and σοφός by χαρίεις, κομψός, &c. There is the same tendency in English; cp. 'decent,' 'respectable' as substitutes for 'good'.

e 3 ἀκολασθεὶς τοις κτλ., 'it is immorality that makes them moral.' The appositive structure is regular after τοῦτο πάσχειν. Cp. below 73 d 7 (Riddell, Dig. § 207). The regular opposite of σωφροσύνη (the virtue of moral sanity, for which English has no name) is ἀκολασθείς. The literal meaning of ἀκόλαστος is 'unchastened'.

καίτοι φαμέν γε . . . ἄλλ' ἔμοι . . . , 'we say, indeed . . . but yet . . .' For this combination of particles, which marks a concession afterwards partially retracted, cp. below e 7 and Euthyphro 3 c 2 καίτοι οὐδέν οὐκ ἄληθες εἴρηκα δι' ἐν προειπόν, ἄλλ' ἔμοι . . .

e 4 συμβαίνει . . . ἔμοιον, 'turns out in their case to be like this.' TW add εἶναι, but cp. Gorgon. 479 c 8 συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακῶν ή ἄδικα.

τὸ πάθος τὸ πέρι κτλ., 'the condition of —' (περὶ, c. acc. as a genitive equivalent).
NOTES

5 ταύτην, istam.
εὐθεία, 'naive', 'unsophisticated', 'artless'. The Petrie papyrus reads ἀνδραποδώθη, but that seems to be an anticipatory recollection of 69 b 8.

69 a 6 μή... οὖχ αὐτή ἦ, 'perhaps this is not —.' Cp. 67 b 2 n.
πρὸς ἀρετήν, 'judged by the standard of goodness.' Cp. Isocr. 4. 76 οὖθε πρὸς ἄργυριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκρινον (Riddell, Dig. § 128). We can hardly give πρὸς the same sense as in the next line; for there is no question of exchanging pleasures and pains for goodness. Goodness is the standard of value, and wisdom (φρόνησις) is the only currency in which it can be rightly estimated. Nor can πρὸς mean 'towards', 'in the direction of'. That interpretation is a survival from the time of the vulgate text, which omitted ἀλλαγή and had to be understood as ἦ ὀρθή πρὸς ἀρετήν (sc. ὀδός). The disappearance of ἀλλαγή from the text is an interesting study in corruption. B has ἀλλά, and T must have had the same; for it presents us with an erasure of four letters. The vulgate text came from a copy of T. W and Iamblichus preserve the word.

7 a 7 πρὸς ἡδονάς, 'for pleasures,' contra voluptates.
8 μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, i.e. greater pains and fears for less, and lesser pleasures for greater, e.g. the fear of slavery for the fear of death, the pleasures of the table for the pleasures of health.

9 ἀλλ' ἦ, i.e. ἀλλὰ μή ἦ, the construction being carried on from a 6. Pleasures and pains are to be exchanged for wisdom, which alone makes goodness truly good. If we give up the pleasures of the table, not merely to enjoy the pleasures of health, but because they stand in the way of the acquisition of wisdom, we may be said to exchange them for wisdom, and that is true σωφροσύνη. So, if we only face death to escape slavery, that is mere popular courage. To put the thing in a modern way, this is a sort of ethical monometallism, wisdom being the gold standard of value.

10 καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα κτλ. I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. The words τοῦτον μὲν πάντα clearly belong to ὄνομαν τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα, and their meaning must be 'all things bought and sold for wisdom', but it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὄνομα as a passive, or that he should use πιπρασκόμενα at all. For ὄνεισθαι in a passive sense, the grammars can only quote Xen. Ep. 8. 2 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἔνοειτο, πειράσθαι εἴκελεόμεν εἰ δύνατο
δ ἵππος ταύτα ποιεῖν, but there it is clearly active, 'at the time he was buying it.' As to πιπρακόμενα, Cobet's remark is true: Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud sequiores protrita est (Nov. Lect. p. 158). It occurs only in one other place (Soph. 224 a 3), where also it seems to be interpolated. I believe, then, that τοῦτον μὲν πάντα ὄνομα καὶ πιπρακόμενα is a scholium on καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον. The interpretation is wrong, as Wytenbach saw; for we are not supposed to buy and sell goodness for wisdom, but to buy wisdom with pleasures, &c. If we take the sentence thus, the simile does not break down, as Geddes and Archer-Hind say it does.

b 1 μετὰ τοῦτον τῷ ὄντι ὃς, 'when accompanied by this (i.e. wisdom) our goodness really is goodness.' The words μετὰ τοῦτον are explained by b 4 μετὰ φρονήσεως and opposed to b 6 χωρίζομενα δὲ φρονήσεως. I should like to read μετὰ μὲν τοῦτον. If I am right about the interpolation, it implies this reading.

b 2 καὶ ἄνδρεια κτλ. In the Protagoras Socrates shows that true courage only belongs to those who are ἑπαρκέως μετ' ἐπιστήμης. This is the way in which he interpreted the doctrine, which was common to him and to the 'Sophists', that Goodness is Knowledge. The distinction between 'philosophic' and 'popular' goodness came to be of great importance. Cp. my edition of Aristotle's Ethics, pp. 65 sqq. (where, however, I have ascribed to Plato what I now see belongs to Socrates).

b 4 καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων, 'whether they be added or not.' The verbs are virtual passives of προστιθέναι and ἀφαίρεῖν, 'to add' and 'to subtract.' Cp. προστείναι, προσκεῖσθαι.

b 5 χωρίζομενα δὲ κτλ. As the participle agrees with πάντα ταύτα (b 1), i.e. pleasures, pains, &c., there is a slight anacoluthia in μὴ... γὰρ τοιάυτῇ ἀρετῇ. Socrates means 'the goodness which depends upon the exchange of fears, pleasures, &c., for one another apart from wisdom'.

b 6 [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα: as καὶ is omitted in B, it is probably an interpolation arising from failure to see that χωρίζομενα is dependent on ἀλλαττόμενα (cp. 61 b 2 n.). The meaning will then be 'exchanged for one another apart from wisdom' (opp. μετὰ τοῦτον).

σκιαγραφία τίς, 'a sort of scene-painting' (Cope). Cp. Photius σκιαγράφος δ' νῦν σκηνογράφος. The term does not mean 'a rough
sketch', but implies the use of painted shadows to produce the impression of solid relief on a flat surface. This art has two chief characteristics: (1) it is deceptive, cp. Critias 107d1 σκιαγραφία... ἀσαφείς καὶ ἀπατηλῷ; (2) it only produces its effect from a distance. Cp. Theaet. 208e7 ἐπειδὴ ἔγγυς ὄσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνήμι οὐδὲ σμικρὸν ἔος δὲ ἀφειστὴκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τι μοί λέγεσθαι. The most instructive passage is Rep. 365c3 πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἑμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, where the idea is that of a 'painted façade', on which columns, &c., are made to appear solid by skilful shading. Cp. also Rep. 583b5 and Parm. 165c7. When Aristotle (Rhet. 1414a8) compares the diction of the public speaker (δημηγορικὴ λέξις) to σκιαγραφία, he does not mean that it is 'sketchy', but that it requires the light and shade to be 'laid on thick'.

b7 ἀνδραποδώθης: so in Rep. 430b7 Socrates opposes true courage to τὴν... δημιουργός καὶ ἀνδραποδώθη, and in Phaedr. 258e5 he says of bodily pleasures δικαίως ἀνδραποδώθεις κέκληται, just because they imply preceding pain (τὸ προλυπηθήναι).

b8 οὐδὲν ὑγίες... ἐκῆ, 'has nothing sound about it.' The word ὑγίες is used of earthen or metal vessels which have no crack or flaw (opp. σαβρός). The old variant ἐκισσοῦα for ἐκῆ gives a smoother construction, but we may easily understand ἧ after τε in b 8. See Vahlen, Opusc. ii. 361.

τὸ δὲ ἀληθῆς, 'the real thing', of which the σκιαγραφία gives a deceptive appearance.

c1 κάθαρσις, 'purification.' Cp. 61a3n. In Xen. Symp. 1.4 Callias son of Hipponicus uses the phrase ἀνδράσιν ἐκκεκαικαρμένην τὰς ψυχὰς ὄσπερ ὑμῖν in addressing Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides. He seems to have heard something of Socrates' teaching on this point, unless he is merely drawing on the Phaedo.

c2 καθαρμός: this is the specifically religious term for the initiatory ceremony of 'purification'. The religious poem of Empedocles was entitled καθαρμοῖ (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 256 sqq.).

c3 τὰς τελετὰς: the mystic 'initiations'. The context shows that the people referred to are the Ὀρφεοτελεται.

c4 οἴτου, isti. The touch of ironical condescension is characteristically Socratic (cp. 62b5n.). It is plain that Socrates did not
think much of the actual Ὀρφεοτελεσταὶ of his time, who are described in the Republic (364 e 3 sqq.) in terms which suggest the itinerant friars, pardoners, and traffickers in indulgences of the later Middle Ages.


c 5 αἰνίττεσθαι, 'to speak in riddles' (αἰνίγματα). The word is regularly used of allegorical statements. It comes from Ion. ἄνως, 'fable', 'riddle' (cp. 61 b 4 n.). For πάλαι cp. 67 c 5 n.

c 6 ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, 'will lie in the Slough.' Cp. Rep. 363 d 5 (of the Orpheotelestae) τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλῶν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἄδου. The βορβόρος is also referred to in Ar. Frogs 145 είτα βορβόρον πολύν | καὶ σκόρφο ἀείων ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κειμένου | εἰ ποιέων τις ἡδίκησε κτλ., and Olympiodorus is doubtless right in saying παραθέλει ἐπος Ὀρφικόν. Heindorf quotes a saying of the Cynic Diogenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 39) γελοίον εἰ 'Ἀγνίσιασ μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμείνων ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διαξούνων, εὐτελεῖς δὲ τίνες μεμυημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται. We must interpret Rep. 533 d 1 τῷ δότι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τίνι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅμα κατορυττομένον in the light of this.

c 8 ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ: Plato often adapts the beginning of a verse to his own prose, preferring to slip into the verse rather than give a formal quotation. The original must have been πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι. The νάρθηξ (serula communis) was the plant of which the Dionysiac thyrsus was made.

d 1 βάκχοι: the true worshippers were so called (cp. the Βάκχαι of Euripides). Schol. Ar. Knights 406 Βάκχον ὦ τὸν Δίωνυσον ἐκάλουν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς τελοῦντας τὰ ὄργα. See Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, vol. v, p. 151.

d 2 ὅρθως, 'in the true sense of the word.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

δὲν ... γενέσθαι, 'to become one of whom,' 'to join whose number'.

d 3 οὖδὲν ἀπελίπον, 'I have left nothing undone.' The phrase states negatively what is positively stated by παντὶ τρόπῳ προωθήθην (cp. Mn. 77 a 3) I have done my best in every way.

d 5 καὶ τῇ ἤγουσαμεν: i.e. 'I and the rest of the band.' The shift from singular to plural is quite natural. To read ἤγουσάμην with Heindorf
would make the plurals which follow (ἐλθόντες ... εἰσόμεθα) very awkward.

d 5 to σαφές, 'for certain.' Cp. 57 b 1 n.

d 7 ταύτ' ... ἀπολογούμαι ὡς ... , 'this is the defence I make to show that —.' Cp. 63 e 8.

d 8 τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας: cp. 62 e 1; 63 a 6 sqq.

e 1 κάκει: cp. 64 a 1 n.

e 3 τοῖς δὲ ... παρέξει: these words seem to have been interpolated here from 70 a 1. They break the sentence awkwardly and spoil the effect of the phrase when it comes in its proper place. Such things do not happen often in the text of Plato, but they happen sometimes.

(3) Cebes points out that all this implies the immortality of the soul, and asks that this should be established (69 e 6—70 c 3).

e 6 ὑπολαβῶν: cp. 60 c 8 n.

70 a 4 εὖθυς ἀπαλλαττομένη κτλ. Riddell (Dig. § 207) takes these words down to οὐδαμοῦ ἣ as explanatory of the preceding clause ('binary structure'). I have punctuated after a 4 σώματος with Heindorf. Then καὶ will co-ordinate διαφθείρηται καὶ ἀπολλύται with οἴχηται, and ἐκβαινοῦσα will belong only to the second clause. It is easy to 'understand' σώματος with it.

a 5 ἄντεπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα: this is the belief assumed throughout the Homeric poems. The ψυχή is the 'ghost' which a man 'gives up', the breath which he 'expires' at death. For the καπνός cp. Il. xxiii. 100 ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἥντε καπνὸς | φχετο τετριγυια, a verse selected for special reprobation by Socrates in the Republic (387 a 1).

a 6 οὐδὲν ἐπὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἢ: Homer does not go so far as this; for even in the House of Hades there is a ψυχή καὶ εἰδωλον. But it might just as well be nothing and nowhere; for it is witless (ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἄν πάμπαι, Il. xxiii. 104).

αὕτη καθ' αὐτὴν συνθροισμένη: cp. 67 c 8.

b 2 παραμυθιας, 'persuasion', 'reassurance'. Cp. Laws 720 a 1 παραμυθιας ... καὶ πειθοῦς. The original sense of παραμυθείωθαι is 'to talk over' (cp. παράφημι, παρείπον, παραπείθω) as in 83 a 3. The meanings 'encourage', 'console', as in 115 d 5, are secondary.

πίστεως, 'proof,' not 'belief'.
b 3  ἰψχή: there seems to be no rule for the addition or omission of the article with ἰψχή. Where MSS. differ, the less commonplace use without the article is to be preferred.

dύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: even Homer allows that souls 'are somewhere' after death, but Cebs wishes to be assured that they are not merely ἀμενηνά κάρνα (this is the point of δύναμιν ἔχει), of whom it can be said φρένες οὐκ ἔν πάμπαν. Here, then, φρόνησις is not equivalent to σοφία, but is used in its popular sense, answering to the Homeric φρένες.

b 5  Ἀληθή, ἔφη, λέγει, ὁ Ἑωράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 77 c 1; 78 a 10; 78 c 5; 82 c 9; 83 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 288).

b 6  διαμυθολογώμεν: cp. μυθολογεῖν, 61 e 2 n. The word is specially appropriate as introducing εἶτε εἰκός κτλ.

c 1  κωμῳδοποιός: Aristophanes was not the only comic poet who made fun of Socrates. Eupolis said (fr. 352) Μισῶ δὲ καὶ (τὸν) Ἑωράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἄδολεσχήν, ἃς τάλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, ὃς ὅθεν δὲ κατασφαγεῖν ἡγεῖ τοῦτον κατημέληκεν, a fragment preserved by Olympiodorus in his commentary on this passage. The charge of ἄδολεσχία (‘garrulity’) was commonly brought against all men of science by the practical Athenians and the comic poets who wrote to please them.

οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων, 'about things which do not concern me', 'things I have nothing to do with'. For the position of the preposition see Riddell, Dig. § 298 and cp. 110 c 2.

First Proof of Immortality (70 c 4—77 d 5).

This proof is based upon two considerations (1) the doctrine of παλιγγενεσία, (2) the doctrine of ἀνάμμησις. Neither of these taken by itself furnishes a proof, though taken together they may be said to do so (77 c 7).

With regard to the proofs of immortality, it should be observed that the first two are successively abandoned as inadequate, while even the third is said to require further examination (107 b 5). The proof which satisfied Plato himself is not one of them (cp. 94 b 4 n.). Nevertheless each contributes something to our knowledge of the subject.
(1) The ancient doctrine of παλιγγενεσία is shown to rest on the law of ἀνταπόδοσις (70 c 4—72 e 1).

c 4 αὐτὸ, 'the matter.'

c 5 παλαιὸς . . . λόγος: cp. the way in which the same Orphic doctrine is introduced in Meno 81 a 5 ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεία πράγματα . . . a 10 Όι μὲν λέγουτές εἰσι τῶν ἀρεάων τε καὶ τῶν ἀρεάων ὅσιοι μεμέληκε περὶ δὲν μεταχειρίζονται λόγους εἰς τε εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν διὸν θείοι εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί ἐστιν . . . φασί γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτῶν—δὴ ἀποθυγίκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. So Ἐρισ. vii. 335 a 2 πείθεσθαι δὲ δυτικὸς άεὶ χρῆ τοὺς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἀρείοις λόγοις, ὅδε μηνύοντι ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι κτλ. For παλαιὸς cp. 67 c 5 n. Herodotus (ii. 123) is mistaken in assigning an Egyptian origin to this doctrine (Ε. Gr. Ph.8 p. 95).

c 6 ὅς εἰσίν ἐνθέντες ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, 'that they are in the other world, having come there from this.' There is no parallel to justify us in taking εἰσίν ἀφικόμεναι together as if it were εἰσίν ἀφιγμέναι. Note the interlaced order (a b a b).

c 8 πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: the regular name for this doctrine in later writers is παλιγγενεσία. The word μετεμψύχωσις, though it has found its way into all modern languages, is quite inaccurate, and is not used before Graeco-Roman times, and then very seldom (Diodorus, Galen). Cp. Servius on Aen. iii. 68 non μετεμψύχωσιν sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit (Pythagoras). Hippolytus, Clement, and other Christian writers say μετανομάτωσις ('reincarnation'), which is accurate but cumbrous.

d 2 τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, 'of the truth of this.' For the neuter plural cp. Riddell, Dig. § 41.

d 7 κατά ἀνθρώπων: cp. Meno 76 a 5 κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς χρήματος τοῦτο λέγω (Riddell, Dig. § 121). Originally κατά, c. gen., is quite neutral in meaning, especially in the phrase κατὰ πάντων (Isocr. 15. 189 ταῖτα . . . κατὰ πᾶσῶν λέγομεν τῶν τεχνῶν). From this use comes the Aristotelian κατηγορεῖν τι κατὰ τινός, 'to predicate something of anything,' and κατὰ ἀλοῦ (Meno 77 a 6), καθ’ ἀλοῦ, καθόλου.

e 1 ἥρ': indirect questions are not infrequently introduced by ἥρα.
NOTES

Cp. Lach. 185 d 9 σκοπείν ἀρα... , Meno 93 b 2 τόδε σκοπούμεν, ἀρα... ,
Rep. 526 c 9 σκεφώμεθα ἄρα... , and just below ε 4.

ε 1 οὐτωσὶ: this is explained by οὐκ ἄλλοθεν κτλ. Cp. 71 a 9. Socrates
generalizes the Orphic doctrine that the living are born from the
dead, and treats it as a case of the principle, maintained by
Heraclitus, of the generation of opposites from opposites (E. Gr.
Ph. 2 p. 186).

ε 2 δόσις τυχάνει δὲ τοιούτων τι, 'everything, that is, which has an
opposite,' equivalent to ε 5 δόσις ἐστι τι ἐναντίον.

ε 3 καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία κτλ. For this way of breaking off an enumera-
tion cp. 73 d 10 ; 94 b 10 (Riddell, Dig. § 257).

ε 5 δόσις... αὐτῷ: for the singular pronoun referring to the plural
dόσις cp. 104 d 2 (αὐτοῦ referring to αὐτό).

71 a 13 δύο γενέσεις: if opposites arise from one another, it follows that
between every pair of opposites (μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων)
there must be two processes (γενέσεις), one by which A arises from B,
another by which B arises from A.

b 3 αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, 'increase and decrease.' We see from this
passage that much attention had already been given to accuracy
of terminology.

b 6 διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, 'decomposing and combining.'
These terms were used by the early natural philosophers to denote
the analysis of compound bodies into their constituents, and the
formation of compound bodies out of something more primitive,
such as what were called at a later date elements (στοιχεία).

b 7 κὰν εἰ μὴ κτλ. The attempt to construct an accurate termino-
logy in any language is sure to reveal gaps. In the Ethics Aris-
totle often has to say that the mean, or one or other of the extremes,

c 9 συζυγίαν, 'pair' (originally of oxen or horses). The word may be
applied, however, to a larger number of things than two. In
grammar it is a 'conjugation', i.e. a class of verbs similarly
inflected.

ε 4 τοῖν περὶ ταύτα, i.e. τοῖν τούτων (περὶ c. acc. = gen.).

ε 8 οὐκ ἀντίποδοις μεν; 'shall we not assign it an opposite process
to balance it?'
NOTES

e 9 χωλή, 'halt', 'lame in one foot'. Cp. the advice of Cimon μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλήν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἔτερον ἐπειδέων γεγενημένην (Plut. Cin. 16).

e 13 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, 'to come to life again.' Sometimes the verb is transitive, 'to bring to life again' (e.g. Crito 48 c 5); but in that case the aorist is ἀναβιώσασθαι (not ἀναβιώναι), as below 89 b 10.

72 a 6 ἔδοκεν: 70 d 2.
a 11 ἓτι οἶδ᾽ ἄδίκως κτλ., 'that we were not wrong either — '. Cp. 63 b 8 ἥδικοιν ἄν, 'I should be wrong.'
a 12 εἰ ... μή ... ἀνταποδίδοιῃ, 'unless there were a constant correspondence.' The verb is here intransitive, as below b 8. Cp. L. S. s. v. ἀποδίδωμι II.

b 1 κύκλῳ περιόντα: the κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως is Orphic. It was just from the Wheel of Birth that redemption (λύσις) was sought by means of purgatory observances (καθαρμοί). On one of the gold plates from Thurii (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 88) the ransomed soul says κύκλος 8 ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέωι. Here, of course, the reference is to cyclical processes generally, but that is characteristic of the way in which a scientific sense is given to religious ideas throughout the passage.

b 2 εὐθεία τις, 'in a straight line.' A rectilinear process is only in one direction, a circular has two.

b 3 καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι κτλ. The metaphor is taken from the δίαυλος, in which the runners turned round the καμπτήρ and came back to the starting-point (Dict. Ant. s. v. Stadium, ii. 693 b). Cp. Aesch. Ag. 344 κάρυσαι διαύλου θάτερον κόλον πάλιν.

b 9 τελευτῶντα ... ἀποδεξεῖν, 'would end by making Endymion seem a thing of naught (a 'bagatelle') by comparison.' This use of ἀποδείκνυμι is fully illustrated in Wytenbach's note. Cp. e. g. Plato, Phaedr. 278 c 6 λέγον αὐτὸς ... τὰ γεγραμμένα φαίλα ἀποδείξαι, Epist. vii. 324 d 7 χρυσῶν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἐμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, 'making the previous constitution seem like gold by comparison.' Plut. C. Gracch. 1 ἀπέδειξε τοὺς ἄλλους ῥήτορας παῖδων μηδὲν διαφέροντας, Plato, Epist. iv. 320 d 6 παρασκευάζου τὸν τε Λυκούργον ἐκείνου ἀρχαίον ἀποδείξιον καὶ τὸν Κύρον, 'to make them seem out of date by comparison.' Wytenbach shows too that ἀρος is regularly used in such comparisons. Cp. e. g. Arist. Lys. 360 ἀρος ἐστι τάλλα πρὸς Κινήσιαν, Antiphanes fr. 232 ἀρ' ἐστι λήρος πάντα πρὸς τὸ χρυσίον; Xen.
An. vii. 7. 41 'Ἡρακλείδη λήρος πάντα ἔδοκει εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἄργυρον ἕχειν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπον. The meaning is not 'to make the story of Endymion appear an idle tale', as most editors say. On the contrary, it would be all the more credible.

οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φαῖνοιτο, 'he (note change of subject) would be nowhere,' an expression taken, like its English equivalent, from the race-course. Cp. Gorg. 456 b 8 οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φανῇ τῶν ιατρῶν, 'the doctor would come in nowhere.' Dem. de Cor. 310 ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ οὐ φανήσῃ γεγονός, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἔκτος, οὐχ ὀσποστοσοῦν.

καθεύδαν: just as τοῦτο πᾶσχει &c. are regularly followed by a clause in apposition (cp. 68 e 2 n.), so τοῦτο πᾶσχει (πεπονθέναι) is regularly followed by an infinitive in apposition. Cp. 73 b 7; 74 a 6; 78 c 2. There is, therefore, no reason for deleting the word with Dobree.

tο τοῦ 'Ἀναξαγόρου: cp. Anaxagoras fr. i ad init. Ὠμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἤν (E. Gr. Ph. 8 p. 299). There is a similar jesting use of the phrase in Gorg. 465 d 3 το τοῦ 'Ἀναξαγόρου ἄν πολὺ ἤν ... ὦμοῦ ἄν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

εἰ ... τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. from some other source than the dead who were once alive.

d 8 ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων κτλ. It is important to observe that in this passage οἱ τεθνεῶτες are simply souls existing in the other world. They are certainly not dead bodies. All through this argument γένεσις means the union of soul to body and θάνατος their separation.

καὶ τάς μὲν γε κτλ. These words appear to repeat 63 c 6, where the statement is in place.

(2) The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις is shown to rest on the theory of Forms (72 e 3—77 a 5).

καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον ... ε 6 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον: the καὶ means 'as well as,' according to the παλαιὸς λόγος of 70 c 5.

ἐν οὗ εἴσωσι θαμὰ λέγειν: it is surely very difficult to regard this definite statement as a fiction. The doctrine is also ascribed to Socrates in the Meno and the Phædrus. It is to be noted, further, that Cebes speaks of it as one peculiar to Socrates, while Simmias
knows very little about it. It did not, therefore, belong to fifth-century Pythagoreanism, though there can be little doubt of its Orphic and Pythagorean origin. The legend of Pythagoras makes a point of his remembering his earlier incarnations, and Empedocles professed to remember his (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 259, n. 1). The apparent contradiction is to be explained as follows. The scientific Pythagoreans of the fifth century had to some extent dropped the religious doctrines of their founder (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 319 sqq.), and their teaching was really inconsistent with a belief in the soul's immortality (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 343). The originality of Socrates seems to have consisted just in this, that he applied the old religious doctrine of ἀνάμνησις to science, and especially to mathematical science.

5 ὅτι ἕµὴν κτλ., 'that our learning is really nothing else than reminiscence,' i.e. that it is simply the process of being reminded of what we once knew. It is important to bear in mind that the process is one of being reminded, not merely one of remembering or recollection.

6 καὶ κατὰ τὸν τοῦτον repeats and emphasizes κατ' ἐκεῖνον ... τὸν λόγον above (e 3).

7 ἀ νῦν ἀνάμμησις κόμεθα, 'what we are now reminded of.' Cp. Meno 81 c 7 οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν ... σιῶν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀναμνήσθηναι ἃ γε καὶ πρῶτον ἤπιστατο, δ 2 ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα—ἀ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἀνθρώπου—τάλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν.

73 a 1 πρὶν ... γενέσθαι, 'before entering into this human frame.' Here εἶρος is practically equivalent to σῶμα. Cp. 77 b 7 πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπους σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι. So Symp. 210 b 2 τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλὸν, Phaedr. 249 a 8 ἀξίων εἰ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει ἐβίωσαν βίον, Rep. 402 d 1 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ... καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει.

a 7 ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ (sc. ἀποδείκνυται) ... ἀ το ἐπείτα ... We regularly find ἐπείτα (usually without δὲ) in the sense of 'secondly' after πρῶτον μὲν ... 'firstly'. This fixes the meaning of ἐνὶ λόγῳ here. It does not mean 'to sum up', as it does above 65 d 13, but 'by one argument'. I think Mr. R. G. Bury is right in holding (Class. Rev. xx, p. 13) that the process ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἤγειν is opposed to, rather than included in, the process καλὸς ἐρωτῶν, and I would illustrate his point further from Theaet. 165 a 1 ἵμεῖς δὲ πῶς θάττων ἐκ τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων (arguments without diagrams) πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν
NOTES

ἀπενεύσαμεν. I am also inclined to accept his reading πρῶτον for ἐν, though it is not absolutely necessary. The use of α', β', γ' as numerals has certainly affected the reading in several passages of Plato. In any case this is better than altering ἔπειτα to ἔπει τοι with Heindorf.

a 8 αὐτοί, 'of themselves.' Cp. 64 a 5.

a 10 ὁρθὸς λόγος, 'a right account of the matter.' An ὄνομα is ὁρθὸν when applied to something which we are justified in applying it to (cp. 69 d 2 n.). In the same way a λόγος or statement is ὁρθὸς when it expresses the truth. The rendering 'right reason' is misleading; for it suggests that λόγος is a mental 'faculty'.

b 1 ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα: this seems a fairly certain reference to Meno 82 b 9 sqq., where Socrates questions a slave about a geometrical diagram, in order to prove that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις. No doubt, if we hold this doctrine and its proof to be genuinely Socratic, the reference to the Meno is less certain; but, on the whole, Plato seems to indicate that, as he has already treated it elsewhere, he need not repeat the proof here.

b 2 κατηγορεῖ, 'it is proof positive' (Riddell, Dig. § 97), 'it is manifest' (velut passim occurrunt ἐδήλωσε, προσημαίνει, δείχει et id genus alia, Heindorf). The verb κατηγορεῖ is used just like the Latin arguerere (L. S. s. v. Π) and might very well take the impersonal construction of δηλοῦν, for which cp. Gorg. 483 d 2 δηλοὶ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ἔχει. If the verb is personal we must supply ὁ ἀγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, which is not satisfactory.

b 6 αὐτὸ ... τοῦτο ... παθεῖν ... ἀναμνησθῆναι, 'to have done to me the very thing we are speaking of, namely, to be reminded.' The MSS. have μαθεῖν, and παθεῖν is a conjecture of Heindorf's (not of Serranus, as Stallbaum says). The words are constantly confused; for in uncial writing Μ is very like Π, both being written without lifting the pen. This is one of the comparatively few corrections in the text of the Phaedo which may be called certain, though it is not adopted in the most recent edition (Wohlrab, 1908). Cp. Gorg. 505 c 3 αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἔστι, κολαζόμενος.

b 7 ἀναμνησθῆναι: in apposition to τοῦτο παθεῖν. Cp. 72 c 3 n.

b 8 ἐπιχείρησε λέγειν, 'attacked the proof.' We see here the beginnings of the use of ἐπιχειρεῖν as a technical term of dialectic. Cp. also ἐπιχείρημα.
c 1  εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῆσεται, 'if a man is to be reminded of a thing.' Cp. 72 e 7 n.

c 5  τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, 'in such a way as this.' Here τοιούτῳ refers forward, and the explanation of it is introduced by the question and answer 'What way do I mean? This.' For similar rhetorical interrogations see Riddell, Dig. § 325.

c 6  εἰν τίς τι ἐτερον κτλ. Here we have a careful psychological analysis of what is meant by 'being reminded'. A modern treatise would say 'If a man, having seen A (τι ἐτερον) ... also thinks of B'. The reading τι ἐτερον is sufficiently well attested (T), and the double ἄλλο is used in the same way below 74 c 13, while the other reading, πρότερον (B), is easily accounted for and yields no satisfactory sense. Recent editors mostly adopt πρότερον and then enclose it in square brackets.

η τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν, equivalent to ἡ τινι ἄλλη αἰσθησει αἰσθημένος, but Plato avoids the juxtaposition of cognate words. The same phrase is used below 76 a 2.

c 7  μὴ μόνον ἐκείνον γνῷ κτλ., 'not only apprehends A, but also thinks of B.'

c 8  οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμη: this is an important reservation. Certain things, notably opposites, must be known together or not at all (τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη). It proves nothing that odd reminds us of even, or that darkness reminds us of light; for in this case the knowledge of the one is ipsis facto knowledge of the other.

c 9  τούτο: internal object of ἀνεμνήσθη (cp. 72 e 7 n.) and antecedent of οὐ, 'that he was reminded of that which he thought of (B). The words οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἑλάβε refer to ἄλλα καὶ ἐτερον ἐννοήση above. δικαίως is used much like ὅρθως. Cp. 72 a 11 n.

d 6  πάσχουσι τούτο: followed as usual by a clause in apposition. Cp. 68 e 3 n.

d 7  ἐγνωσαν: empirical ('gnomic') aorist. Cp. 113 d 3.

ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἑλάβον: equivalent to ἐννοήσαν, but with more emphasis on the ingressive force of the aorist.

tὸ εἴδος, 'the bodily form.' Cp. 73 a 1 n.

d 8  τούτο: pred. 'and reminiscence is just this'. Cp. 75 d 10.


d 10  καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία κτλ. Cp. 70 e 3 n.

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NOTES

74 a 6 ἐννοεῖν: in apposition to προσπάσχειν, cp. 72 c 3 n. When a man is reminded of A by a or of B by b, an additional thought necessarily presents itself to his mind, the thought of the presence or absence of any deficiency in the likeness of a or b to A or B. This thought is only forced upon us when we are reminded ἀφ’ ὤμοιων.

72 b 7 μέντοι νῇ Δία: cp. 68 b 7 n.

We are reminded of B not by A, but by an image of A, which we may call a.

There are also beauties of the forms which the Pythagoreans call parole, hyperbole, and ellipse, and which are described in the Conics of Apollonius of Perga.

We have seen already that the 'forms' (what we really mean when we speak of 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', &c.) are not perceptible by the senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

We are now introduced to a second point in the theory. The 'forms' are types (παράδειγματα) to which particular sensible things approximate more or less closely. A given triangle is never what we really mean by 'triangle', nor a right action what we really mean by right.

According to this view, particular sensible things are μιμήματα or εἰκόνες of the 'forms'. There is ample evidence that a doctrine like this was held by the later Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph. 3 pp. 353 sqq.).

In the third book of the Elements of Euclid, Proclus, in Eucl. I, p. 419 (Friedlein) says: "Esti mel αρχαία, ἡ συνήθειαν ἡ ἐν τῆς Πυθαγορείας Μούσης εὐρήματα ταύτα, ἡ τε παραβολή τῶν χωρίων καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις."

We can see how the use of the words parabola, hyperbola, and ellipse in Conic Sections comes from this, but Conics are post-Platonic.

9 a 9 φαμέν που κτλ. Cp. 65 d 4 n.

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different (ἐπερόν τι), 'over and above' all these things (παρὰ πάντα ταύτα), which is 'just the equal' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον).

b 1 μέντοι νῇ Δι(α): cp. 65 d 6 n. Simmias was not familiar with the doctrine of Reminiscence, but now he feels at home once more.

b 2 αὐτὸ δ ἔστιν: W adds ἴσον and so do the margins of B and T. It is, perhaps, unnecessary, but gives the full technical expression for this kind of reality, 'the what it is by itself', 'the just what it is'.

b 4 ἐξ ἀνυινδή ἐλέγομεν: we certainly have an exact scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of equality, but we have seen (65 d 9) that equality cannot be perceived by the senses. These, then, are not the source of our knowledge. Sensible objects only remind us of equality. But we cannot be reminded of a knowledge which we never possessed.

b 8 τὸ μὲν ... τῷ δ' οὖ: there is an ancient variant τότε (i.e. τοτε) μὲν ... τότε (i.e. τοτε) δ' οὖ. Either reading gives a good sense. Sticks and stones sometimes seem equal and sometimes unequal to the same persons, and they appear equal to one person, unequal to another. This shows that the 'really equal' (αὐτὸ δ ἔστιν ἴσον) is something different.

c 1 αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα: things that are 'just equal'. There is no difficulty about the plural. When Euclid says (Αξ. 1) Ἁ τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ἴσα, he is not speaking of sticks or stones, but of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. Cp. αὐτὰ τὰ ὀμοιά, Parm. 129 b 1. The two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are an instance of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.

c 4 ταύτα ... τὰ ἴσα: the sticks and stones mentioned above, not αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.

c 11 Οὐκοῦν ... d 3 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: this step in the argument is not, perhaps, strictly necessary, and some critics would bracket the words. It must be observed, however, that they serve to make the proof that our knowledge of the equal is reminiscence clearer, by reminding us of the preceding discussion. The equality of sticks and stones must either be like or unlike real equality, but in either case it is different from it, and our conception of real equality therefore corresponds to the account already given of reminiscence. Socrates does not assume at this stage that the equality of sticks and stones is 'like' real equality. That is the next step in the argument.
c 13 ἐώς ἀν...: dummodo, ‘so long as’... For the formula which follows cp. 73 c 6; 76 a 2.

d 2 αἰτῶ, ‘the process in question.’

d 4 τι τοιοῦτον refers forward. The fact here noted indicates that we have to do with ἀνάμνησις ἀφ' ὀμοίων. Cp. 74 a 5.

d 6 ἣ ἐνδει τί εἰκόνων... ἣ οὐδέν; ‘do they fall short of it at all... or not?’ For the rare use of ἐνδεῖν as equivalent to ἐλλείπειν cp. Rep. 345 d 4 ἐώς γ' ἀν μηδέν ενδείη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἰναι, 529 d 1 τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδείν. There is no need, then, to read ἐκείνῳ with Madvig.

d 7 τῷ τοιοῦτον εἰναί οἶνον τὸ ἱσον, ‘in being such as the equal.’ For the dative of that in which one is deficient cp. Thuc. ii. 87. 1 τῇ... παρασκευῇ ἐνδείη ἐγένετο, Isocr. Paneg. 105 τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδεε-στέρους. Owing to a misunderstanding of this construction late MSS. insert μὴ after τῷ, and various conjectures have been proposed by modern critics.

d 9 βούλεται... εἰναί, ‘aims at being.’ The phrase is often used to express a tendency, especially by Aristotle.

e 1 [ἱσον]: this seems a clear case of an ‘adscript’ which has crept into the text. Though it is in W it is not translated in the version of Aristippus, who has simply tale esse quale illud.

e 2 φαυλότερον, ‘inferior.’

e 3 ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ εἰκόν, ‘but of which it falls short.’ The relative οὐ cannot be repeated after ὧ, though αἰτοῦ might have been added. Cp. 65 a 5 n.

e 9 Ἀναγκαῖον ἀρὰ... προειδόναι: the point of the argument is that we could not judge the equality of sticks and stones to be defective unless we were in possession of a standard by which to judge them. Sensible things could never furnish us with such a standard, therefore we must have derived it from some other source.

75 a 2 ὁργεται: equivalent to βούλεται, 74 d 9.

a 7 ταῦταν δὲ κτλ., ‘I count all these as the same thing’ (for the purposes of the present argument, as appears from the reply). Cp. Meno 75 e 2 πάντα ταῦτα ταῦταν τι λέγω· ἵσως δ' ἀν ἥμιν Πρόδικος διαφέρωσι.

a II Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ κτλ. It can only be from the senses that our judgement of the inferiority of sensible objects originates, and yet that judgement implies previous knowledge of the standard by which we judge them and find them inadequate.
b i. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, sc. ἱσα. The phrase is modelled on the common ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς.

ἐκείνου . . . τοῦ δ έστιν ἰσον: for the terminology cp. 74 b 2 n. and below d 2 n.

b 4 Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἀρξασθαί κτλ. The reasoning is quite sound, as we shall see if we remember that we should never call sticks or stones equal at all, unless we knew clearly what we meant by equality.

τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι, 'make use of our other senses'; for τάλλα is internal accusative (Riddell, Dig. § 2).

b 6 τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων is substituted for τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν under the influence of ἀνοίσεων. This is simply a case of the 'attraction' of prepositions with the article by verbs of motion. Cp. 76 d 9; 109 e 4.

b 7 ἀνοίσεων, 'to refer.' Reference to a standard is regularly expressed by ἄναφέρειν πρὸς . . . referre ad . . . Cp. 76 d 9.

δτι seems to be used as if ἄναφέροντες ἐννοῆσειν had preceded instead of ἀνοίσεων. Vahlen (i. 489) proposes to insert καὶ ἐννοῆσειν before δτι.

προθυμεῖται, 'do their best,' a still more picturesque way of expressing tendency than βούλεται or ὁρέγεται above.

πάντα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἱσα.

b 10 γενόμενοι εὐθύς, 'immediately upon birth.'

c i. πρὸ τούτων: before we saw, heard, &c.

c 7 εἰ . . . ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, sc. αὐτὴν, 'if we were born with it,' i.e. the knowledge of the equal.

c 9 τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν: the knowledge of τὸ ἱσον implies these; for together they make up its opposite, τὸ ἄνωσον, and τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη.

c i i. peri αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ κτλ. We see here how the theory originated in mathematics, and was thence transferred to what we call morals and aesthetics. The beautiful and the good resemble the equal in this, that they are nowhere perfectly realized.

d 2 οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα κτλ., 'on which we set the seal of αὐτὸ δ ἐστι.' Here again we have 'we' in connexion with a technical term, and this implies the work of a school. Cp. 65 d 4 n. For the metaphor cp. Polit. 258 c 5 (τῇ πολιτικῇ) μίαν (ἵδιαν) ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, Phileb. 26 d 1 ἐπισφραγισθέντα τὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἑναντίον γένει.

τὸ "αὐτὸ δ ἐστι", 'the just what it is': so I have ventured to
write for the τότε δὲ ἐστί of the MSS. Iamblichus has simply τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ, and it seems to me that τὸ must be right. The reading which I have given accounts sufficiently for the others. Most editors write τούτο, δὲ ἐστι.

d 2 καὶ εἰς ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: ι. ε. διαλεγόμενοι, for question and answer are the two sides of the Socratic dialectic. We see from 78 d 1 that this phrase also was technical in the Socratic school. Cp. Crit. 50 c 8 ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴθεσιν χρήσει τὸ ἑρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Rep. 534 d 9 (dialectic) εἷς ἔρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἷος τ' ἐσονται.

d 7 Εἰ ... ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλεληψμέθα, 'unless we forget them on each occasion' of our birth. The doctrine of παλιγγενεσία seems to be implied by ἐκάστοτε and ἀεὶ γιγνεσθαι ('to be born on each occasion') below. There would be no room for reminiscence unless birth involved forgetting. Heindorf proposed to insert γιγνόμενοι after ἐκάστοτε to make this clear; but we may easily 'understand' it.

d 9 λαβόντα κτλ., 'having acquired knowledge of a thing, to have it and not to have lost it.' ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι is an instance of 'polar expression'. Cp. 86 a 5 ἐὰν εἰσαι ... καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι.

d 10 ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν, 'loss of knowledge' (ἀπόλλυμι and ἀποβάλλω are synonyms in this sense). For other definitions of ἥθη cp. Symp. 208 a 4 ἥθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, Phileb. 33 ε 3 ἐστι γὰρ ἥθη μνήμης ἔξοδος.

e 2 Εἰ ... γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, 'if we lost it in the process of birth.'

e 3 περὶ αὐτά: here αὐτά means simply 'the things in question'. Cp. 60 c 1; 76 c 2. There is no need to read ταῦτα with W; for the reference is plain.

e 4 πρίν: the use of πρίν as an adverb is almost unexampled in prose (except with the article).

e 5 οἰκεῖαν ... ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν, 'to recover knowledge which is our own.' This is the real meaning of the whole doctrine, which can only be adequately expressed in a mystical form. The mystery of knowledge is the same as the mystery of love. It is a 'mystical union' with what at first seems alien (ἄλλωτρων), but is in time recognized to be our very own.

e 7 ὁρθῶς: cp. 62 b 2 n.
These participles are subordinate to αἰσθάνεσθαι, 'whether by sight or hearing or any other sense.'

πάντες is opposed to οἷς φαμεν μανθάνειν and repeated below b 8. We must not, therefore, read παντὸς.

οὐδέν ἄλλον ἦν, 'nothing but.' The phrase ἄλλον ἦν is used after negatives and treated as a single word (cp. 68 b 4). It is wrong to write ἄλλον (for ἄλλο) as is shown by 81 b 4 πρὸς ἄλλον.

dύναι λόγον, 'to give an account of it.' This is the mark of the διαλεκτικὸς. Cp. Rep. 534 b 3 ἐν διαλεκτικῶν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστος λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐόσας (cp. 78 d 1); καὶ τὸν μή ἐχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἐν μή ἐχών λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἐχεῖν;

αὐριον τηνικάδε, 'this time to-morrow.' It seems to me that, if Plato originated the theory, he could not possibly have put this statement into the mouth of Simmias. Cp. Prot. 336 b 8, where Alcibiades says τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἶδος τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν εἰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ παραχωρεί (Σωκράτης).

αὐθρώπῳ εἶδος, 'in human form.' We see from the next words how close εἶδος in such phrases comes to the meaning of σῶμα. Cp. 73 a 1 n. καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον, 'and had intelligence.' For the sense of φρόνησις here cp. 70 b 4 n. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις gives the first indication of the intelligence of the disembodied soul.

ἐν πολὺ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; sc. ἦν ἐν τῷ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. The interrogative πολὺ is not a mere equivalent of τίν. It always expresses feeling of some sort, surprise, scorn, or incredulity. Here we may reproduce the effect by saying, 'And at what other time do we lose it, pray: '

ἀρτί: 75 d 4.

δὲ δὲ θυμούμεν ἂν, 'the things we are always talking of.' Once more we have the 'we,' which implies that this doctrine was perfectly familiar to the school.

οὐσία: cp. 65 d 13 n. τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι: cp. 75 b 6 n. ἀναφέρομεν: cp. 75 b 7 n.

Ἀμετέραν οὖσαν: equivalent to οἴκειαν above 75 e 5.
e 2  ταύτα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν.
ουτὸς ὁστερ καί, 'in just the same way that', 'just as surely as'.

e 3  ταύτα, sc. καλὸν τέ τι κτλ. There is no real difficulty in the fact
that ταύτα here and in the next line has a different reference from
ταύτα in e 2. The reference is quite plain in all three cases.

e 4  ἄλλος ... ἐρημένος, 'spoken in vain', 'this argument will go for

e 9  εἰς καλὸν: this phrase can hardly have any other than its usual
meaning opportunely. Cp. Meno 89 e 9 εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν 'Ἀντως παρε-
καθέζετο, Symp. 174 e 5 εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις, and often. The phrase is
purely adverbial, and it is not correct to say, with most editors, that
it is explained by the words εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι κτλ., which depend
directly on καταφεύγει.

καταφεύγει, 'is taking refuge.' The λόγος or argument is over
and over again spoken of as the thing hunted (cp. 63 a 2 n., and
below 88 d 9 n.). I take the meaning to be that it has 'taken cover'
very conveniently for us who are hunting it. From Rep. 432 b sq.
we see that the idea is that of a hare or other animal taking refuge
in a bush (θάμνος), which the huntsmen surround so that it cannot
escape (Adam's note in loc.). When the argument is proved, it is
cought. Cp. Lysis 218 c 4 ἔχαιρον, ὁστερ ὁρευτής τις, ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς
δ᾿ ἐθνευόμεν.

77 a 1  ὁμοίως, 'in the same way', 'just as surely', equivalent to οὔτως
ὁστερ καί ... οὔτως καί above (76 e 2).

a 5  ἀποδείκται, 'the demonstration is adequate.' The words ἐμοίγε
δοκεῖ are parenthetical, and do not affect the construction. Cp.
108 d 8. The omission of δοκεῖ in TW is an attempt to normalize
the construction. The answer shows that δοκεῖ is right; for it is
the only word that can be supplied after Τί δὲ δὴ Κἐβητι;

(3) The doctrines of παλαγγελεία and ἀνάμνησις afford an incom-
plete demonstration until they are combined (77 a 6—77 d 5).

a 8  Ἰκανῶς, sc. ἀποδείκται. Simmias and Cebes point out, however,
that the argument from ἀνάμνησις only proves the antenatal existence
of the soul, not its survival after death. Socrates replies that we
must take the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις and that from ἀνάμνησις
together. At the same time, he admits that a more thorough
discussion is required.
b 3 ἑνεστηκεν, ‘there is still the objection.’ This is originally an agonistic metaphor; for ἑνατηναι is ‘to stand up to’. Cp. Lysias, 3. 8 ἐδύνα με τὶπετειν ἐπεχείρησεν ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὸν ἡμινάμην ἑνατάς . . ., Isocr. 5. 39 ἑνατηναι τοῖς ἐφημένοις. Hence comes the technical use of ἑνατειας (instantia) in dialectics of an ‘objection’ to an argument (ἐπιχειρημα). Plutarch uses the word for the tribunes’ intercessio.

b 4 ὅπως μὴ . . . διασκεδάνυται κτλ. For the use of ὅπως μὴ after verbs of fearing instead of μὴ cp. below 84 b 5. There are four or five instances of this construction in Plato. The verb is subjunctive and has long v, but the termination should not be accented -ύται as if it were contracted from -ύται. It is really an older form of the subjunctive (Kühner-Blass, § 281. 3). So διασκεδάνυσιν, 77 e 1, and the opt. πήγνυτο, 118 a 2.

b 6 ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, ‘from some other source’ than from the souls in the other world which have come there from this (the ἐνθεώντες ἀρισκόμεναι of 70 c 6). I formerly read ἀμόθεν ποθεν with Bekker; but, apart from the fact that the regular phrase is ἀμόθεν γε ποθεν, I now think the meaning is settled by 72 d 1 ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, where see note.

c 1 Ἐφ λέγεις κτλ. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

c 5 τέλος . . . ἔχειν, i. q. τελεία ἐσεσθαι, ‘to be complete.’ Cp. τέλος λαμβάνειν, τέλος ἐπιδειναι, &c. In Greek philosophy the word τέλος always implies the idea of completion or full growth. An animal or plant τέλος ἔχει when its growth is complete, when it is full grown. B has ἔχειν for ἔχειν, which would be equally correct. It is impossible to draw any distinction between the two constructions. For the fut. inf. in this use cp. e. g. Rep. 567 b 8 εἴ μὲλει ἄρξειν.

c 7 καὶ νῦν, ‘even as it is.’ The sense of νῦν is the same as in the common νῦν δὲ . . ., nunc vero . . ., ‘but, as it is.’

συνθείναι . . . έἰς ταῦτάν, ‘to combine the present argument (viz. that the soul exists and is conscious before our birth) with the argument we assented to before it.’

d 5 ὅπερ λέγετε, ‘the point you mention.’ This reading comes from a late MS. and is probably due to conjecture alone. It gives, however, a much better sense than the ὅπερ λέγεται of the oldest MSS., which is supposed to mean ‘as is said’, i. e. ‘as I say’. We should
certainly expect ὑπὲρ λέγω in that sense, and the confusion of ὀτι and τοι is common; both being pronounced alike.

(4) Practical Application.—We must rid ourselves of the fear of death at all costs (77 d 5—78 b 4).

This digression (cp. 78 a 10) marks the end of the First Argument and leads up to the Second.

d 6 διαπραγματεύσασθαι, 'to discuss thoroughly.' Cp. below 95 e 9 and the use of πραγματεία above 63 a 1.

d 7 τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, 'as children do.' That the phrase does not necessarily mean 'as children say', is shown e. g. by Xen. Oec. 16. 7 ἀνεμώνῃ τῷ τῶν ἀλιέων, which in the context must mean 'what fishermen do'.

e 1 διασκεδάννυον is probably subjunctive and to be pronounced with long ν (cp. 77 b 4 n.). The indicative would not be so appropriate; for the fear refers to the future. If the verbs were indicative, we should have to render 'lest the wind puffs it away and scatters it' on each occasion when it issues from the body.

e 2 ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι, 'in a high wind,' the regular phrase. So μέγας πνεῖ ὁ ἀνέμος. This clause is, of course, a humorous addition to the theory.

e 3 ὃς δεδιότων, sc. ἡμῶν, in spite of the fact that strict grammar would require δεδιότας in agreement with ἡμᾶς, the unexpressed object of ἀναπείθειν. The genitive absolute is often used in this way. Cp. Riddell, Dig. § 274.

e 4 μάλλον δὲ, vel potius, 'or rather,' the regular phrase in introducing a correction.

μὴ belongs to δεδιότων, but is anticipated for emphasis. A striking instance of this is Crito 47 d 9 πειθόμενοι μὴ τῷ τῶν ἑπαύντων δόξῃ.

e 5 ἐν ἡμῖν, 'in us.' It is necessary to state this, as it has been suggested that the words mean 'among us' and refer to Apollodorus! This makes nonsense of the passage. The 'child in us' is often referred to by later Platonist writers like Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius (cp. Wytenbach's note).

ὅσοις differs from ὃς as qui with the subjunctive from qui with the indicative. Its use here is justified by the preceding τοῖς.

e 6 πείρῳ μεταπείθειν was conjectured by Heindorf, and is now known
to be the reading of W. It is far better than the πειρώμεθα πειθέν of BT; for it resumes πειρῶ αναπείθεν above with a slight variation which is quite in Plato's manner.

e 7 τὰ μορμολύκεια, 'bugbears.' Μορμόω (whose full name was Μορ-μολύκη) was a she-goblin used, like 'Ακκό, Ἐμποσα, and Λάμια to frighten naughty children. Cp. Theocritus xv. 40 οὐκ ἄξω τυ, τέκνων, Μορμόω, δάκνει ἵππος, Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 17 φοβείσθαι τοὺς πελταστάς, ὀς πέρ μορμόνας παιδάρια, Lucian, Philop. 2 παιδών ἐτὶ τὴν Μορμόω καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων. According to the Platonic Lexicon of Timaeus, μορμολύκεια were ma ks, τὰ φοβερὰ τοῖς παιοι προσωπεῖα. The verb μορμολύπτεσθαι is used in Crito 46c 4 and Gorg. 473d 3.

e 8 ἐπιδέιν, incantare, 'to sing charms' (carmina, ἐπιθαλ). Socrates makes an elaborate use of this idea in Charm. 155e sqq., cp. esp. 157a 3 θεραπείεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφ' (Ζάλμοξις), ὦ μακάρι, ἐπιθαλίς τισίν, τὰς δ' ἐπιθαλίς ταῖτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς' ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιού- των λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγύγνεσθαι, ἢς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ὑπὸν ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ἐγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῇ ἀλλῷ σώματι πορίζειν. The ascription of this to the Thracian Zalmoxis shows it to be Pythagorean; for Herodotus tells us (iv. 95) that Zalmoxis (or Zamolxis) had been a slave of Pythagoras (E. Gr. Ph. p. 93), and it goes well with what we know of the Pythagorean musical κάθαρος (cp. 61 a 3 n.). Socrates also used the term in connexion with his μαίνετική (Theaet. 149d 1).

e 9 ἔως ἄν ἐξεποσάτε, 'till you have charmed it out of him.' This is another conjecture of Heindorf's which has been confirmed by fuller knowledge of the MSS.; for it is actually found in a Vienna MS. and virtually in TW. The reading of B is ἐξιόσητα, and it appears from the margin of W that this was an ancient variant. It cannot, of course, be passive; but we might supply τις as its subject. 'One must sing charms ... till one has healed him.'

78 a 3 Πολλὴ ... ἡ Ἑλλᾶς, wide enough, for instance, to include Southern Italy, where the Pythagoreans were once more becoming powerful. For this use of πολὺς cp. the Homeric πολλὴ γαῖα, πολλὴ χώρη (II. xxiii. 520), Thuc. vii. 13. 3 πολλὴ δ' ἡ Σικελία, Theocr. xxii. 156 πολλὴ τοι Σπάρτη, πολλὴ δ' ἱππήλατος Ἡλίσ.

a 4 τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη: Socrates is no doubt thinking primarily of Thracians and Phrygians. The Orphic 'orgia' came from the
former, the Corybantic 'purifications' from the latter. Plato regarded the distinction between Hellenes and barbarians as an unscientific division of mankind (Polit. 262 d 1 sqq.), but it was revived by Aristotle.

a 6 eis ὅτι ἄν εὐκαύρωτερον: this is the reading of T and seems far better than the variant eis ὅτι ἀναγκαύτερον. The corruption is an extremely easy one, and the omission of ἄν in the variant is, to say the least of it, hard to justify, while the insertion of ἄν after ὅτι would spoil the rhythm. Of course εὐκαύρωτερον is the comparative adverb, not the adjective.

a 7 καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων, 'by yourselves too' (as well as by questioning Hellenes and barbarians), 'along with one another' (for joint search is the true Socratic method). We cannot take μετ’ ἀλλήλων to mean 'among yourselves' as some do. Apart from the unheard-of sense thus given to μετά c. gen., the pronoun ἀλλήλων excludes such a rendering. We should have had ἐν ἦμιν αὐτοῖς.

a 8 ἵσως γὰρ ἄν κτλ. The usual hint that Orpheotelestae and Corybantic καθαρται are not to be taken too seriously. Cp. 69 c 4 n.

a 10 ταῦτα ... ὑπάρξει, 'that shall be done', 'you may count on that'. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

Second Proof of Immortality (78 b 4—84 b 8).

This proof is based, not upon ancient doctrines, but on a consideration of the soul's own nature, which is shown to resemble that of the eternal forms. From this we may infer that, like them, it is indissoluble.

b 5 ἐαυτούς is an emphatic ἀλλήλους.

b 6 τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι is better attested than the τὸ διασκεδάννυσθα of B. We have seen (72 c 3 n.) that τοῦτο πᾶσχειν takes an infinitive in apposition. The article is added in this case because τὸ πάθος precedes.

b 7 καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινι (οὗ): some of the early editors deleted καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ as a tautology; but the pronoun πότερον in b 8 shows that two kinds of things have been distinguished. We must therefore add οὗ with Heindorf, though it appears in no MS. and Olympiodorus did not read it; for he tries to get rid of the tautology by taking the first τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ of things and the second of persons.
(1) Only that is dissoluble which is composite, and the things which are constant and invariable are not composite. Further, the things which are constant and invariable are invisible. We have to ask, then, whether the soul belongs to the class of invisible, constant and invariable, non-composite things, or to that of visible, variable, composite, and therefore dissoluble things (78 c 1—80 c 1).

c 1 τά...συνθέτω δόντι φύσει: if we take these words together with Wytttenbach, they add a fresh touch to τά συνθέτειν. That suggests an artificial combination; this refers to what is essentially and from the nature of the case composite. The addition of the participle δόντι indicates that this is the construction and makes it very unnatural to take φύσει προσήκει together, as many editors do.

c 2 τούτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθήναι: cp. 72 c 3 n. The verbs συνθέτειν, 'compound,' διαιρέω, 'divide,' are the regular opposites.

c 3 ταύτη ἐπερ συνετήθη: e.g., if it is a compound of the four 'elements,' it will be divided into these.

c 6 κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαύτως, 'constant and invariable.' We see that this is the sense from the ἄλλος ἄλλως, which is the opposite of ὁσαύτως, and μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, which is opposed to κατὰ ταύτα. Cp. d 2; 80 b 2.

c 7 τὰ δὲ ἄλλωτ' ἄλλως: the familiarity of the term may excuse the ellipse of ἔχοντα and make it unnecessary to read ἄ for τά with Heindorf.

c 8 ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα: for the resumptive demonstrative with δὲ cp. e.g. Lach. 194 d 2 δ ἄμαθς, ταύτα δὲ κακός. So below 80 d 8; 81 b 8; 113 e 5.

d 1 ἢ οὐσία ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, 'the reality the being of which we give account of.' The hyperbaton of δίδομεν has misled the commentators here. We must take λόγον τοῦ εἶναι together as equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὐσίας or ' definition', and as governing the genitive ἢς. For λόγος τῆς οὐσίας cp. Rép. 534 b 3 ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικῶν καλεῖσ τον λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; The meaning, then, is simply 'the reality which we define'. When we define 'triangle',

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it is not this or that triangle, but αὐτὸ δέ ἐστιν τρίγωνον, 'just what is triangle,' that finds expression in our definition.

d 1 καὶ ἑρωτώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, ἵ. ἡ. διάλεγόμενοι, cp. 75 d 2 n. In the dialectic process it is by question and answer that definitions are reached. When we ask τί ἐστι; the answer is a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας.

d 3 αὐτὸ ἕκαστον δέ ἐστιν, 'what any given thing itself is' or 'is by itself', 'just what a given thing is'. Cp. 74 b 2 n.

d 4 τὸ δὲν, 'the real,' is added to suggest the opposition of εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι.

d 5 μονοεδές δὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, 'being uniform if taken alone by itself.' I regard αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό 'as a reservation here. The triangle, for instance, has more than one εἴδος. There are equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles. But none of these εἴδη enter into the definition of the triangle simply as such.

d 10 Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. (Riddell, Dig. § 27), 'what of the many beautiful things?' as opposed to τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐστιν καλὸν. It is clear that we cannot retain both καλῶν here and ἤ καλῶν in e 1, and most editors bracket the former. This, however, commits us to the view that there are εἴδη of men, horses, and clothes, which is a point that has not been referred to, and which raises certain difficulties which do not concern us here. It is hard to believe that ἱμάτια would have been mentioned at all except as an instance of τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ. I therefore take Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν ... ἤ ίσων together, and regard 'people, horses, and clothes' as examples of the first, just as 'sticks and stones' might be given as examples of the second. It is only as instances of καλὰ that people, horses, and clothes can be said to be ὀμόνυμα τῷ καλῷ (cp. e 2 n.).

e 1 τοὐντων: i. e. καλὸν. This, I take it, has caused the interpolation of ἤ καλὼν.

e 2 πάντων τῶν ἑκείνων ὁμονύμων, 'all the (other) things (besides καλὰ and ἵσα) which bear the same name as those,' i. e. as αὐτῶν ἕκαστον δέ ἐστιν. For this way of expressing the relationship between τὰ πολλὰ ἑκαστα and αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστίν ἕκαστον cp. Parm. 133 d 2 τὰ ... παρ' ἡμῖν ταὐτὰ ὁμόνυμα δύτα ἑκείνως. Observe the tendency to use ταὐτα of the 'many' and ἑκεῖνα of the 'ideas'.

πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἑκείνως, 'just the opposite to these,' i. e. to αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, &c. What we call 'beautiful things' or 'equal things' are
constant neither to themselves nor to one another. As we have seen (74 b 8), they do not appear beautiful or equal to different people, or even to the same person at different times.

79 a 3 τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, 'by thinking.' There is no distinction here between διάνοια and νοῦς. The phrase means thinking generally as opposed to sense-perception.

a 4 ἀδήτῳ, 'invisible.' The correct form was first made known by the Flinders Petrie papyrus, and has since been found to be the reading of the first hand of T. and of W. Cp. the Homeric αἴδηλος, άιστος, αἴδνος. The reading of B, followed by nearly all MSS. and editions, is αἰειδῆ, which could only mean 'formless', 'unsightly', and is quite inappropriate.

a 6 Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει κτλ. Olympiodorus distinguishes three ἐπιχείρημα intended to prove that the soul is more like the indissoluble than the body: (1) ἐκ τοῦ ἄνοράτου αὐτῆς, (2) ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, (3) ἐκ τοῦ δεσπόζειν τοῦ σώματος. The first ἐπιχείρημα begins here.

δόσει οἴη τῶν ὄντων, 'two types of things.' It is important to observe that the word ὄντα is used of both. It means 'things' in the widest and vaguest sense. Of course, strictly speaking, visible things are not ὄντως ὄντα and the things invisible are not 'things' at all.

b 1 ἄλλο τι, nonne, just like ἄλλο τι ἂν ... above (70 c 9). The words have become phraseological, but their original sense ('anything else') is so far felt that the affirmative answer is given by Οἴδεν ἄλλο.

b 4 φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι: this seems better than the equally well attested φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι. In the direct speech ὁμοιότερον ἄν εἶναί would be quite natural.

b 9 τῆς τῶν ἄνθρωπων φύσει, sc. ὄρατα καὶ μῆ. It is left open for us to say that in some sense we may 'see' these things πρὶν ἐν ἄνθρωπειᾳ εἰδει γενέσθαι or after the soul has left its human body. Such a beatific vision is described in the Phaedrus, but belongs to another aspect of the theory than that dwelt upon in the Phaedo.

b 13 Οὐχ ὄρατόν. 'Αιδῆς ὁρᾷ; cp. 105 d 15 Ἀνάρπτιον. The inference from 'not visible' to 'invisible' seemed more necessary to the Greeks than to us.

c 2 Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε κτλ. The second ἐπιχείρημα (cp. a 6 n.). The soul can apprehend the invariable best apart from the body.
c 2. πάλαι, 'some time ago,' i.e. 65 b 1 sqq. For the meaning of πάλαι cp. 63 d 5 n.

c 8. τοιούτων, sc. πλανωμένων καὶ ἐν ταραχῇ δυντών (Riddell, Dig. § 54). The soul fluctuates and is confused because it is in contact with objects which are fluctuating and confused.

d 3. συγγενής οὖσα: we have seen already that reality is ὀλκείον to the soul (75 e 5), and this has been reinforced by the consideration that it is more alike to the invisible than the visible.

d 4. καὶ ἐξή αὐτῆ, sc. μετ' ἐκείνου γίγνεσθαι.

d 5. καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα... ἐχε, 'and remains ever constant in relation to them.'

d 6. τοιούτων: i.e. κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαίτωσ ἐχόντων.

τούτο... τὸ πάθημα, 'this condition,' i.e. a constant relation to constant objects.

e 3. ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, 'this line of argument.' The verb μετέρχομαι (88 d 9) and its substantive μέθοδος furnish another illustration of the metaphor from hunting. The literal sense of μετέιναι is 'to go after', 'to follow up', especially of going in pursuit of game. As the λόγος is the game in the θηρα τοῦ δυντος, the phrase μετείναι τῶν λόγων is natural.

δὲ καὶ παντὶ: the usual phrase is δὲλ ὡσαίτ διαφέρειν, 'to be totally different.' Here it is used of likeness.

e 8. ὁρα δὴ καὶ τῇ ἑκάστη κτλ. The third ἐπιχείρημα (a 6 n.). The soul rules over the body. This is the argument which comes nearest to Plato's own proof of immortality.

80 a 4. οἶνον ἄρξεν... πεφυκείναι, 'to be by nature such as to rule and lead,' 'to be naturally adapted for rule and leadership.' For this use of ὁρα cp. 83 d 9; 94 e 4; 98 c 8. We must 'understand' οἶνον again with ἄρξεσθαι.

a 10. εἰ... τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, 'whether this is our conclusion.' The results of a dialectical discussion are technically called τὰ συμβαίνοντα, and it is in the light of these that the ὑπόθεσις with which it starts must be examined. If an impossibility συμβαίνει, the ὑπόθεσις must be given up.

b 3. δροιότατον εἶναι ψυχῇ, sc. συμβαίνει. The verb συμβαίνει in this sense is generally used personally; cp. 67 c 5 κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὗ τούτο συμβαίνει...; so there is no need to read ψυχήν. The impersonal construction also occurs; cp. 74 a 2 ἄρ' οὖν οὗ... συμβαίνει.
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τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἴναι κτλ. There is no anacoluthon; for the prospective τάδε above is merely shorthand for τῷ θείῳ ὁμοίωσαν εἴναι ψυχή, τῷ ἀθανάτῳ ὁμοίωσαν εἴναι ψυχή, &c.

b 4 ἀνόητος: a play on words is involved in making this the opposite of νοητός, for ἀνόητος properly means ‘senseless’, ‘foolish’. The true opposite of νοητός, ‘intelligible’, ‘object of thought’, is αἰσθητός, ‘sensible’, ‘object of sense’.

b 6 ἂν οὖχ οὕτως ἔχει, ‘to show that it is not so.’ This meaning would be equally well expressed by ὥς which is an ancient variant and well attested. Schanz’s ἂ, however, has the advantage of explaining the readings of B (ἡ) and W (ἡ). Cp. Theaet. 184 c 4 ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως . . . ἂ οὐκ ὑρή.

b 10 ἐγγὺς τι τούτου: a hint that this argument is not quite conclusive. The soul has only been shown to resemble the indissoluble.

(2) Practical Application.—We must purify our souls and purge it of the corporeal (80 c 2—84 b 8).

c 3 ἐν ὀρατῷ κείμενον, ‘situated in the visible region.’ Ast quaintly interprets: ‘lying in a visible thing,’ i.e. a coffin or tomb.

c 4 καλδίαπνεισθαι is so well attested that its omission in B must be a slip. I cannot see that it is an inappropriate word to use of a dead body.

c 5 ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν . . . χρόνον, ‘a fairly long time.’ Cp. Crito 43 a 10 ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

c 6 ἐπιμένει, ‘remains as it is’ (dist. περιμένει, ‘waits’). Cp. 59 e 4 n. ἐὰν μὲν τις καί . . . , ‘indeed, even if a man . . . ’ For the hyperbaton of καί Schmidt compares Prot. 323 b 3 ἐὰν τις καί εἰδότιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν. The μὲν (‘indeed’) is solitarium as in Prot. 361 e 3 τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνω (however it may be with others). The meaning, then, is that even if a man dies with his body in good condition, it lasts quite a long time. Of course a healthy body decomposes more rapidly than an old and withered one.

χαρέντως ἐξον, equivalent to καλὸς or εὖ ἐξον. We find μετρίως and ἐπιεικῶς used in the same sense. Cp. 68 e 2 n. There is no suggestion of ‘gracefulness’, but only of ἐνεξία or ‘good condition’.

c 7 ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὀρῷ, ‘at a fine season of the year’ (τοιαύτῃ standing for καλῆ implied in χαρέντως, Riddell, Dig. § 54). Decomposition is more rapid in summer than in winter. Most recent editors understand the phrase to mean ‘in the bloom of youth’; but (1) ἐν
\(\ddot{o}p\) without τοιαύτη would be sufficient for this. Cp. *Meno* 76 b 8; *Phaedr.* 240 d 7; *Rep.* 474 d 4; and (2) when \(\ddot{o}p\) is mentioned in connexion with death, it means not 'youthful bloom', but 'a ripe old age'. Cp. e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 968 αὐτός δ', ἐν ὀραίῳ γὰρ ἰσταμαι βίου, | θυνήσεις ἐτοιμος. On the other hand, one who dies in early youth (and in that sense ἐν \(\ddot{o}p\)) is said to die πρὸ \(\ddot{o}p\) or \(\ddot{o}p\)os. The latter word is common in sepulchral inscriptions.

c 7 καὶ πάνυ μάλα, sc. συχνὸν χρόνον, 'for quite a long time.' συμπεσόν, 'reduced to bones and muscle'; 'emaciated'. This clause justifies the preceding ἐὰν μὲν τὶς κτλ. An emaciated body remains almost entire for an inconceivable time, and even a body in good condition lasts quite a long time. For συμπίπτειν cp. Hdt. iii. 52 ἀνεφίσησι συμπεπτώκοτα. In the medical writers σύμπτωσις is technical for emaciation.

c 8 καὶ παραχευθέν: there is nothing unnatural in Socrates' frequent references to Egypt, which was always an object of interest to the Greeks. Socrates must have known many men who had fought there in 460 B.C. This passage has strangely been supposed to prove Plato's Egyptian journey.

c 9 ὄλγυον ὄλον μένει, sc. τὸ σῶμα, 'remains all but entire.'

d 1 καὶ ἄν σαπ]η, sc. τὸ (ἄλλο) σῶμα.

νεφρα, 'sinews.' Cp. below 98 c 7 n.

d 5 \(\ddot{o}p\), scilicet. The particle indicates that we have to do with an argumentum ex contrario (cp. 68 a 3 n.) put in the form of a question. 'Are we to say, then, that the soul . . . ?'

tοιούτον . . . ἕτερον, 'just like itself' (cp. 58 d 8 n.), not equivalent to ἀιδη, for that is expressly mentioned besides. The meaning is that expressed throughout the preceding argument by ὄμων.

d 6 εἰς 'Αἰδοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς, 'to the House of Hades in the true sense of the word.' This refers to the commonly accepted etymology of the word, for which cp. *Crat.* 404 b 1 καί τὸ γε ὄνομα δ 'Ἀιδής' . . . πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδών (sic ΒΤ) ἐπονομάσθαι. The denial of the etymology here shows that (rightly or wrongly) it was commonly accepted.

d 7 τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν: in the mystic theology Hades or Zeus Chthonios is called Eubouleus, and Eubouleus is also found (e.g. at Eleusis and on the Orphic gold plates of Southern Italy) as an independent god. I suspect that Socrates is here alluding to this sacred name.
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d 8 αὐτή δὲ δὴ resumes ἦ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα after the parenthesis.

e 2 ἐὰν μὲν κτλ. The protasis is interrupted at e 5 and resumed by 81 a 4 οὗτῳ μὲν ἔχουσα. Then ἐὰν μὲν is answered by 81 b 1 ἐὰν ἔγε.

e 3 κοινωνοῦσα: imperfect participle.

e 4 ἔκοισά εἰναί, 'so far as it could help it' (61 c 4 n.). The reservation is the same as that implied in ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη 67 a 4.

e 6 τὸ δὲ: this is the reading of the Petrie papyrus, and is more likely to have been altered than the τούτο δὲ of the MSS.

81 a 1 τεθνάναι μελετῶσα βαθίως, 'practising death without complaining.' Most editors emend or delete βαθίως, which is found not only in all MSS. and citations, but also in the Petrie papyrus. The use of the perfect infinitive need cause no difficulty; for it is often used of the moment of death which completes the process of τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν (62 a 5 n.). Vahlen (Opusc. ii. 213) proposes to construe βαθίως with μελετῶσα, but there has been no question of complaining about the practice of death, while we have had βαθίως ἀν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν (62 c 10) and βαθίως ἀπαλλαττοῦντο αὐτῶν (63 a 7) explained just below by οὗτῳ βαθίως φέρεις. The opposite is ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκον- τας (62 e 6). All these passages are quoted by Vahlen himself.

a 8 κατὰ τῶν μεμυμένων, 'of the initiated.' Cp. 70 d 7 n. This resembles the fairly common use of κατὰ c. gen. with ἔπαινος, ἐγκώ-μιον, and the like.

a 9 διάγουσα: after ἀπηλλαγμένη we expect διαγοῦσῃ, which Heindorf proposed to read. It would be easier to write ἀπηλλαγμένη, for there is no reason why the grammatical construction of ὑπάρχει should be kept up. The general sense of the sentence suggests the nominative.

b 3 ἐρώσα, sc. αὐτοῦ.

γοητευομένη is read by T as well as by the papyrus. It is not easy to decide between it and the equally well attested γεγονητευ-μένη.

τε is connective here. This is a poetical usage, and becomes increasingly frequent in Plato's later style. For a striking instance from his middle period cp. Phaedr. 267 a 6 Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε.

b 4 δοκεῖν, 'to think': cp. 64 b 2.

b 5 ἀλλ' ἂν...: cp. 68 b 4 n.; 76 a 6 n. 72
NOTES

b 5: the relative cannot be repeated in a different case (cp. 65 a 5 n.), so the ό and φ which are logically required as the sentence proceeds, are simply omitted.

b 7 φιλοσοφία αίτητον: Stallbaum compares Tim. 29 a 6 λόγω καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν.

b 8 τούτο δὲ ...: cp. 78 c 8 n.

c 4 διελημμένην, 'broken up by', 'patched with the corporeal'. The meaning of διαλαμβάνειν is best seen from 110 b 7. As applied to colours, it means 'to pick out', distinguere, as in a quilt or tartan. Cp. Milton, Comus 453–75.

c 6 σύμφυτον: though σύμφυτος and συμφυής usually mean 'congenital', that sense is excluded by ἐνεποίησε. We also find both words in the sense of 'grown together' (from συμφύναι, 'to coalesce'), and this must be the meaning here. We also find σύμφυοις as a medical term, especially of bones.

d 1 κυλινδομένη, 'haunting.' I have not ventured to write καλινδον-μένη, though Cobet says (N. L. p. 637) 'Platonica sunt καλινδείσθαι ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ, ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ, et odiose ἐν δικαστηρίοις καλινδεῖται, quem-admodum quis proprie ἐν πηλῷ aut ἐν βορβόφῳ dicitur καλινδεῖσθαι'. Very like the present use of the word is Rep. 479 d 4 κατεύχεις τὴν κυλινδεῖται τού τε κὴ ὄντως καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρνῶς. The suggestion is that of a restless spirit which cannot tear itself away from the body. Cicero, Somn. Scip. 9 says circum terram ipsam volvantur of such souls.

d 4 διὸ καὶ ὑπάνται, 'which is just why they are visible.' There is a touch of Socratic playfulness in this theory. If the soul is invisible, we must give some such account of ghosts as this.

d 6 Εἰκὸς μέντοι: cp. 65 d 6 n.

οὗ τι ... ἀλλὰ ..., a common formula in Plato. The γε belongs to καὶ.

d 8 τροφῆς, practically equivalent here to διαίτης, 'way of life.' Cp. 84 b 4; 107 d 4.

e 2 ἐνδούνται: cp. 82 e 2 n. For similar doctrine see Phaedr. 249, Rep. 618 a, 620 sq., Tim. 42 b, 91 sq.

e 3 ᾧν: we can say 'bad characters' for people who have bad characters, though we should hardly use the word of the lower animals. Very similar to the English use are Rep. 496 b 2 γενναῖον καὶ εὕ τεθραμμένον ἤνος, 503 c 9 τὰ βέβαια ταύτα ᾧν quoted by Bywater on Ar. Poet. 1454 a 23.

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καὶ μὴ διηνισκόμενοι: an instance of ‘polar expression’; for διηνισκόμενοι means ‘to avoid carefully’ or ‘scrupulously’ (ἐλεβάζως).

82a7 ἢ ἄν ... τοῦ, ‘the way they would take,’ a variation for οἷ, which some late MSS. unnecessarily read.

ξιστά, ‘each class.’ Note how the gender is varied (1) τῶν ... προτετελμένων, (2) τὰς τοιαύτας (sc. ψυχάς), (3) ἀκαστα.

καὶ τούτων: i.e. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. There are degrees of happiness even among souls which are not wholly purified.

τῆν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν, ‘popular goodness, the goodness of the good citizen.’ This is related to philosophical goodness just as true belief is related to science. Socrates admits the relative value of both. For the phraseology cp. Rep. 619c7 ἐδει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφῶν. Here πολιτικὴ means ‘belonging to citizens’ (cp. Gorg. 452e4), not ‘political’.

τοιούτον κτλ., ‘a race civilized and tame like themselves.’ The regular opposite of ἡμερος is ἄγριος, and both words are used of men, animals, and plants. They mean ‘civilized’, ‘tame’, ‘cultivated’, as opposed to ‘savage’, ‘wild’.

ἀνδρας μετρίους, ‘good men,’ though of course only in the popular sense. We might have had ἐπειεκτεῖς or σπουδαῖον with the same meaning. Cp. 68e2n.

μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι ... ἄλλ’ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ: the tendency to ‘polar expression’ here asserts itself at the expense of logic. The sentence ends as if οὖθεν had preceded. We must remember that φιλόσοφος and φιλομαθής are synonyms (Rep. 376b8 Αλλὰ μεντοῦ ... τό γε φιλομαθῆς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταύτων;). For ἄλλ’ ἢ cp. 68b4n.

οἵ ορθῶς φιλόσοφοι: cp. 67b4n.

οἰκοθεριάν, ‘waste of substance.’

οἵ ... φιλοχρήματοι are contrasted with οἵ φιλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι just below. Here once more we have the Pythagorean doctrine of the tripartite soul and the ‘Three Lives’. Cp. 68c1n.

ἐπειτά emphasizes the preceding participles.

μέτοι μᾶ Δία: cp. 65d6n.

σώματι πλάττοντες ξῖον: most editors suspect πλάττοντες, and it has been emended in various ways. The true interpretation, however, was given by Vahlen long ago (cp. Opusc. i. 83). He pointed out that πλάττειν is used much in the same sense as θεραπεύειν in

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64. d 8 and 81 b 2, and compared Rep. 377 c 3 καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθωσι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σῶματα ταῖς χεραῖς, to which passage may be added Tim. 88 c 3 τὸν τε αὐτὸ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα. Cp. also Plut. C1 ἐκ διδακτῶν ἢ ἁρετῇ 439 f ὅστε αἱ τίτθαι ταῖς χεραῖς σῶμα πλάττοντων καὶ Coriolanus 32. Vahlen holds further that σῶματι is governed by ζῆν, and that the meaning is ‘live for the body, moulding it into shape’, though the only example of ζῆν c. dat. in this sense which he quotes is in [Dem.] 7. 17 Φίλιππος ζωντες καὶ οὐ τῇ ἐαυτῶν πατρίδῃ. Perhaps Eur. Ion 646 ἔα δ' ἐμαντῶ ζῆν μὲ may be added. If this is not accepted, I would rather read σῶματα with TW than have recourse to conjecture. The σῶματα of B is, however, the difficilior lectio, and I believe Vahlen’s interpretation to be right. His discussion (loc. cit.) of the use of participles with an object to be understood from the context should be read.

d 3 χαίρειν ἐπιόντες, ‘dismissing from their thoughts.’ Cp. 63 e 3 n.

d 6 τῇ ἐκείνῃ λύσει: this, as well as καθαρμός, is Orphic. Olympiodorus quotes some Orphic verses, which at least contain some old ideas: Ὁρυμα ἐκτελέσουσι, λύσιν προγόνων ἀδεμίστων | μαυρέμοι σὺ δὲ τῶν ἔχων κράτος οὐς κ᾽ ἐθέλησα | λύσεις ἐκ τε πόνων χαλέπων καὶ ἀπείρων οἶστρου.

e 1 παραλαβοῦσα, ‘taking in hand,’ as a doctor takes his patient in hand for treatment. The vb. παράλαμβάνειν is technical in this sense, especially of teachers taking pupils. Cp. Rep. 541 a 1 τοὺς δὲ παιδᾶς αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες.

e 2 διαδεξεμένην: cp. 62 b 3 n. It is noteworthy that Socrates now adopts and expounds the very doctrine which he had put aside as ‘too high’; for the εἰργός is clearly the φρουρά. The reason is that he is now able to give a more scientific account of it.

e 4 κυλινδομένην: cp. 81 d 1 n. Here the word means simply ‘wallowing’. Cp. Polit. 309 a 5 τοὺς ἐν ἀμαθία ... καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδομένοις, Theaet. 172 c 8 οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις ... κυλινδούμενοι.

e 5 τὴν δεινότητα, ‘the cleverness’, ‘the ingenuity’. So far as I can see, none of the editors take the word in this sense; but surely the point is just that the prison-house is ingeniously contrived so as to make the prisoner co-operate in his own imprisonment.

εἶτι δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν, sc. ὁ εἰργός, ‘that it is effected by means

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of desire,' i.e. 'that it has desire as its instrument.' As we shall see, pleasures and pains, with which ἐπιθυμία is concerned, are the agents by which the soul is imprisoned (83 d 4; 84 a 4).

d 6 ὡς ἄν ... εἰη. This is an extremely rare construction in Attic prose, the nearest parallel being Xen. Cyrr. i. 3. 8 καὶ διδάσασι τοῖς προσφέροντι σκατολούσ ὅχουντες τὴν φιάλην καὶ προσφέρουσιν, ὡς ἄν ἐνδοίεν τὸ ἐκπώμα εὐληπτότατα τῷ μελλοντι πίνειν. It is equivalent in sense to ὅπως c. fut. ind. after verbs of 'ways and means' (the idea of contrivance being implied in δεινώτερα). In other words, ὡς is a relative adverb of manner, and ἄν is to be taken closely with the optative. Tr. 'so as best to secure the prisoner's co-operation in his own imprisonment.'

83 a 1 τοῦ δεδεσθαί: the MSS. have τῷ, but Heindorf's τοῦ restores the normal construction of συλλαμβάνειν, 'to co-operate' (dat. of the person with whom, gen. of the thing in which). Cp. Eur. Med. 946 συλλήψομαι δὲ τοῦδὲ σοι κἀγὼ πόνου, Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 12 ἵνα ... ἀγαθοῦ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ, ib. 7. 32 ἀγαθὴ συλλήψωρ τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων.

a 2 οὕτω ... ἡχοῦσαν go together, 'in this state.'

a 3 παραμυθεῖται: cp. 70 b 2 n.

b 1 ὅτι ἄν ... τῶν ὅντων: here it is once more implied that both the objects of sense and the objects of thought are ὅντα. Cp. 79 a 6.

b 2 δι' ἄλλων, opp. αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, and virtually equivalent to διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

ἐν ἄλλωσ ὅν ἄλλο, opp. αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτόν, 'that which varies in varying conditions,' as opposed to τὸ ἀεὶ ὅσαύτως ἡχοῦ.

b 6 οὕτως emphasizes the preceding participles. Tr. 'It is just because she does not think it right to ... that she ...'

b 7 καὶ φόβον is omitted by T, the Petrie papyrus, and Iamblichus. It looks as if it had been inserted to make this clause symmetrical with the next, in which ἥ λυπθῇ appears to have been inserted for a similar reason. Plato avoids exact symmetry of this sort, though his editors, ancient and modern, often foist it on him.

b 9 τοσοῦτον, here practically 'so small'.

c 1 ὅν: Iamblichus has ὡς, which would be more regular, but is to be rejected for that very reason. The partitive genitive is used as if only οἷδεν, not οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον, preceded.

c 3 καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό, 'and does not take it into account.'

c 5 αναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ... καὶ ...: the emphasis falls on ἅμα. A
belief in the reality of its object must arise simultaneously with any
strong feeling of pleasure or pain. We have really to deal, there-
fore, with a wrong view as to what is real, which is another way of
saying that goodness is knowledge.

c 8 (rά) seems necessary and could easily have been dropped by
haplography after μάλιστα.

d 4 ἀπερ ἢλφ ἐχουσα, 'with a rivet,' like Κράτος and Βία in the
Prometheus, as Geddes suggests. It is pleasure and pain that rivet
the setters of the bodily prison-house.

d 9 οία: cp. 80 a 4 n.
καθάρως: Heindorf conjectured καθάρως, comparing 67 a 7 ; 80 e 2 ;
82 c 1 ; but the Petrie papyrus confirms the adverb.

d 10 ἀναπλέα, 'contaminated', 'tainted'. Cf. 67 a 5 n., and Symp.
211 e εἰλικρινής, καθαρόν, ἁμεικτον, ἄλλα μή ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε
ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων. The feminine form is Ionic.

e 1 ἐμφύσεσθαι: cp. Tim. 42 a 3 ὅποτε δή σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
(ψυχαί).

e 5 οἱ δικαιοφιλομαθεῖς, synonymous with οἱ ὀρθοὶ φιλόσοφοι, 'those
who deserve the name of philosophers.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

e 6 κόσμου, equivalent to σώφρονες. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

οὐχ οὖν . . . ἐνεκά φασίν, 'not for the reason given by the mass of
men' (cp. 82 c 5 sqq.). It is not necessary to discuss the precise
nature of the ellipse here ; for the meaning is plain. The Petrie
papyrus omits φασίν, as Hermann originally proposed to do. This
is the only case where it confirms a modern conjecture.

84 a 2 οὐ γάρ, 'No, indeed.' It is better to punctuate after γάρ than to
take οὐ γάρ ἄλλα together with the older editors and Riddell (Dig.
§ 156).

a 3 τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν κτλ. We must subordinate and say 'that,
while it is philosophy's business to release the soul, the soul should
hand itself over to pleasures and pains to fasten its chains once
more'.

a 4 αὐτήν, 'of itself', 'of its own accord'. Cp. 64 a 5.

παραθηδόναι (cp. 82 c 4) is the correlative of παραλαμβάνειν (82 e
1 n.). Once more pleasures and pains are represented as the agents
of the soul's imprisonment. The εἰργός is δι' ἐπιθυμίας (82 e 5).

a 5 ἕγκαταθεῖν, sc. τῷ σώματι. Cp. 62 b 3 n.

ἀνίνυτον ἔργον . . . μεταχειριζόμενης, 'to engage in the endless task

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of a Penelope handling her web in the opposite way.' The vulgate μεταχειριζόμενη is a late conjecture and has nothing to commend it. I formerly read μεταχειριζόμενη with Peipers, which is certainly better (cp. R. G. Bury in Class. Rev. xx, p. 13). But μεταχειριζο-μένη is the reading of BTW, attested by the Petrie papyrus and Iamblichus, and would not be a natural mistake. It would be safer to write τινός for τινά if any change were required; but the web is the real point of the metaphor, and the indefinite pronoun may attach itself to ιστόν for that reason.

a 7 τοῦτων, sc. τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν.

a 8 ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα: cp. 59 a 3 n.

τά διδάσκαλον, ‘what is not the object of belief (δόξα),’ but of knowledge. The word is found only here in this sense. Cp. the similar use of ἄνοιγτον above 80 b 4.

b 3 ἀπελλάχθαι, sc. οἰςαν, not οἰςαν δεῖν, as is shown by the nominative ἀφικομένη. The soul believes that after death she is done with all human ills.

b 4 οὐδὲν δεῖνων μὴ φοβηθῆναι, ‘there is no danger of her fearing.’ Cp. Αριστ. 28 b 1 οὐδέν δὲ δεῖνὼν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στήν, ‘there is no fear of my being the last’, Gorg. 520 d 5 οὐδέν δεινόν αὐτῷ μὴ ποτε ἀδικηθῆ, Rep. 465 b 8 οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτὲ ... διχοστατήθη.

b 5 [ταῦτα ἡ ἐπιτηδεύσασα]: I take this to be an explanation of, or more probably an ancient variant for, ἐκ δὴ τῆς τουαίτης τροφῆς. To change δὴ into γ' with Stephanus and most editors is to hide the wound, not to heal it.

ὅπως μὴ ...: cp. 77 b 4 n.

b 6 ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος: i.e. ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγὴ τοῦ σώματος (70 a 2). The whole clause refers back to what Cebes said at 70 a.

Narrative interlude. Socrates is as ready as ever to hear objections to what he says (84 c 1—85 b 9).

This long interlude marks off the first part of the dialogue from the second, in which more serious objections have to be faced than those of οἱ πολλοὶ. There are scientific objections too.

c 2 πρὸς τῷ ... λόγῳ ἢν, ‘was absorbed in the foregoing argument.’ Cp. Φαεδρ. 249 c 5 πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἀδικεῖστω, d 1 πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γαγνῷ μενῶς, Rep. 567 a 1 ἢνa ... πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίως ταύτα εἴναι, Dem. 19. 127 ἄλοι πρὸς τῷ λόγῳ. 78
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c 3 ὥς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, lit. 'as he appeared to look at', 'to judge from his appearance'. In this usage the exophretic ἰδεῖν means much the same as τήν ὄψιν. Cp. Tim. 52 e i παντοδαπὴν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, Eur. Her. 1002 εἰκών, ὥς ὅραν ἐφαίνετο, Παλλάς.

c 4 σμικρὸν . . . διελεγέον ὑπερ, 'went on talking in a low voice' (not 'for a little'). The opposite of (σ)μικρὸν λέγειν, &c., is μέγα λέγειν, &c. 'to speak loud.'

c 6 ἔχει ὑποψίαι καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς: 'it admits of, suggests, gives room for many misgivings and is open to many forms of attack' (ἀντι- λαβῆ, like ἀντίληψις, 87 a 6, is a metaphor from wrestling, 'the opponent's grip').

d 3 εὐπρόφησεν, 'that you will find a way out of your difficulty,' εὐπροφία being the opposite of ἀπορία.

d 5 πᾶλαι, 'for some time.' Cp. 63 d 5 ὑ.

e 2 μὴ . . . διάκειμαι of fear for something in the present, whereas d 7 μὴ . . . γ. refers to the future, 'lest it should prove to be'. It is incorrect to say that the present indicative implies certainty.


85 a 1 κάλλιστα: this is Blomfield's correction of the MS. μάλιστα, and is now known to be the reading of W, though the first hand has written καὶ μάλιστα above the line. We cannot defend μάλιστα by interpreting it as 'loudest'. That would be μέγατον, which I had conjectured before the reading of W was known.

a 2 τῶν θεῶν: Apollo, as we presently learn, and, in particular, Apollo Hyperboreus who, as I have shown in E. Gr. Ph.² p. 97, n. 3, was the chief god of the Pythagoreans (cp. 60 d 2 ὑ.). Aristophanes too was aware that the swans sang to Apollo. Cp. Birds 769 τοιάδε κύκνωι . . . συμμιγῇ βοήν, ὅμοι πετροίς κρέκουσας, ἵκχον Ἀπόλλω . . . ἀχώ ἐφεξήμενοι παρὶ Ἐβρον ποταμών.

a 3 τὸ αὐτῶν δῖος τοῦ θανάτου, 'their own fear of death.' (Some editors wrongly take τοῦ θανάτου with καταψεῦδοντα.)

a 5 ἔξαδεν, 'to sing a song of departure.' There is some reason to
believe that the last song of the chorus was spoken of as τὰ ἔξῳδικά as well as τὸ ἔξῳδίων. The scholiast on Ar. ᾨσὺς 270 says so, though the text is generally emended to τὰ ἔξῳδικά, and Plotinus, Ἑπι. 6. 9. 8 (p. 1404. 10) says οἶνον χαρός ἔξῳδων. Cp. Polyb. xxxi. 20. I μάρτυρ ἔξῳσας τὸ κύκνειον, Plut. Ῥυμ. 161 c (of Arion) ἔξῳσι δὲ καὶ τὸν βίον τελευτῶν, καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι κατὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκνων ἄγεννέστερος.

a 7 η τε ἄγδων καὶ χαλιδών καὶ ὁ ἔποι (note how Plato avoids the formalism of the article, Riddell, Dig. § 237). These are the three birds of Attic legend, Procone, Philomela, and Tereus. Procne, not 'Philomel', is the nightingale in Athenian legend.

b 3 διαφέροντας η, 'in a higher degree than,' cp. below 95 c 3. The construction διαφέρειν η is as regular as διαφέρειν c. gen.

b 5 λεῶς τοῦ ἀυτοῦ θεοῦ: we know from the Ἀπολογία that Socrates regarded himself as consecrated to Apollo by the answer given to Chaerephon at Delphi. The view that Plato invented this does not merit discussion. With the expression ὄμοδουλος cp. Ἀρ. 23 c 1 διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

b 6 οὐ χείρον... ἔχειν, 'that I possess the art in no inferior degree', 'that I am not worse provided than they are with the gift of prophecy at my Master's hands'. Cp. Hdt. iii. 130 φλαύρως ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην.

b 8 τοῦτον γ' ἑνεκα, 'so far as that is concerned.' Cp. 106 d 2.

b 9 Ἄθηναίων: the absence of the article is normal, and the position of the word suggests the official style.

The Objections of Simmias and Cebes (85 b 10—95 c 6).

1 The Objection of Simmias (85 b 10—86 d 4).

c 3 τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἰδέναι, 'sure knowledge.' As we have seen (62 b 5), Plato represents Socrates as speaking with a certain reserve as to the details of the doctrine.

c 4 μὴ οὐχὶ... καὶ μὴ...: the negatives are not co-ordinate. The first is dependent on μαλακοῦ εἶναι ἄνδρός (which implies a negative and therefore takes μὴ οὐ). The second merely introduces a negative statement of παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν. Tr. 'To fail to test them in every way without desisting till one is utterly exhausted by examining them on every side, shows a very poor spirit.'
c 7... ἶ μαθεῖν... ἶ εὑρεῖν, ‘either to learn (from another) or find out (for oneself).’ This contrast had an almost proverbial currency. 

c 8... ei ταύτα ἀδύνατον: cp. Parm. 160 a 2 ταύτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.

d 1... óχούμενον: cp. Ar. Knights 1244 λεπτή τις ἐλπίς ἐστ’ ἐφ’ ἥσ ὀχούμεθα.  
... ηπερ ἐπὶ σκέδιας: cp. Cic. Tusc. i. 30 tamquam in rate in mari immenso nostra vehitur oratio. Simmias is thinking of the raft of Odysseus.

d 3... λόγου θείου τινός: this must refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the soul. It is quite in keeping with all we can make out as to the history of Pythagoreanism that Simmias and Cebe should feel regretfully that they can no longer accept the λόγος of their society. We are just about to learn that they had adopted a view of the soul which was wholly inconsistent with it. I assume that Heindorf is right in deleting ἦ; for otherwise the whole phrase must go. The conjunction ἦ is never used to introduce an explanation. Even, however, if ἦ λόγου θείου τινός is an adscript, or a question asked by some reader, it gives a perfectly correct explanation of the meaning, as is shown by c 9 τῶν ἀνθρωπινῶν λόγων.

d 7... πρὸς ἐμαυτόν: cp. 95 e 7 πρὸς έαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος.

e 3... ἐμοῖγε, sc. οὐ φαίνεται ἵκανός εἰρήσθαι. 
... περὶ ἀρμονίας, ‘with regard to the tuning of a lyre and its strings.’ It is important to remember here that ἀρμονία does not mean what we call ‘harmony’. It has its literal sense of ‘tuning’ in a certain key or mode, from which its other senses, ‘scale’ and ‘octave’, are easily derived. What we call ‘harmony’ is in Greek συμφωνία. 
Cp. 86 a 1 ἐν τῇ ἡμισμένῃ λύρᾳ, ‘in the tuned lyre.’

86 a 3... κατάξῃ refers to the framework of the lyre, διατέμνη and διαρρήξῃ (‘cut and break’) to the strings. Schanz (Stud. p. 36) regards διατέμνη as an adscript to διαρρήξῃ. It is true that in a 7 we have only διερρογοίναιων and not διατετμημένων, but that is just Plato’s way of avoiding formal symmetry.

a 6... οὐδὲμία... ἄν ἐτῇ: Bekker brackets ἄν, which restores the normal construction on the assumption that ἐτῇ is indirect speech for ἐστί. But the direct speech might very well be ἄν ἐτῇ, which would remain unchanged in oratio obliqua.

b 2... ἀλλὰ φαῖν ἀνάγκη... ἐναι: the original protasis ἐτὶ τὶς διασχυρίζοιτο.
\ldots \textit{\omega s k\tau l.} is resumed, but in \textit{oratio recta}, as is natural after the parenthesis. Of course, \textit{φαι} still depends upon \textit{ei} in a 4, but has no effect upon the construction. It is the parenthetical \textit{φησι, inquit}, adapted to the construction of the long protasis. We might write \textit{ἀλλὰ (φαι)} \textit{ἀνάγκη κτέ.}

b 5 \textit{kai γάρ οὖν κτλ.}: Simmias here interrupts himself. He thinks he may as well drop the imaginary \textit{τις} and state plainly that the comparison of the soul to a \textit{ἀρμονία} is their own doctrine. The hesitation with which he does so is responsible for the cumbrousness of the sentence, and is the natural consequence of the feelings which he expressed in the interlude.

\textit{kai αὐτόν σε κτλ.}: it is assumed that Socrates is familiar with the recent developments of Pythagoreanism, though he may not accept them.

b 6 \textit{ὑπολαμβάνομεν}: who are ‘we’ this time? Most editors suppose that no particular school is meant, and that the theory under discussion was simply a popular belief. This is most improbable. It has all the marks of being a medical theory, and we now know that Philolaus was a medical writer (E. Gr. Ph.\textsuperscript{2} p. 322). Further, the doctrine was held at a later date by Aristoxenus, who was acquainted with the last of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.\textsuperscript{2} p. 320), who were disciples of Philolaus like Simmias. We shall see below (88 d 3) that Echecrates, another disciple of Philolaus, had accepted it too. I have pointed out elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.\textsuperscript{2} pp. 339 sqq.) how such a doctrine would naturally arise from the attempt to adapt Pythagoreanism to the views of the Sicilian school of medicine, which were based on the Empedoclean doctrine of the four ‘elements’ identified with the ‘opposites’ hot and cold, wet and dry (E. Gr. Ph.\textsuperscript{2} p. 235). Further confirmation of this view will be found in the following notes. Aristotle says (\textit{De An.} A. 4. 407 b 27 \textit{kai ἄλλῃ δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανῇ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἠπτον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγους δ' ὀσπέρ εὐθύνας δεδωκύια καὶ τοὺς ἐν κοινῷ γνωμένως λόγους (i.e. dialectical discussions) ἀρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτήν λέγουσιν καὶ γάρ την ἀρμονίαν κράσων καὶ σύνδεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκείσθαι εἰς ἐναντίων.

b 7 \textit{ὁσπέρ ἐντεταμένου κτλ.} The body is thought of as an instrument tuned to a certain pitch, the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry, taking the place of high and low (\textit{ὅξυ καὶ βαρύ} in music.
b 8 καὶ συνεχομένου, ‘and held together.’ It is the presence of the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry which keeps the body together, so long as neither opposite prevails unduly over the other (cp. Zeno, ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 29 καὶ ψυχὴν κράμα υπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προερημένων (the four opposites) κατὰ μὴδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν).

υπὸ θερμοῦ κτλ. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school. Cp. Anon. Lond. xx. 25 (from Meno’s Ιατρικά) Φιλιστίων δ’ οἶεται ἐκ τεττάρων ἱδεῶν συνεστάναι ἡμᾶς, τούτ’ ἐστιν ἐκ τεττάρων στοιχείων πυρός, ἀέρος, ύδατος, γῆς. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐκάστου δυνάμεις, τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν, τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος τὸ ψυχρόν, τοῦ δὲ ύδατος τὸ ύγρόν, τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἔγρον. Cp. the speech of the physician Eryximachus in Symp. 186 d 6 ἐστὶ δὲ ἔχθεστα τὰ ἑναντιώτατα, ψυχρῶν θερμῶν, πικρῶν γλυκῶν, ἔξρον ἕγρῳ ... τούτοις ἐπιστηθεὶς ἑρωτα ἐμποιήσαι καὶ ἀμύνοιαν ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπίου ... συνεστησεν τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην.

b 9 κράσιν, temperaturam. The word was properly used of the mixture of wine and water in the κρατήρ in certain fixed proportions. This seems to have been an earlier way of describing what the later Pythagoreans called a ἄρμονία. Parmenides (fr. 16) already speaks of the κράσις μελέων, and Diogenes Laertius ix. 29 ascribes the theory to Zeno (cp. above b 8 n). The whole doctrine of the ‘temperaments’ is a development of this. Eryximachus (Symp. 188 a 1) uses both terms in connexion with climate (ἡ τῶν ὀρῶν τοῦ ἑναντιοῦ σύστασις) which is good ἐπειδὰν ... πρὸς ἀλληλα ... τὰ τὴν θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ἔγρα καὶ ύγρὰ ... ἄρμονίαν καὶ κράσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα.

c 2 εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει κτλ., ‘if then our soul is just a tuning.’ After the explanation given in the last parenthesis, the protasis is resumed (hence οὖν) in another form. For the present εἰ τις διστυχρίζοτο κτλ. is dropped.

c 3 ὅταν χαλασθῇ: χαλάν is a regular synonym of ἀνέναυ, relaxare, to loosen a string. The opposite is ἐπιτείνω, intendere.

c 6 ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις, ‘in musical notes.’ In Attic the word φθόγγος is practically confined to the meanings ‘note’ (whether in music or the notes of birds) and ‘accent’.

d 1 ἔρα οὖν: this introduces the apodosis, which also contains, in the words εἰάν τις ἀξιώτ, a reminiscence of the original protasis εἰ τις διστυχρίζοτο.
NOTES

3 τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, of the elemental opposites (hot-cold, wet-dry) of which the body is composed.

(2) *The objection of Cebes (86 d 5—88 b 8).*

5 Διαβλέφας, 'with a broad stare' (aor. pcp. synchronous to ἐφη). This verb occurs nowhere else before Aristotle Περὶ ἐνυπνίων 462 a 12 ἐνιος γὰρ τῶν νευτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν, ἔαν Ἰ ἰκότος, φαίνειν εἰδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, where it plainly means 'having the eyes wide open'. The words ὁσπερ... εἰώθει suggest that the reference is to the well-known peculiarity of Socrates' eyes described in *Theaet.* 143 e 9 as τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων, a peculiarity also referred to in Xen. *Symp.* 5. 5, where Socrates says that his eyes are able to see, not only what is in front of him (τὸ κατ' εὐθῦ), but also τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου (obliquely) διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιον εἶναι (because they are ἀνά λέιες τῆς). That this is the meaning of τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων is, I think, proved by the opposition of ἐκφθαλμὸς (so Plato, *Theaet.* 209 c 1) to κοιλόφθαλμος in Xen. *Eq.* 1. 9, though in itself Campbell's suggestion that τὸ ἔξω refers to the position of the eyes and the width between them is perfectly possible. It is the same peculiarity which Aristophanes intends when he makes the Clouds say to Socrates (*Clouds* 362) τῷ φθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις. If this is so, δια- does not mean 'through', but 'apart', as in διαβαίνω, so we must not translate 'with a piercing glance'. The phrase ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέ- ψας below (117 b 5) means something rather different.

7 τὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; the aorist in such questions expresses impatience. Cp. *Gorg.* 509 e 2 τὶ οὐκ αὐτῷ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω; So already Hdt. ix. 48 τὶ δὴ οὗ... ἐμαχεσάμεθα;

8 ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου, 'handling the argument.' Cp. *Euthyd.* 283 a 2 ἐπεσκότων τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄφωντο τοῦ λόγου. Heindorf's view that ἀπεσβαίνω is here used reprehendendi et impugnandi potestate seems improbable, though adopted in L. and S.

1 χρόνου ἐγγενομένου, 'when we have had time.' Cp. *Symp.* 184 a 6 ἰναι κρόνου ἐγγενήται. The phrase is common in Thucydides.

2 ἐπειτα [86]: the balance of evidence is in favour of omitting δὲ.

Cp. 73 a 7 ἰν.
συγχωρεῖν, sc. δοκεῖ χρήματ.

3 αὐτοῖς, sc. Σιμμᾶ καὶ Κέβητι.
εάν τι δοκῶσι προσφέδεν, 'if it appears that they are at all in tune.'
The voice and the accompanying instrument are said προσάδειν or ἀπόδειν. Socrates gently rallies the musical terminology of the Thebans. Cp. 92 c 5.

e 3 οὗτος ἡδη, illum demum, 'then and not till then.' There is a slight anacoluthon, as ἡ has preceded.

e 4 ὑπερδικέω is a poetical word found only in late prose.

e 5 τὸ . . . θραττον, 'what is troubling you.' Here we have an old word (Pind., Aesch.), though with Att. -ττ- for -σσ-. Cp. the Homeric τέτρηχα. The reading τὸ is well attested, so ἀπιστίαν παρέξει is probably due to the same hand as the interpolation at 69 e 3. The change of τὸ to ὅ in later MSS. is clearly a 'conjecture'.

e 6 εἰν τῷ αὐτῷ . . . εἶναι, 'to have got no further.'

e 7 διπέρ . . . ταυτών . . . ἐχειν, 'to be open to the same criticism as we made in our former argument' (77 b 1 sqq.).

87 a 2 τὸδε τὸ εἶδος, 'this (human) body.' Cp. 76 c 12.

οὐκ ἀνατιθέμαι, 'I do not retract,' a metaphor ἀπὸ τῶν πεπεινούτων καὶ τὰς κεκινμένας ἡδη ψήφους ('pieces') διορθούντων (Harpocration). Cp. Hippiarch. 229 e 3 ὡςπέρ πεπεινων ἐθέλω . . . ἀναθέσθαι. It takes the construction of verbs of denying.

a 3 χαραίνως, syn. εἲ, καλῶς. Cp. 80 c 6 n.

ἐπαχθές, 'exaggerated.' The word is applied not only to arrogant self-praise (Dem. Cor. 10 ἵνα μηδεν ἐπαχθές λέγω) but also to 'overdone' or 'fulsome' praise of others. Cp. Laws 688 d 6 λόγῳ . . . σε, ὃ ξένε, ἐπαυνείν ἐπαχθέστερον. It is just this sensitiveness to τὸ ἐπαχθές which accounts for the way of speaking described in 68 e 2 n.

a 5 οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε, sc. ἰκανός ἀποδεδείχθαι, 'I think the demonstration is deficient in this respect.'

a 6 ἀντιλήψει, 'objection,' a metaphor from wrestling; cp. 84 c 7 ἀντιλαβᾶς.

a 7 τί οὖν ἄν φαίν ὁ λόγος: the argument is often personified in this way. Cf. Soph. 238 b 4 ὃς φησιν ὁ λόγος. For the position of ἄν cp. 102 a 1. The parenthesis was so familiar that φαίν ἄν was not consciously to the speaker a separate clause. (Riddell, Dig. § 295.)

b 4 ὁμοίως . . . ὡςπέρ ἄν τις . . . λέγω, 'with as much right as if.' The whole of this section is thrown into the form of a reported dialogue between ὁ λέγων and ὁ ἀπιστῶν.
b 5 ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου, simply ‘an old weaver’. It is idiomatic to add ἀνθρωπός to the names of trades. In Scots we might say a ‘webster body’.

b 6 ὅτι οὖκ ἀπόλωλεν κτλ., ‘that the man is not dead, but is safe and sound somewhere.’ Of course this is not supposed to be an argument for the continued existence of the weaver’s soul, but is meant to disprove the fact of his death in the ordinary sense of the word. The weaver corresponds to the soul, and the garment to the body.

b 7 σϖς: all MSS. have ιως, but it is difficult to reject Forster’s correction σϖς in view of the next line and c 5 below.

αὐτὸς ὑφηγάμενος: this touch is not necessary to the argument, nor indeed is it strictly necessary that the old man should be a weaver at all; but Cebes has in view a theory of the soul weaving the body as its garment, which is pretty nearly the opposite of the view that it is the ἀρμονία or κράσις of the elementary opposites. The latter makes the soul a resultant of the bodily organization, the former makes it the organizing principle. The view that the body is the garment of the soul is primitive (cp. the Orphic χιτῶν, and Empedocles, fr. 126 Diels σαρκῶν ἀλλόγωντι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶν, E. Gr. Ph.² p. 258, n. 1); but the theory of Simmias is essentially Heraclitean. Such eclecticism was characteristic of the time.

c 1 ἀπιστοῖ is Heindorf’s correction of the MS. ἀπιστῶν, which seems to involve an incredible anacoluthon; seeing that ἀνερωτῆ must have the τις in b 4, not that in b 8, for its subject.

c 3 τινος strikes me as a not very successful attempt at botching the sentence after ἀπιστοῖ had been corrupted into ἀπιστῶν. The argument surely requires that the person asked, not ‘some one’, should give the answer, and we can easily supply αὐτοῦ from the context.

c 6 τὸ δι(ε), ‘whereas,’ cum tamen. This is a fairly common Platonic idiom (cp. 109 d 8), though it can hardly be said that it has been satisfactorily explained.

c 7 πᾶς [γὰρ] ἀν ὑπολάβοι, ‘any one would retort,’ rather than ‘every one would understand’. The γὰρ is more likely to have been inserted in B than dropped in TW. The asyndeton is quite correct.

ὅτι εὐθὺς λέγει κτλ., ‘that this is a silly argument.’ The verb is used twice over in order to make the construction personal.

86
NOTES

c 8. ὁντος, iste, 'this weaver of yours.'

d 4. τυχή πρὸς σῶμα, 'the relation of soul to body will admit of the same comparison.'

d 5. μέτρι (α.)... λέγειν: i. e. ἐὰν λέγειν. Cp. 96 d 6.

d 7. ἀν φαίη: cp. 87 a 7 n.

d 8. εἰ γὰρ ρέω κτλ., 'for, even if the body is in a state of flux and is perishing while the man is still living, yet the soul always weaves afresh the web that is worn out.' This is a parenthesis intended to justify the statement that each soul wears out many bodies. The optative is regular in the parentheses of indirect speech, and ἀλλὰ means at. For the theory (which is just that of modern physiology) cp. Tim. 43 a 4 τὰς τής ἀθανάτου τυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδων εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον. It is essentially Heraclitean (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 161 sqq.).

e 3. τυχεῖν... ἐξουσαν, 'it must have at the time.'

e 4. τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας, 'its natural weakness.' Such words as φύσις are often used with the genitive to form a mere periphrasis for the noun which they govern, but their proper meaning may emerge more or less, as here.

e 5. ἐπιδεικνύοι... διόχοιτο: the construction reverts to d 5 μέτρι ἀν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὅσ... All this is still the speech of ὁ ἀπιστῶν. There is a much stronger instance of an oblique optative with nothing to depend on below 95 d 3.

88 a 1. εἰ γὰρ τις κτλ. These words are addressed, not (as Heindorf and Stallbaum thought) by Cebes to Simmias, but by the supposed objector to Cebes. 'Even if,' he says, 'we were to make a still greater concession to the man who uses this argument (τῷ λέγοντι) than the concession which you (Cebes) mention' (above 87 a 1 sqq.).

a 6. αὐτό, 'the thing in question,' i. e. the soul. Cp. below 109 a 9.

a 7. τυχήν (τὴν ψυχὴν W) is added for clearness after γιγνομένην. The more regular construction would be to say either αὐτήν or γιγνόμενον.

a 8. μηκέτι συγχωρεῖ: these words continue the protasis and still depend on εἰ, 88 a 1. 'If, having granted this, he were to stop short of making the further admission that...'

πονεῖν was technical for λυπεῖσθαι in fifth-century philosophy. Cp. Anaxagoras (quoted in Aristotle's Ethics 1154 b 7) ἀεὶ πονεῖ τὸ ζῴον.
b 3 ei de tou'to oútwes ἔχει κτλ. The original protasis, ei ... τις ... 
συγχωρήσειεν, which has just been continued by b 2 φαίη, is dropped, 
and a new protasis, resuming the argument of τις, is begun. 
οὖνεϊ προσήκει, 'no one has a right', 'is entitled'. Stephanus 
reads προσήκειν.

b 4 θάνατον δαρκοῦντι: as δαρκεῖν is equivalent to οὖ (μη) φοβεῖσθαι 
(cp. 63 εἰ 10 π.) it naturally takes an object accusative.

b 6 ἀνάγκην εἶναι is dependent on b 2 φαίη. The reported speech 
which is dropped for a moment at b 4 προσήκει reasserts itself here.

Dramatic Interlude. The effect of the objections (88 c 1—89 a 8).

The importance of this break in the argument is marked by the fact 
that it takes us back to Phlius and Echecrates, and that the 
dramatic form is resumed. It has to be shown that current Pythagorean 
views about the soul are inadequate and that we must go 
deeper.

c 4 εἰς ἀπορίαν καταβάλειν: cp. Phileb. 15 c 4 εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν ... 
καταβάλλων.

οὐ μόνον τοῖς ... ἄλλα καὶ εἰς τά ... The change of construction 
is characteristic.

c 6 μη ... εἴμεν ... ἦ: the change of mood is due to the fact that 
the first verb refers to the present, the second to the future. The 
opt. μη εἴμεν is the indirect form of μη ... ἔσμεν, while μη ... ἦ 
means 'lest they should prove to be'. The subj. here might also 
have become opt., but this would have obscured the difference of 
meaning. For other instances cp. Riddell, Dig. § 89.

d 1 ἐπίρχεται, 'it is borne in upon me.'

d 2 ὡς ... ὡν: exclamations, like interrogations, may be conveyed 
by a participial phrase.

d 4 ἀντιλαμβάνεται: this is a different application of the metaphor 
from wrestling, explained 84 c 6 π. Cp. Parm. 130 ε 2 οὖπω σου 
ἀντειληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐτὶ ἀντιλήψεται.

d 9 μετήλθε τὸν λόγον: cp. 76 e 9 π. The λόγος is the game which is 
hunted. So Meno 74 d 3 εἰ οὖν ὦσπερ ἔγω μετήλθε τὸν λόγον, Soph. 
252 b 8 ἐτὶ τοῖς ἄν ... καταγελαστώτατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον. That 
this is the meaning appears from the equivalent phrase διώκειν τὸν 
λόγον Theaet. 166 d 8.

88
NOTES

89 a i ἐκεῖνος: cp. Riddell, Dig. § 194.
a 2 ὅς ἡδεως κτλ.: cp. 58 e 4 n.
a 3 ἀγαμέως: Plato often uses ἀγαμαί of the effect produced on Socrates by his interlocutors.

Protreptic interlude (89 a 9—91 c 5). A Warning against μυστολογία.

b 1 ἐπὶ χαμαίζηλον τινὸς: Χαμαίζηλος' διφρίον μικρόν, ἣ ταπεινῶν σκιμπό-διον (Timaeus, s. v.).
b 2 καταψήσας οὖν κτλ. This is imitated in Xenophon’s Ἀπολογία 28 τοῦ δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπείν κτλ. In Xenophon, however, it is the head of Apollodorus that Socrates strokes. This is pointless; for he would hardly wear his hair long like the youthful Phaeo. It appears from the following words that Socrates wishes to see how Phaedo will look with his hair cropped as a sign of mourning.
b 8 Ἀλλὰ τί; ‘What then?’ Heindorf shows from Aristophanes that this was a regular colloquial formula.
b 10 ἀναβείσασθαι: cp. 71 e 13 n. The metaphor here implied is the same as in βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, 88 e 2.
c 1 εἰ... μὲ διαφεύγοι: here we have the other metaphor, the hunting of the λόγος.
c 2 ὡσπερ Ἀργεῖοι: Ηδτ. i. 82 Ἀργεῖοι μὲν νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ χρόνου κατακειμένοι τάς κεφαλάς, πρότερον ἐπάναγκες κομέοντες, ἐσπούσαντο νόμον τε καὶ κατάρην μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα... πρὶν Θυρέας ἀνασώσωνται.
c 5 πρὸς δὺο... οὖδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς: the proverb is more fully explained in Ἐνθυδ. 297 c 1 τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὅσ οἷς οἷος τε ἢν τῇ τῇ ὑδρα διαμάχεσθαι... καὶ καρκίνῳ τω... ἐκ βαλάττος ἀφιγμένῳ... ὅσ ἐπείδη αὐτών ἔλύτει οὖτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ... δάκνων, τοῦ Ἴλεων τοῦ ἀδελφιδοῦ βοηθῶν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἰκανὸς ἐβοηθήσεν.
c 7 ἐως ἐτί φῶς ἐστίν: cp. 61 e 4 n.
c 10 τοῦ Ἡρακλῆ: the poetical form (cp. Soph. Ἰταν. 476) is purposely
used to suggest a poetical reminiscence (Vahlen, *Opusc.* i, p. 485).

d1 μυσόλογοι, 'haters of discourses' or 'arguments' (not 'reason'), as appears from d 3 λόγους μυσόλογους. Minucius Felix, *Octavi.* xiv. 4, quoted by Geddes, translates quite correctly *igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus.*

d2 τούτου ... ἥ ...: cp. *Crito* 44 c 2 τίς ἀν αἰσχίνων εἰπ ταύτης δόξα ἣ δοκεῖν κτλ. Riddell, Dig. § 163.

d5 ἀνευ τέχνης: the meaning of this is made clear by e 5 ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια.

e2 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιής: cp. 90 c 3, *Ar. Plut.* 362 ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνίως ὑγιεῖς ἐστιν οὐδενός. So *Crat.* 440 c 6 καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν δυτῶν καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιεῖς οὐδενός. For the meaning of ὑγιές cp. 69 b 8 n.

90 a1 σφόδρα qualifies χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς, not ὁλίγους, as is shown by a 4 τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.

a8 τα ... ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: the ἐσχατα are opposed to τα μεταξὺ, and the ἀκρα are the extremes of these.

b2 φανήναι: cp. 72 c 1 n.

b4 ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ... ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη, ἥ ... , 'that is not the point of comparison but this ...'

b7 τῆς περὶ τοῦ λόγους τέχνης: the term Logic (λογική, sc. τέχνη) originated from phrases like this, though neither ἡ λογική nor τὰ λογικὰ are used till a far later date. Logic is thought of here as an art of dealing with arguments, just as the art of life (ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τέχνη 89 e 5) teaches us to deal with men.

b8 ὃν, 'being so.' We cannot take ὃν here as equivalent to 'being true' with some editors. If anything, it is ἕνδης that must be supplied.

b9 καὶ μᾶλιστα δὴ κτλ. The protasis which began at b 6 ἐπειδὰν is forgotten and never resumed.

οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες: the true originator of ἀντιλογικὸ λόγος was Zeno of Elea, who was some twenty years older than Socrates (E. Gr. Ph. 9 p. 358). From quite another point of view Protagoras maintained δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἀπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλους, οἳ καὶ συνεργάτα, πρώτος τοῦτο πράξας (Diog. Laert. ix. 51). Cp. 101 e 2.

c4 ἀτεχνίως δώσας ἐν Εὔριπε: the current in the Euripus was said to change its direction seven times a day (Strabo ix. 403). In reality
the παλίρροια is more irregular, being partly tidal and partly due to seiches. Cp. Pauly-Wissowa, vi, col. 1283. The current is strong enough to stop a steamer. For ἀτεχνως introducing such expressions cp. 59 a 4 n.

c 5 ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται κτλ. The language of this sentence is just that which is elsewhere used of the followers of Heraclitus (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 417 n. 3). Cp. Crat. 440 c 6 αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν οὖν καταγγέλωσκεν ὡς συνεὶς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσπερ κεράμα ἦ, καὶ ἄτεχνως ὅσπερ οἱ κατάρρη νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ ἰεύματος τε καὶ κατάρρη- ρον πάντα χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. Now, in the Theaetetus Plato makes Socrates say that Protagoras justified his πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος by basing it on the doctrine of Heraclitus. It seems, then, that Protagoras is mainly intended here. It is certain, at any rate, that Plato would not have made Socrates refer in this way either to Antisthenes or Euclides; for both are supposed to be present.

c 9 δῆ τινος: the particle δῆ follows the interrogative τίς but precedes the indefinite τις. Cp. 107 d 7; 108 c 1; 115 d 4.

d 1 ἔπειτα marks inconsistency or inconsequence by emphasizing the preceding participle.

d 9 μὴ παρίωμεν, 'let us not admit' (from παρίημι).

e 2 πολύ μᾶλλον: we must supply ἐννοῶμεν or some such word from the context.

91 a 2 οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι: here we have the beginnings of the characteristic Aristotelian use of ἀπαίδευσια for ignorance of Logic. Aristotle applies the word to the followers of Antisthenes (Met. Z. 3. 1045 b 24 οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὖτως ἀπαίδευτοι), but no such reference is admissible here. Cp. 90 c 5 n.

a 3 φιλονίκος: the MSS., as usual, have -ει- for -ι-, but it is very doubtful whether there ever was such a word as φιλόνεικος, 'strife-loving,' and Plato certainly derives φιλονίκον from νίκη in Rep. 581 b 2 (see Adam, in loc.). In every passage where the word occurs in Plato the meaning 'victory-loving' is appropriate. Here the sense is clearly that Socrates may seem to be arguing for victory rather than truth.

a 5 οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο, 'what they themselves have laid down,' their own θέσεις.

91
NOTES

a 8  εἰ μὴ εἰπῇ πάρεργον, ‘except incidentally.’  
Cp. Polit. 286 d 5 πλὴν εἰ (εἰ μὴ Τ) πάρεργον τι.

b 1  ὥς πλεονεκτικῶς: Socrates playfully suggests that he is taking an unfair advantage.  
It is ‘Heads I win; tails you lose’.

b 3  ἀλλ’ οὖν... γε, ‘at any rate.’  The emphatic word is placed between ἀλλ’ οὖν and γε in this combination.

b 4  ἦττον... ὀδυρόμενος, ‘I shall be less likely to distress the company by lamentations.’

b 5  ἄνοια, ‘folly.’  Most editors follow Stephanus in reading ἄνοια, apparently without MS. authority.  B has διάνοια, a mistake due to the resemblance of Α and Δ.  Schanz’s ἣ δὲ δὴ ἄνοια implies a much less likely corruption.

c 3  εὐλαβοῦμενοι is omitted in B, but this may be an accident.

c 5  τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπτῶν: cp. the description of the oratory of Pericles by Eupolis (fr. 94 Kock) οὖτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων | τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις.

Reply to the objection of Simmias (91 c 6—95 a 3).

The objection of Simmias is fully dealt with, but that of Cebes is found to raise a larger question, and leads up to the Third Proof of Immortality.

c 7  Συμμίας μὲν γὰρ κτλ.  The two views are resumed and carefully distinguished.  There is (1) the view that the soul is the ἀρμονία of the body and must therefore perish even before the body, and (2) the view that the soul weaves for itself many bodies, but perishes with, or even before, the last of them.

c 8  ἐμοὶ... ὄν, ‘in spite of its being.’  The adv. ἐμοὶ is ‘attracted’ by the participle.

d 1  ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδε οὖσα, a periphrasis which only differs from ἀρμονία οὖσα by being more emphatic.  Cp. above 87 e 4 τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας.

d 3  τόδε ἄδηλον παντὶ, sc. φύσιν to be supplied from συνχωρεῖν.

d 7  ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται, ‘is unceasingly perishing.’  Cp. 87 d 8 εἶ γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σώμα καὶ ἀπολλύσειτο ἐτὶ ξόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.  Distinguish οὐδὲν παύεται, finem nullum facit, from οὐ παύεται.

92 a 1  ἐνδεδήναι: cp. 62 b 3 n.

a 5  ἀλλο ποτὲ τι: I now observe that Heindorf suggested this reading, though he did not print it in his text.
It is shown first that the view of the soul as a ἄρμονία is inconsistent with the doctrine of ἀνάμμηνεις which Simmias accepts. A ἄρμονία could exist before the body of which it is the attunement just as little as it could survive it. This brings out the fundamental inconsistency of the later Pythagorean doctrine.

It is mere superstition to read ἄνωτα because B has ἄνωτον.

The regular term for the consequences of a ὑπόθεσις. Cp. d 6 n.

The two terms are synonymous. Cp. 73 a 1 n.

'without demonstration, from a specious analogy.' Cp. Theaet. 162 e 4 ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ὑπτινοὺν λέγετε ἄλλα τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὥστε εἴδειν ὡς Ὀδόρως ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνός μόνον ἄν εἶ, Euthyd. 305 e 1 πάντως ἀντίκτως λόγου ... οὐ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα ὅ γε λόγος ἔσχε τινὰ ὑποθεσίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.—Καὶ γὰρ ἔσχε ἄνωτως ... ὑποθεσίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν.

'the means popular belief.' We cannot infer from this expression that it was a widespread popular belief.

Socrates assumes that the meaning of ὑπόθεσις is familiar to his hearers from its use in geometry, which is illustrated in a well-known passage of the Meno (86 e sqq.). Even Xenophon knew the term: cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 εἰ δὲ τις ἀντίκτως περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοντος μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὸς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ... φάσκων κτλ. ... ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανηγεν ἄν πάντα τῶν λόγων ὁδὲ πως κτλ. We shall learn shortly exactly what a hypothesis is. It
will be sufficient to say here that it is a statement of which the truth is postulated and from which we deduce its consequences (τὰ συμβαίνοντα). The phrase literally means ‘the argument proceeded (ὁ λόγος ... εὑρηται) by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance’.

d 7 ἀξιας ἀποδείκσθαι: we are not told here, nor were we told above, why the hypothesis in question is worthy of acceptance. We only know that Cebes and Simmias accepted it at once. The position of the argument, then, is this: Simmias declares that he cannot give up the doctrine that μᾶθησις is ἀνάμνησις so long as he accepts the hypothesis, and this he will not give up.

ἐρρήθη γὰρ ποι ἐν τι. The ὑπόθεσις is given formally above 76 d 7 ei ... ἔστιν ἄ θρυλομεν ἀεὶ, καλὰν τέ τι καὶ ἀγάθον καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη ὀν- σία ... Now it has been shown that we refer all our sensations to this standard, and that this means that our soul already possesses it and rediscovers it in the process of learning. From this it followed in turn that our soul must have existed before entering into a human body. These steps have been rigorously demonstrated (ικανὸς ἀποδείκται), and therefore, so long as we accept the ὑπόθεσις, we must accept the conclusion.

d 8 ὁσπερ αὐτῆς ἔστιν κτλ.: i.e. the pre-existence of the soul is as certain as the fact that the reality which bears the name of τὸ δ ἔστιν belongs to it (cp. 76 e 1 ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέρων ὀνόματι). This is the interpretation of Wyttenbach and Heindorf. Most recent editors adopt Mudge’s emendation ὁσπερ αὐτῆ ἔστιν κτλ. That would, no doubt, give a correct sense (‘as certainly as the reality itself which bears the name of δ ἔστι exists’), and would even be a more accurate statement of the ultimate ὑπόθεσις. But αὐτῆς ἔστιν serves to remind us of the point on which the whole argument turns, namely that this ὀνόματι is really the soul’s original possession, and that what we call learning is really οἰκεῖον ἑπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν (75 e 5). For the form of expression cp. Theaet. 160 c 7 τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ ἔστιν (ἡ ἐμὴ ἀναδοθήσις).

e 1 ταύτην, sc. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. There is no doubt about the conclusion (τὸ συμβαίνον) being correctly demonstrated; what Simmias says here is that he firmly believes himself to be justified (ὀρθῶς) in accepting the ὑπόθεσις which forms the major premise.

e 4 Ti δὲ ... τῷδε; the following argument proceeds on independent
lines, and is based upon the nature of ἀρμονία itself. Socrates first
gets Cebes to make two admissions. These are (1) that every ἀρμονία
is determined by its component elements, (2) that no ἀρμονία admits
of degrees.

93 a 8 Πολλοῦ... δὲ: the subject is ἀρμονία.

έναντία... κανηθήναι... ἢ φθιγξασθαί, 'to move (vibrate) or give out
a sound in opposition to its parts,' i.e. to the tension and relaxation
which produces it, as explained below 94 c 3.

93 a 11 Τί δὲ; κτλ. The second ὀμολογήμα (93 a 11–b 7). No ἀρμονία
admits of degree. A string is either in tune or it is not. To use
the language of the Philebus, ἀρμονία is a form of πέρας and does
not admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον.

οὖτως... ὃς ἂν ἀρμοσθῇ, 'just as it is tuned,' i.e. according as it
is tuned to the fourth (διὰ τεσσάρων), the fifth (διὰ πέντε), or the
octave (διὰ πασῶν). Modern editors suppose the meaning to be just
the opposite and vainly try to explain in what sense one ἀρμονία can
be more a ἀρμονία than another; but the meaning is stated quite
clearly below 93 d 2. Olympiodorus, representing the school tradi-
tion, is quite explicit: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἶναι ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας πλεῖον μηδὲ
ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἤττον.

93 a 14 μᾶλλον... καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: Olympiodorus refers the first term to
pitch (ἐπίτασις and ἀνείας) and the second to the intervals. If a
string is in tune it cannot be made more in tune by tightening or
loosening. Nor is it correct to say that the octave is more of a
ἀρμονία than the fifth or the fifth than the fourth.

b 1 εἰπὲρ ἐνδεχεται τούτο γίγνεσθαι, 'supposing this possible,' a plain
indication that it is not possible. Socrates is only explaining what
would be implied in saying that one ἀρμονία is more a ἀρμονία than
another. It would mean that it was more tuned, which is absurd;
for, as we learn from Rep. 349 e 11 the musician, in tuning a lyre,
will not be willing μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν
πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιόν πλέον ἔχειν.

b 2 ἤττον τε καὶ ἐλάττον: some inferior MSS. read ἤττον τε, which is
more symmetrical, but the evidence is against it.
b 4 Ἡ οὖν κτλ. That being so, we must further admit that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another. Socrates does not express a view one way or the other on this point. He only wishes an admission from Simmias that, on his ιπόθεσις, it must be so.

εὗτο ... ὡστε ... So below 103 e 2. Cp. Lat. est ut.

b 5 μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας: some editors bracket μᾶλλον here, and it is in a sense redundant. We may say that it is more fully expressed by the words ἐτὶ πλέον ... ἤπτον.

b 8 Φίρε δὴ κτλ. Socrates now proceeds to make use of the two ὀμολογήματα, but in the reverse order. We have seen that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another, i.e. more or less a ἀρμονία. But goodness is also a ἀρμονία, and souls differ in that one is better than another, which would imply that one ἀρμονία is more or less of a ἀρμονία than another, which is absurd.

c 3 τὶ ... ὡντα; ‘being what?’ We can say τὶ ἐστὶ ταῖτα; and the question may be asked by a participle in Greek. We must render ‘What will he say that these things are which are in our souls?’ (εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς go together).

c 6 τὴν μὲν ἡμυὸσθαί κτλ. Are we to say that both the good and the bad soul are ἀρμονία, but that the good soul also has a ἀρμονία and is in tune, while the bad soul has none and is out of tune? If we say that the soul is a tuning, we shall have to say that a tuning may be tuned or untuned.

d 2 τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀμολόγημα, ‘this is just our admission.’ Here we have an explicit statement that our admission was that no ἀρμονία can be more or less a ἀρμονία than another. Editors who do not see this are obliged to bracket ἀρμονίας in d 4, or to explain it unnaturally as ‘the particular harmony which is the soul’.

d 6 τὴν δὲ γε, sc. ἀρμονίαν. The application of this to ψυχῆ only begins at d 12. The point here made depends on 93 a 14, where it was shown that being more or less tuned would involve being more or less a ἀρμονία, which is absurd.

d 9 ἐστὶν διὶ πλέον ... μετέχει; ‘does it partake more in —?’ Here διὶ is acc. neut. of δοτὶs. Cp. e 7 ἄρι ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ... μετέχει; 94 a 1 Μᾶλλον δὲ γε ποὺ ... , ‘yes, or rather, surely —.’

κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον, ‘according to the right account of the
matter,' 'to put the matter correctly.' If the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be better than another (for no ἀρμονία can be more in tune than another). Indeed, no soul can be bad at all (for no ἀρμονία can be out of tune).

a 12 πάσχειν ἐν ταύτα, 'Do you think this would happen to our argument if our ὑπόθεσις were right?' Here the συμβαίνοντα are inadmissible, and therefore the ὑπόθεσις is destroyed (ἀναιρεῖται). For the use of πάσχειν in dialectic cp. Parm. 128 d 4 τούτο βουλό- 
μενον δῆλον, ὡς ἐτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἐν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἡ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι.

b 4 Τι δι; Socrates now takes up the first of the two ὑμολογήματα and tests the hypothesis by it. It is the soul which rules the body, whereas a ἀρμονία is dependent upon that of which it is the ἀρμονία (93a 6).

c 3 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: 92 e.4. 

μὴ ποιεῖ ἐν... c 6 οὐποτ' ἐν...

Both negatives are legitimate after ὑμολογεῖν. Here they are alternated for variety.

c 4 οἷς ἐπίτελοντο καὶ χαλώτο... ἐκέινα: equivalent to τάς ἐπιτύπωσειν καὶ χαλάσεις... ἐκέινων, οἷς representing τούτοις ἂ, where ἂ is internal accusative. This is a favourite construction with Demo- 
stenes (cp. Shilleto on de Fals. Leg. 415), but is not common in Plato. Observe that χαλάν is equivalent to ἀνείναι (remittere) the usual opposite of ἐπιτελείν (intendere).

c 5 ψάλλομαι is the reading of Stobaeus and seemingly of T before correction. As ψάλλων is the proper word for striking strings, it is very appropriate here. The vulgar reading πάλλοντο is supposed to refer to vibrations. The verb is used of 'brandishing' weapons and shaking lots, and in the passive of the heart 'quaking', but never of strings or instruments.

d 5 ταῖς ἐπιθύμιαις... διαλεγομένη: the comma after νοοθετοῦσα is due to Hermann and makes the construction more regular. It is to be observed, however, that such a construction as τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, 
τὰ δὲ νοοθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθύμιαις is not indefensible.

d 6 ἐν 'Οδουσσελα: Od. xx. 17. The passage is quoted in a similar connexion in Rep. 390 d 4; 441 b 6.

e 5 ἦ καθ' ἀρμονίαν: in such phrases κατὰ means 'in a line with', 'on the level of'. Tr.'far too divine a thing to be compared with a ἀρμονία.' Aristotle made use of the preceding argument in his
NOTES


Reply to the Objection of Cebes begun, but broken off (95 a 4—e 6).

95 a 4 Εἶνεν δὴ κτλ. Socrates now goes back to the objection of Cebes. The transition is effected by means of a pleasantry about Harmonia of Thebes (Θηβαῖκης, not Θηβαῖας, for the κτητικῶν, not the ἔθνικῶν, is used with names of women). She has become fairly propitious, and we must now tackle Cadmus (who married Harmonia in the Theban legend), i.e. the objection of Cebes. There is no need to seek a deeper meaning in the words.

a 8 θαυμαστῶς ... ὦς are to be taken together. Cp. 102 a 4.

a 9 οὕτε: Forster's conjecture ὅ τι (or, as I prefer to write in accordance with ancient practice, ὅτι) is attractive, but it is hard to account for the οὕτε of all MSS. unless it is original. Linde proposes ὅ γε ὑπόρει.

b 1 τι ... χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ: cp. Theaet. 165 b 7 τί γὰρ χρήσῃ ἄφικτο έρωτήματι;

b 5 μὴ μέγα λέγε, 'do not boast.' Cp. μέγα φρονεῖν, 'to be proud' (the other sense 'do not speak loud' is less appropriate here). Cp. Hipp. ma. 295 a 7 Ἀ μὴ μέγα ... λέγε. Eur. Her. 1244 ἵσχε στόμ', ὦς μὴ μέγα λέγων μείζων πάθης.

b 6 βασκανία, 'malign influence,' lit. fascination of the 'evil eye', to the effects of which those who boast of their luck are specially exposed.

περιτρέψῃ, 'turn to flight,' keeps up the metaphor of ἔφοδος above.

b 7 ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, 'coming to close quarters.' The metaphor is kept up. Homer nowhere uses the phrase ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, and Herwerden would read ἄσσον ἱόντες, but ὁμηρικῶς may mean 'like Homeric warriors', not 'in Homeric phrase'.

b 8 τὸ κεφάλαιον, 'the sum and substance.' The word is derived from the ancient practice of writing the sum of an addition at the top. Cp. Lat. summa (sc. linea).

c 7 ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, οὕτε δὲ ... 'not immortality, but only that—'

d 3 ζῷη ... ἀπολλύοντο: the optatives are due to the indirect speech,
though there is no principal verb with ὅτι (or ὡς) on which they can be said to depend. They cannot, as some editors say, depend on c 7 φής, for φάναι only takes acc. c. inf. ·Cp. above 87 e 5 n., where also the optatives occur after a clause introduced by ἄλλα γάρ. Riddell, Dig. § 282.

d 7 εἰ μὴ...εἰ τι: the simplest explanation of this optative is to regard τῷ μῷ εἰδότι as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδεῖν.

Narrative Interlude. The origin of the new Method (95 c 7—102 a 2).

e 8 Οὕτω φαύλον πρᾶγμα, 'no light matter,' 'no easy task.' Cp. L. S. s.v. I. 1.

e 9 περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν, 'the cause of coming into being, and ceasing to be.' Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς is the title of one of Aristotle's most important treatises, best known by the scholastic name De generatione et corruptione. Περὶ c. gen. is used instead of the simple gen. or περὶ c. acc. under the influence of the verb διαπραγματεύσασθαι. Cp. 96 c 6; 97 c 6; 97 d 2; 98 d 6, and 58 a 1 n.

96 a 2 τὰ γε ἐμὰ πάθη, 'my own experiences.' It has been strangely supposed—so unwilling are interpreters to take the Phaedo in its plain sense—that these are either Plato's own experiences or 'an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth.' Besides the general considerations stated in the Introduction, there is this special point to be noted, that the questions raised are exactly such as were discussed in the middle of the fifth century B.C., when Socrates was young, and that they correspond closely with the caricature of Aristophanes in the Clouds, which was produced in 423 B.C., when Plato was a baby. By the time of Plato's youth quite another set of questions had come to the front at Athens.

a 8 περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: this is the oldest name for what we call 'natural science' (cf. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 14 n. 2). Heraclitus (fr. 17) said that Pythagoras had pursued ἱστορία further than other men, and it appears that even geometry was called by this name in the Pythagorean school (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107 n. 1). The restriction of the term to what we call 'history' is due to the fact that Herodotus followed his predecessors in calling his work ἱστορία, and his pre-
decessors belonged to Miletus, where all science went by that name (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 28). The term ‘Natural History’ partly preserves the ancient sense of the word, a circumstance due to the title of Aristotle’s Περὶ τὰ ζωὰ ιστορίαι (Historia Animalia).

a 8 ὑπερήφανος agrees with σοφία or ιστορία and εἰδέναι is added to it epexegetically. Heindorf compares Gorg. 462 c 8 οὐκοίν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οὖν τ’ εἶναι ἀνθρώπους; The ὑπερήφανος of Eusebius and Stobaeus would simplify the construction, but the evidence is against it.

b 1 ἀνὸ κᾶτω: we say ‘backwards and forwards’. Cp. 90 c 5 and Gorg. 481 d 7 ἀνὸ καὶ κᾶτω μεταβαλλομένου.

b 3 ὡς τινες ἐλεγον. This is the doctrine of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagorás, and, according to a statement already known to Theophrastus, the teacher of Socrates (cp. Phys. Op. fr. 4 Ἀρξέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης συγγεγονέναι φασίν, Ἀναξαγόρου γενομένῳ μαθητῇ, Diels, Vors.² 323, 34; 324, 26). The following are the relevant quotations and rest ultimately on the authority of Theophrastus. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9, 2 εἶναι δ’ ἄρχὴν τῆς κυψέσεως ἄποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλλήλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἰδ. i. 9. 5 περὶ δὲ θηρῶν φησιν ὅτι θερμαυνομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν ἐμίσγετο, ἀνεφαίνετο τὰ τε ἅλλα ζῷα πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώποι, ἀπαντά τὴν αὐτὴν διάταν ἔχουσα ἕκ τῆς ἐλὸς τρεφόμενα. Diog. Laert. ii. 17 γεννᾶσθαι δὲ φησι τὰ ζώα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἱδὲν παρασπηλιάν γάλακτι οἶνον τροφὴν ἀνιέσις. This last touch explains the reference to putrefaction (σηπεδῶν). As Forster already pointed out, early medical theory made πέψις, cibi concoctio, a form of σήμης, and Galen says (in Hippocr. Aph. vi. 1) παλαιά τις ἢν συνήθεια τούτου τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἄσηπτα καλεῖν ἀπερ ἡμεῖς ἅπεστα λέγομεν. Now Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for applying the σήμης theory to milk. Cp. Gen. An. 777 a 7 τὸ γὰρ γάλα πεπεμμένον αἰμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διεφθαρμένον, Ἠμπεδοκλῆς δ’ ἢ οὐκ ὁρὸν ὑπελάμβανεν ἢ οὖν εὗ μετῆγεκε (‘ used a bad metaphor’) ποίησας ὅς τὸ γάλα ‘μυρόν ἐν ὠγιόδατον δεκατῇ πῦνον ἔπλετο λευκὸν’. σαπρότης γὰρ καὶ πέψις ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ πῦνον σαπρότης τῖς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γάλα τῶν πεπεμμένων. The meaning is, then, that the warm and cold gave rise by putrefaction (σηπεδῶν) to a milky slime (ἰλός) by which the first animals were nourished. We are thus able to give συντρέφεται its natural sense. It is significant that Socrates should mention the theory of Archelaus first. 

IÇ0
b 4 ὅ φρονοῦμεν, 'what we think with.' The question of the 'seat of the soul' or sensorium was keenly debated in the first half of the fifth century B.C. The views that the soul is blood or breath are primitive, but both had just been revived as scientific theories. Empedocles had said (fr. 105 Diels) ἀίμα γὰρ ἀνθρώπους περικάρδιον ἐστι νόημα, and he was the founder of the Sicilian school of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 288 n. 3). The doctrine that the soul is air was as old as Anaximenes, but had just been revived by Diogenes of Apollonia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 414), and is attributed in the Clouds (230) to Socrates. The Heracliteans at Ephesus of course maintained their master's view that the soul was fire.

b 5 ὅ δ' ἐγκέφαλος κτλ. The credit of being the first to see that the brain was the seat of consciousness belongs to Alcmaeon of Croton (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 224), and the same view was upheld in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates and his school. It is one of the strangest facts in the history of science that Aristotle, followed by the Stoics, should have gone back to the primitive view that the heart was the seat of sensation.

b 7 γίγνοιτο: the optative is due to the general sense of indirect speech.

b 8 κατὰ ταύτα: equivalent to οὕτως.

γίγνεσθαι: note ἐστιν (b 5) ... γίγνοιτο (b 7) ... γίγνεσθαι (b 8), 'a gradual transition from the direct to the most pronounced form of the indirect speech' (Geddes).

ἐπιστήμης: Diels (Vors.² 102, 18) attributes to Alcmaeon this explanation of knowledge as arising from memory and belief 'when they have reached a state of quiescence'. We seem to have an echo of it in Aristotle An. Post. B. 19. 100 a 3 sqq. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίγνεται μνήμη, ... ἐκ δὲ μνήμης ἔμπειρία, ... ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἱρεμέοντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ... τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης. From Gorg. 448 c 4 sqq. we learn that Polus of Agrigentum derived τέχνη from ἐμπειρία. There is no reason for doubting that the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is pre-Platonic. It is alluded to by Isocrates in Helena 5 ὅτι πολὺ κρείττον ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄρχησαν ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάσει, and Blass dates the Helena before 390 B.C. Antisthenes is said to have written four books Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (Diog. Laert. vi. 17).

b 9 τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν (i.e. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) ... πάθη: it is highly
characteristic of the middle of the fifth century B.C. that the theory of τὰ μετέφωρα is mentioned last and in a somewhat perfunctory way. For the time, the rise of medicine had brought biological and psychological questions to the front, while astronomy and cosmology remained stationary in eastern Hellas until new life was given them by the Pythagoreans. The state of science here indicated is quite unlike any we know to have existed either at an earlier or a later date. It belongs solely to the period to which it is here attributed, a period which I have endeavoured to characterize in E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 405, 406.

2 ὃς οὐδὲν χρῆμα: the Ionic χρῆμα only survives in Attic in a few phrases like this (L. S. s. v. II. 3) The Athenians only used freely the plural χρῆματα, and that in the sense of 'property'. Cp. Laws 640 c 5 ὃς οὐδένι γέ πράγματι.


6 ἀ πρὸ τοῦ φύτην εἰδέναι repeats c 4 ἀ καὶ πρότερον κτλ. (a b a).

1 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ κτλ.: this refers to another great question of the time. Socrates means that his former beliefs were upset by the question of Anaxagoras (fr. 10) γὰρ ἐν ἐκ μὴ τριχῶς γίνοντο βρίζ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκὸς; This led to the doctrine that there were portions of everything in everything. Cp. also Aēt. i. 3. 5 (Dox. 279 α) ἔδοκεν αὐτῷ ἀπορώτατον εἶναι πῶς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος δύναται τι γίνεσθαι ἡ φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. τροφήν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα ἀπλὴν καὶ μονοειδῆ, ἀρτον καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ ταῦτα τρέφεται βρίζ φλεῦ ἀρτηρία σάρξ νεύρα ὅστα καὶ τὰ λουπὰ μόρια. τοῦτων οὖν γινομένων, ὁμολογητέων ἑστὶν ὅτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερόμενῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὐξέται. (Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 303.)

6 μετρίως, i. q. καλῶς. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

8 φῦνιν γὰρ κτλ. This refers to another set of questions, which stand in a close relation to Zeno's criticism of the Pythagoreans. Roughly, we may say that the difficulty here touched upon is the nature of the unit, whether in measuring, weighing, or numbering.

1 αὐτή τῇ κεφαλῇ, 'just by the head.' This is an example of a popular unit of measurement. Cp. II. iii. 193 μείων μὲν κεφαλὴ 'Αγαμέμνων.

3 προσεῖναι (TW) is virtual passive of προσθείναι, which is the reading of B. That is a natural slip.
The difficulty here is what is meant by the addition of units. How can it be that when one is added to one the result is two? How can either the original one or the one which is added to it become two; or how can the one which is added and the one which is added to it become two? The nature of the unit involved real difficulties which we need not discuss here; it is more important for our purpose to observe that in the Parmenides Plato actually represents the young Socrates as discussing such subjects with Parmenides and Zeno. The two dialogues confirm each other in the most remarkable way; for here too we are dealing with the youth of Socrates.

Another instance of the disjunctive hypothetical sentence (cp. 68 a 3 n.) What causes surprise is that the two things should be true at the same time.

The repetition of ὡς is a colloquialism. We are still dealing here with the difficulty of conceiving a unit. In the Republic (525 d 8 sqq.) Socrates refers to the same difficulty, but he is not troubled by it, for he has come to see that the unit is an object of thought and not of sense. Plato can hardly have felt it seriously at any time.

Another method of investigation. The noun μέθοδος by itself came to bear this meaning, as 'method' always does in our usage.

There can be no doubt that φόρεων is 'to make a mess' (cp. 101 e 1), and ἐκή, temere, emphasizes that meaning. Cp. Aesch. P. V. 450 ἐφυρον ἐκή πάντα. Of course, Socrates has not the slightest doubt of the superiority of his new method, and this description is only a piece of characteristic εἰρωνεία.

it is natural to think of the Anaxa-
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gorean Archelaus, who was said to be the teacher of Socrates (cp. 96 b 3 n.).

c 1 ὃς ἄρα κτλ. The actual words of Anaxagoras were (fr. 12 Diels) καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν, ὅσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὁποῖα ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. The familiar πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὦμοι, εἶτα νοὺς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν (Diog. Laert. ii. 6) is not a quotation, but a summary of the doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 299, n. 1).

c 7 περὶ ἐκάστου: cp. 95 e 9 n.

d 2 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου: ἀπὸ  ἑνὸς, sc. περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. I formerly bracketed ἐκείνου, which rests only on the authority of B; but Vahlen has since shown (Opusc. ii. 558 sqq.) that αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου is too idiomatic to be a mistake.

d 7 κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, ‘to my mind,’ as we say. I cannot believe that this common phrase involves any reference to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras. Such a joke would be very frigid.

d 8 πλατεία ... ἡ στρογγύλη: this was still a living problem in the days when Socrates was young, but not later. The doctrine that the earth is spherical was Pythagorean; the Ionian cosmologists (including Anaxagoras himself and Archelaus) held it was flat, with the single exception of Anaximander, who regarded it as cylindrical.

e 3 ἐν μέσῳ: so far as we can tell, this was not only the doctrine of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, but also of the early Pythagoreans. It is important to observe that the geocentric theory marked a great advance in its day as compared, e.g., with the belief of Thales that the earth was a disk floating on the water (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 32). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates refer to the later Pythagorean doctrine that the earth revolved with the planets round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.). That was familiar enough in the fourth century B. C., but would have been out of place here.

98 a 1 ποθεσόμενος: this is now known to be the reading of T as well as of Eusebius. B has ἵπποδέμενος, which cannot be right, and the ἰποθησόμενος of W looks like an emendation of this.

a 4 τάχους ... πρὸς ἄλληλα, ‘their relative velocity.’

τροπῶν, ‘turnings.’ This refers to the annual movement of the sun from the ‘tropic’ of Capricorn to that of Cancer and back again, which is the cause of summer and winter. The Greeks gave
the name of τροπαί to what the Romans, from a slightly different point of view, called solstitia.

a 6 ἀ πᾶσχε: symmetry would require the addition of καὶ ποιεῖ, but Plato avoids such symmetry.

b 1 ἐκάστῳ ... καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι, 'to each individually and to all collectively.'

b 3 οὐκ ἀν ἀπεδόμην πολλοί, 'I would not have sold for a large sum.'

b 7 ψχόμην δερόμενος: this is a slight variation on the usual phrase ἀπ' ἐλπίδος κατεβλήθην, κατέπεσον, 'I was dashed down from my hope' (cp. Euthyphro 15e 5 ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλόν μεγάλης). Socrates speaks as if he had been cast down from Olympus like another Hephaestus (πᾶν δ' ἡμαρ δερόμην, Il. i. 592).

b 8 ἀνδρα, 'a man.' The word expresses strong feeling, here disappointment. Wytenbach compares Soph. Αἰας 1142 ἡδηποτ' εἰδον ἀνδρ' εὐγ γλώσσῃ θραυσών, 1150 εὖ γάρ δέ γ' ἀνδρ' ὀπωπα μωρίας πλέων (cp. Arist. Αἰχ. 1128).

τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Plato expresses the same feeling in his own person in Λαώς 967 b 4 καὶ τινες ἐτόλμων τούτο γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεύειν καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὅσ νοῦν εἰη ὁ διακεκοσμηκός πάνθ' ὁσα κατ' οὐρανόν. οί δὲ αὐτοὶ ... ἀπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔποι ἀνέπεμψαν πάλιν κτλ. Xenophon (Μεμ. iv. 7. 6) preserves a faint echo of this criticism of Anaxagoras. Aristotle (Μετ. Α. 985 a 18) simply repeats it (Ε. Γ. Φh.² pp. 309 sq.).

b 9 οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον, sc. τον νοὺν, 'nor ascribing to it any causality.' For the double acc. cp. Dem. Phorm. 25 τίν' ἀν ἑαυτῶν αἰτίαν αἰτιασάμενος ... δικάζομαι; Antipho, 1. 29 ἀ ἐπατιῶμαι τὴν γνώματα τάτην. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιάται τῶν γνωμομέων ἠ νοῦν.

c 7 νεύρων, 'sinews,' 'tendons,' not nerves. The nervous system only became known in the third century B.C. Cp. Galen, de plac. Hipp. et Plat., p. 647 Ερασίστρατος μὲν ὄν (floruit 258 B.C.), εἰ καὶ μὴ πρόσθεν, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ γήρος τῷ τῆν ἀληθῆ τῶν νεύρων ἄρχην κατενόησεν' Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μέχρι παντὸς ἀγνούσας εἰκότος ἀπορεῖ χρείαν εἰπεῖν εἰκονόλογον.

c 8 διαφυάς ήξει, 'are jointed.' The διαφυάι are the same thing as the συμβολαί (d 3), looked at from another point of view. Cicero, de Nat. D. ii. 139 says commissurae.

d 2 αἰοφορομένων ... ἐν ταῖς ... συμβολαῖς, 'swinging in their sockets.'
d 5 συγκαμφθέλες: cp. 60 b 2.

d 7 φανάς τε κτλ. Cp. e.g. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels, Vors.² p. 332, 14) τοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἄφος ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινουμένου (τῇ ἀκοῇ γίνεσθαι).

e 4 παραμένοντα, 'not running away.' We have no English word for παραμένειν, any more than for τραβεῖν (cp. 63 e 10 n.). It is the negative of ἀποδιδράσκειν (99 a 3). Cp. 115 d 9.

e 5 νη τὸν κύκα: such euphemisms seem to occur in all languages. Cp. parbleu! écod! It is true that in Gorg. 482 b 5 Socrates says μά τὸν κύκα τὸν Διοπτίουν θεῶν (Anubis), but that seems to be only a passing jest. A euphemistic oath of this kind was called 'Ράδαμάνθους ὄρκος (Suid. s. v.).

99 a 1 περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοῦς: cp. Crito 53 b 4 where it is suggested that Socrates might escape ἢ Θῆβας ἢ Μέγαράς. He would have found friends in both places, as we know. This whole passage is reminiscent of the Crito.

a 8 καὶ ταῦτα νῆρ πράττων; 'and that too though I act from intelligence,' as was admitted above, 98 c 4. The MSS. have πράττω, but Heindorf's πράττων is a great improvement and gives καὶ ταῦτα its proper idiomatic force.

b 2 τὸ γὰρ μὴ... οἶον τ᾽ εἶναι κτλ. is another instance of the exclamatory infinitive justifying a strong expression of feeling. Cp. 60 b 5 n. and Symp. 177 c 1 τὸ οὖν τοιοῦτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, "Ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι... ἀξίως ψυχῆς.

b 3 ἀνευ οὖ: here we see the beginning of the technical term οὖ (or δῶ) οὐκ ἀνευ, the conditio sine qua non. Such causes are called συναιτία in the Timaeus. Cp. 46 c 7 Ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πάντα ἔστω τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεῶν ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἁρίστου κατὰ τὸ δύνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελέων δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναιτία ἄλλα αὕτη εἶναι τῶν πάντων κτλ.


b 5 ἀλλοτρίῳ ὄνομα, 'by a name that does not belong to them,' which is not their ὀικεῖον ὄνομα. The vulgate ὄμματι cannot be defended, though it is the reading also of BW.

b 6 αὐτό repeats δ (cp. 104 d 2 n.).
b 6 ο μέν τις κτλ. Once more we have the scientific problems of the middle of the fifth century. The first theory is that the earth does not fall because of the rapidity of the revolution of the heavens. This was the western theory, and was originated by Empedocles, who supported it by the experiment of swinging a cup full of water rapidly round (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 274). Cp. Arist. de Caelo 295 a 16 οι δ' ὀσπερ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιβέβησαν καὶ βάττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάδοις υδώρ καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον δώμος οὗ φέρεται κάτω πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτῆν αἰτίαν. The vortex theory of Leucippus was more subtle than this (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 399) and is not referred to here. In Clouds 379 Aristophanes makes fun of the αἰβέριος Δίνος who has taken the place of Zeus.

b 7 ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν: these words are to be taken together, as Geddes says (after Hermann) and μένειν is a virtual passive, 'is kept in its place by the heavens.'

b 8 ο δὲ κτλ. This is the eastern theory, which originated with Anaximenes and was still upheld by Anaxagoras and Democritus. As Aristotle tells us (de Caelo 294 b 14), they said τὸ πλάτος αἰτίου εἶναι . . . τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν οὗ γὰρ τέμνειν ἄλλ' ἐπιποματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν. Its breadth prevents it from cutting the air beneath it, and it lies on it 'like a lid' (πῶμα). It is absurd to suppose that Plato was ever troubled by crude notions of this kind, and even Socrates must soon have learnt better from his Pythagorean friends. Everything points to the Periclean age and no later date.

καρδόπω,' a kneading-trough'. This, however, does not seem to be a very appropriate image, and I believe we should read καρδοπίω from Hesychius Καρδόπων τῆς καρδόπου τὸ πῶμα, 'the lid of a kneading-trough'; cp. Aristotle's ἐπιποματίζειν quoted above. The discussion of the word κάρδοπος in Arist. Clouds 670 has another bearing. It refers to the speculations of Protagoras about grammatical gender.

C 1 τὴν δὲ τοῦ κτλ. Constr. τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὐτῶ νῦν (αὐτὰ) κεῖσθαι ὡς οἷον τε βελτιστα αὐτὰ τεθημαι. As we see from the following words, δύναμιν has its full meaning. The fact that they are in the best possible place is regarded as a force which keeps them there.
That being so, *παύτην* (τὴν δύναμιν) is the subject of *διαμονίαν ἴσχεν ἔχειν.

c 3 *τοῦτον . . . ἴσχυρότερον*, ‘an Atlas stronger than this one’ (*τοῦτον* is masc.).

c 5 ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ δέον: I think these words must be taken together; for ὡς ἀληθῶς is often used to call attention to an etymology (cp. *80* d 6 *n*.), and here τὸ δέον, ‘the fitting,’ is taken as ‘the binding’. The hyperbaton is of a normal type. For the etymology itself cp. *Crat.* 418 c 7 ἄγαθον γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα (‘being a form of good’) τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς ἐναι καὶ κόλυμα φορᾶς.

c 9 *τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν*: the paroemiographers say this expression is used ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶν τι πραττόντων, καθόσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. According to this, the reference would be rather to a less adventurous than to a second-best’ course. See, however, Eustathius *in Od.* p. 1453, 20 δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται ὅτε ἀποτυχών τις οὐρίον κόμται πλέγ κατὰ Παυσανίαν. Cp. also Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 5, ‘where pandere vela orationis is opposed to the slower method of proceeding, viz. dialecticorum remis’ (Geddes). In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method he is about to describe is a *πισ aller or ‘makeshift.’ The phrase is ironical like *ἐἰκῇ φύρῳ* above. Cp. Goodrich in *Class. Rev.* xvii, pp. 381 sqq. and xviii, pp. 5 sqq., whose interpretation I find myself in substantial agreement.

d 1 ἥ *πεπραγμάτευμαι*: these words depend on ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι and govern τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.

d 5 *τὰ ἐντα* like *τὰ πράγματα* just below (e 3) are ‘things’ in the ordinary sense of the word. It seems to me quite impossible that these terms should be applied to the *ὁντως ὄντα*, τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα. They must be the same as τὰ ὄντα in *97* d 7 *τὸς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων*, that is, the things of the visible world. It is quite true that Plato makes Socrates use the expression τὸ ὄν for τὸ ὁντως ὄν, but I know of no place in which he is made to use τὰ ὄντα *simpliciter* of the *εἴδη*. Further, the whole point of the passage is that Socrates had become exhausted by the study of physical science, and what he calls the *δεύτερος πλοῦς* is, we shall see, nothing else than the so-called ‘Theory of Ideas.’

*τὸν ἦλιον ἐκλείποντα*, ‘the sun during an eclipse.’ This is a mere illustration. Socrates keeps up the irony of the phrase *δεύτερος*.
πλοῦς by suggesting that his eyes are too weak to contemplate the things of the visible world. He had to look at them in a reflexion, he says.

e 3 τοῖς ὑμασὶ καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰτηθέων: this makes it quite clear that τὰ δόντα, τὰ πράγματα are the things of sense.

e 5 εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα, 'taking refuge in the study of propositions' or 'judgements', or 'definitions'. It is not easy to translate λόγους here; but at least it is highly misleading to speak of 'concepts' (Begriffe), nor is there any justification in Plato's writings for contrasting Socratic λόγοι with Platonic εἴδη. It is just in λόγοι that the εἴδη manifest themselves, and what Socrates really means is that, before we can give an intelligible answer to the question 'what causes A to be B', we must ask what we mean by saying 'A is B'. So far from being a δεύτερος πλοῦς, this is really a previous question.'

e 6 ἵσως μὲν σῶν κτλ. Here Socrates distinctly warns us not to take his ironical description too seriously. It is not really the case that the λόγοι are mere images of τὰ δόντα or τὰ πράγματα. On the contrary, it will appear that the things of sense may more fitly be called images of the reality expressed in the λόγοι. To use the language of the Republic, we must not confuse διάνοια and ἐπιστήμη with εἰκασία.

ϕ εἰκάζω: i.e. τούτῳ ϕ εἰκάζω τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ δόντα.

100 a 2 ἐν [τοῖς] ἔργοις, 'in realities'. The word ἔργα is equivalent to δόντα and πράγματα, and is used here because it is the standing opposite to λόγοι.

a 3 ύποθέκεος ἐκάστοτε κτλ., 'in any given case assuming as true.' This amounts to saying that Socrates had recourse to the method of deduction. Here it is important to remember, first, that in the fifth century B.C. geometry had advanced far beyond all other sciences, just because it had adopted the deductive method, and, secondly, that this advance was due to the Pythagoreans. The ideal is that all science should become 'exact science'.

a 4 ὅν καὶ κρίνω κτλ. We start from a proposition (λόγος) which we judge not to be open to attack. If this is admitted, we may proceed; if not, we cannot do so until we have established our ὑπόθεσις.

b 1 οὐδὲν καὶ νόν: if Plato had been the real author of the 'Theory of
Ideas', and if, as is commonly believed, it was propounded for the first time in the *Phaedo*, this sentence would be a pure mystification.

b 2 οὐδὲν πέπανμαι. 'ΌU παύεται et οὐδὲν παύεται sic different ut Latine: finem non facit et finem nullum facit,' Cobet *Nov. Lect.* p. 500.

b 3 ἕρχομαι ... ἐπιχειρῶν ... ἐπιδείξασθαι, 'I am going to try to show'. In this construction ἕρχομαι usually takes a future participle; but, as Heindorf says, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδείξασθαι is 'instar futuri ἐπιδείξασθαι'.

τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἰδος, 'the sort of causation I have worked out'. A phrase like this shows how far εἰδος is from being a technical term. When Socrates wishes to be technical, he speaks of the 'just what it is' (τὸ αὐτὸ δ ἔστω).

b 4 ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυβρύλητα: *cp. 76 d 8 ἀ τρυλοῦμεν ἄει.* Here once more the doctrine of εἰδος is assumed to be well known and generally accepted. What is new is the application of it, the method of ὑπόθεσις and deduction. This time it is Cebes who assents to the doctrine without hesitation; last time it was Simmias.

b 8 τῆν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξεων καὶ ἀνευρήσεων ὡς: there is a curious and characteristic interlacing of words here (a b a b); for τῆν αἰτίαν ἀνευρήσεων and ἐπιδείξεων ὡς would naturally go together. Riddell, *Dig.* § 308 classes this under the head of *Hysteron proteron*.

c 1 ὡς διάδοτος σοι κτλ., 'You may take it that I grant you this, so lose no time in drawing your conclusion.' *Cp. Symp.* 185 e 4 οὐκ ἄν φθάνως λέγων.

c 3 Σκότα... τάν... *Cp. 64 c 10 n.*

c 5 οὐδὲ δι' ἐν is more emphatic than δι' οὐδέν.

ἡ διότι μετέχει κ.τ.λ. If we say that a, a, a are beautiful, that implies (1) that 'beautiful' has a meaning quite apart from any particular instance of beautiful things, and (2) that this meaning (A) is somehow 'partaken in' by the particular instances a, a, a. These have a meaning in common, and their relation to it is expressed in the relation of subject to predicate. This too Cebes admits at once.

d 1 χρώμα εὖνθές ἔχων, 'because it has a bright colour'. The participle explains δι' ἕτοι, which is the indirect form of διὰ τὴ; The adjective εὖνθές is common in Hippocrates, especially of the bright red colour
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of blood, &c. As applied to colour, ἄνθος is ‘bloom’, ‘brightness’, and is sometimes almost synonymous with χρώμα. Cp. Rep. 429 d 8 and 557 c 5 with Adam's notes. The point is that it is meaningless to say a, a, a are A because they are x, y, z, unless we have first shown that x, y, z necessarily 'partake in' A.

d 3 ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἑως εὐθῆς as opposed to the σοφαὶ αἰτίαι mentioned above. The irony of 97 b 7 εἰκὴ φύρω is here kept up, and this should warn us against taking the expression δεύτερος πλοὺς as seriously meant. (Distinguish ἀτέχνως from ἀτέχνως.)

5 εἰτε παρουσία κτλ. The precise nature of the relation between predicate and subject may be expressed in various more or less figurative ways. We may say that the predicate is 'present to' the subject, or that the subject 'partakes' in the common nature of the predicate. Socrates will not bind himself to any of these ways of putting it; he only insists that, however we may express it, it is beauty that makes things beautiful.

d 6 ὃς δὴ καὶ ὅπως κ.τ.λ. These words are an echo of the formula used in the public prayers, for which cp. Crat. 400 e 1 δοσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαίς νόμος ἑστίν ἤμων εὐχεσθαι, ἑρωνεῖ τε καὶ ὅποθεν χαίροντων ὅνομαξόμενοι, ταύτα καὶ ἥμασ αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς θεοὺς) καλεῖν. It seems to me, therefore, that Wytenbach's suggestion, προσαγορευομένη for προσγενομένη, must certainly be right, though he did not adopt it himself. The manuscript προσγενομένη goes well enough with παρουσία, but not with the other terms. The whole question is one of names; for Socrates has no doubt as to the fact. Plato elsewhere represents him as making use of this formula. Cp. Prot. 358 a 7 εἰτε γὰρ ἦδυ εἰτε τερπνῶν λέγεις ... εἰτε ὅποθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαύτα ὅνομαξων, Phileb. 12 c 3 τὴν μὲν ἀφροδίτην, ἀπὶ ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτη προσαγορεύων. So Tim. 28 b 2 ὁ δὴ πᾶς ὤφανός ἦ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὅνομαξόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἤμων ὄνομαξωθώ, Laws 872 d 7 ὅ γὰρ δὴ μῦθος ἢ λόγος ἢ ὅτι χρή προσαγορεύειν αὐτῶν. The formula arose from fear that the gods should be addressed by the wrong name. Cp. Aesch. Ag. 160 Ζεὺς, ὡσίς ποτ' εἶστιν, εἰ τὸδ' αὖ|τῷ φίλον κεκλη-μένος, | τοῦτο μὲν προσεξενεπώ. This connexion is made quite clear in the passage from the Philebus quoted above, which is introduced by the words Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος ... ἄει πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄνοματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φάβου.

d 6 οὐ γὰρ ἐτι κτλ., 'I do not go so far as to insist on that'. Cp.
Aristotle Met. A. 6. 987 b 13 τὴν μὲντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μύμησιν, ἤτις ἀν εἰ ὁ τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφείσαν (sc. of Πυthagόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων) ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν, i.e. 'they left it as a point for dialectical inquiry' (for this meaning of ἐν κοινῷ cp. de An. A. 4. 407 b 29 quoted in 86 b 6 n.). I think Aristotle is referring to the present passage. He is quite clear about the Pythagorean origin of the theory.

d 8 [γίγνεται] is omitted both here and below e 3 by B; and W, which inserts it in e 3, has it in a different place from T. Most likely, then, it is an interpolation, and the formula τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ is much neater without it.

d 9 τούτου ἐχόμενος, 'holding to this.' Cp. 101 d 1 ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῖς τῆς υποθέσεως.

101 a 5 φοβούμενος οἷμαι κτλ. The Euthydemus shows that Socrates is making no extravagant supposition in suggesting that the ἀντιλογικοί might make such criticisms as (1) if A is taller than B 'by a head', B is also smaller than A 'by a head', therefore the same thing is the cause of greatness and smallness, and (2) that a head, being small, cannot be the cause of greatness.

a 6 ἐναντίος λόγος: for the personification of the λόγος cp. 87 a 8 n.

b 1 τέρας, 'a portent.' The word seems to have been common in dialectic as equivalent to ἄτοπον or ἀδύνατον. Cp. Meno 91 d 5 καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ... Parm. 129 b 2 τέρας ἐν οἶμαι ἦν, Theaet. 163 d 6 τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἰ ὁ λέγεις, Phil. 14 e 3 τέρατα διηνάγασθαι φάναι.

b 9 τὴν πρόσθεσιν... c 1 τὴν σχέσιν: addition of unit to unit or division of the unit into fractions. Cp. above 96 e 7 sqq.

c 2 ἄλλως πως... ἢ μετασχόν κτλ., 'otherwise than by participation in the proper reality of any given form (ἐκάστου) in which it participates.' The theory is thus summed up by Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. 335 b 9 ἄλλ' οἱ μὲν Ικανὴν φίλησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὡσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδων Σωκράτης' καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσι, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἰδῆ, τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν' καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἐκαστὸν λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἰδος, γίγνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν, καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν. Observe that Aristotle does not ascribe this theory to Plato, but to 'Socrates in the Phaedo.'

c 4 ἐν τούτοις, 'in the cases just mentioned.'

c 5 μετάσχεσιν, ἢ. ὃ. μέθεξιν. The form seems to occur here only.

c 8 κομψεις: Wytenbach points out that Socrates has in mind the
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The words of Euripides' *Antiope* which Plato makes him quote in *Gorg.* 486c 6, ἀλλοις τὰ κομψά ταύτ’ ὀφείς (σοφίαματα). It is part of the irony that the plain man's way of speaking is described as a 'subtlety', while the new theory of predication is called artless and naïve.

c 9 ἔδειξε... τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιάν: Aristophanes is said to have used this expression in the *Babylonians*. It probably (like our phrase *take umbrage*) referred originally to horses shying at their shadows. We have to go warily with so many *ἀντιλογικοί* lying in wait for us.

d 1 ἐξόμενος ἐκείνου κτλ., 'holding fast to the safe support of the ὑπόθεσις' (cp. 100 d 9), which is regarded as a staff (Ar. *Ach.* 682 oίς Ποσειδών ἀσφάλειός ἐστιν ἡ βακτρία).

d 3 εἶ δὲ τις κτλ. It does not seem possible to take ἔχεσθαι here in the sense of 'attack', and Madvig's conjecture ἐφαιτο is the reverse of convincing. It does, however, seem possible to render 'if any one fastens on' or 'sticks to the ὑπόθεσις', that is, if he refuses to consider the *συμβαίνοντα* till the ὑπόθεσις has been completely established. The method of Socrates is different. He first considers the *συμβαίνοντα* to see whether they involve any contradiction or absurdity. If they do, the hypothesis is *ipso facto* destroyed. If the *συμβαίνοντα* are not contradictory or absurd, the ὑπόθεσις is not indeed established, but it has been verified, so far as it can be, by its application. When we have seen that the axioms of geometry lead to no contradictions or absurdities in their application, they are at least relatively established. Cp. *Meno* 86 e 2 συγχώρησον ἑκ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι. For the terminology of the method cp. *Parn.* 135 e 9 εἶ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν ('a given thing') ὑποθέσεων σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως. Cp. e.g. the example immediately after (a 5) εἶ πολλά ἐστι (the ὑπόθεσις), τι χρὴ συμβαίνειν κτλ. The method of experimental science is the same. The ὑπόθεσις is first tested by seeing whether it is verified or not in particular instances; the deduction of the ὑπόθεσις from a higher one is another matter, which must be kept distinct.

d 4 ἔστω ἄν κτλ. It is doubtful whether ἄν can ever be retained with the opt. in *oratio obliqua*, though there are several examples in our texts (*G. M. T.* § 702). The better explanation is that given in L. & S. (s. v. ἔστω I. c) that 'ἄν... is added to the Optat. (not to ἔστω) if the
event is represented as conditional'. In that case, the real construction is ἐως ... σκέψεως ἄν, and ἄν is anticipated. Cp. Isocrates, 17. 15 μαστιγῶν ... ἐως ἄν τάληθη δύζειν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. The meaning, then, will be 'till you have a chance of considering'.

d4 τὰ ἄπτ’ ἐκεῖνης ὁμηθέντα: i.e. τὰ συμβαίνοντα. In e 2 below the phrase is τῶν ἐξ ἐκεῖνης ὁμηθένων, and those who regard the sentence as spurious hold that the aorist participle is incorrect. But (1) the aorist is appropriate, because it is only after the consequences have been drawn that we can compare them with one another, and (2) it is more likely that Plato himself should vary the tense than that an interpolator should do so.

d5 εἰ ... διαφωνεῖ: Jackson holds that this clause is inconsistent with the account of the method given at 100 a 4 ἄ μεν ἄν μοι δοκή τοῦτο συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἄληθή δόντα κτλ., but that is a different stage in the process. We first posit as true whatever agrees with the ὑπόθεσις, and then we test the hypothesis by considering whether the things thus posited agree with one another.

ὑπεθή δὲ κτλ. Socrates recognizes that the ὑπόθεσις is not established by the process described so far. That can only be done by subsuming it under some higher ὑπόθεσις, and that in turn under a higher, till we come to one which is unassailable. This is the process described at greater length in Rep. 533 c 7 sqq.

d7 τῶν ἄνωθεν, ‘higher,’ i.e. more universal. Cp. Rep. 511 a 5 τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἄνωτέρο ἐκβαίνειν.

e1 ἐπὶ τοῖς κανόν: i.e. to an ἀρχή which no one will question. This is not necessarily an ἀρχή ἀναπόθετος (Rep. 510 b 7). A ὑπόθεσις may be, humanly speaking, adequate without that (cp. below 107 b 9).

οὐκ ἄν φύρω, ‘you will not jumble the two things together.’ Though the middle does not appear to occur elsewhere, φύρεσθαι τῶν λόγων, ‘to jumble one’s argument,’ seems very natural Greek, and it is hardly necessary to read φύροι. Otherwise we must take φύροι as passive, comparing Gorg. 465 c 4 φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ... σοφισταί καὶ ῥήτορες.

ὡσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοι: Socrates is no doubt thinking of the attacks on mathematics made by Protagoras and others. When we study geometry, we must accept its fundamental ὑποθέσεις; the question of their validity is a different one altogether, and one with which the
geometer as such has nothing to do. Only hopeless confusion can result from mixing up the two things.

e 2 τὰς ἀρχὰς, 'your starting-point,' i.e. the ὑπόθεσις. Though ἀρχὴ is sometimes used of an ultimate ἀρχὴ as opposed to an ὑπόθεσις, it can be used of any starting-point whatsoever. When we are discussing the συμβαίνοντα, we take the ὑπόθεσις as our ἀρχὴ and decline to give any account of it.

e 5 ικανοὶ . . . ὑπὸ σοφίας κτλ., 'their cleverness enables them . . .'

There is a slight redundancy in the use of δύναμις after ικανοί, but it is easily paralleled. They can make a mess of everything without disturbing their own self-complacency.

102 a 3 Νὴ Δία κτλ. The distinction which Socrates has just made appeals at once to a Pythagorean mathematician. We are taken back to Phlius for the last time, in order that the next stage of the argument may have its full weight.

Third Proof of Immortality (102 a 10—107 b 10).

The first two proofs were based upon analogy. They both depended upon the Doctrine of Forms; but in neither was Immortality deduced from that doctrine. The Third Proof is intended to be such a deduction.

b 2 τάλλα: i.e. particular things.

τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχειν, 'are called after them.' This is how Socrates expresses the 'extension' of a class as opposed to its 'intension'.


b 8 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ. The notion here formulated is that of the essential attribute. We say, indeed, as a façon de parler (τοῖς ἰδίμασι) that Simmias is greater than Socrates; but it is not gua Simmias or gua Socrates that they stand in this relation, but only in so far as greatness and smallness can be predicated of them. The emphatic words are περικέναι and τυγχάνειν ἵχων. The first expresses participation in an εἶδος which belongs φύσει to the subject, the latter participation in an εἶδος which belongs to the subject as a matter of fact, but not essentially. The sentence is anacoluthic; for the subject τὸ . . . ὑπερχεῖν is dropped and a new subject τὸ ἀληθὲς is substituted.

c 10 ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσει . . . εἶναι, 'has the name of being.' Heindorf

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quotes Hdt. ii. 44 Ἱπουρίος ἐπωνυμήν ἕχοντος Θασίου εἶναι. So often ὄνομάζειν εἶναι.

C I I τοῦ μὲν κτλ., 'submitting his smallness to the greatness of A (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it, and presenting his own greatness to B (Socrates) as something surpassing his smallness.' The reading ὑπέχων is not merely a conjecture of Madvig's, as even the most recent editors say, but the best attested MS. reading (TW). The meaning of ὑπέχειν is much the same as that of παρέχειν, and it takes the same construction, the epexegetic infinite active (ὑπερέχειν), which we express by a passive. Cp. Gorg. 497 b 9 ὑπόσχεσε Σωκράτει εξελέγκται.

d 2 "Εοικα ... συγγραφικῶς ἔρειν, 'it looks as if I were about to acquire a prose style.' Wytttenbach took συγγραφικῶς as referring to the language in which θηφίσματα were drafted, comparing Gorg. 451 b 7 ὄσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι. Heindorf derived it from συγγραφή, a 'bond' or 'indenture', and thought of legal phraseology. On the whole, it seems to me more likely that there is a reference to the balanced antitheses of Gorgias and his followers, of which the preceding sentence certainly reminds one. The word συγγραφικῶς only occurs in late writers, but there it is the adjective of συγγραφέως and always refers to prose style. This interpretation makes the fut. inf. ἔρειν more natural than the others.

d 7 τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος: the form of greatness, so far as it 'is present' in us or we 'participate' in it.

d 9 δυσώιν τὸ ἐπερον κτλ. This alternative is important for the argument, and the terminology should be noticed. If any form is 'in' a given thing, that thing will not admit (δέχεσθαι) any form which is opposed to it. The original form will either (1) withdraw from (or 'evacuate') the thing, or (2) perish. The metaphors are military throughout this discussion.

e 2 ὑπομένων δὲ κτλ. These words explain the following. 'It refuses to be something other than it was by holding its ground and admitting smallness.' Here ὑπομένειν 'to hold one's ground' is used as the opposite of ὑπερχαρεῖν 'to get out of the way', 'to withdraw in favour of' (its opposite).

e 3 ὄσπερ ἐγώ κτλ. Socrates can 'admit' either greatness or smallness without ceasing to be Socrates; but the greatness which is 'in' Socrates cannot 'admit' smallness.
c 5 τετόλμηκεν seems to be suggested by the military metaphor.

103 a 1 ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι, 'when this happens to it,' i.e. when it is attacked by its opposite.

a 4 οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι is probably nothing more than a touch of realism. We need not look for covert meanings.

a 5 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . . . λόγοις: 70 d 7 sqq.

αὐτή εἶναι, 'to be this,' a change of construction from τὸ μείζων γίγνεσθαι. Both the personal and the impersonal construction are admissible with ὁμολογεῖτο.

a 11 παραβαλῶν τὴν κεφαλήν, 'turning his head' as one naturally would to a new speaker (not 'bending').

b 3 τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα: i.e. the thing in which there is an opposite form. It is a cold thing that becomes hot and a hot thing that becomes cold; hot does not become cold, or cold hot. In the previous illustration Socrates is the συμκρῶν πράγμα which may become μέγα, though smallness cannot admit greatness.

b 5 τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει (sc. ἐναντίον) is the opposite form αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό as opposed to τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν which is chosen as an instance of the form so far as it is 'in' a thing. For this way of speaking of the εἰδή cp. Rep. 597 b 5 where the 'ideal bed' is spoken of as ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, and Parm. 132 d 1 τὰ μὲν εἰδὴ ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι. All Greek thinkers use the word φύσις of that which they regard as most real. The Ionians meant by it the primary substance (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 13); Socrates means by it the world of εἴδη.

b 6 τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία: a clearer expression for τῶν ἐναντίων πραγμάτων.

b 7 τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ: cp. 102 b 2.

b 8 δὲν ἐνόντων: governed by τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν (not gen. abs.).

c 1 γένεσιν ἄλληλων, 'becoming one another', 'turning into one another'.

c 5 Οὐδ' αὐτοί κτλ. On previous occasions (77 a 8; 86 e 5) we have heard of the doubts of Cebes, but 'he does not feel his doubts return on this point' (Geddes).

καίτου οὕτοι λέγω κτλ. Here we have another hint that the doctrine is not fully worked out. Cp. above 100 d 5 and below 107 b 5.
c 10 'Επι . . . καὶ τοῦτο κτλ. We now advance beyond the merely tautological judgements with which we have been dealing hitherto, to judgements of which the subject is a thing and the predicate a form. We have seen that hot will not admit cold or cold heat; we go on to show that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. We advance from the judgement 'A excludes B' to 'a excludes B'.

c 11 θερμὸν τι καλεῖς: cp. 64 c 2 n. It will be found helpful to keep this simple instance in mind all through the following passage.

c 13 ὅπερ is regularly used to express identity. A is not identical with a nor B with b.

e 2 'Εστιν . . . ὄστε: cp. 93 b 4 n.

e 3 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος, 'its own name,' the name of the εἶδος, e.g. hot or cold (ἀξιοῦσθαι, 'to be entitled to').

e 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, sc. ἄξιοῦσθαι αὐτῷ, i.e. τοῦ ὄνοματος τοῦ εἰδος, e.g. fire and snow; for fire is always hot and snow is always cold.

e 5 τῆς ἐκείνου μορφῆς: i.e. τῆς ἐκείνου ἰδέας, τὸ ἐκείνου εἶδος. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable predicate (ἀει, ὅταν περὶ ἃ).

e 7 δει. . . τυγχάνειν, ἢ q. ἄξιοῦσθαι.

ὅπερ νῦν λέγουμεν, sc. τὸ περίττον.

104 a 2 μετὰ τοῦ ἄντων ὄνοματος, 'along with its own name,' whatever that may be. In addition to its own name we must also call it odd (τοῦτο καλεῖν, sc. περίττον) because it is essentially (φύσει, cp. πεφυκέναι) odd.

a 3 λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι κτλ., 'I mean by the case mentioned (αὐτὸ) such a case as that of the number three,' which is not only entitled to the name 'three', but also, and essentially, to the name 'odd'. Similarly fire is not only entitled to the name 'fire', but also, and essentially, to the name 'hot'.

a 6 ὅντος οὐχ ὅπερ κτλ. Most editors adopt Heindorf's conjecture ὅπερ for ὅπερ, which is demanded by grammar; for ὅπερ ought to be followed by ἡ τριάς (sc. ἐστίν). On the other hand, it may be urged that ὅπερ was so common in geometry, especially to express ratios, that it may hardly have been felt to be declinable. It is a symbol like : or =, and nothing more.

a 8 ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἄριθμοῦ ἄπας, 'one whole half of the numerical series.' For ὁ ἡμισυς instead of τὸ ἡμισυ see L. & S. s v. I. 2, and, for
the expression, *Theaet.* 147 e 5 τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δία διελάβομεν ('we divided into two equal parts').

b 2 ὃ ἐτεροι ... στίχοι, 'the other row' or 'series'.

b 10 ἐπούνης ... c 2 ὑπομείναι: the military metaphors are still kept up. Cp. 102 d 9 n.

c 1 ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα, as if dependent on φαίνεται, b 7, the intervening εἶναι being ignored. We are now able to say that things which have opposite forms as their inseparable predicate refuse to admit the form opposite to that which is 'in' them, but either perish or withdraw at its approach. The simplest instance is that of snow which is not opposite to heat, but melts at its approach.

d 1 τάδε ... κτλ. We are not defining a class of eἶδη, but a class of things (c 8 ἀλλ' ἄττα) which are not αὐτὰ ἐναντία to the 'attacking' form. It has not been suggested in any way that fire and snow are ἔιδη, and it seems improbable that they are so regarded. On the other hand, 'three,' which, for the purposes of the present argument, is quite on a level with fire and snow, is spoken of (d 5) as an ἱδέα. It is this uncertainty which creates all the difficulties of the present passage. That, however, is not surprising; for, in the *Parmenides,* Plato represents Socrates as hesitating on this very point, and as doubtful whether he ought to speak of an ἐἴδος of 'man, fire, or water.' This, however, does not affect the argument. We need only speak of 'things' without deciding whether they are 'forms' or not.

ἀ δὲν κατάσχη κτλ. Things which, though not themselves opposite to a given thing, do not withstand its attack, are 'those which, if one of them has taken possession of anything, it compels it not only to assume its own form, but also in every case that of something opposite to it' (i.e. to the attacking form). The illustration given just below makes it quite clear that this is the meaning, though the pronouns are a little puzzling, and will be dealt with in separate notes. The verb κατέχειν keeps up the military metaphor; for to 'occupy' a position is χωρίον κατέχειν.

d 2 τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν, sc. τὴν τοῦ κατάσχοντος. There is nothing abnormal in the shift from plural (ἀ) to singular in a case like this. After an indefinite plural some such subject as 'any one of them' is often to be supplied, and κατάσχη is felt to be singular in meaning as well.
as in form, as is shown by ὅτι ἀν and αὐτό, whereas at d 5 we have ἀ ἄν κατάσχη duly followed by αὐτοῖς. For the change of number cp. also 70 e 5 n. and Laos 667 b 5 δεῖ τόδε ... ἵππρεσιν ἀπασιν δοσις συμπαρέπεση τις χάρις, ἃ τούτῳ αὐτὸ μόνον (sc. τὴν χάριν) αὐτο ὅ το σπουδαίωτατον εἰναι κτλ.

d 2 αὐτό refers to ὅτι ἄν κατάσχη, the thing occupied. For the slight pleonasm cp. 99 b 6; ἔκκλημα 8. The meaning is fixed by d 6 ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς referring to ἀ ἄν . . . κατάσχη.

d 3 αὐτῷ is omitted by most editors, but the meaning of ἐναντίον is by no means clear without a dative. If we remember once more that we are defining a class of things which do not hold their ground before the onset of an opposite, it is not difficult to interpret αὐτῷ as 'the opposite in question' implied in τὰ ἐναντία οἷς ὑπομένει ἐπιστήτα above. This is also borne out by the illustration given below. It is the form of the odd which prevents the approach of the even to three, just as it is the form of cold which prevents the approach of heat to snow. (Cp. below e 9 τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐπιστήτει. This last passage is strongly against the reading δεῖ for δεῖ, which I regard as a mere corruption (ΑΕΙ, ΔΕΙ).

d 12 ἦ περιττή, sc. μορφή. There does not seem to be any other instance of this brachylogy. The normal use is seen just below in ἦ τὸν ἄρτιον.

e 5 Ἀνάρττος ὁ πα. The precise point of this step in the argument only emerges at 105 d 13 sqq. The term περιττός, 'odd,' does not at first seem parallel to a term like ἄνθρώπος. As Wohlrab says, the point would not require to be made in German; for in that language the odd is called das Ungerade.

e 7 ὁρίσασθαι: W has ὁρίσασθαι δεῖν, which gives the meaning, but is probably due to interpolation. Tr. 'What I said we were to define'.

ποῖα κτλ. Fire, for instance, is not opposite to cold nor snow to heat, yet fire will not admit cold, nor will snow admit heat.

e 8 αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον. It is plain from αὐτὸ δέχεται in the next line that αὐτό must refer to the same thing as τίνι, and, in that case, τὸ ἐναντίον can only be added if we suppose τίνι to mean virtually τὸν ἐναντίον τίνι, 'one of a pair of opposites,' and take αὐτό as 'the opposite in question.' I cannot attach any appropriate sense to the vulgate αὐτό τὸ ἐναντίον, which ought to mean 'what is actually
opposite to it', which would imply e. g. that snow will not admit the cold. The same objection applies to the variant αὐτῷ τὸ ἑναντίον adopted by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum. Wytenbach proposed either to delete τὸ ἑναντίον or to read τὸ οὐκ ἑναντίον. The former proposal would simplify the sentence; the latter shows that he understood it.

e 8 νῦν, 'in the present case.'

e 10 ἐπιφέρει is another military metaphor (cp. ἐπιφέρειν πόλεμον, bellum inferre, ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν &c.). Tr. 'it always brings into the field its opposite', i.e. τὸ περιττόν. It is very important to notice that ἐπιφέρειν is always used of the thing 'attacked', while ἐπιείναι and κατέχειν are used of the thing which 'attacks' it. Ἐπιφέρειν refers to the means of defence. It is, we may say, τὸ ἀμυνόμενον which ἑναντίον τι ἐπιφέρει τῷ ἐπιττῷ. Further, ἐπιείναι is not the same thing as κατέχειν, which implies a successful έφοδος.

η διὰς τῷ περιττῷ, sc. τὸ ἑναντίον ἐπιφέρει, i.e. τὸ ἀρτιόν.

a 1 ἀλλ' ὅρα κτλ. ἀλλά resumes after the parenthesis with a slight anacoluthon.

a 2 μὴ μόνον κτλ. Taking the same instance as before, not only does cold refuse to admit its opposite, heat, but so does snow, which always brings cold (which is the opposite of heat) into the field against it in self-defence.

a 3 ἀλλά καὶ ἐκεῖνο κτλ. All editors seem to take ἐκεῖνο as subject of δέξασθαι and antecedent to δ ἄν ἐπιφέρη, but that leads to great difficulties, the chief of which are that we have to refer ἐκεῖνῳ to something other than ἐκεῖνο and to take ἔφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτῷ ἤγ of the thing which is being attacked instead of the attacking form. Riddell (Dig. § 19) took ἐκεῖνο (sc. ὁρίζει) as an accusative pronoun in apposition to what follows. I prefer to take it as the object of δέξασθαι and closely, with ἔφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτῷ ἤγ. The subject of δέξασθαι will then be δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντίον ἐκεῖνῳ. Then αὐτῷ τὸ ἐπιφέρον repeats δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ κτλ. and τῇ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἑναντίοτητα repeats ἐκεῖνῳ. We have thus an instance of interlaced order (a b a b) which is, I take it, what Socrates means by speaking συγγραφικῶς.

a 5 ou . . χεῖρων, 'it is just as well.'


a 7 τὸ διπλάσιον, in apposition to τὰ δέκα, 'which is the double of five,' and therefore an even number.
NOTES

a 8 τούτο μὲν οὖν κτλ. I formerly inserted οὐκ before ἐναυτίον with most editors, but this leaves καὶ and the concessive μὲν οὖν without any meaning. I now interpret: 'It is quite true that this (the double) itself itself opposite to another thing (viz. the single, τὸ ἀπλοῦν); but at the same time it will also refuse to admit the form of the odd' (to which it is not itself opposite). The reason is, of course, that τὸ διπλάσιον always ἐπιφέρει τὸ ἄρτιον, brings the even into the field to resist the attack of the odd; for all doubles are even numbers. It goes without saying that it will not admit τὸ ἀπλοῦν which is its own opposite.

b 1 οὔδε δὴ κτλ. The almost accidental mention of double and single suggests another opposition, that of integral and fractional. With Heindorf, I take the construction to be οὔδε δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον (§) οὔδε τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἡμιοῦ και τριγυμώριον αὐ (§) καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ἅλου (ἴδεαν). If we observe the slight colloquial hyperbaton of την τοῦ ἅλου, there is no need to interpret τὸ ἡμιοῦ in an artificial way (as 'fractions whose denominator is 2', like \( \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \frac{1}{3} \)) or to delete it. No given fraction is itself opposite to τὸ ἅλου, but they all 'bring into the field' τὴν τοῦ μορίου ἴδεαν in self-defence against the attack of τὸ ἅλου.

b 5 δ ἐν ἐρωτῶ, 'in the terms of my question' (Church). The readings of the MSS. vary considerably, but the meaning is clear from the sequel.

b 6 λέγω δὴ κτλ., 'I say this because, as a result of our present argument, I see another possibility of safety over and above (παρ') that safe answer I spoke of at first' (100 d 8).

b 9 φ ἐν τί κτλ., 'what must be present in anything, in its body (i.e. 'in a thing's body'), to make it warm?' The text is not quite certain, and it would no doubt be simpler to omit ἐν τῷ with Stephanus, thus making the construction the same as in c 3. It is possible, however, to understand ἐν τῷ σώματι as a further explanation of φ ἐν ἐγγένηται, so I have let it stand.

c 1 τὴν ὀμαθη,'foolish.' Cp. 100 d 3. The irony is kept up.

C 2 κομψοτέραν: κομψός is the urbane equivalent of σοφός, and ὀμαθής is the regular opposite of σοφός (cp. 101 c 8). We are taking a step towards the κομψεῖα which we deprecated before. ἐκ τῶν νῦν: cp. b 7. φ ἐν πῦρ. It is safe to say this because θερμότης is an inseparable predicate of πῦρ, and so the presence of fire is a sufficient αἰτία of

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bodily heat. This does not mean in the least that fire is the only such cause, as appears clearly from the other instances. There are other causes of disease than fever, and other odd numbers than the number one (ἡ μονάς).

3 Ψυχή ἄρα κτλ. Previously we could only say that participation in the form of life was the cause of life; but, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, we may substitute ψυχή for κω, just as we may substitute πῦρ, πυρετός, μονάς for θερμότης, νόσος, περιττότης. There is not a word about the soul being itself a form or ἔδος, nor is such an assumption required. The soul may perfectly well be said to ‘occupy’ the body without being itself an ἴδεα. It is a simple military metaphor (cp. 104 d 1 n.), and implies no metaphysical theory.

10 Οὐκοῦν ψυχή κτλ. The point is that, though ψυχή itself is not opposite to anything, it always ‘brings into the field’ something which has an opposite, namely life. We may say, then, that soul will not admit that opposite (i.e. death), but must either withdraw before it or perish.

13 Τί οὖν κτλ. The point here is mainly verbal. It has to be shown that what does not admit ἄδανατος may be called ἄδανατος.

1 Αμομοῦν ... τὸ δὲ ἀδικὸν stands for τὸ μὲν ἄμομοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικὸν by an idiom of which Plato is specially fond. Cp. Prot. 330 a 3 ἀλλο, τὸ δὲ ἀλλο, Theaet. 181 d 5 δύο δὴ λέγω ... εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοιώσεν, τὴν δὲ φοράν, Rep. 455 c 6 γνὺ ἱατρική, ἡ δ' οὖ, καὶ μουσική, ἡ δ' ἀμομοῦσ φύσει.

10 Τί οὖν κτλ. It has been proved that the soul will not admit death; but we have still to deal with two possible alternatives; for it may either ‘withdraw’ or ‘perish’. This alternative actually exists in all other cases; but in the case of τὸ ἄδανατον the second is excluded; for τὸ ἄδανατον is ἵπσο ἑκατο ἄνωλεβρον. Therefore the soul must ‘withdraw’ at the approach of death.

1 a ἀλλο τι ... ἦ, nonne. The interposition of the subject is unusual, but cp. 106 e 1. There is no contradiction in saying that ‘the uneven’ is perishable. If there were, three would be imperishable because it may be substituted for ‘the uneven’.

3 τὸ ἀθέρμον, though the reading rests only on the authority of the corrector of T, must be right (θέρμον BTW Stob.). The word is coined, like ἀνάρτης, to furnish a parallel to ἄδανατος. Snow is to τὸ ἀθέρμον as soul is to τὸ ἄδανατον.
a 4 ἐπάγοι: another military metaphor.

a 8 τὸ ἄμυκτον: Wytenbach conjectured ἄψυχρον to correspond with ἀθέρμον, but ἄμυκτον, 'what cannot be cooled,' is a better parallel in sense, if not in form, to ἄθάνατον.

c 1 αὐτοῦ, sc. τοῦ περίττοι: ἄντ' ἵκελον, sc. ἄντι τοῦ περίττοι.

d 2 τούτου γε ἕνεκα: cp. 85 b 8.

d 3 μή δέχοτο: I can find no parallel to this use of μή. There are instances of μή with the potential optative in interrogations introduced by πῶς or τίνα τρόπον. We might have had πῶς ἄν... μή δέχοτο; 'how could anything else avoid receiving?' and this is virtually what the sentence means (G. M. T. § 292).

107 a 5 ἀναβάλλωτο is an instance of the optative without ἄν often found after such phrases as (οἴκ) ἔσθ' ὀστίς...,(οἴκ) ἔσθ' ὀπως.

b 6 ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον, if the text is sound, is a very striking anacoluthon due to the parenthesis. This sentence is just like the reference to the μακροτέρα ὀδός in Rep. 435 d and the μακροτέρα περίοδος, ib. 504 b. It is clear that the πρώται ὑποθέσεις which are to be re-examined are just those mentioned above, 100 b 5, that is to say, the 'Theory of Ideas' in the form in which it is presented to us in the Phaedo. Whether Socrates was conscious that the theory required revision, I am not prepared to say; but it is clear that Plato was. The re-examination of these ὑποθέσεις is to be found chiefly in the Parmenides and the Sophist, both dialogues in which Socrates does not lead the discussion.

b 9 τούτο αὐτό, viz. that you have followed up the argument as far as is humanly possible. If you make sure (σαφές) of this, you need seek no further. The argument ends with a fresh confession of the weakness of human arguments. Cp. 85 c 1 sqq.

οὖθεν ἥτησετε περαιτέρω: cp. Tim. 29 c 8 ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένους ὡς οἱ λέγων ἐγὼ υμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἄνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὅταν περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα θυτείν.

The conclusion of the whole matter. The Myth (107 c 1—115 a 8).

c 2 εἴπερ ή ψυχή ἄθανατος κτλ. Cp. Rep. 608 c 9 Τί οὖν; οἷς ἄθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτον δεῖν χρόνον ἐπουδακίναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς;

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c 3 \(\text{ἐν φ' καλοῦμεν τὸ ζήν, 'for which what is called life lasts.'} \) For this way of speaking cp. II. xi. 757 καὶ Ἀλησίου ἐνθα κολώνη κέκληται. Wytenbach quotes several poetical parallels and Xen. Hell. ν. 1. 10 ἐνθα Ἡ Τριπυρία καλεῖται.

d 4 \(\text{νῦν δῆ, nunc demum.} \) Cp. 61 c 6 n.

c 6 \(\text{ἔρμαιον, 'a godsend,' Schol. τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος. The word was properly used of treasure-trove ('windfall,' \textit{aubaine}), which was sacred to Hermes.} \) Cp. Symp. 217 a 3 ἔρμαιον ἡγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχια ἔμων σαμαστῶν and the expression κοῦν Ἐρμῆς, 'Shares!' (Jebb on Theophrastus, Characters, xxvi. 18).

c 8 \(\text{νῦν δὲ, 'but, as it is...'} \)

d 6 \(\text{τροφής:} \) cp. 81 d 8 n.

λέγεται, sc. \(\text{ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, in the mystic doctrine.} \) Cp. 67 c 5 n.

d 6 \(\text{ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων:} \) cp. for the mystic doctrine of the guardian δαίμων Menander (fr. 550 Kock) Ἀπαντὶ δαίμων ἄνδρι συμπαρισταται | εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγῷ τοῦ βίου. The idea that the δαίμων has a soul allotted to it as its portion appears in the \textit{Epitaphios} of Lysias 78 ὁ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἠμετέραν μοίραν εἰληχός, and Theocritus iv. 40 αἰαὶ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος ὅς με λελόγχει. It was doubtless the common view, but is denied by Socrates in the Myth of Er (Rep. 617 e 1), where the \textit{προφήτης} says: \(\text{οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ύμεῖς δαίμονα αἵρησεσθε.} \)

d 7 \(\text{eis δὴ τινα τόπον κτλ.} \) We learn what the place was from Gorg. 524 a 1 ὅτου οὖν ... δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμών. The 'meadow' of Judgement is Orphic. Note the use of δὴ \(\text{τις in allusion to something mysterious.} \) Cp. 108 c 1; 115 d 4. So δὲ δὴ, 107 c 1, 2. All through this passage δὴ is used to suggest something known to the speaker and to those whom he addresses, but of which they shrink from speaking.

d 8 \(\text{διαδικασμένους κτλ.} \) In Rep. 614 c 4 we read that the Judges, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσεων, bade the righteous proceed to the right upwards and the wicked to the left downwards. The active is used of the judges and the middle of the parties who submit their claims to judgement (cp. 113 d 3). The meaning cannot be, as has been suggested, 'when they have received their \textit{various sentences},' for that would require the passive, and \(\text{διαδικάζεσθαι always means 'to submit rival claims to a court.'} \)

e 1 \(\text{φ δῆ:} \) cp. d 7 n.
e1 τοὺς ἵνθεῖνε : cp. 76 d 8 n.
e2 ἐν δῇ τὺχεῖν : cp. d 7 n. I have adopted δῇ from Stobaeus rather than the MS. δεῖ, which reads awkwardly. Cp. Crat. 400 c 5 ὡς δίκην διδοὺσι τῆς ψυχῆς δὲν δῇ ἐνεκα διδοῦσιν (referring to the Orphic doctrine).
e4 ἐν πολλαῖς ... περιόδοις (ἐν of the time a thing takes cp. 58 b 8 n.). In Rep. 615 a 2 we have a χιλιετὴς πορεία, consisting of ten περιόδοι of a hundred years each. In the Phaedrus (249 a) the περιόδοι are longer.
e5 ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τῆλεφος. The references to this quotation in other writers seem to be derived from the present passage, not from the original play.

108 a 4 σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους, 'partings of the way and bifurcations.' The reading τριόδους was that of Proclus and Olympiodorus and is much better than the MS. περιόδους, which is probably due to περιόδοις in e 4. It is the only reading which gives a proper sense to the next clause (see next note), and goes much better with σχίσεις. Cp. also Gorg. 524 a 2 ἐν τῷ λειμῶν, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἡ δὲ σφέρετον τῷ ὀδῷ, ἡ μὲν ἐς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' ἐς Τάρταρον. Virgil, Aen. vi. 540 Hic locus est partes ubi se via findit in ambas.
a5 θυσίαν is better attested (TW Stob.) than the ὄσιαν of B, though that is an ancient variant (ϣρ. W). The MS. of Proclus, in Remp. (85. 6 Kroll), has οὐσίαν, which explains the corruption (O for Θ). The reading θυσίαν alone fits the explanation of Olympiodorus, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τριόδους τιμῶν τῆς Ἐκάρης (cp. last note). The sacrifices to Hecate (Trivia) at the meeting of three ways are well attested, and Socrates means that these shadow forth the τριόδος in the other world.
a7 οὐκ ἄγνοει τὰ παρόντα : i.e. the purified soul is familiar with the region through which it must travel.
a8 ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν : 81 c 10.
περὶ ἐκεῖνο (sc. τὸ σῶμα) ... ἐπτομήνῃ, 'in eager longing for'. The verb πτοεῖσθαι always refers to fluttering or palpitation of the heart, often, as here, caused by desire. For desire of the corporeal in a disembodied soul cp. 81 e 1.
b4 ὅπερ : Cobet proposed οἰπερ, but cp. 113 a 2 ὃ ... ἀφικνοῦνται (where, however, Schanz reads οἱ). The poetical form is not out of place here.
b 5 τοιοῦτον: i.e. ἀκάθαρτον.

b 7 ταύτην μὲν resumes τὴν μὲν above.

b 8 συνέμπορος: συνοδουπόρος Timaeus. The word is poetical, like the use of the simple ἐμπορος for ‘wayfarer’.

αὐτὴ, ‘by itself’, ‘alone’.

c 1 ἐστὶν ἄν ... γένονταί, ‘till they have passed.’ The χρόνοι are the περίοδοι. Cp. Prot. 320 a 7 πρὶν εἶ ἡ μὴνα γεγονέναι.

δὴ τίνες: cp. 107 d 7 n.

c 2 ἧν ἔλθοντων, ‘when they are gone,’ i.e. when they have passed.

ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης is equivalent, as often, to εἰ ἀνάγκης. There is no personification.

c 3 μετρῶς: i.e. καλῶς. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

c 7 τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσβάθμων λέγειν. From the time of Anaximander and Hecataeus the construction of γῆς περίοδοι had been a feature of Ionic science (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 53, n. 4). Aristophanes mentions a περίοδος containing the whole earth as among the furniture of the φροντιστήριον (Clouds 206). In this passage, as we shall see, Socrates abandons the central doctrine of Ionian geography.

c 8 ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι. It is best not to inquire too curiously who this was. It was not Archelaus; for he believed the earth to be a flat disk hollow in the centre. It was not Anaximander; for he regarded the earth as cylindrical. It was not a Pythagorean; for the ‘hollows’ are distinctively Ionian. The influence of Empedocles on the details of the description is well marked. Such an attempt to reconcile opposing views may well have been made at Athens during the second half of the fifth century B.C., but hardly at any other time or anywhere else. Personally, I am quite willing to believe that the theory is that of Socrates himself. It can scarcely have been seriously entertained by Plato at the time he wrote the Phaedo; but it continued to have great influence. The cosmology of Posidonius, as we know it from the Περὶ κόσμου wrongly included in the Aristotelian corpus, is based upon that of the Phaedo, and it was in substance the cosmology of Posidonius which ultimately prevailed over the more scientific doctrines of the Academy, and dominated European thought till the time of Copernicus. The leading thought is that, if the earth is spherical, there must be other οἰκούμενα than the one we know; for our οἰκούμενη is but a small portion of the surface of the sphere.
NOTES

4 d. οὐχ ή Γλαύκου τέχνη: Eusebius has οὐχί ή, so perhaps we should read οὐχί for οὐχ ή with Heindorf, who shows that later writers quote the proverb in this form. The paraemographers give several explanations of it, the simplest of which is that it comes ἀπὸ Γλαύκου Σαμίου διὰ πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεύρει σιδήρου (cp. Hdt. i. 25). I believe, however, that the more complicated explanation is right, and that the reference is to a working model of the 'harmony of the spheres’ originally designed by Hippasus, for which see Appendix II.

5 d. έλεον καὶ ἡμέραν, τὰς σταθομέρες, τὰς μέντοι ἀληθείας, sc. πέπεισμαί, χαλεπότερον, sc. δηγήσασθαι.

9 d. έξαρκεῖν is the best attested reading, but that of B, έξαρκεῖ, might stand, if we take μοι δοκεῖ as a parenthesis.

4 c. Πέπεισμα ὡς... δεῖν: anacoluthon.

5 e. ἐν μέσῳ... περιφερής οὐσία: the original Pythagorean doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 345). Note the propriety with which οὐρανός is used for 'the world’, i.e. everything contained within the heavens (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 31). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates adopt the later Pythagorean view, that the earth revolves round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.).

109 a 1. ἀέρος: the accepted Ionian doctrine (cp. 99 b 8 n.).

2 a. τὴν ὁμοιότητα, 'its equipollence.' This is another instance of historical accuracy in terminology; for the terms ὁμοιός and ὁμοιότης were originally employed where ἴσος and ἴσότης would have been used later. Cp. Proclus, Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, p. 250. 22 Friedlein λέγεται γάρ δή πρῶτος ἐκεῖνος Ἡθὸς ἐπιτιθέσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀρά παντὸς ἵσοσκελούς αὐτὸ τῇ βάσει γονίᾳ ἴσαί εἰσίν (Eucl. i. 5), ἀρχαίκωτερον δὲ τὰς ἴσας ὁμοιὰς προσευχηρκέναι. Just as what we call equal angles were called similar angles, so a sphere was said to be 'similar every way'. Aristotle ascribes both the theory and the use of the term ὁμοιότης to Anaximander (de Coelo 295 b 11 εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἵ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τὰ φαινείν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν γῆν) μένειν, ὅσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων 'Ἀναξιμιανδροῦς' μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἀνω ἥ κατω ἣ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσθήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἰδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἐσχάτα. ἐχον, ἀμα 8' ἀδύνατον εἰς τάναντια ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κινήσιν 'δοσ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν. It is quite wrong to take ὁμοιότης as referring to homogeneity of substance or density. As we shall see, the world is not homogeneous in substance at all.

3 a. τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἱσορροπίαν, 'the equilibrium of the earth itself.'
Anaximander’s cylindrical earth could hardly be called ἱσόρροπον like the Pythagorean spherical earth in the centre of a spherical world (οὐρανός).

a 6 ὁμοίως ... ἔχουν is equivalent to ὁμοίων ὅν (πάντῃ). Cp. Aristotle loc. cit. (a 2 n.) ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔχασα ἔχουν.

a 8 Καὶ ὅρθως γέ. The ready assent of Simmias marks the doctrine, so far, as Pythagorean.

a 9 πάμμεγά τι εἶναι is a direct contradiction of Archelaus, who said κείσθαι δ’ ἐν μέσῳ (τὴν γῆν) οὐδὲν μέρος οὐσαν, ὦς εἰπεῖν, τοῦ παντός (Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9. 3).


b 1 τοὺς μέχρι κτλ. The Pillars of Herakles are well known as the boundary of the οἰκουμένη on the west, and Aeschylus spoke of the Phasis as the boundary of Europe and Asia (fr. 185) διδύμων χθόνις Εὐρώπης | μέγαν ὥδ’ Ἀσίας τερμόνα Φάσιν), cp. Hdt. iv. 45. So Eur. Ἡρ. 3 ὡσι τε Πόντον τερμόνων τ’ Ἀτλαντικῶν | ναιώσει εἷσον.

b 2 περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν οἰκούντας, ‘dwelling round the Mediterranean (the θάλασσα κατ’ ἐξοχῆν) like frogs or ants round a swamp.’ (Cp. Ἕλ. Μ. τέλμα· τόπος πηλὼδης ὕδωρ ἔχουν.)

b 3 καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι κτλ. As Wytenbach saw, this part of the theory comes from Anaxagoras (and Archelaus). Cp. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 8. 9 εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν γῆν) κοιλὴν καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασιν (Ἀναξαγόρας φησίν), ib. 9. 4 λίμνην γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον (τὴν γῆν), ἀτε κύκλῳ μὲν οὕσαν ύψηλῆς, μέσον δὲ κοιλὴν (Ἀρχέλαος φησίν), a view which is obviously a generalization from the Mediterranean basin. Here it is combined with the theory of a spherical earth (Anaxagoras and Archelaus believed in a flat earth), and it is assumed that there are several such basins with water in the middle and inhabited land round them. According to Posidonius, too, there were many οἰκουμέναι, but they were islands, not hollows.

b 6 τὸ τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὰμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἄερα. Here again Plato correctly represents fifth-century science, according to which water is condensed air, mist being the intermediate state between them (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 79, n. 1). The discovery of atmospheric air as a body different from mist was due to Empedocles (ib. p. 263) and Anaxagoras (ib. p. 309); but it appears that the Pythagoreans adhered to the older view. Cp. Tim. 58 d 1 ἄερος (γένη) τὸ μὲν εὐαγέστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθὴρ καλούμενος, ὦ δὲ ἔθελετάτος ὰμίχλη τε καὶ σκότος.
b 7  αὐτήν ... τὴν γῆν: the true surface of the earth (called below ‘the true earth’), as opposed to the basins or ‘hollows’. It rises above the mist and ‘air’. It is clear that we are to suppose considerable distances between the basins.

b 8  αἰθέρα: αἰθήρ is properly the sky regarded as made of blue fire. This, as we see from the passage of the Timaeus quoted in the last note, was supposed to be air still further rarefied. It is the intermediary between fire and air, as ὀμίχλη is that between air and water.

c 1  τοὺς πολλοὺς κτλ. This implies that Socrates knows the divergent views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former of whom gave the name αἰθήρ to atmospheric air (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 263 sq.), while the latter used it of fire (ib. p. 312 n. 1).

. τῶν περί τὰ τοῦτα εἰσβοθών λέγειν: I do not know any other instance of περί c. acc. after λέγειν in Plato (Gorg. 490 c 8 is not one; for πλέον ἑξειν is ‘understood’ and λέγειν is parenthetical). I am inclined to think the words εἰσβοθῶν λέγειν have been wrongly added from 108 c 7. For the resulting phrase cp. Phaedr. 272 c 7 διὰ (λόγον) τῶν περὶ ταῦτα τινων ἀκήκων, ib. 273 a 5 τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα.

c 2  ὑποστάθμην, ‘sediment,’ lit. ‘lees’ (τρυγία, τρύξ Hesych.). Note that air, mist, and water are the sediment of the αἰθήρ.

d 4  παρὰ σφίσι: Socrates is thinking of a whole people dwelling at the bottom of the sea. This is not inconsistent with εἰ τις above (c 4); for εἰ τις is continued by a plural oftener than not.

d 7  διὰ τοῦτον, sc. διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος.

d 8  τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτῶν, ‘whereas it is just the same thing’ with us as with the imaginary dwellers at the bottom of the sea. For τὸ δὲ cp. 87 c 6 n. I see no reason to suspect the text. The asyndeton explicatium is quite in order; for εἶναι ταῦτῶν is explanatory of ταῦτον δὴ τούτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεποιθέναι (cp. 72 c 3 n.).

e 2  ἐπ’ ἀκρα: the surface of the ‘air’ is parallel to that of the sea (d 1).

e 3  κατιδόν (ἀν): the δῆ of Eusebius is probably a trace of the lost ἀν (AN, ΔΗ), which might easily be dropped by haplography.

e 4  ἀνακύπτοντες: cp. Phaedr. 249 c 3 (ψυχή) ἀνακύψατα εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ ὄντως. The position of the attributive participle outside the article and its noun is normal when there is another attribute. Cp. Phil. 21 c 2 τῆς ἐν τῷ παραξρήμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτοῦσης.
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e 5  οὐτὸς ἄν τινα . . . κατίδειν is a good instance of a form of
'binary structure', noted by Riddell (Dig. § 209), in which 'the fact
illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration,
and re-stated after it' (a b a).

e 7  δ ἄληθὸς . . . τὸ ἄληθνόν . . . ἦ ὃς ἄληθος: observe how Plato
varies the expression.

110 a 1  ἢδε . . . ἦ γῆ, 'this earth of ours,' i.e. the hollow in which we
dwell and which we take to be the surface of the earth.

a 5  σῆραγγες, σῆραγγεζ, ἱφαλος πέτρα βῆγματα ἔχουσα, Hesych., Suid.

a 6  δπου ἄν καὶ [ἦ] γῆ ἦ, 'wherever there is earth' to mix with the
water. Though there is no good authority for the omission of ἦ, it
is certainly better away.

a 8  ἐκεῖνα, the things above on the true earth which are in turn (aδ) as
superior to what we have as those are to the things in the sea.

b 1  εἰ γαρ δῆ . . . καλὸν is far the best attested reading, though
B omits καλὸν and alters δῆ to δεῖ. Olympiodorus apparently had
δεῖ and καλὸν, for he finds it necessary to explain why the μῦθος is
called beautiful. It is to be observed that a μῦθος is only in place where
we cannot apply the strictly scientific method. There is nothing
'mythical' about the εἶδῆ, but all we call 'natural science' is neces-
arily so, as is explained at the beginning of the Timaeus. It is, at

b 6  ἦ γῆ αὐτῆ, 'the true earth.'

ὡσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαίραι, 'like balls made of twelve pieces
of leather.' This is an allusion to the Pythagorean theory of the
dodecahedron, which was of special significance as the solid which
most nearly approaches the sphere (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 341 sq.). To
make a ball, we take twelve pieces of leather, each of which is
a regular pentagon. If the material were not flexible, we should
have a regular dodecahedron; as it is flexible, we get a ball. This
has nothing to do with the twelve signs of the zodiac, as modern
editors incorrectly say. Cp. Tim. 55 c 4 ἔτι δὲ οὖσης συντάσσεως μᾶς
πέμπτης (a fifth regular solid besides the pyramid or tetrahedron,
the cube, and the icosahedron), ἔτι τὸ πᾶν δ θεὸς αὐτῆ κατεξρήσατο
ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφὸν ('when he painted it', see next note). The
author of the Timaeus Locrus is perfectly right in his paraphrase of
this (98 e) τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγυστα σφαίρας
ἐῶν. The whole matter is fully explained in Wyttenbach's note,
from which it will be seen that it was clearly understood by Plutarch, Simplicius, and others. Proclus, in his *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid*, shows how the whole edifice of the *Elements* leads up to the inscription of the regular solids (κοσμικὰ or Πλατωνικὰ σχῆματα) in the sphere.

b 7 χρωμασιν διειλημμένη. The true earth is represented as a patchwork of different colours (for διειλημμένη cp. 81 c 4 n.). This must be the explanation of the words ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν, ‘painting it in different colours’ (cp. διαποκιλλω). Each of the twelve pentagons has its own colour.

b 8 δείγματα, ‘samples.’ In the same way our precious stones are ‘pieces’ (μορφα) of the stones of the true earth (below, d 8).

c 2 πολύ ἐτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων: for the position of ἐκ cp. 70 c 1 n.

η τούτων: the case after η assimilated to that before it (Riddell, Dig. § 168). Cp. *Meno* 83 c 8 ἀπὸ μείζονος . . . ἡ τοσαύτης γράμμη, *Laws* 892 b 1 ὀφθης γ’ αὐτῆς (sc. ψυχῆς) πρεσβυτέρας ἡ σώματος.

τὴν μὲν . . . , sc. γῆν, ‘one portion of it,’ one pentagon.

c 4 τὴν δὲ δοσὶ λευκῆ, ‘all the part of it which is white.’

c 6 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κτλ. The meaning is that, as the basins or ‘hollows’ are full of ‘air’ and water, the surfaces of these produce the appearance of glistening patches among the other colours, so that the general appearance is that of a continuous (συνεχές) surface of various colours (ποικίλον).

c 7 ἐκπλεα is quite a good word, and there is no need to read ἐμπλεα with inferior authorities.

d 3 ἀνὰ λόγον, ‘proportionally.’

d 6 τὴν τε λειότητα: so W. B makes the almost inevitable mistake τὴν τελειότητα, and so at first did T, but erased it in time.

d 7 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα, ‘the precious stones that are so highly prized in our world.’ Prof. Ridgeway has some interesting observations on the relation between the Pythagorean solids and natural crystals in *Class. Rev.* x (1896) p. 92 sqq..

e 1 οὐδὲν δει ποῦ, ‘every one of them.’ The phrase is regularly treated as a single word equivalent to πάντα. Hence the plural καλλιω.

e 3 οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι κτλ. Another instance of interlaced order (a b a b); for διαπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε υπὸ τῶν δεύρῳ συνεργηκότων go closely together, and υπὸ σημείων καὶ ἄλμης goes with διε-
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ϕθαρμένων (so Stallbaum). The συνερρυγκότα are water, mist, and air (cp. 109 b 6).

c 5 τοῖς ἄλλοις, 'to animals and plants besides.' Cp. Gorg. 473 c 7 ὑπὸ τῶν πολίτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χέων.

III a 1 ἐκφανή, 'exposed to view,' not, as with us, hidden beneath the earth.

a 6 ἐν νῆσοις κτλ. This is an attempt to fit the old idea of the Islands of the Blest into the mythical landscape. Cp. Pindar, Ol. ii. 130 ἐνθά μακάρων | νάσος ὄκεανίδες | αὐραὶ περιπτεοπιτειν, which is humourously paraphrased by ἀς περιπτειν τὸν ἄφα, the air being the sea in which these islands are. But they are 'close to the mainland', otherwise we should see them from our hollow! The suggestion of Olympiodorus, that these men feed on the apples of the Hesperides, is therefore not so wide of the mark as might appear.

a 7 ὁπερ... τοῦτο... , the regular way of expressing a proportion. Cp. Ποιδ. 5 αἵα λόγον.

b 2 κρᾶσιν, 'temperature.' In Greek, however, as in French, the word has a wider sense than in English. It is not only the due temperamentum of the hot and cold, but also that of the wet and dry (cp. 86 b 9 n.). The κρᾶσις τῶν ὄρων is 'climate'.

b 4 φρονήσει: sight and hearing stand for the senses generally (hence πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα), to which intelligence must of course be added. It is, therefore, wrong to read ὁσφρήσει with Heindorf. Cp. Rep. 367 c 7 οἴον ὄραμ, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν.

b 6 ἄλογη: T has ἔθη, and this reading was adopted by Heindorf from the apographa. In the Lexicon of Timaeus we read ἐδος τὸ ἄγαλμα. καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ὁ ἐξερυθα, and, as the word does not occur elsewhere in Plato, this may indicate that Timaeus read it here, but ἄλογη seems better. Cp. Livy, xxxv. 51 in fano lucoque.

b 7 φήμας, 'sacred voices.' Like φάτις and κληδών, φήμη is used of omens conveyed by the hearing of significant words. Virg. Aen. vii. 90 Et varias audit voces, fruitorque deorum | colloquio.

b 8 αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν: not in dreams or visions, as some say. The point is just that they see the gods with their waking senses.

c 1 αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς, 'face to face.' Here πρὸς αὐτούς (τοὺς θεούς) belongs to συνυοσίας and αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) to γίγνεσθαι (α ὃ ὃ ὃ).

c 2 οἰα τυχάνει ὄντα, 'as they really are.' This is an astronomer's vision of blessedness.

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36 τοὺς μὲν κτλ. Three sorts of τὸσοι are enumerated (1) deeper and broader (than the Mediterranean basin), (2) deeper and narrower, (3) shallower and broader. The fourth possibility, shallower and narrower, is not mentioned. Plato does not care for symmetry of this kind.

c8 αὐτῶν: Heindorf read αὐτῶν from inferior MSS., and I formerly conjectured αὐ. No change, however, is necessary. For the pleonasm cp. Riddell, Dig. § 223. It assists the shift from ὄντας to ἔχειν.

d2 ὑπὸ γῆν... συντετρήσθαι, 'are connected by subterranean openings.' This seems to come from Diogenes of Apollonia. Cp. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. iv. 2. 28 sunt enim perforata omnia et invicem pervia. The geological conformation of the country made such views seem very credible in Greece.

d5 ὀσπερ εἰς κρατήρας: cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1593 κοίλου πέλας κρατήρος ('near the basin in the rock', Jebb). A scholium on this passage of Sophocles runs: τοῦ μυχοῦ τὰ γάρ κοίλα ὄντων ἐκάλουν ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Αἰτνη κοιλώματα κρατήρες καλοῦνται. Cp. such names as 'The Devil's Punchbowl' in English. It is easier to understand how the crater of a volcano got its name, if we may trust this scholium, and the rocky basins fit in very well with the present context.

e1 ἐν Σικελία κτλ. This seems to come from the Sicilian Empedocles, who explained the hot springs of his native island by comparing them to pipes used for heating warm baths (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 277). The ρύαξ is the lava-stream. Cp. Thuc. iii. 116 ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκ τούτο ὁ ρύαξ τοῦ πυρός ἐκ τῆς Αἰτνης.

3 ὡς ἄν: the MSS. have ὄν ἄν, but Stallbaum's conjecture ὡς ἄν is now confirmed by Stobaeus.

e4 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κτλ. The theory is thus stated in Aristotle's Μετεωρολογικά, 355 b 32 sqq. τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ Φαιδωνι γεγραμμένου περὶ τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης ἀδύνατον ἐστίν. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπαντά μὲν εἰς ἀλληλα συντετρηται ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀρχῇ δὲ πάντων εἰκ καὶ πηγῇ τῶν ὑδάτων ὁ καλοῦμενος Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον ὑδάτος τι πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ ρέοντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ρέοντα ἀναδίδονται πάντα τῇ δὲ ἐπίρροσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἐκαστα τῶν ρευμάτων διὰ τὸ σαλέων ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχειν γὰρ ἔδραν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλεύσθαι (Ἤ. Ἰλλεύσθαι, 'oscillate') κινούμενον δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιεῖν τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τῶν ρευμάτων. τὰ δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν λιμνάζειν, οἶκαν καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν εἰναι θάλασσαν, πάντα δὲ
πάλιν κύκλω περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἄρχην, ὃθεν ἤρξαντο ἰδίων, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρῦ τῇ δέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ἰδίων ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἀνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. εἰναι δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τὴν κάθεσιν τὸ γὰρ λουπὸν πρὸς ἀνάρτους ἁδὴ πάσης εἶναι τὴν φοράν. τοὺς δὲ χύμοις καὶ τὰς χριόσεις ἰσχεῖν τὸ ὁδόρ δὲ ὀίας ἄν τύχωσι ρέωτα γῆς.

4 "ἀστερ παιδραν πυνα (cp. 66 b 4 π.), 'a sort of see-saw,' ἀντιταλάντωσις Olympiodorus, cp. French balancement from bilancem. The term αἰώρησις, gestatio, was familiar in medical practice, where it was used of any exercise in which the body is at rest, sailing, driving, &c. (cp. Tim. 89 a 7), and αἴωρα meant a 'swing' or 'hammock' (Laws 789 d 3). Aristotle's paraphrase has διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν. The whole description shows that a sort of pulsation, like the systole and diastole of the heart, is intended. The theory is, in fact, an instance of the analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 79), and depends specially on the Empedoclean view of the close connexion between respiration and the circulation of the blood (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 253).

112 a 1 διαμπετρεῖς τετρμένον, 'perforated right through.' Tartarus has another opening antipodal to that first mentioned. We are not told that it is a straight tunnel, but that seems likely, and we shall see that it passes through the centre of the earth. So, too, Dante's Hell is a chasm bored right through the earth (Inferno, xxxiv, sub fin., Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 101).

2 "Ομήρος: II. viii. 14. 'The Arcadian form of βέρεβρον, scil. ζέρεβρον, was the special name for the singular "Katavothra" of Arcadia' (Geddes). Cp. Strabo, p. 389 τῶν βερέβρων, ἀ καλόνων όι 'Αρκαδες ζερεβρα, τυφλων δυτων και μη δεχομενον απερασιν. The whole account of Stymphalus, from which this is taken, is very suggestive of the present passage.

4 ἀλλοθρ.: II. viii. 481.

7 δι' οίας ἄν... γῆ: Aristotle (l. c. sub fin.) specifies taste and colour as the characteristics the rivers derive from the earth they flow through.

b 2 τυθένα... βάσιν: Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἐδραν. There is no bottom at the centre of the earth. 'On comprendra la pensée de Platon en se rappelant que théoriquement une pierre jetée dans un puits traversant la terre selon un diamètre irait indéfiniment d'une extrémité à l'autre' (Couvreur). We must keep in mind
throughout this passage that everything falls to the earth's centre. The impetus (δρμή) of the water takes it past the centre every time, but it falls back again, and so on indefinitely.

b 3 ἀλωρεται δὴ κτλ. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἄει περὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλει-σθαί, for which we must read ἰλεισθαί, the proper word for oscillatory or pendulum motion. (Cp. Tim. 40 b 8, where I take the meaning to be the same. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 346 sq.) καὶ κυμαίνει: the doxographical tradition connects this with the tides. Cp. Aëtius on the ebb and flow of the tides (Dox. p. 383) Πλάτων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰώραν φέρεται τῶν ἵδατών· εἶναι γάρ τινα φυσικὴν αἰώραν διὰ τῶν ἐγγείου τρῆματος περιφέρουσαν τὴν παλύρροιαν, ὑφ’ ἃς ἀντι-κυμαίνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη. From this we may infer that there are two oscillations a day.

b 4 τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ, sc. τὸ περὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. The πνείμα is mentioned because the whole theory is derived from that of respiration. Cp. the account of ἀναπνοή in Tim. 80 d 1 sqq., where much of the phraseology of the present passage recurs: τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ... γέγονεν ... τέμνοντος μὲν τὰ σατία τοῦ πυρός, αἰωρομένου δὲ ἐντὸς τῶν πνεύματι συνεπομένου (cp. b 4), τὰς φλέβας ... τῇ συναιωρήσει (cp. b 7) πλη-ροῦντος τῶ ... ἐπαντλεῖν (cp. c 3). Brunetto Latini 'speaks, very much in the same way as Plato does, of waters circulating in channels through the Earth, like blood through the veins of the body' (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 103).

b 5 εἰς τὸ ἐπ’ ἐκείνα ... εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, 'in the direction of the further side of the earth' (the antipodes), 'in the direction of the hither side'.

c 2 τὸν δὴ κάτω καλοῦμενον: the words δὴ and καλοῦμενον are a protest against the popular view that the antipodes are 'down'. It is just to avoid this incorrectness that Socrates says τὰ ἐπ’ ἐκείνα, or τὰ κατ’ ἐκείνα.

τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα ... εἰςρεῖ, 'the streams flow into the regions on the further side of the earth,' as opposed to τὰ ἐνθάδε. I apprehend that τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα must be explained in the same way as b 5 τὸ ἐπ’ ἐκείνα, and in that case τὰ βεῦματα must be the subject. Further, if we omit διὰ in c 3 with Stobaeus, we may take τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς together. Even if we retain διὰ I have no doubt that we must 'understand' τῆς γῆς after τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνα. Cp. Aristotle's paraphrase (loc. cit. III c 4 n.) τὴν δ’ ἐπίρροσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ’ ἐκαστα τῶν ῥευ-
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μάτων, where τῶν ἰενμάτων is governed by ἐπίρρυσιν, and ἐφ' ἐκάστα means ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἐπὶ τάδε.

c 3 ἀσσερ ὑ ἐπαντλούντες, sc. πληροῦσιν, 'like irrigators.' The word ἐπαντλεῖν is used of raising water to a height for purposes of irrigation (Dict. Ant. s. v. Antlia). No stress is to be laid on the particular process by which this is done; the point of the simile lies in the way the water rises to a point further from the centre (whether on this side of it or the other) and then flows off through the channels (ὁχτοί, τίνι) like irrigation waters.

c 4 ἐκεῖθεν... δεύρο, 'from the antipodes... towards us.'

c 6 εἰς τοὺς τόπους κτλ. All the streams are raised by the αἰώρα above the centre (on either side) and are drained off to τόπου on the surface of the earth, from which they once more find their way back to Tartarus by subterranean channels.

c 7 ἐκάστοις ὀδοποιήται, 'a way is made for each of them.' The simile of the irrigation-channels is kept up. The εἰδοποιεῖται of W confirms the ὀδοποιήται of Stobaeus, and T has ἐκάστοις as well as Stobaeus. The reading of B (εἰς οὐς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιεῖται) is inferior to this.

d 3 θῇ: there is some doubt as to the necessity of inserting θ here and in d 5. It seems safer, however, to insert it. In Symp. 173 a 6 B has θ and TW θ. In Crito 44 a BTW have θ θ.

d 4 ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τής ἐκροῆς, 'at a lower level than the point of issue' really means nearer the centre of the earth, not nearer the antipodes.

d 5 καταντικρυ... κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος: Aristotle (loc. cit. III 4.) interprets these words by κάτωθεν and ἄνωθεν, by which he clearly means 'on the other side' and 'on this side of' the earth's centre. The choice of words is unfortunate (especially as he bases his criticism on them); for we have been warned (c 1) that to call the antipodes 'down' is only a popular way of speaking. In substance, however, Aristotle seems to me quite right in his interpretation. I do not see how κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος can mean 'on the same side of Tartarus', as many recent editors suppose. The phrase must surely be interpreted in the light of e 2 τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν... μέρος, which certainly refers to the sections of Tartarus on either side of the earth's centre. The difficulties which editors have raised about this interpretation are purely imaginary. So long as a stream falls
into Tartarus at a point nearer the earth’s centre than it issued from it, it may correctly be said to fall into it ὑποκάτω τῆς ἐκροῆς, quite irrespective of whether it debouches on this side of the earth’s centre or on the other.

d 5 〈ἡ〉 ἡ [εἰσορεί] εἵπεσεν, sc. εἰσορεί. If we omit εἰσορεί with Stobaeus we can take ἡ (or ἡ ἡ) εἵπεσεν together as equivalent to τῆς ἐκροῆς. It is important to observe that εκπίπτεν is the verb corresponding to ἐκροῦ, and that the reference is to the point at which the stream issues from Tartarus.

d 6 ἐστὶ δὲ ἀ κτλ. We have had the case of streams which issue from Tartarus in one hemisphere and fall into it in the other; we are now told of streams which come back to the hemisphere in which they started after circling round the other. They may even make this circuit several times, but with each circuit they will be ‘lower’, i.e. nearer the earth’s centre. Their course will therefore be a spiral, and that is the point of περελιθέντα ... ὡσπερ ὁ δίφεις, for ἐλιξ means just ‘spiral’. As to περὶ τὴν γῆν it does not necessarily mean ‘round (the outside of) the earth’. Cp. ii3 b 1 n.

d 8 καθένα is intransitive or rather ‘objectless’. Cp. Ar. Knights 430 εἴρειμι γὰρ σου λαμπρὸς ἡδὲ καὶ μέγας καθείς (of a wind), and συγκαθέναι (sc. ἑαυτοῦ), ‘to condescend.’

e 1 ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, ‘in either direction as far as the middle,’ that is to say, from either opening of Tartarus to its middle, which coincides with the centre of the earth.

e 2 ἀναντεῖ γὰρ κτλ., ‘for the part (of Tartarus) on either side (of the centre) is uphill to both sets of streams,’ i.e. both to those which fall into it καταντικρὸ ἡ ἡ ἐξεσεν and to those which fall into it κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. The πρὸς which B and W insert in different places is probably due to an ancient variant πρόσαντες. How old that variant must be is shown by the fact that Aristotle (loc. cit.) has πρὸς ἀναντεῖ. Heindorf conjectured πρόσω, and recent editors follow him, but that is a non-Attic form and not used by Plato.


e 6 ἐξωτάτω, ‘furthest from the centre.’

e 7 περὶ κύκλῳ, ‘round in a circle.’ There seems to be no doubt that

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perí can be used as an adverb in this phrase. Cp. Tim. 40 a 6 neímas perí pánta kúklw tón ouránwv, Laus 964 e 4 perí álhn kúklw t'wn túln óràn. The phrase is also found written in one word (v. L. & S. s. v. períkuklos) and this is how B writes it here. Perhaps Hermann is right in accenting perí to show that it is an adverb. We are not told that the λίμνη made by Oceanus is the Mediterranean, but that is doubtless so.

e 7 καταντικρύ, 'diametrically opposite,' i.e. on the opposite side of the centre of the earth (cp. ι12 d 5 n.). Acheron is the antipodal counterpart of Oceanus, running in the opposite direction. It is fitting that the place of the dead should be in the other hemisphere. In the Axioschus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., we are told (371 b 2) that 'the gods below' took possession of τó ἐτερον ἡμισφαίριον.

ι13 a I ὡς γὴν ῥέων: the Acherusian Lake is subterranean.

a 2 οὖ: cp. 108 b 4 n.

tón políllαν: all except αἱ τῶν ὄρθως φιλοσοφοῦντων. Cp. ι14 b 6 sqq.

a 5 εἰς τάς τῶν ἔσων γενέσεις, 'for the births of animals.' Cp. 81 e 2 sqq.

toútwv kata méson: i.e. at a point intermediate between Oceanus and Acheron. As Oceanus flows ἓξωτάτω, i.e. furthest from the centre (ι12 e 6 n.), Acheron will branch off from Tartarus nearer the centre, but on the other side. The point intermediate between these ἐκβολαι will therefore be above the centre on the same side as Oceanus.

a 6 ἐκβάλλει, 'issues', 'branches off' (from Tartarus). The word is synonymous with ἐκπίπτει (ι12 d 5 n.) and so is ἐκβολή with ἐκροή.

a 7 πυρὶ ... καόμενον. It seems to me that this may have been suggested by the remarkable statements in the Περίπλουs of the Carthaginian Hanno (§§ 11–14) about the regions blazing with fire which were seen on the voyage southward from Cape Verde to Sierra Leone. If so, Pyriphlegethon is doubtless the Senegal. The Περίπλουs, if genuine, would be well known in Sicily in the fifth century B.C.

b 1 περιελιστόμενος ... τῇ γῇ is generally assumed to mean 'winding round the earth', whereas it is clear that, like Cocytus (c 3), Pyriphlegethon must go under the earth after leaving the λίμνη in order to reach the Acherusian Lake, which is certainly subter-
In the erroneous belief that Eusebius omits τὴν γῆν, most editors bracket the words; but this is quite unnecessary. They can quite well mean ‘coiling itself round inside the earth’ (ambire terram intus in ipsa, Stallbaum); cp. II. xxii. 95 ἐλισσόμενος περὶ χείρ of a serpent ‘coiling himself round (the inside of) his nest’ (Monro). Cp. ΙΙΙ d 8 ὀσπερ ὦ ὀσέας.

b 3 οὐ συμμειληγόμενος τῷ ὑδάτι: cp. II. ii. 753 ὄδοι ὦ γέ (sc. Τιταρήσιος) Πηνείῳ συμμισθοται ἀργυροδινη, | ἀλλὰ τὲ μὲν κατεπερευ ἐπιρρέει ἤν τῇ ἕλαιον | ὄρκον γὰρ δεινοῦ Ἑττύ̄ος ὑδατὸς ἐστὶν ἀπορρόφῳ.

b 4 κατωτέρω τού Ταρτάρου, ‘at a lower point in Tartarus,’ i.e. nearer the earth’s centre than the Acherusian Lake, which must itself be nearer the centre than the ἐκβολή of Pyrphlegethon, though on the opposite side.

b 6 δὴ ἄν τὺχωσι τῆς γῆς, ‘at various points on the earth’s surface.’ This shows that Pyrphlegethon in its subterranean spiral course passes under Etna. For the βύακες cp. ΙΙΙ ε 1 n.

τούτου . . . κατανυκρῷ: i.e. on the other side of the earth’s centre, but nearer it than the ἐκβολή of Acheron, though further from it than the Acherusian Lake.

b 8 οἶνον ὅ κανόν: it is not certain what substance is intended. In Theophrastus κανόν is λαπίς lazuli and that stone is probably meant here. In any case, we are to think of a bluish grey, steely colour, in strong contrast to the fiery plain of Pyrphlegethon.

c 1 ἄν δῆ, sc. τόπου (not ποταμῶν). For δῆ cp. ΙΟΤ ε 1 n.

d 3 διέδικασαντο: cp. ΙΟΤ d 8 n.

βιώσαντες: the Ionic participle is in place in a solemn passage like this, though in 95 c 3 we have the Attic βιώσει. Later, the Ionic form became trivial, as in the λαθε βιώσας of Epicurus.

d 4 οὐ . . . ἄν διδξον, ‘those who are found to have —,’ a regular forensic expression.

μέσως, ‘middlingly,’ to be distinguished from μετρίως which stands for εἰ.

d 5 ἂ δῆ κτλ. Another allusive and mysterious δῆ (cp. ΙΟΤ ε 1 n.). The δχῆματα on which they embark must be boats of some kind. Charon’s bark is familiar, but there are other boats of the dead besides that.

d 6 τὴν Λίμνην, sc. τὴν Ἀχεροουσίάδα.

d 7 καθαίρομενοι: Purgatory is an essentially Orphic idea. Cf. Suid.
(s. u. Ἀχέρων) ὁ δὲ Ἀχέρων καθαρσία ἐσκε καὶ οὗ κολαστηρίῳ, σπερμάτων καὶ σμήνων τὰ ἀμαρτήματά τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν. They are purified by fire as well as by water.

d 7 διδόντες δίκαιος is subordinate to καθαρσίμενοι, 'purged by punishment.'

d 8 εὐφρεσιών, 'good deeds,' seems to have been the regular word in this connexion (opp. ἀδικήματα). Cp. Rep. 615 b 6 εἴ τινες εὐφρεσιάς εὐπρεσικότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσοι γεγονότες εἶν.

e 2 ἀνάτως ἡχάν κτλ. The doctrine of the incurable sinners occurs also in the myths of the Gorgias (525 c sqq.) and the Republic (615 e sqq.). The rudiments of it are to be found in the picture of the three great sinners—Tantalus, Ixion, and Sisyphus—in the Νέκυα of the eleventh book of the Odyssey. From the Gorgias we learn that they are eternally punished as παραδείγματα.

e 6 οὔποτε, 'nevermore,' is more solemn than the everyday οὐδέποτε, 'never.' The Neoplatonists are very anxious to get rid of the doctrine of eternal punishment, but it is stated quite explicitly.

114 a 1 μεταμέλον: accusative absolute, cum eos paenitierit. Tr. 'and have lived (aor. subj.) the rest of their life in repentance.' Any impersonal verb may take this construction: cp. Ἀφολ. 24 d 4 μελον γέ σοι, Rep. 346 b 4 συμφέρον αὐτῶ, 'when it is good for him.'

a 2 τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ ἀλλῳ τρόπῳ, 'in some other way of the same sort,' viz. as those who have done wrong ἅπ' ὀργῆς.

a 5 τὸ κύμα, 'the reflux.' Cp. 112 b 3 κυμαίνει διὸ καὶ κάτω. This fits in well with the general scheme. Pyrophlegethon and Cocytus rise in opposite hemispheres. When the water in Tartarus rushes εὖ τάδε it casts them out by Pyrophlegethon, when it rushes εὖ ἐκείνα by Cocytus.

κατά τὸν Κωκυτόν, 'down Cocytus.' Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. 16 τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἔχωρει. In a 7 κατὰ τὴν λίμνην we have another meaning of κατά, 'on the level of,' 'opposite to.' It must be remembered that the waters of Pyrophlegethon and Cocytus do not mingle with the Purgatorial Lake.

b 7 διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ δόσις βιῶναι, 'to have led exceptionally holy lives,' as contrasted with those who have lived μέσως (113 d 4). We must 'understand' ξὴν or some such word with δόσις. For such an ellipse Stallbaum compares Euthyd. 281 a 5 τὸ ὄρθως (sc. χρησθαι) ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη, Symp. 181 b 6 ἀμελοῦντες δὲ

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NOTES

to kalôs (sc. diapráξasthai) ἡ μῆ, Phileb. 61 d 1 ἀρα... τοῦ καλῶς ἀν μᾶλστα ἐπιτύχομεν; For similar brachylogies designed to obviate the repetition of the same word cp. Prot. 325 b 3 σκέψαι ὡς θαυμα- σίως γίγνονται οἱ ἄγαθοι (sc. ἄγαθοι), 344 e 1 τὸ δὲ κακῶ (κακῶ) οὐκ ἐγχο- ρεῖ γενέσθαι, Meno 89 a 6 οὐκ ἂν ἔδεν φύσει οἱ ἄγαθοι (sc. ἄγαθοι). The προκεκρίσθαι added by Theodoret is an obvious interpolation.

c 2 ἐπὶ γῆς: i.e. on the 'true earth', the Earthly Paradise.

c 3 ἀνευ... σωμάτων: cp. 76 c 12 χώρις σωμάτων. This is the statement which brought upon Plato the condemnation of the Church as being inconsistent with the resurrection of the body. Eusebius has καμάτων for σωμάτων, which looks like a deliberate falsification.

c 4 οἰκήσεις... τούτων καλλίους. 'We are to think, perhaps, of the natal stars of the Timaeus' (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 109). In any case, those alone reach the Celestial Paradise who have undergone the philosophic κάθαρσις. The ordinary purgation is not sufficient.

c 7 πᾶν ποιεῖν, 'to leave nothing undone.' Cp. Gorg. 479 c 1 πᾶν ποιουσιν ὡστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι.

c 8 καλὸν... τὸ ἀθλὸν: cp. Rep. 608 b 4 Μέγας... ὁ ἄγων, ... μέγας, οὐχ ὅσοι δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, c 1 Καὶ μὴν... τὰ γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἄρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἢθλα οὐ διελθόθαμεν.

d 1 Τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ. The difference between scientific knowledge and a 'probable tale' is once more insisted on. For the expression cp. 63 c 1 sqq., 108 d 5 sqq., Meno 86 b 6 καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυρισμὴν, ὅτι δὲ... περὶ τούτων πᾶν ἂν διαμαχοῖμην. Contrast d 4 ἐπείπερ ἀδάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὐδα ('evidently is').

d 5 πρέπειν, sc. διασχυρισμᾶσθαι.

c 5 ξιόν, sc. εἰσαί, 'that it is worth while to take the risk of thinking it is so.' Cp. 85 d 1.

d 7 ἐπάθεν: cp. 77 e 8.

e 3 πλέον ὥραν... ἀπεργάζοσθαι, 'to do more harm than good.' The phrase occurs twice in the Euthydemus 280 e 5 πλέον γὰρ ποὺ ὁμαι βάτερον ἑστώ, εάν τις χρηταὶ ὑπὲρ οὐκ ὑδρᾶς πράγματι ἢ εὰν ἐῷ, 297 c 7 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ ἰκανός ἐβοήθησεν (sc. Ἰδέεως Ἡρακλεὶ), ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰδέεως ἐἰ ἠλθοῦ, πλέον ἂν βάτερον ποιήσειν. Cp. also Isocr. Aeg. 25 τούτων τὸν ταλαίπωρον οὐδὲς τῶν συγγενῶν... ἐπισκεψόμενος ἀφίκετο, πλὴν τῆς μυτρᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς, αἱ πλέον βάτερον ἐποίησαν. I do not think that, in these places, the meaning is 'to make bad worse' (Hein-
dorj), or that ἀπέρον has anything to do with Pythagorean views about ‘the other’. We should hardly find the phrase in a private speech of Isocrates if it had. More likely it is a colloquialism like πλέον τι ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιεῖν.

a 5 φαίη ἄν ἄνηρ τραγικός, ‘as the man in the play would say’. The phrase does not occur in any extant tragedy.

a 8 νεκρὸν λούειν: for the construction cp. Meno 76 a 9 ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη.

Practical Application. The real Socrates will not die (115 b 1—116 e 7).

b 2 ἐπιστάλλεις is the vox propria for the last wishes of the dying. Cp. 116 b 4.


c 1 οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε, nil proficietis, ‘you will do no good’, ‘it will profit nothing’.

c 6 Οὐ πέθω κτλ. Aelian, V. H. i. 16, has another version of this, which he is not likely to have composed himself: Καὶ πῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καλῶς Ἀπόλλοδωρος δοξάζει, εἰ γε αὐτὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἔξ Ἀθηναίων φιλοτησίαν καὶ τὸ τοῦ φαρμάκου πῶμα ἐτὶ ὄντως ὅφει Σωκράτην; εἰ γὰρ οἴεται τὸν ὀλίγον ὑστερον ἐρρημμένον ἐν ποιλ καὶ κεισόμενον γάρ ἐμὲ εἰναι, δήλος ἐστί με οὐκ εἰδώς. This may be a fragment of Aeschines or another.

c 7 οὗτος Σωκράτης, ‘Socrates here.’ The omission of ὅ is idiomatic when the pronoun is used δεικτικῶς.

d 1 πῶς με θάπτῃ: indirect deliberative. Goodwin, M. T. § 677.

d 4 δὴ τίνας: once more the allusive and mysterious δή. Cp. 107 d 7 n.

d 5 ἄλλος λέγειν: cp. 76 e 4.

d 7 ἢν οὗτος... ἡγγυάτο does not refer to the offer of Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, to become security for the fine of 30 minae which Socrates proposed in his ἄντιληψις (Apol. 38 b 6). We may infer from Crito 44 e 2 sqq. that Crito had further given security that Socrates would not run away (ἡ μὴν παραμενεῖν).
e 3 προτιδεται κτλ. The πρόθεσις (‘laying out for burial’) and the ἐκφορά (‘carrying to the tomb’) are the regular parts of the ceremony before the actual burial. The middle voice of προτιδεσθαι is justified because people lay out ‘their dead’. Cp. Eur. Alc. 663-4 καὶ θανῶντα σὲ | περιστελοῦσι καὶ προβήσουνται νεκρῶν, Thuc. ii. 34. 2 τὰ μὲν ὡστὰ προτιδεται ... ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ἦ ... ἐννεκφέρει ... ὁ Βουλόμενος.

5 εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ‘so far as the thing itself (inaccurate language) goes’.

116 a 2 ἀνώστατο εἰς: cp. Prot. 311 a 4 ἔξαναστώμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν. οἶκημα means ‘a room’.

a 5 τοτὲ δ’ αὖ, as if τοτὲ μὲν had preceded. Cp. the omission of ὁ μὲν, 105 e 1 n.

b 1 δοὺ γὰρ κτλ. Cp. 60 a 2 n.

b 2 αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες ... ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκεῖναι (to be construed with διαλεξθείς) is apparently a conjecture. It seems to be implied that the women of Socrates’ family were well known to Echecrates and his friends. In fact, ἐκεῖναι has much the same effect as the γυνώσκεις γὰρ with which Xanthippe is introduced (60 a 2). It is surely impossible to believe with some editors that Xanthippe is not included among the οἰκεῖαι γυναίκες. The mere fact that the youngest child is brought back seems to show that she is.

b 3 διαλεξθείς, sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς παιδίωσ καὶ ταῖς γυναῖξιν. The vulgate reading ἐκεῖναι would imply that he had no last words for his sons.

b 6 χρόνον ... πολὺν κτλ. As the conversation recorded in the Phaedo began in the morning, and it is now close upon sunset on one of the longest days of the year, it is plain that Socrates spent several hours alone with the women and children. There is no trace of indifference to them. Cp. 60 a 7 n. Of course Phaedo can only narrate conversations at which he was present.

b 8 στὰς πάρ’ αὐτόν, ‘stepping up to him?’

c 5 ἐν τοῦτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, during the thirty days (cp. 58 a 4 n.) for which Socrates had been in prison.

d 6 ἀνδρῶν λαόστος, ‘the best of men.’ In Attic λαόστος is confined to a few phrases.
d 7 ἀποδακρύει: cp. ΠΙ7 c 8 ἀπέκλαον.
d 9 ὁ ἀνθρώπος. It is to be observed that the man who administers the hemlock-draught is not the same person as the officer of the Eleven. The seeds were pounded in a mortar to extract the juice. Cp. App. I.
e 1 ἐπὶ ἡλιον ἐναι κτλ., 'that there is still sunlight on the hilltops.' For this sense of ἡλιος cp. Hdt. viii. 23 ἄμα ἡλιό σκιναμένφ. The meaning cannot be that the sun has not yet sunk behind Cithaeron; for Crito says οἶμαι. He means that, though no longer visible, it is still shining on the hilltops.

ΠΙ7 a 2 γέλωτα δφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, 'to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.'

φειδόμενοσ οὐδενός ἐπὶ ἐννυτος, 'sparring the cup when there is nothing in it,' a proverbial way of speaking. Cp. Hesiod, ἔργα 367 μέσοσθι φειδέσθαι, δείλη δ' ἐν πυθμέν φείδω. For the Latin version of the saying cp. Seneca, Ep. 1 nam, ut visum est maioribus nostris, seria parsimonia in fundo est, 'Begin to spare halfway, it is a sorry saving when you reach the lees' (Geddes).
a 4 τῷ παιδί, 'to his servant.'
b 1 αὐτῶ ποιήσει, 'it will act of itself.' In the medical writers ποιεῖν is used technically of the action of drugs. Heindorf quotes Dioscorides i. 95 ποεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, 'it acts against poisons.'
b 3 καὶ μάλα ἰλεως, 'very cheerfully indeed.' For καὶ μάλα cp. 61 εἰ n. ἰλειως is the adverb.
b 4 οὐδὲ διαφθείρας: Plutarch uses φθείρειν and φθορά of mixing colours (L. S. s. νυ.), and the expression employed here seems to be derived from that technical use. Cp. II. xiii. 284 τού δ' ἀγαθοῦ ωτ' ἄρ τρέπεται χρῶς κτλ.
b 5 ταυρηδόν ὑποβλήψας. This does not seem to have anything to do with ταυροῦσθαι, ἀποταυροῦσθαι, which refer to the glare of an angry bull. An angry or threatening look would be quite out of the picture here. In Arist. Frongs 804 ἐβλήψε γοὺν ταυρηδόν ἐγκύψας κάτω is, indeed, given as a sign that Aeschylus βαρέως φέρει, but ὑποβλήψας is quite different from ἐγκύψας κάτω, which suggests the bull about to toss. It means 'to look askance at' (ὑπόδρα), and, from its use in Hippocrates and Aristotle (L. S. s. ν.), we see that
the original meaning was to look with the eyes half open. It is, then, a ‘mischievous look’ rather than a threatening one.

b 6 πρός τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τιν. Perhaps Socrates thought of pouring a libation in honour of Anytus, just as Theramenes had toasted Critias in hemlock-juice. Cp. Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 56 καὶ ἐπεὶ γε ἀποθνῄσκειν ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κόνειον ἔπιε, τὸ λειπόμενον ἐφάσαν ἀποκοταβισάντα ἐπείν αὐτῶν. Κριτία τοῦτ' ἔστω τῷ καλῷ. For the use of πρός cp. Symp. 174 b 1 πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν δὲν ἑναὶ ἀκλητος ἐπὶ δείπνον.

c 4 ἔπισχόμενοι... ἐξέπευν, ‘he held his breath and drank it to the last drop.’ Stallbaum shows that πίνειν ἔπισχόμενοι was a standing phrase. Cp. e.g. Stesichorus fr. 7 Σκύφιον δὲ λαβὼν δέπας ἐμετρον ὡς τριλάγυνον | πτ' ἔπισχόμενοι κτλ. The rendering ‘putting it to his lips’, though grammatically possible, does not seem strong enough for this and other passages where the phrase occurs, so I prefer K. F. Hermann’s interpretation. The sense assigned to ἔπισχομενος is not unlike that which it has in Symp. 216 a 7 ἔπισχόμενος τὰ ὀτα.

καὶ μᾶλα εὐχερῶς, ‘without the very least disgust’. As δυσχερῆς means ‘fastidious’ and δυσχεραίεων fastidire, the meaning is that he drank the poison as if it was quite a pleasant drink.

c 5 ἐπιεικῶς, ‘fairly’, ‘pretty well’.

c 7 ἀστακτί: not in single drops, but in a flood. Cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1251 ἀστακτὶ λείβων δάκρυν, 1646 ἀστακτὶ... στένοντες. W has ἀσταλακτί, which would mean the same thing, and also preserves an ancient variant ἀβαστακτί, which would mean ‘unbearably’.

c 8 ἀπέκλαυν ἐμαντών, ‘I covered my face and wept for my loss.’

c 9 οὖν ἀνδρὸς κτλ., ‘to think what a friend I was bereft of.’ This is another ‘dependent exclamation’. Cp. 58 e 4 n.

d 5 κατέκλασε, which Stephanus conjectured for κατέκλασεν, is actually the reading of T. Cp. Homer, Od. iv. 481 κατεκλάσθη φιλον ήτορ, Plut. Timoleon 7 τὸ δὲ Τιμολέοντος... πάθος... κατέκλασε καὶ συνετριψεν αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν.

e 1 ἐν εὐφημίᾳ: cp. 60 a 3 n.

a 2 πάγνυτο: cp. 77 b 4 n.

καὶ αὐτὸς ἦπτετο, ‘the man himself’ (not Socrates). It is im-
plied that the others had touched Socrates by the executioner’s directions.

a 5 τὸ ἦτρον: ὁ μεταξὺ δύμαλοῦ τε καὶ αἰδοῖον τόπος Τημαευς, ἦτρον... 'Αττικῶς· ἱππογάστριον Ἑλληνικῶς Μοερίς.

a 7 τῷ 'Ἀσκληπιῷ ὄφελομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: for the offering of a cock to Asklepios cp. Herondas iv. 11 ἤλεφ δεύτε | τοῦ ἀλέκτροσ τοῦθ' ὄντων οἰκήσ τοίχων | κήρυκα θύω, τάπιδρτα δέξιοι. Socrates hopes to awake cured like those who are healed by ἐγκοίμησις (incubatio) in the Asklepieion at Epidaurus.

a 16 ἡμεῖς, 'we,' his disciples.

τῶν τότε, 'of the men of his time.' The phrase is regular in such appreciations. Stallbaum compares Hdt. i. 23 Ἀρίωνα... καθαρφθὸν τῶν τότε εἴναις οὐδὲν δεύτερον, Xen. An. ii. 20 κήρυκα ἄριστον τῶν τότε. Cp. Plato, Epist. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσθύτερον Σωκράτη, ὅν ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν αἰσχυνομην εἰπὼν δικαιότατον εἰςαὶ τῶν τότε.

a 17 καὶ ἄλλως, 'and in general.' The calm of the closing sentence is characteristically Attic. We find the same thing in tragedy and in the Orators.
APPENDIX I

DEATH BY HEMLOCK

It is expressly stated by Xenophon (Hell. ii. 3. 56) that Theramenes was put to death by a draught of κόνειον, and Plutarch says the same of Phocion (Phoc. 36). As described in the Phaedo, the drug acts by producing a gradual refrigeration proceeding from the feet upwards to the heart. Death ensues when the heart is affected, and is accompanied by a spasm or convulsion (ἐκκυνθή, 118 a 12). The same symptoms are implied in the passage of Aristophanes (Frogs 123) quoted in the note on 118 a 1, where κόνειον is mentioned by name, and where we are told that it was pounded, as the drug referred to in the Phaedo also was (117 a 6). Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxv. 95) speaks of the vis refrigeratoria of the cicuta, and says that the juice was prepared from pounded seeds. It is to be noted further that wine was used as an antidote in cases of such poisoning. Pliny tells us this of cicuta (Hist. Nat. xiv. 7), and Plato himself implies the same of κόνειον in the Lysis. This agrees very well with the warning given to Socrates by the expert not to talk too much (Phaed. 63 d 5 sqq.). He explains that this will impede the action of the drug by heating him. Wine would act in the same way. There can be no doubt, then, that Socrates was poisoned by κόνειον, or that κόνειον is cicuta. That cicuta is ‘hemlock’ is shown by the use of the word in the Romance languages (Fr. cigué).

In the face of all this, it is disturbing to be told, as we are by some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different symptoms. I cannot pronounce an opinion on that; but I have submitted the case to an eminent pharmacologist, my colleague Professor C. R. Marshall, who says that ‘as evidence against the view that Socrates died of conium poisoning I do not think the statements’ (of the authorities referred to) ‘worthy of serious consideration. Personally I am decidedly of opinion that his death

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1 Lys. 219 ε 2 οίον εἰς ἀσθάνατον αὐτὸν (τῶν ὕδων) κόνειον πεπωκότα, ἀρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦτ᾽ ἵνα ὁίον, εἶπερ τοῦτο ἡγοεῖτο τῶν ὕδων σώσειν;
APPENDIX II

was due to conium. It is difficult to be absolutely positive on the point, as conium is somewhat peculiar in its action, and the symptoms produced vary with the dose and probably with the individual. From this it appears that there is certainly no scientific ground for rejecting the philological evidence.

APPENDIX II

Γλαύκου τέχνη

The correct text of the scholium in Ven. T is as follows:

παροιμία ἦτοι ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥᾴδιως κατεργαζόμενων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνω ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως εὐργασμένων. Ἡσιάσσας γάρ τις κατασκεύασε χαλκοῦς τέταρας δίσκους οὕτως, ὄστε τὰς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ἵσας ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμύλιον δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, διπλάσιον δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου, κρονομένους δὲ τούτους ἐπιστελείν συμφωνίαν τινά. καὶ λέγεται Γλαύκου ἱδόντα τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθόγγους πρώτον ἐγχειρῆσαι δι’ αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτα τῆς πραγματείας ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. μέμηνται δὲ τούτων Ἀριστόξενου περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀκρόασεως, καὶ Νικοκλῆς ἐν τῷ περὶ θεωρίας. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρα τέχνη γραμμάτων, ἣν ἀνατίθεασε Γλαύκῳ Σαμίῳ, ἢφ’ ἦσ ἵσας καὶ ἡ παροιμία διεδίδηθη. οὕτως δὲ καὶ σιδήρου κόλλησιν εὕρεν, ὡς φησιν Ἡρόδοτος.

This comes from the paroemiographer Lucillus Tarrhaeus (cp. L. Cohn, Quellen der Platoscholien, pp. 836 sqq.), and the reference to Aristoxenus takes us back to the time when there was a living Pythagorean tradition. Eusebius, c. Marc. 15 D (quoted by Heindorf), is fuller, and mentions some other versions. One says that Glaucus was drowned at sea (just like Hippasus!) before his invention was spread abroad; another agrees with the story in the scholium; a third refers to Glaucus of Samos and the άνάθημα at Delphi. The fourth is as follows: ἐτερος δὲ Γλαύκου αὐτῶν ἀναθείναι τρίποδα χαλκοῦν δημιουργήσαντα τοῖς παχέως τε (τοῖς παχέσιν δότε;) κρονομένου τοὺς τε πόδας ἐφ’ ὄν βέβηκε καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στέφανην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς ράβδους διὰ μέσον τεταγμένας φθέγγεσθαι λύρας φωνῆς. If this is genuine tradition, as it appears to be, it is not without significance that Socrates should allude to a distinctively Pythagorean invention.
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